Madras High Court
A.K.Gopal vs R.K.Sitrula on 2 February, 2012
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS
DATED: 02.02.2012
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA
A.S.No.880 of 2008
and
M.P.No.1 of 2008
A.K.Gopal .. Appellant
Vs.
R.K.Sitrula . .. Respondent
This appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2008 passed in O.S.No.11 of 2007 on the file of the Fast Track Court II, Ranipet (Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranipet)
For appellant : Mr.A.Seshan
For Respondent : Mr.R.Margabandhu
JUDGMENT
This appeal is focussed by the defendant as against the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2008 made in O.S.No.11 of 2007, which was one for specific performance of an agreement to sell, on the file of the Fast Track Court II, Ranipet (Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranipet). The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.
2. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this appeal would run thus:
The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance with the following prayer:
"(a) To direct the defendant to execute the sale deed after receiving the balance sale consideration, in respect of the schedule described property as per the suit sale agreement dated 11.09.2006;
(b) in default, to execute the sale deed by this Hon'ble Court on behalf of the defendant through process of this Hon'ble Court;
(c) To grant an order of injunction restraining the defendant, their men, agents etc., from alienating the suit property to any 3rd parties pending disposal of this suit; and
(d) For costs.." (extracted as such)
3. The defendant filed the written statement resisting the suit; whereupon issues were framed.
4. During trial, the plaintiff-Sitrula examined herself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2-Dhanapal and Exs.A1 to A3 were marked. The defendant-Gopal examined himself as D.W.1 on his side.
5. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellant/defendant preferred this appeal on various grounds.
6. A thumb nail sketch of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant placing reliance on the grounds of appeal, would run thus:
(a) The trial Court failed to take into consideration Section 16 as well as Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Mere verbatim reproduction of the ingredients of those Sections would not tantamount to proving the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract.
(b) The plaintiff has to stand or fall on his own pleadings and she cannot pick holes in the case of the defendant and try to achieve success in the litigative process.
(c) There is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff was ready with the alleged remaining part of the sale consideration amounting to Rupees eleven lakhs and odd. The evidence would show that even according to the plaintiff, she was not in a position to pay the remaining part of the sale consideration, but she borrowed money from Mani and Annamalai, but they were not examined before the Court.
(d) The evidence of P.W.2 is not in favour of P.W.1-the plaintiff. In fact, there was no consensus ad idem at all between the plaintiff and the defendant, in allegedly agreeing to sell his property in favour of the plaintiff.
(e) There was actually a loan transaction which emerged between the defendant's son and the plaintiff. As the relatives of the plaintiff are all money lenders, the plaintiff also was lending money for usurious interest. By way of security alone, in blank papers the defendant put his signatures, but it was subsequently converted into Ex.A1. Simply because there are some minor contradictions between the defendant's reply notice and his written statement, the plaintiff cannot try to make a mountain out of a mole hill and venture to wriggle out of her liability to prove her case by fobbing of the onus on him.
(f) The catena of decisions would be to the effect that ever since the date of agreement to sell, the plaintiff should be ready and willing to perform his or her part of the contract and in the absence of it, the discretionary relief of specific performance cannot be ordered. But the trial Court ignoring all these salient features, simply took the case of the plaintiff for gospel truth and decreed the suit, warranting interference in the appeal.
7. In a bid to shoot down and mince meat, torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellant/defendant, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would pilot his arguments inviting the attention of this Court to various portions of the records, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:
Soon after the expiry of four months' period as contemplated in Ex.A1-the agreement to sell which emerged between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff issued the notice calling upon the defendant to come forward to perform his part of the contract, but the defendant gave reply with totally untenable pleas as though there was no agreement to sell at all and there was only a loan transaction etc; whereupon, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit. After filing the suit, the plaintiff also deposited the remaining part of the sale consideration in the Court. Absolutely there is no iota or molecular extent of evidence to prove or establish that there were latches on the part of the plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff also did not wait for three years' limitation period, but filed the suit immediately on 23.01.2007, whereas the agreement to sell was dated 11.09.2006.
Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would pray for the dismissal of the appeal.
8. The points for consideration are as to:
(1) Whether the trial Court failed to take into consideration the pleas of the defendant that Ex.A1 does not reflect the true agreement to sell, and that there was no agreement to sell at all as contained in Ex.A1, but it only emerged by way of securing the prompt repayment of the loan of Rupees two lakhs lent by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant's son?
(2) Whether the judgment of the trial Court is bad in view of the alleged ground that the plaintiff did not prove that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by having the money readily with her?
3. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgment of the trial Court?
9. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven with one another.
10. The indubitable and indisputable, or atleast the undeniable facts would run thus:
Ex.A1 is the agreement to sell which emerged between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the latter-the land owner of the suit property agreed to sell the suit property in favour of the former for a total consideration of Rs.13,12,500/- (Rupees thirteen lakhs twelve thousand five hundred only). Under the said agreement, a sum of Rupees two lakhs was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The time stipulated in the agreement for performance of the contract was four months. Ex.A2 is the notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant and Ex.A3 is the reply challenging the very claim of the plaintiff that Ex.A1 is the agreement to sell. After the filing of the suit, the plaintiff also deposited the remaining part of the sale consideration in Court.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would refer to the following decisions:
(i) The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1995 (2) MLJ 118 [N.P.Tirugnanam (Died) by LRs. v. Dr.R.Jagan Mohan Rao and others]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"5. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act'). Under Sec.20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid agreement of sale. Sec.16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract."
(ii) The decisions of this Court reported in:
(a) 2010(2) TLNJ 590 (Civil) [Jugraj v. P.Sankaran and others]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"19. With regard to the plea of readiness and willingness of the appellant-plaintiff, the appellant has specifically stated in the plaint that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As per section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff must be pleaded and proved. With regard to the proof of readiness and willingness, the appellant has not examined any independent witness other than his own evidence. That apart, the appellant did not produce any document to prove the plea of readiness and willingness. With regard to the readiness as P.W.1, he has stated that he is a money lender and he was having sufficient funds to perform his part of the contract. To substantiate the same, he has not even filed a single document to show that he was having sufficient funds to complete the sale from the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit. In the absence of any proof, the appellant cannot sustain the plea of readiness and willingness."
(b) (2010) 6 MLJ 113 [Bafna Developers, a registered partnership firm Regn.No.458/95 rep. by its Partner Ashok G.Bafna, Coimbatore 641 001 v. D.K.Natarajan and others]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"25. To obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to allege and prove continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of hearing to perform the contract on his part. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act provides that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract. The continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of agreement till the date of the hearing of the suit need to be proved. The substance of the matter and surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff must be taken into consideration in adjudging readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
26. The mere statement in the plaint expressing readiness and willingness would not be sufficient. The material should be placed to prove the same. In the instant case, the evidence and circumstances would clearly indicate that the readiness and willingness contended by the plaintiff was only an empty averment in the plaint. Evidence and surrounding circumstances clearly indicate that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract."
(c) (2010) 1 MLJ 363 [Kalash Properties Pvt. Ltd., rep. by its Chairman and Managing Director G.Kalaiasundaram, Chennai 600 102]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"23........The appellant/plaintiff has not proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It has been repeatedly held that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform the contract from the very commencement ie. from the time of entering into agreement till the end. In the instant case, according to the plaintiff, there was an oral agreement in the second week of January, 1995. What all noticed by the Court is only the filing of the suit with an averment that the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract."
