Allahabad High Court
Rajjan Singh And 7 Others vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others on 29 August, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:152167 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 36562 of 2024 Court No. - 78 RESERVED ON 5.8.2025 DELIVERED ON 29.8.2025 HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.
1. Heard Shri R.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the applicants, Shri Rajendra Prasad Shukla, learned counsel for the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 and Sri Rajesh Kumar Gupta, learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The instant application under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking quashing of the order dated 7.10.2024 passed by Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No 3 Kanpur Dehat in Warrant Case No. 1904517/2010 (Complaint Case No. 4517/2010) (Anand Kumar Singh Vs. Rajjan Singh and others) under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 336, 452, 504, 506(2) IPC police station Derapur District Kanpur Dehat as well as entire proceedings of the said case.
3. Brief facts of the case are that husband of opposite party no. 2 and father of opposite party no. 3, namely, Anand Kumar Singh has filed an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. alleging therein that the applicants no. 3 and 5 had stolen the Gun of the said Anand Kumar Singh regarding the same a case was pending before the Judicial Magistrate II, Kanpur Dehat at Kanpur and 7.1.1994 was the date fixed for deposition of Anand Kumar Singh in the said case. The applicants herein put pressure upon the said Anand Kumar Singh not to depose in the said case against the applicants no. 3 and 5 which was refuted by the said Anand Kumar Singh. On 6.1.1994 at about 10.00 a.m. in the morning the applicants herein with intention to kill the said Anand Kumar Singh and other family members armed with Gun, country made pistol and Lathis came to the house of said Anand Kumar Singh and started pelting bricks and stones. The applicants no. 1 and 7 and Jai Bahadur Singh started firing from their Guns. Thereupon the said Anand Kumar Singh entered into his house to save himself. Thereupon the applicants started beating his wife Nirmala Devi and son Neeraj Kumar, who are the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 herein respectively. The said Anand Kumar Singh went on the roof and started firing in self defence. In between various villagers gathered there. Thereupon the applicants herein ran away from the spot and while running away they have snatched a golden chain from the neck of opposite party no. 2 and they also dishevelled house hold goods. Due to fear of the applicant he could not approach the police same day. However, on the next day he reached to Kanpur to attend the hearing of the case and moved an application before the S.P. Kanpur personally and also through registered post but nothing has been done. However, a false case was registered against the said Anand Kumar Singh by the police. The said application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. made by Anand Kumar Singh was treated as a Complaint case. During the said incident the opposite party no. 2 and 3 sustained the following injuries :
Opposite party no. 2-Nirmala Devi:
1. Abrasion 3.5 cm x .5 cm. On right forearm a extent surface
2. Contusion 3 cm. X 2 cm. On left forearm in middle extension surface
3. Abrasion 1.5 cm. X .5 cm. On dorsum of left foot.
Opposite party no. 3-Neeraj Kumar Singh
1. Contusion 8 cm. X 5 cm. On outside red?.
2. Contusion 10 cm. X 2 cm. On right hand on ext. surface
3. Contusion 9 cm. X 9 cm. On left hand forearm a external surface
4. Complain of pain in head but no ext. injury seen.
4. During the pendency of the said complaint case the applicants herein filed an application under section 482 No. 5752 of 1999 (Satyendra Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. ) in which interim protection was granted by a coordinate Bench of this court on 15.11.2004. However, subsequently on 15.7.2005 the said application was dismissed for want of prosecution. During the pendency of the said case the complainant Anand Kumar Singh has died on 31.7.2014. However, as the order was not informed to the trial court the proceedings of the trial court kept in abeyance till 9.11.2022, when the trial court has proceeded in the matter in the light of the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and others Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2018) 16 SCC 299 and summoned the applicant herein again. After the receipt of the summons, the applicants herein, as the complainant has died, have entered into a compromise dated 23.9.2024 with the injured persons i.e. surviving opposite party no. 2 and 3 and filed the same before the trial court concerned alongwith an application under Section 257 Cr.P.C. However, the said application was rejected vide the impugned order dated 7.10.2024 by the trial court on the ground that since the instant case involved offences under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 336, 452, 504, 506(2) IPC and the accused persons, the applicants herein have not appeared before the court nor has obtained bail in the offences. Against the said order dated 7.10.2024 rejecting the application under section 257 Cr.P.C. the instant application under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicants.
5. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that looking at the nature of the injuries sustained by the injured opposite party no. 2 and 3, they are not on vital part of either of the injured persons and no fire arm injury has been sustained by any of the injured persons, therefore, the offence under section 307 IPC prima-facie is not established against the applicants herein. The complainant of the instant case has already died and surviving injured persons opposite party no. 2 and 3 has already amicably settled their dispute due to intervention of well wishers and the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 and 3 are family members. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgement dated 7.2.2024 of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Application U/s 482 No. 780 of 2024 (Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. and others). Thus learned counsel for the applicants submits that since the allegations under section 307 IPC is not sustainable against the applicants on the basis of the entire material available on record, therefore, he seeks quashing of the entire proceedings of the instant case.
6. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and 3 also supports the submission of the learned counsel for the applicants and submits that since the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 and 3 are family members and they have already settled all their dispute amicably and they do not want to prosecute the instant case against the applicants herein.
7. Per contra, learned A.G.A. submits that since the complainant of the instant case has died, therefore, it is open for the applicant to move an application under section 256 Cr.P.C. for dismissal of the instant case as admittedly the opposite party no. 2 and 3 are not prosecuting the complaint case against the applicants herein. Since the opposite party no. 2 and 3 have not yet been substituted in the said complaint case, the settlement between the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 and 3 cannot be acted upon and on the basis of the same the proceedings cannot be quashed.
8. Having heard the rival submissions so made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, this court has carefully gone through the record of the case.
9. Facts of the case have already been noted above.
10. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had summed up and laid down the following principles for guidance of the High Courts in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: -
"29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
11. Although in Narinder Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the question of permissibility of quashing proceedings involving commission of offence under Section 307 I.P.C., it held that offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that generally the power to quash proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., but yet, this prohibition is not absolute and in certain circumstances mentioned in the portions of the judgment quoted above, the High Courts could quash the proceedings even in cases involving heinous and serious offences on the basis of a compromise in the interest of justice. Thus, Narinder Singh (Supra) does not lay down that there is an absolute bar against quashing of proceedings on the basis of compromise where the offence is heinous and serious nature.
12. In Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, the precedents on the subject were considered and the broad principles which emerge from the precedents, were summarised in the following propositions:
"16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
6.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
13. In State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point and observed and held as under:
"15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
5.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc."
14. In the light of the judgements of the Apex Court it is a settled position that the cases where the accused persons have been summoned for the offence under section 307 IPC as well and the cases which come within the category of heinous crime, ordinarily cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. However, if on close scrutiny the High Court comes to a conclusion that the heinous offence has been alleged only for the purposes of ornamenting the case and there is no foundation or basis for the same, then such proceedings can be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties.
15 However, coming to the facts of the instant case, since in the instant case, the complainant has already died and no application for substitution of the legal heirs of the complaint has been filed by the opposite party no. 2 and 3 to continue with the complaint case against the applicants. In view thereof, till they are substituted as complainants, the compromise between the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 and 3 cannot be taken note of and would be of no consequence. Thus there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 7.10.2024 rejecting the application under section 257 Cr.P.C. moved by the opposite party no. 2 and 3. If the opposite party no. 2 and 3 have failed to substitute themselves, then the provisions of section 256 Cr.P.C. are applicable in the instant case and the complaint can be dismissed on the death of the complainant.
16. In view thereof, this court do not find any good reason to act upon to the settlement dated 23.9.2024 arrived at between the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 and 3. Thus the proceeding of the instant case cannot be quashed on the basis of the compromise between the parties. However, it is open for the applicant to move an application under section 256 Cr.P.C. seeking dismissal of the complaint case on the death of the complainant himself as there is no substitution.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, the instant application is disposed of with liberty to the applicants to approach the trial court by moving an application under section 256 Cr.P.C. which shall be decided by the trial court concerned in accordance with law.
August 29, 2025 o.k.