Bombay High Court
Sau. Archana Asthpal Chakranarayan vs The Divisional Commissioner, Amravati ... on 22 August, 2022
Author: Avinash G. Gharote
Bench: Avinash G. Gharote
1 77.WP.3287-2022.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 3287 OF 2022
( Sau. Archana Asthpal Chakranarayan
Vs.
The Divisional Commissioner, Amravati & Ors. )
Office Notes, Office Memoranda Court's or Judge's orders
of Coram, Appearances, Court's
orders or directions and
Registrar's orders
Mr. N.J. Patil, Advocate for the Petitioner/s.
Mr. N.R. Patil, AGP for the Respondent No.1/State.
Mr. K.S. Malokar, Advocate for the Respondent No.3.
Mr. S.S. Deshpande, Advocate for the Respondent No.4.
CORAM: AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.
DATED : 22nd AUGUST, 2022.
Heard.
2. The order dated 14.12.2021, passed by the learned Collector, Washim under Section 36 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, (for short "M.V.P. Act), has been challenged on the ground, that the disqualification of the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch on the ground that the meeting for the month of May 2021 was not held on account of the Village being effected by Covid-19 and the petitioner, not being conversant with an android mobile regarding the holding of a meeting online, were not found to be cause sufficient within the meaning of Section 36 of the M.V.P. Act. It is contended, that the fact that the Village Ladegaon was effected by Covid-19 in 2021, is not a 2 77.WP.3287-2022.odt disputed position, as the impugned order, itself records (page 14) that during the period from 16.04.2021 to 05.06.2021 there were 40 positive patients in the Village and in the Z.P. School at Ladegaon, 13 patients were in isolation in the month of May 2021. It is also contended, that the provisions of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were imposed in the Village on account of applicability of the provisions of Disaster Management Act. It is contended, that this was cause sufficient for the petitioner/Sarpanch not to have the meeting in the month of May 2021. The chart at page 14 of the impugned order demonstrates, that meeting for all the other months have been regularly held. The inability of the petitioner to understand the process of holding a meeting online, is also stated to be one of the ground indicating sufficient cause. It is therefore submitted, that since the cause indicated was sufficient, the learned Collector, ought to have accepted the same and refrained from passing of the order of disqualification.
3. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the respondent No.3, does not dispute the table in the impugned order. He also does not dispute the position, that in April 2021 and May 2021, there was insurgence of Covid-19 in the Village Ladegaon and for the duration from 16.04.2021 to 05.06.2021 there were approximately 40 Covid-19 positive patients in the Village and so also in the month of May 2021, 13 patients were kept in isolation in Z.P. School at Village Ladegaon. He also does not dispute, that Section 144 of 3 77.WP.3287-2022.odt Code of Criminal Procedure, was imposed in the Village on account of the applicability of the provisions of Disaster Management Act. His contention, is however this would not amount to sufficient cause, and therefore, the impugned order ought not to be disturbed. He further submits, that since the order was passed under Section 36 of the M.V.P. Act, a revision under Section 155 of the M.V.P. Act, was maintainable and the petitioner be relegated to the remedy, for which reliance is placed upon Sau.Wandana Ramkrushna Neskar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2009(2) ALL MR 730.
4. Mr. Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner however, by placing reliance upon Shubhangi Anil Gawande and Ors. Vs. Additional Collector and Ors., MANU/MH/1617/2010 and Radhabai Vs. The Collector, Nanded and Ors., MANU/MH/1102/2022, submits that since the order under Section 36 of the M.V.P. Act, is final, it would be susceptible to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further invites my attention to the language of Section 155 of the M.V.P. Act and submits, that the powers of revision, as vested therein in the State Government are for the purpose of examining the record and proceedings of the Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti or Standing Committee or of any Officer for the purpose of satisfying as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, and therefore, the impugned order, cannot fall within the four corners of the language of Section 155 of the M.V.P, Act. He further submits, that Section 155 of the M.V.P. Act, falls under 4 77.WP.3287-2022.odt Chapter 11 of the M.V.P. Act, which relates to over all control of the State Government over the actions of various Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samities, and therefore, would not be available in the present case against the order under Section 36 of the M.V.P Act.
5. Faced with this, Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the respondent No.4, seeks time to make appropriate research and place the position on record, considering which, list the matter tomorrow i.e. on 23.08.2022.
JUDGE SD. Bhimte Signed By:SHRIKANT DAMODHAR BHIMTE Signing Date:22.08.2022 18:40