(d) (2008) 8 MLJ 873 [Ramnath Publications Pvt. Ltd., rep. by its Managing Director K.Natarajan and another]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"36. From the above decisions, it would be quite clear that in order to satisfy the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, mere plea though specifically made in the suit for specific performance, that the plaintiffs were ready and willing would not be sufficient. But, that must be proved by acceptable evidence. In the instant case, even the statement of P.W.1 in the box that the plaintiffs were all along ready and willing to perform their part of the contract by paying the balance of consideration, would not be sufficient."
(e) 1997 (2) MLJ 576 [Vasantha and others v. M.Senguttuvan]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"17. In His Holiness Acharaya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar (1996) 4 SCC 526 their Lordships made a distinction between 'readiness' and 'willingness', to perform a contract. In that case, their Lordships said thus:
"There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, ie., 27.2.1976. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract."
18. Even if we accept the finding of the lower court that the appellant has sufficient funds is accepted, that will not show his willingness. 'Willingness' must be to implement the contract in accordance with the terms within the stipulated period or within a reasonable time thereafter. If he had the necessary funds, he has to explain why he did not offer or tender the balance sale consideration and got the sale deed.........."
12. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant would rely on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2011(4) CTC 640 [Saradamani Kandappan v. S.Rajalakshmi and others].
13. I would like to fruitfully refer to the following decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2010(10) SCC 512 [Man Kaur (Dead) By L.Rs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"40. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The first issue is the breach by the defendant vendor which gives a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific performance by persons enumerated in Section 16 of the Act. A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs.1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by the defendant. But in that case, if the plaintiff did not have the balance Rs.9 lakhs (and the money required for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay such money, when the contract has to be performed, the plaintiff will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves breach by the defendant, as he was not "ready and willing" to perform his obligations."
14. A mere poring over and perusal of those decisions would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that there should be specific pleading to the effect that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and it is not enough that the plaintiff should plead and keep quiet, but there should be clinching evidence to that effect also. Therefore, this Court has to see as to whether in this case, there is evidence to show that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract throughout.
15. Before embarking on the task of analysing the aforesaid point, I would like to give my finding on the issue as to whether there is any valid agreement to sell as contained in Ex.A1, which emerged between the plaintiff and the defendant.
16. Trite the proposition of law is that the plaintiff should succeed or fall on his own pleadings and cannot pick holes in the case of the defendant and try to achieve success in the litigative process. In the meanwhile, one should not lose site of one other fact, so to say, the defendant who is resisting the suit by filing a written statement with verification, also be truthful and no carte blanch is given to the defendant in the litigative process to plead whatever he likes, whether it is falsehood or truth. There should not be any amount of falsity or mendacity in the pleadings of the parties which proposition stood enunciated in catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court. A litigant who is participating in the litigation process with false facts, deserves no sympathy or respect. In this back drop, Ex.A1 has to be analysed. No doubt, it was signed only by the defendant and not by the plaintiff. The core question arises as to whether that could be taken as an agreement to sell at all. It is a common or garden principle of law that an agreement to sell can even be oral, except for invoking Section 53(a) of the Transfer of Property act. This is a case wherein Section 53(a) of the Transfer of Property Act has not been invoked. The evidence on the side of the plaintiff would be consistent and cogent that it was the defendant who agreed to sell the property in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly, the plaintiff executed Ex.A1. In such a case, simply because the plaintiff did not sign Ex.A1, it would not be fatal to the claim of the plaintiff that Ex.A1 is an agreement to sell.
17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the defendant would submit that there was no such agreement to sell at all and Ex.A1 emerged, because the plaintiff at the time of allegedly giving loan to the defendant, insisted for executing such a document and that happened to be the plea of him in Ex.A3-the reply notice. The relevant portion of the reply notice is extracted hereunder for ready reference:
"4. Infact, my client approached your client for a loan of Rs.2,00,000/- for his urgent family necessity. Your client is a money lender and doing pawn broker business at Ussoor. Your client used to lend money at a very higher rate of interest only on strong security. Your client agreed to advance the said loan amount at the rate of Rs.2/- per hundred per month provided my client should execute an agreement for sale in respect of the notice mentioned property in favour of him. My client expressed his willingness to hypothecate the notice mentioned property as security for the said loan amount but your client insisted my client to execute an agreement for sale as the same was less expensive. Your client made a representation that soon after the said loan is discharged, the alleged agreement would be cancelled and returned to my client. Believing your client's representation and since my client was in urgent need of money, my client was forced to agree for the terms of your client."
