Kerala High Court
M.C.Sathy vs K.Venugopalan on 5 February, 2020
Author: Anil K.Narendran
Bench: Anil K.Narendran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
WEDNESDAY, THE 05TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2020 / 16TH MAGHA,
1941
MACA.No.2469 OF 2010
AGAINST THE AWARD IN OP(MV) 757/2006 OF MOTOR ACCIDENT
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL ,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
1 M.C.SATHY, W/O.LATE DINESAN,
PONNAMTHARA HOUSE,, VACHAKKAL,
EDAVANAKKAD P.O.,ERNAKULAM DT.
2 AADIS D.SEKHARAN A MINOR AGED 9 YEARS
S/O.LATE DINESAN, REP.BY HIS MOTHER AND
NEXT FRIEND M.C.SATHY, PONNAMTHARA HOUSE,,
EDAVANAKKAD P.O.
3 SMT.GOWRI WO.LATE SEKHARAN
AGED 64 YEARS, AATHIRA PUVATHUKATTIL HOUSE,,
EDAVANAKAD P.O., ERNAKULAM.
BY ADV. SRI.K.V.RAJAN
RESPONDENT/S:
1 K.VENUGOPALAN, 23/119 KAUSTHUBHAM,
CHANGAMPUZHA NAGAR,, KOCHI- 682023.
2 M.V.KRISHNAN SO. CHATHU SREENIVAS
HOUSE, BEHIND MODERN BREAD COMPANY,,
EDAPPALLY, KOCHI-682024.
3 CHOLAMANDALAM MS GENERAL INSURANCE
CHITTOOR ROAD, ERNAKULAM,
KOCHI 682011
MACA No.2469 of 2010 -2-
4 NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO LTD
KALAMASSERY BRANCH,
ERNAKULAM - 682104
R1 BY ADV. SRI.VINCENT RAPHAEL
R3 BY ADV. SRI.MATHEWS JACOB SR.
R3 BY ADV. SRI.P.JACOB MATHEW
OTHER PRESENT:
R3 - SRI. P.JACOB MATHEW
THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 05.02.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
MACA No.2469 of 2010 -3-
"CR"
JUDGMENT
The appellants are the claimants in O.P.(MV)No.757 of 2006 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation on account of the death of one Dinesan, husband of the 1st appellant, father of the 2 nd appellant and son of the 3rd appellant, in a motor accident which occurred on 29.9.2005, while he was riding a motorcycle bearing registration No.KL-7/V-1939. At the place of accident, a scooter bearing registration No.KL-7/AD-141, owned by the 1 st respondent, ridden by the 2nd respondent and insured with the 3rd respondent, hit the motorcycle. In the accident, he sustained fatal injuries, who succumbed to the injuries on 10.10.2005, while undergoing in- patient treatment. Alleging that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the scooter by the 2 nd respondent rider, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal, claiming a total compensation of Rs.16,00,000/- under various heads.
2. Before the Tribunal, respondents 1 and 2 remained absent and they were set ex parte. The 3 rd respondent insurer filed written statement admitting the policy coverage of the scooter MACA No.2469 of 2010 -4- involved in the accident; however, denying negligence alleged against the 2nd respondent rider of the scooter. The insurer contended that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by the deceased, who applied sudden brake and thus hit against the scooter. Therefore, there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. The insurer contended further that the compensation claimed is highly excessive.
3. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A13 were marked on the side of the claimants. The 1 st appellant was examined as PW1 and an occurrence witness was examined as PW2. Exts.B1 and B2 were marked on the side of the respondents.
4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the scooter by the 2 nd respondent and also on account of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, who was riding the motorcycle without holding a valid and effective driving licence. The Tribunal fixed negligence between the 2nd respondent and the deceased in the ratio of 60:40. Under various heads, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.10,24,480/-. After deducting 40% of the said amount, i.e., MACA No.2469 of 2010 -5- Rs.4,09,792/- towards contributory negligence, the claimants were awarded a sum of Rs.6,14,688/-. Deducting Rs.50,000/- towards interim award, they were found entitled for a sum of Rs.5,64,688/- together with interest at the rate 8% per annum from the date of petition, i.e., from 16.01.2006, till realisation, with proportionate cost, and directed the 3rd respondent insurer to satisfy the award. The amount of compensation was ordered to be apportioned among the claimants in the ratio 50:40:10.
5. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads and also challenging the finding of the Tribunal on the question of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, the appellants/claimants are before this Court in this appeal.
6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/claimants and also the learned Senior Counsel for the 3rd respondent insurer.
7. The issues that arise for consideration in this appeal are as to whether the finding of the Tribunal on the question of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased can be sustained in law; and whether the appellants are entitled for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads.
MACA No.2469 of 2010 -6-
8. Ext.A4 is the charge sheet in Crime No.3796/2005 of Aroor Police station, registered in connection with the motor accident in question, in which the 2 nd respondent rider of the scooter was charge sheeted by the police alleging offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The deceased was serving as Head Constable in the Kerala Police Service and his wife, who was examined as PW1, is serving as Sub Inspector of Police. In Ext.A4 charge sheet it is stated that the deceased, who was the owner of the motorcycle, was riding the same without holding a valid driving licence. The Tribunal noticed that PW1 has not disputed the statement to that effect in Ext.A4 charge sheet. In the impugned award, the Tribunal held that, when the allegation is regarding contributory negligence, the fact that the deceased was riding the motorcycle without a valid driving licence will get a predominant position.
9. The document marked as Ext.A5 is the scene mahazar, as per which, the place of occurrence is 152cms towards west from the eastern end of the tarred portion of the road. The width of the tarred portion of the road is 9.18m and both the vehicles were proceeding in the same direction, i.e., from north to south. Ext.A6 is the AMVI report of Vespa scooter bearing registration No.KL- MACA No.2469 of 2010 -7- 7/AD-141 and Ext.A7 is the AMVI report of Hero Honda motorcycle bearing registration No.KL-7/V-1939. Ext.B1 is the mahazar of the motorcycle and Ext.B2 is the mahazar of the scooter. In order to prove the occurrence, an autorickshaw driver was examined as PW2.
10. As per Ext.B1 vehicle mahazar, the front mudguard of the motorcycle was dented on either side. As per Ext.B2 vehicle mahazar, the front body of the scooter, on the right side, was broken and dented. In Ext.A6 AMVI report, the damage caused to the scooter is noted as a small dent on the bottom of the leg shield, on the right side. As per Ext.A7 AMVI report, the front shield of the motorcycle, on the left side, was dented. No damage was caused to the rear side of the motorcycle ridden by the deceased and the only damage caused to that vehicle is on its front mudguard.
11. In the impugned award, the Tribunal held that the damage caused to both the vehicles is a clear pointer to the fact that, in the accident, the front portion of the motorcycle ridden by the deceased hit on the front leg shield of the scooter, at its right side. The evidence of PW2 cannot outweigh the telling evidence as to the damage caused to both the vehicles. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the deceased had contributed to the cause of the MACA No.2469 of 2010 -8- accident, to the extent of 40%, and it is justified in rendering such a finding since the deceased was holding no driving licence to ride a two-wheeler.
12. In Sudhir Kumar Rana v. Surinder Singh [(2008) 12 SCC 436] the Apex Court held that 'contributory negligence' may be defined as negligence in not avoiding the consequences arising from the negligence of some other person, when means and opportunity are afforded to do so. The question of contributory negligence would arise only when both parties are found to be negligent. If a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence. The same, by itself, may not lead to a finding of negligence as regards the accident. It has been held by the courts below that it was the driver of the mini truck which was being driven rashly and negligently. It is one thing to say that the appellant [rider of the two wheeler] was not possessing any licence but no finding of fact has been arrived at that, he was riding the two-wheeler rashly and negligently. If he was not driving rashly and negligently which contributed to the accident, only because he was not having a licence, he would not be held to be guilty of contributory negligence. The matter might have been different if, by reason of his rash and negligent driving, the accident had taken MACA No.2469 of 2010 -9- place.
