Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
N. Sivarama Chandrasekhara Rao vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others on 19 June, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1996AP394, 1996(2)ALT1039, AIR 1996 ANDHRA PRADESH 394, (1996) 3 SERVLR 216, (1996) 3 ANDHLD 166, (1996) 2 ANDH LT 1039
ORDER
1. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate order or direction to declare the proceedings of the second respondent -- the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Government of An-dhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in Re. No.2715/ PCI-4/95, dated 5-7-1995 as illegal and void and further seeks any other appropriate order.
2. Petitioner is the Secretary of Sri Trikoteswara Swamy Educational Society, Narasaraopeta which was registered under the Societies Act in the year 1984. The said society was started with the object of establishing educational institutions. On account of the efforts made by the members of the society, a degree college was established in Narasaraopet town known as Smt. Nanda-muri Basava Taraka Rama Rao Degree College in the month of December, 1984. Sri Trikoteswara Swamy Educational Society (for short the society') framed its own Articles of Association. As per the Articles of Association, the Governing Body consisting of seven members is to be elected to look after the administration of the society and the college established by it. The members of the Governing Body so elected are the President, Vice-President, Secretary, Joint Secretary and Treasurer from amongst themselves, apart from two other members who constitute the Governing Body. The strength of the Governing Body is seven which is the strength of the General Body of the Committee.
3. It is stated, the petitioner was elected from among the members as Secretary of the Society who also acts as Correspondent of the said College. The fourth respondent on becoming Minister in the year 1987, opted out of the Society. In his place one N. Lakshmi-narayana was co-opted as member of the - Governing Body. In the year 1990 also, some members namely Gangineni Sambaiah and Gaddam Venkateswarlu opted out of the society and in their place N. Bhanuprasad and Sri N. Hari Prasad were taken.
4. The College said to have been admitted to grant-in-aid in the year 1990.
5. It is alleged that in the month of March, 1995 the petitioner was elected as the Zilla Parishad member, Guntur from Nara-saraopet Z.P.T.C. which was the cause of concern to the fourth respondent who felt that the petitioner's prominence in the political field may mar his future prospects as a political leader of that area. In order to cut the petitioner to size, it is alleged, the fourth respondent hatched a conspiracy against the petitioner for removing him from the Secretaryship of the educational society. !n that pursuit, it is stated, the fourth respondent made attempts to create problems with the help of some musclemen, which was also informed to the police by the petitioner. After a criminal complaint being filed against the fourth respondent, the fourth respondent seems to have got a petition dated 12-6-1995 submitted to the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Guntur - 3rd respondent herein, to conduct an enquiry against the petitioner on certain charges. Pursuant to the complaint, the third respondent seems to have issued a notice dated 17-6-1995 with a copy to the Principal of the College informing that the third respondent would be visiting the College on 19-6-1995 around 9.00 a.m. for conducting an enquiry on the basis of the complaint received by him. Though the petitioner was not served with any notice directly, he received the said communication from the Principal of the College. As the petitioner was away and not in a position to attend the enquiry as desired by the third respondent, he requested the third respondent to postpone the visit for two to three days so as to enable him to participate in the enquiry. However, the third respondent seems to have visited the College on 19-6-1995 and submitted a report to the first respondent at the instance of the fourth respondent for initiating action under Section 24 on the A. P. Education Act. The petitioner was trying to find out the consequences arising out of the report sent against him by the third respondent. While the matter stood thus, the petitioner saw a press report on 7-7-1995 in Eenadu Telugu daily as to his removal from the Secretary and Correspondentship of the society by the Governing Body of the society and in his place the fourth respondent being elected as Secretary and Correspondent of the college and also the assuming of the charge a . such by the fourth respondent. The resolution of the Governing Body of the educational society dated 16-6-1995 removing the petitioner from the Secretary and Correspondentship of the society and electing the fourth respondent as the Secretary was forwarded to the second respondent for approval as required under the relevant provisions. The second respondent through proceedings N0.2715/PC.I-4/95 dated 5-7-1995 approved the resolution passed by the society on 16-6-1995 removing the petitioner from Secretary and Correspondentship of the society while electing the fourth respondent in his place as Secretary and Correspondent of the society. This is the order which is challenged in this writ petition on various grounds.