However, while deposing before the Court by filing chief examination affidavit, the same defendant would aver thus:
"3/ ehd; cly;epiya[k; rhpapy;yhjtd; vd; kfd; fld; bgw ntz;Lk; vd;w vz;zj;Jld; bgw;Wr;brd;w btw;Wj;jhs; ifbaGj;ij bfhz;L thjpnahL nrh;e;J (vd; kfDk;) nghypahf g[idag;gl;l Mtzk; MFk;/ ,aw;ifahd NH;epiyapy; Vw;gl;l cld;gof;if ,y;iy/ vd; kfd; 2.00.000-? (,uz;L ,yl;rk;) fld; bgw btw;Wj;jhs;fspy; bgw;w ifbaGj;ij rl;lj;jpw;F g[wk;ghf thjp jahh; bra;J bfhz;L kpf mjpfKs;s (tpiy) brhj;ij Fiwe;j tpiyf;F mgfhpf;f ntz;Lk; vd;w jg;bgz;zj;njhL. thjp bjhlh;e;Js;s tHf;if bryt[ld; js;Sgo bra;a ntQqkha; gpuhj;jpf;fpnwd;/"
18. As such, according to the defendant, in his reply notice as well as in his written statement, his contention was that the said agreement-Ex.A1 was executed by the defendant only by way of securing the prompt repayment of the alleged loan borrowed by the defendant from the plaintiff. But on the other hand, in the chief examination affidavit of D.W.1 (the defendant), a new case emerged to the effect that in blank papers the defendant signed, because the plaintiff insisted so and that too while the plaintiff lent loan to the defendant's son. It is therefore quite obvious and axiomatic as well as the elephant in the room that no elaborate discussion is required that there is prevarication in the stand of the defendant.
19. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without being tautologous, I would like to point out that the defendant can take various and different pleas, but they should not smack falsity or mendacity. As correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, the defendant has not come forward with a consistent case at all, wherefore, certainly this Court can take note of the conduct of the defendant who went to the extent of averring that the plaintiff did not have the financial wherewithal to fulfil her part of the contract.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant inviting the attention of this Court to Ex.A1, would develop his argument that the plaintiff at the relevant time was residing at Rajapalayam which is 38 kms away from Arcot, where Ex.A1 was got scribed, and that such a fact is unbelievable. I am at a loss to understand as to why this Court should look askance at such a fact, because it is quite normal for a resident of a place to proceed to some other distant place and get the agreement to sell scribed. The stamp paper was purchased at Arcot, the place where Ex.A1 was scribed specifying the plaintiff's address as Rajapalayam. It is therefore clear from the evidence, that Ex.A1 is a genuine agreement to sell and accordingly, the trial Court appropriately and appositely applied the correct proposition of law in deciding the issue concerned.
21. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would invite the attention of this Court to the proximity of time between one event and another in this case. Four months' time was contemplated for performance as per Ex.A1-the agreement dated 11.09.2006 and as such, on the expiry of the four months' period by 11.01.2007, Ex.A2 - the plaintiff's notice on 12.01.2007 emerged and for which, the reply was given immediately on the next day, i.e. on 13.01.2007 by the defendant, disputing the very transaction. The suit itself was filed by the plaintiff on 23.01.2007 expressing her readiness and willingness to deposit the amount and accordingly, the amount was deposited even though it was not a must as per Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. The proximity of time as narrated above, would unambiguously and unequivocally demonstrate and display that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract; in fact, her conduct, her eagerness and astuteness to get the transaction fulfilled. In such a case, the non-examination of Mani and Annamalai from whom the plaintiff during cross examination stated as the persons, who financed her the sum of Rs.6,12,350/- was not at all material.
22. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant also inviting the attention of this Court to the deposition of P.W.2, as well as P.W.1 and D.W.1, would develop his argument that there is nothing to indicate what encumbrance certificate was obtained earlier to the execution of Ex.A1 and that the evidence would exemplify and convey that the encumbrance certificate was obtained later. In fact, the deposition of P.W.2 would clarify the position that the old encumbrance certificate was seen before executing Ex.A1 by the defendant and thereafter, fresh encumbrance certificate also was obtained. There is also nothing to doubt the evidence which transpired that before execution of Ex.A1, the parties concerned visited the suit property at Mangadu in Arcot Taluk and returned from there to Arcot and got the Ex.A1 scribed near the Sub Registrar's Office, Arcot. The places referred to above are all not very far from each other.
23. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that the deposition of P.W.1-the plaintiff is to the effect that the plaintiff herself admitted that she was not having the remaining consideration with her and that in view of her admission, it is quite obvious and axiomatic that she was not always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract ever since the emergence of Ex.A1.
24. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would appropriately and appositely advance his argument that four months' time was stipulated for performance of the contract; that the plaintiff well within that four months' period raised money and was keeping it with her, intending to perform her part of the contract and that was why just on the expiry of four months' period, she issued the notice calling upon the defendant to come forward to receive the amount and execute the sale deed, for which it was the defendant who had a volte face and turned turtle and dished out untenable pleas disputing the very agreement to sell.
25. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. Simply because the plaintiff stated that she was not having the remaining part of the sale consideration at the time of emergence of Ex.A1, that it does not mean that she was not ready and willing to perform her contract. The purpose of stipulating the time itself is to see that both parties are equipping themselves adequately to perform their part of the contract and that is having nothing to do with readiness and willingness. The plaintiff clearly and categorically stated, that in addition to the sum of Rupees five lakhs which she had as her savings, she borrowed a sum of Rs.6 lakhs from Mani and Rs.12,500/- from Annamalai and thereby, keeping the said amounts with her to perform her part of the contract. As such, even by phantamagorical thoughts, such a conduct on the part of the plaintiff cannot be labelled or dubbed as one expressing her alleged inability to perform her part of the contract. In a hypothetical case, if the plaintiff avails the entire three years' limitation period after the expiry of the period stipulated in the agreement for performing her part of the contract for filing suit for specific performance by hob nobbing the issue, then the matter would be different. But here, the factual scenario as highlighted supra was entirely different and that bespeaks the ideal conduct of the plaintiff to purchase the property without any significant delay.
26. In the reply notice also the defendant did not state anything that the plaintiff had no financial wherewithal to fulfil her part of the contract, but on the other hand he disputed the transaction itself. Between 11.09.2006 and 23.01.2007, the space of time was too short and without any latches or any speck of negligence, the plaintiff approached the Court and in such a case, the question of doubting the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to fulfil her part of the contract is beyond doubt and the trial Court au fait with law and au courant with facts decided the lis. As such, the conduct of the parties in this case and also the time factors discussed supra would evince and evidence that the plaintiff had a genuine case, but the defendant tried to torpedo it unsuccessfully without any basis.
27. On balance, point No.1 is decided to the effect that the trial Court correctly held that Ex.A1 was a true agreement to sell and it is not a document not intended to be acted upon.
28. Point No.2 is decided to the effect that the trial Court correctly held that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract.
G.RAJASURIA,J., gms
29. Point No.3 is decided to the effect that there is no perversity or illegality in the judgment of trial Court.
In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
02.02.2012 Index : Yes/No Internet: Yes/No To The Fast Track Court II, Ranipet (Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranipet) A.S.No.880 of 2008