13. In Dinesh Kumar. J. @ Dinesh J. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2018) 1 SCC 750] it was contended on behalf of the appellant [injured rider], before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, that both the Tribunal and the High Court were manifestly in error in holding the appellant to be guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 40%. It was contended that the Tribunal, as well as the High Court, proceeded on the erroneous premise that since the appellant had failed to produce the driving licence, an adverse inference on the aspect of contributory negligence would have to be drawn. The Apex Court noticed that both the Tribunal and in appeal the High Court, have found fault with the appellant for not having produced his driving licence. The Tribunal noted that the appellant had admitted in the course of his cross-examination that the road where the accident took place was a two-way road and that, on each side, three vehicles could pass at a time. A suggestion was put to the appellant that while trying to overtake another vehicle, he had approached the offending lorry from the right side, as a result of which the accident took place. The appellant denied the suggestion. The award of the Tribunal indicates that absolutely no evidence was MACA No.2469 of 2010 -10- produced by the insurer to support the plea that there was contributory negligence on the part of the appellant. The Division Bench has placed a considerable degree of importance on the fact that there was no visible damage to the lorry but that it was the motorcycle that had suffered damage and that there was no eye- witness. The Apex Court agreed with the submission, which has been urged on behalf of the appellant, that plea of contributory negligence was accepted purely on the basis of conjecture and without any evidence. The Apex Court held that, once the finding that there was contributory negligence on the part of the appellant is held to be without any basis, the second aspect which weighed both with the Tribunal and the High Court, that the appellant had not produced the driving licence, would be of no relevance. Relying on the law laid down in Sudhir Kumar Rana [(2008) 12 SCC 436] the Apex Court held that the deduction of 40% which was made on the ground of contributory negligence was without any basis.
14. In Satheeshan E.K. v. Mustafa K.P., and another [2018 (4) KLT 337], relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sudhir Kumar Rane v. Surinder Singh [(2008) 12 SCC 436] this Court held that, if a person drives a vehicle without MACA No.2469 of 2010 -11- licence, he commits an offence. The same, by itself, may not lead to a finding of negligence as regards the accident. If the driver without licence was not driving rashly and negligently, which contributed to the accident, the mere fact that he was not having a driving licence; he cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence.
15. The question of 'contributory negligence', i.e., negligence in not avoiding the consequences arising from the negligence of some other person, when means and opportunity are afforded to do so, would arise only when both parties, i.e., the deceased who was riding the motorcycle and the 2nd respondent who was riding the scooter, are found to be negligent. By riding the motorcycle without holding an effective driving licence, in contravention of Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the deceased committed an offence punishable under Section 181 of the said Act, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. [ with fine of five thousand rupees, with effect from 01.09.2019 - substituted by Section 63 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 ] If the deceased was not riding the motorcycle rashly and negligently, which had contributed to the accident, only because he was not holding an effective driving licence, he would not be held to be guilty of MACA No.2469 of 2010 -12- contributory negligence.
16. In Meera Devi v. H.P. Road Transport Corporation [(2014) 4 SCC 511] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated that to prove contributory negligence, there must be cogent evidence.
17. A reading of the impugned award would indicate that there was absolutely no evidence before the Tribunal to support the plea of the insurer that there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, who was riding the motorcycle. On the side of the insurer, Ext.B1 mahazar of the motorcycle and Ext.B2 mahazar of the scooter were marked. As per Ext.B1 vehicle mahazar, the front mudguard of the motorcycle was dented on either side. As per Ext.B2 vehicle mahazar, the front body of the scooter, on the right side, was broken and dented. The Tribunal placed considerable emphasis on the damages caused to the motorcycle and the scooter, as shown in Exts.B1 and B2, and accepted the plea of contributory negligence raised by the insurer, on mere suspicion, conjectures and surmises, without any cogent evidence to prove any negligence on the part of the deceased in riding the motorcycle. In the absence of any cogent evidence, the Tribunal committed manifest error in coming to the conclusion that the MACA No.2469 of 2010 -13- deceased is guilty of contributory negligence, to the extent of 40%. The finding to that effect in the impugned award is set aside and it is held that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent riding of the scooter by the 2 nd respondent, who was charge sheeted by the police in Ext.A4 charge sheet, alleging offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code. In the result, the appellants/claimants will be entitled for payment of a sum of Rs.4,09,792/-deducted by the Tribunal (based on the finding of 40% contributory negligence) together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of petition till realisation, with proportionate cost (as per the award).
