Gauhati High Court
Bishnu Rabha vs The Union Of India And 3 Ors on 20 January, 2020
Bench: Ajai Lamba, Achintya Malla Bujor Barua
Page No.# 1/6
GAHC010316642019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C) 185/2020
1:BISHNU RABHA
S/O- LT. DHANIRAM RABHA, R/O- VILL. BHOGDABARI, P.O. AND P.S.
BOKO, DIST.- KAMRUP(M), ASSAM, PIN- 781123.
VERSUS
1:THE UNION OF INDIA AND 3 ORS
REP. BY THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, DEPTT. OF POST, NEW DELHI-
110001.
2:THE CHIEF POST MASTER GENERAL
ASSAM CIRCLE
GUWAHATI- 781001.
3:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POSTAL SERVICES
GUWAHATI- 781001.
4:THE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POST OFFICES
GUWAHATI DIVISION
GUWAHATI- 781001
Counsel for petitioner : Mr. J Laskar
Counsel for respondents : Mr. SC Keyal,
Assistant Solicitor General of India Page No.# 2/6 BEFORE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AJAI LAMBA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA 20.01.2020 (Ajai Lamba, C.J.) Bishnu Rabha has preferred this writ petition in challenge to order dated 4.9.2019 rendered by Central Administrative Tribunal (for short 'the CAT'), Guwahati Bench in OA NO.040/00329/2017 titled "Bishnu Rabha vs. The Union of India through the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Post and three others". It appears that the applicant/petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 27.4.2015. The said order and subsequent orders passed in that context came to be challenged before the CAT in OA NO.040/00329/2017.
It has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that article of charges was served on the petitioner; enquiry was held; order of penalty was passed; the petitioner preferred departmental appeal. The penalty has been upheld.
It further appears that after the appeal was dismissed even review petition was filed, which was also dismissed.
2. It appears that the petitioner preferred one petition after another in the same context, however, in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we need not refer to the chequered history of repeated litigations brought to various forums.
Suffice it to say that essentially the charges framed against the petitioner appeared to be in relation to his service period from 13.2.2006 to 11.2.2010 as Sub-Post Master, Hahim Bazar, Boko. Accusation against the petitioner is to the effect that he withdrew money without knowledge of the depositors from SB Account Nos.152224 and 152370 at Samuka BO.
The further accusation against the petitioner is to the effect that during the same period he fraudulently withdrew money from three SB Account Nos.152237, 152089 and 152423.
Further accusation is that during the same period, the petitioner withdrew money from SB Account Nos.151113 and 152222. The withdrawals were made on various dates from accounts of various persons.
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3. On the framing of article of charges and statement of imputation, the same was served on the petitioner. The petitioner being confronted with the article of charges responded by the written communication dated 17.11.2014, apparently signed on 18.11.2014. In the said response, the petitioner has admitted his omission specifically.
We have gone through the said document which has been placed on record as Annexure-3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also been confronted with the same document and the contents thereof. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to dispute that indeed the petitioner accepted the wrong doings in regard to withdrawal of money from the accounts.
We have taken into account the fact that the petitioner has termed such withdrawal as omissions and errors, which plea cannot be accepted.
4. Be that as it may, this Court is not required to sit in appeal over the decision rendered by the administrative authorities. The scope of judicial review of an administrative action has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos. 7319-7320 of 2019 in the case of Municipal Council, Neemuch -vs- Mahadeo Real Estate and Ors . The following has been held.
"14. xxxxxxx However, before doing that, we propose to examine the scope of the powers of the High Court of Judicial review of an administrative action. Though, there are a catena of judgments of this Court on the said issue, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 lays down the basic principles which still hold the field. Paragraph 77 of the said Judgment reads thus:
"77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?
2. committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy Page No.# 4/6 or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:
(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R.v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696 Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, 'consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention'"
15. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of an administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court comes to a conclusion, that the decision maker has not understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when it is found that the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the principle of "Wednesbury Unreasonableness" or unless it is found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the decision- making process, it would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the decision making process. It is also equally well settled, that it is not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can examine only the correctness of the decision making process.
16. This Court recently in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim reported in 2019 SCC On Line SC 902 had again an occasion to consider the scope of interference under Article 226 in an administrative action.
"31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an Page No.# 5/6 error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.
32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, the same may be regarded as perverse.
33. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect."
17. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law, i.e., when the error is apparent on the face of the record and is self evident. The High Court would be empowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the decision impugned is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that the test is not what the court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken. Not only this but such a decision must have led to manifest injustice."
(Emphasised by us)
5. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case within the scope of judicial review, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has been given due opportunity of hearing in conformity with the service rules and regulations. Learned counsel for the Page No.# 6/6 petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any prejudice that might have been caused to the rights of the petitioner by infraction of procedure.
6. Considering the seriousness of the charges; the fact that the petitioner was confronted with the article of charges and was given due opportunity of hearing to respond thereto; the petitioner admitted the misconduct through written communication dated 17/18.11.2014 (supra); that the petitioner exercised his statutory rights to appeal and review, which however were dismissed, we find no reason to interfere. The impugned orders have been passed while taking into account relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The rules of procedure were followed and principles of natural justice were adhered.
The impugned order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal cannot be faulted and does not call for interference.
7. This petition is dismissed.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
20.01.2020
Comparing Assistant