18. Now the issue that remains to be considered is as to whether the appellants are entitled for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads.
19. In Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121] the Apex Court laid down the principles governing determination of quantum of compensation in the case of death in a motor accident. The Apex Court held that the compensation awarded does not become 'just compensation' merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and MACA No.2469 of 2010 -14- equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by following the well settled steps, namely, ascertaining the multiplicand (annual contribution to the family), the multiplier and calculation of loss of dependency by multiplying the multiplicand by such multiplier.
20. In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of 'just compensation' and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of 'just compensation' has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the MACA No.2469 of 2010 -15- legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the Tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to be guided by the expression, i.e., just compensation.
21. In the instant case, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads reads thus;
Heads of claim Amount claimed Amount awarded
(in Rs.) (in Rs.)
Loss of 14,84,336/- 9,09,480/-
dependency (1,04,940 x 2/3 x 13)
Loss of consortium 25,000/- 10,000/-
(her date of birth is
25.5.63)
Loss of estate 50,000/- 5,000/-
Loss of love and 25,000/- 15,000/-
affection (mother and minor son
is also there)
Pain and suffering 15,000/- 10,000/-
Medical expenses 70,000/- 70,000/-
Funeral expenses 5,000/- 5,000/-
16,74,336/- 10,24,480/-
less Rs.4,09,792/-
towards 40%
contributory negligence
= Rs.6,14,688/-
22. The accident occurred on 29.09.2005. At the time of
accident, the deceased was aged 45 years. It was claimed that, at the time of accident, the deceased was earning a monthly income MACA No.2469 of 2010 -16- of Rs.9,670/- as Head Constable in City Traffic Police Station, Kochi City. The document marked as Ext.A8 is a certificate dated 13.01.2006 issued by the Sub Inspector of Police, City Traffic Police Station, certifying the last pay and allowances drawn by the deceased, as follows; Basic Pay - Rs.5,500/-; Dearness Allowance - Rs.3,245/-; Other Allowances - Rs.925/-. The gross salary of the deceased was Rs.9,670/-. The Tribunal took the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.8,745/-, excluding a sum of Rs.925/- towards other allowances.
23. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava [(2008) 2 SCC 763] the contention raised before the Apex Court by the appellant insurer was that, for the purpose of computation of the amount of compensation what was material is the basic pay and not other allowances. Per contra, the respondents/claimants contended that, apart from the basic salary, contributions made by the employee should also be taken into consideration for calculation of the amount of compensation, inter alia, on the premise that the same would have become payable to him at a future date as, for example, voluntary retirement, superannuation, etc. which would be beneficial to the entire family. It was pointed out that the contributions towards Provident Fund, Life Insurance Corporation, MACA No.2469 of 2010 -17- Gratuity, etc. are includable in the definition of income. The Apex Court held that the term 'income' has different connotations for different purposes. A Court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks that are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on the death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act uses the word 'just compensation' which, should be assigned a broad meaning. If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The basis for considering the entire pay packet is what the dependants have lost due to the death of the deceased. It is in the nature of compensation for future loss towards the family income. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by MACA No.2469 of 2010 -18- way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished from the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted.
24. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was a permanent employee in Government Service, who was working as Head Constable in City Traffic Police Station, Kochi City. As per Ext.A8 certificate, the deceased was getting Rs.925/- per month under the head other allowances, in addition to basic pay and dearness allowance. It is not discernible from Ext.A8 as to whether those allowances were by way of perks, which were beneficial to the members of his family, that would have been added to his monthly income, by way of contribution to the family, which were not perks for the benefit of the deceased. In the absence of any materials to prove the said aspect, the Tribunal rightly excluded 'other allowances' while computing the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of assessing compensation under various heads.
25. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the determination of 'just compensation' has to be on the foundation of evidence brought on record as regards the age and income of the deceased and MACA No.2469 of 2010 -19- thereafter the apposite multiplier to be applied. The formula relating to multiplier has been clearly stated in Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121] and it has been approved in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 65]. The age and income, as stated earlier, have to be established by adducing evidence. The Tribunal and the Courts have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of approach. There has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum. In such an adjudication, the duty of the Tribunal and the Courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour has been made by this Court for standardization which in its ambit includes addition of future prospects on the proven income at present. As far as future prospects are concerned, there has been standardization keeping in view the principle of certainty, stability and consistency. In Pranay Sethi the Apex Court approved the principle of 'standardisation' so that a specific and certain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on the basis of age.
MACA No.2469 of 2010 -20-
26. In Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, in case of self- employed persons also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. In Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma [(2015) 6 SCC 347] another Three-Judge Bench followed the principle stated in Rajesh. In Pranay Sethi, after expressing the opinion that the dicta laid down in Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and not the decision in Rajesh, the Constitution Bench observed that, in Munna Lal Jain, the Three-Judge Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari which has concurred with the view expressed in Sarla Devi or in case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a Larger Bench.
27. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] the Constitution Bench held that, while determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between MACA No.2469 of 2010 -21- 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. The Apex Court held further that, in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.
28. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 45 years. At the time of accident, the deceased was earning monthly income as Head Constable in Kerala Police. In the impugned award, the Tribunal did not add anything to the monthly income of the deceased towards future prospects.
29. At the time of accident, the deceased had a permanent job. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, an addition of 30% of the monthly income of the deceased can be made towards future prospects, since the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years.
MACA No.2469 of 2010 -22-
30. Therefore, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, 30% of the monthly income of the deceased fixed by the Tribunal as Rs.8,745/-, i.e., a sum of Rs.2,623/- (8,745 x 30/100) has to be added towards future prospects. The income tax component for the annual income of the deceased comes to Rs.1,640/- for the assessment year 2006-07 (FY - 2005-06). In the result, the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, is reckoned as Rs.9,728/- [(8,745 + 2,623) - 1,640].
31. In Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121], the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions in Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176], U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362] and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie [(2005) 10 SCC 720] held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table in paragraph 40 of the said decision [prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie], which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 [for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years], reduced by one unit for every five years, i.e., multiplier MACA No.2469 of 2010 -23- of 17 for 26 to 30 years, multiplier of 16 for 31 to 35 years, multiplier of 15 for 36 to 40 years, multiplier of 14 for 41 to 45 years, and multiplier of 13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, i.e., multiplier of 11 for 51 to 55 years, multiplier of 9 for 56 to 60 years, multiplier of 7 for 61 to 65 years and multiplier of 5 for 66 to 70 years.
32. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, as far as the multiplier is concerned, the Claims Tribunal and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds a place in paragraph 19 of Sarla Verma, read with paragraph 42 of the said judgment.
33. In the instant case, as on the date of accident, the deceased was aged 45 years. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case and Pranay Sethi's case referred to supra, the multiplier of 13 applied by the Tribunal is not correct and the proper multiplier to be applied is 14.
34. In Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121] the Apex Court, on the question of deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased held that, the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to MACA No.2469 of 2010 -24- the dependants. Where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be one-third where the number of dependant family members is 2 to 3; one-fourth where the number of dependant family members is 4 to 6; and one-fifth where the number of dependant family members exceeds 6. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependant on the father. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on MACA No.2469 of 2010 -25- the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two- third.
35. In Reshma Kumari [(2013) 9 SCC 65] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reproduced paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of Sarla Verma and approved the same, in paragraph 38 of the decision, by stating that, the standards fixed in Sarla Verma provide guidance for the appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses. One must bear in mind that the proportion of a man's net earnings that he saves or spends exclusively for the maintenance of others does not form part of his living expenses but what he spends exclusively on himself does. The percentage of deduction on account of personal and living expenses may vary with reference to the number of dependant members in the family and the personal living expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond to the number of dependants. Therefore, the standards fixed in Sarla Verma on the aspect of deduction for personal living expenses in paras 30, 31 and 32 must ordinarily be followed unless a case for departure in the circumstances noted in the preceding MACA No.2469 of 2010 -26- paragraph is made out. In paragraph 43.6 the Apex Court directed that, insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in Sarla Verma, subject to the observations made in para 38 of Reshma Kumari.
36. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, after considering the analysis made in Sarla Verma, which was reconsidered in Reshma Kumari, approved the method provided therein by stating that, as far as the guidance provided for appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals and Courts should be guided by the conclusion in paragraph 43.6 of Reshma Kumari.
37. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 45 years with a family consisting of 2 dependants. The 1 st appellant, the wife of the deceased, who is employed as Sub Inspector of Police, cannot be treated as a dependant family member of the deceased. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari and Pranay Sethi referred to supra, the Tribunal rightly deducted 1/3rd of the monthly income of the deceased towards his personal and living MACA No.2469 of 2010 -27- expenses.
38. Towards loss of dependency, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.9,09,480/- (1,04,940 x 13 x 2/3). The Tribunal took the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.8,745/-. Adding 30% of the monthly income towards future prospects and deducting income tax component [(8,745 + 2,623) - 1,640 = 9,728); deducting 1/3rd towards personal and living expenses of the deceased; and applying the multiplier of 14, the compensation under the head loss of dependency is re-fixed as Rs.10,89,536/- (9,728 x 12 x 14 x 2/3), resulting in an additional compensation of Rs.1,80,056/- (10,89,536 - 9,09,480).
39. In the impugned award, towards funeral expenses, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.5,000/-. Towards loss of consortium the 1st appellant is awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/-. Towards loss of love and affection the appellants are awarded a sum of Rs.15,000/-. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.5,000/- under the head loss of estate.
40. In Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. MACA No.2469 of 2010 -28-
41. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the head relating to loss of care and guidance for minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh refers to Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited [(2012) 6 SCC 421], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the Tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, the reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. MACA No.2469 of 2010 -29- But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have been quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years, which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.
42. In Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh [(2018) 9 SCC 146] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted compensation on conventional heads, in terms of the figures standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, to the wife and children of one Puran Chand, who died in a motor accident, which occurred on 30.12.1992.
43. In Sureshchandra Bagmal Doshi v. New India Assurance Company Limited [(2018) 15 SCC 649] the Apex Court granted the figures on conventional heads standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, i.e., Rs.15,000/- as loss of estate; Rs.40,000/- towards loss of consortium; and Rs.15,000/- as funeral expenses to the parents [appellants before the Apex Court], who lost their only daughter in a motor accident which occurred on 16.08.1998. In the said decision, Rs.40,000/- granted in Pranay Sethi towards loss of MACA No.2469 of 2010 -30- consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the parents of the deceased, towards loss of love and affection. Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus;
"1. Fate can be cruel. This is a tragic case where the only daughter of a lawyer husband and a doctor wife, who got married early and unfortunately became a widow also at a young age, died in a vehicular accident, which took place on 16.8.1998. The claim of the parents (appellants herein) in respect of this unfortunate demise forms the subject matter of the present appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
14. Now coming to the last aspect, i.e., the conventional heads, in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], it has been standardised at Rs.15,000 for loss of estate; Rs.40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs.15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs.70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 percent in the span of every three years. However, we are still within the window of three years." "underline supplied"
44. In Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram [(2018) 18 SCC 130], after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the Apex Court held that in legal parlance, 'consortium' is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', 'parental consortium' and 'filial consortium'. MACA No.2469 of 2010 -31- The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of 'company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation'. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training'. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.
45. In Magma General Insurance the Apex Court held that consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium MACA No.2469 of 2010 -32- far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions, therefore, permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In a case where parents have lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court held further that, the amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under 'loss of consortium' as laid down in Pranay Sethi.
46. In Magma General Insurance, the deceased was aged 24 years, who was engaged in the business of manufacturing 'namkeen products', who died in a motor accident which occurred on 01.12.2013. The father, brother and sister of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The MACA No.2469 of 2010 -33- Claims Tribunal did not award any compensation to the brother of the deceased, as he could not be considered to be a dependant. Compensation was awarded to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, who were held to be dependants. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court found that the Claims Tribunal used the wrong principle for application of multiplier. The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased and not that of his father. The High Court, while re-assessing the compensation granted a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs.50,000/- x 2) towards loss of love and affection to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased. The insurer filed S.L.P. before the Apex Court contending, inter alia, that the father and sister of the deceased could not be considered as dependants, and were not entitled to compensation. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs.1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses is erroneous. It was contended that only Rs.30,000/- could have been awarded as per the judgment in Pranay Sethi. [i.e., loss of estate - Rs.15,000/- MACA No.2469 of 2010 -34- and funeral expenses - Rs.15,000/-] The Apex Court held that, considering that the deceased was living in a village, where he was residing with his aged father, who was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister, the High Court correctly considered them to be dependants of the deceased, and made a deduction of 1/3 rd towards personal expenses of the deceased. [Para.16 @ page 135 of SCC] The Apex Court found that the deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had pre-deceased him. The father of the deceased was about 65 years old and his sister was unmarried. The deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the father and unmarried sister of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under his dependants. [Para.18 @ page 136 of SCC] Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para.52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi, decreased the compensation under the head funeral expenses from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-. However, the amount awarded under the head loss of love and affection was maintained. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and MACA No.2469 of 2010 -35- filial consortium, the Apex Court deem it appropriate to award the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium.
47. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, which was followed in Santhosh Devi and Suresh Chandra Bagmaldoshi referred to supra, the compensation payable under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, 40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years.
48. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the surviving spouse is entitled for spousal consortium; children of the deceased are entitled for parental consortium; and parents of a deceased child, who died in a motor accident, are entitled for filial consortium. The amount of compensation that has to be awarded will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under the head loss of consortium, as laid down in Pranay Sethi.
MACA No.2469 of 2010 -36-
49. In Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72] one of the contentions raised was that, any direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the reasons, if any, given for exercising such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by that Court under Article 141. It was also pointed out that, other Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. The Apex Court left open that question, observing as follows; "Though there appears to be some merit in the first respondent's submission, we do not propose to examine that aspect." Though the said question was left open, the Apex Court observed as follows in Para.26 of the judgment;
"26. ....... Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article
142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/ relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article MACA No.2469 of 2010 -37-
142. When the High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/ relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The Courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. ......"
50. In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih [(2014) 8 SCC 883] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the view taken in ABS Marine Products' case (supra) holding that, the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are directions issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held further that, the directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. Paras.11 to 13 of the judgment read thus;
"11. Article 136 of the Constitution of India was legislatively intended to be exercised by the Highest Court of the Land, MACA No.2469 of 2010 -38- with scrupulous adherence to the settled judicial principle well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Article 136 of the Constitution is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and make the law operational to make it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague. In short, it declares the law, as under Article 141 of the Constitution.
12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law. The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. 'Declaration of Law' as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution: is the speech express or necessarily implied by the Highest Court of the land. This Court in the case of Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72], Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381] and in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667], has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the MACA No.2469 of 2010 -39- judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case.
13. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions of the Court based on different scales of Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be best weighed on the same grounds of reasoning and thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no conflict in the views expressed in the first two judgments and the latter judgment."
51. In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., the Apex Court maintained the compensation awarded by the High Court at the rate of Rs.50,000/- to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased towards loss of love and affection. However, the compensation under the head funeral expenses was decreased from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, after quoting para 52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex MACA No.2469 of 2010 -40- Court awarded the father and unmarried sister of the deceased an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium.
52. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of love and affection and such other matters. In such circumstances, once the surviving spouse is awarded compensation towards spousal consortium; or the children of the deceased are awarded compensation towards parental consortium; or the parents of the deceased child are awarded compensation towards filial consortium, they are not entitled for award of further compensation under the head loss love and affection, as it would result in duplication or overlapping of compensation under the relevant heads.
53. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. In Magma, after MACA No.2469 of 2010 -41- noticing the fact that the mother of the deceased had pre-deceased him, his father was aged 65 years old, his sister was unmarried, and the deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival, the Apex Court granted a sum of Rs.40,000/- as compensation to unmarried sister of the deceased under the head filial consortium, after maintaining the compensation (Rs.50,000/- x 2) awarded by the High Court towards loss of love and affection, which can only be treated as a direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the exercise of such power cannot be considered as law laid down by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
54. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. referred to supra, Rs.5,000/- awarded by the Tribunal in the impugned award towards funeral expenses is enhanced to Rs.15,000/-, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.10,000/- (15,000 - 5000); Rs.10,000/- awarded towards loss of consortium to the 1st appellant is enhanced to Rs.40,000/- and the same is granted under the head spousal consortium, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.30,000/- (40,000 - 10,000); Rs.15,000/- MACA No.2469 of 2010 -42- awarded towards love and affection is re-fixed as Rs.40,000/- each (40,000 x 2 = 80,000) payable to appellants 2 and 3, and the same is granted under the head parental consortium to the 2 nd appellants, who is the son of the deceased, and under the head filial consortium to the 3rd appellant, who is the mother of the deceased, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.65,000/- (80,000 - 15,000).
55. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.5,000/- towards loss of estate. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] an amount of Rs.15,000/- can be granted under the head loss of estate. Accordingly, the appellants are granted a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.10,000/- (15,000 - 5,000).
56. The Tribunal awarded Rs.10,000/- as compensation towards pain and suffering of the deceased.
57. In Jyni and others v. Raphel P.T. and others [2016 (2) KHC 870], a Division Bench of this Court held that death in an accident is generally the result of violent impact on the body resulting in serious injuries causing severe pain. The magnitude of the ordeal may vary from case to case depending upon the nature of injuries sustained. In cases of instantaneous deaths also pain MACA No.2469 of 2010 -43- and suffering is invariably present, as in the case of survival for hours or days. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some notional amount is payable under the head pain and suffering. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.15,000/- could be awarded under the head pain and suffering in such cases.
58. In the instant case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries after undergoing in-patient treatment for a period of 11 days. Considering the nature of injuries sustained, this Court deem it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards pain and suffering of the deceased, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.5,000/- (15,000 - 10,000).
59. The Tribunal awarded no compensation towards transportation expenses; extra nourishment; bystander expenses; and damage to clothing. The accident is of the year 2005. The deceased succumbed to the injuries after undergoing inpatient treatment for 11 days. Therefore, this Court deem it appropriate to grant an amount of Rs.2,000/- towards transportation; MACA No.2469 of 2010 -44- Rs.1,650/- (150 x 11) towards bystander's expenses; Rs.1,100/- (100 x 11) towards extra nourishment; and Rs.750/- towards damage to clothing.
60. Towards medical expenses, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.70,000/-. Ext.A13 medical bills are for a total sum of Rs.75,239.92. Therefore, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under this head is re-fixed as Rs.75,240/-, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.5,240/- (75,240 - 70,000).
61. In the result, the appellants/claimants will be entitled for an additional/balance compensation of Rs.7,20,588/- (Rupees seven lakhs twenty thousand five hundred and eighty eight only) [4,09,792 + 1,80,056 + 10,000 + 30,000 + 65,000 + 10,000 + 5,000 + 2,000 + 1,650 + 1,100 + 750 + 5,240] in this appeal, which will carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of petition till realisation, with proportionate cost for the balance compensation of Rs.4,09,792/- (as per the award). The additional/balance compensation granted in this appeal, excluding that granted to the 1st appellant as spousal consortium, that granted to the 2nd appellant under the head parental consortium and that granted to the 3rd appellant under the head filial consortium, shall be apportioned among the appellants in the ratio MACA No.2469 of 2010 -45- 60:20:20. The 3rd respondent insurer shall satisfy the additional/balance compensation granted in this appeal together with interest, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. The disbursement of additional/balance compensation to the appellants/claimants shall be made taking note of the law on the point and in terms of the directives issued by this Court in Circular No.3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No.D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019. The appellants shall provide their Bank account details (attested copy of the relevant page of the Bank Passbook having details of the Bank Account Number and IFSC Code of the branch) before the Tribunal, with copy to the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.
This appeal is disposed of as above. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
ANIL K.NARENDRAN JUDGE das