6. Sri E. Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the. writ petitioner assails the proceedings of the second respondent dated 5-7-1995 mainly on three grounds. The first and foremost ground of attack is that the Articles of Association of the said educa-. tional society do not provide for removal of the Secretary and therefore, it is contended that when there is no provision to remove the Secretary, the resolution dated 16-6-1995 stated to have been passed by the Governing Body of the society removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship of the society is illegal. It is nextly contended that for calling a meeting of the Governing Body, a prescribed procedure is laid down, to say, giving notice to all members of the Governing Body who constitute the General Body. It is alleged, in all, there are seven members of the Governing Body which is the strength of the General Body. When a meeting is to be called for, even on urgent notice, the meeting has to be necessarily convened at the instance of the Secretary on a requisition made by not less than three members. The Secretary on receiving the requisition, issues notice of such meeting to all the members fixing a date for meeting. In the event, the Secretary fails to convene a meeting as desired by not less than three members, the Joint Secretary is competent to convene the meeting.
7. It is alleged that the said meeting held on 16-6-1995 was not convened by the petitioner though he was functioning as the Secretary of the Society nor there was any requisition by the members to convene such a meeting. Even otherwise, it is contended, for the meeting convened on 16-6-1995, as required, notice has not been sent to the petitioner who is also one of the members of the Governing Body. It is further alleged, notices have been sent to only four members from out of seven members, basing on which, a meeting was convened on 16-6-1995. When notices are not sent to all the members, convening of such a meeting is invalid. Any resolution passed in such meeting is not valid. It is nextly contended, the second respondent who has approved the removal of the petitioner from the Secretary and Correspon-dentship of the College, basing on the resolution passed by the said educational society on 16-6-1995, has failed to apply her mind. It is urged, when a resolution is sent to (he second respondent seeking approval of removal of Secretary and Correspondent, in normal circumstances, the second respondent being the authority under the Education Act, to approve such change, ought to have verified whether the Articles of Association for such change replacing the Secretary by electing a new person in his place and whether the meeting convened on 16-6-1995 was properly conducted in accordance with the procedure contemplated in this regard. Without having even looked into the Articles of Association and the minutes proceedings, the second respondent mechanically passed the order of approval on 5-7-1995 as if the resolution of the society is validly passed. It is contended that the action of the second respondent, a public authority having failed to discharge his public duty while approving the illegal resolution which has the effect of removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship is not permissible. The endeavour of Sri E. Manohar, counsel for the petitioner is to say that the fifth respondent who was asked to submit a report after holding an enquiry into the allegations against the petitioner, failed to give any notice to the petitioner and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to state his case. The fifth respondent sends his report to the second respondent from Guntur on 4-7-1995. The second respondent simply accepts the report of the fifth respondent without even verifying as to the facts and approves the removal of the petitioner on 5-7-1995 itself. It is contended that the combined efforts of all the respondents against the petitioner is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and contrary to the procedure and as such liable to be set aside. In the background, it is submitted the order of the second respondent in removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship is illegal and has to be set aside.
8. In all, there are five respondents in this writ petition. Respondents 1 to 3 are represented by the learned Additional Advocate General. On behalf of the fourth respondent, a separate counter has been filed. Insofar as the fifth respondent is concerned, his actions are not directly questioned in the writ petition and therefore, the fifth respondent becomes a mere formal party in this writ petition and no counter is filed on his bebalf.
9. On behalf of respondents 1 to 3, the learned Addl. Advocate General who took notice has filed counter on behalf of the second respondent who is the principal contestant. An affidavit sworn in by one Hanumanlu, s/ o T. L. Sastry, stated to be the Assistant Director of Collegiate Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh has chosen to answer the allegations made against the second respondent. A separate counter has also been filed on behalf of the fourth respondent by Sri G. Raghuram, Advocate.
10. Though the writ petitioner has raised various contentions in the writ petition, a cryptic counter has been filed on behalf of the second respondent by contending that after receipt of the resolution of the Governing Body removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship on 16-6-1995, the second respondent in order to appraise herself with furthermore facts, addressed the third respondent on 30-6-1995 to submit a report duly verifying the records. Since the 3rd respondent was on leave, the matter was entrusted to the fifth respondent. The fifth respondent seems to have visited the college and perused some records and also seems to have held an enquiry, submitted a report to the second respondent on 4-5-1996. Basing on the report of the fifth respondent, the second respondent approved the removal of the petitioner from the Correspondentship of NVC College, Narasaraopet, Guntur district by an order dated 5-7-1995. The order of the second respondent dated 5-7-1995 is sought to be justified on the ground the same is passed under S. 7 of the A. P. Grant-in-Aid Code.
11. In the counter filed by the fourth respondent against whom various allegations have been made, the fourth respondent has justified the removal of the petitioner from the Secretaryship by contending that the petitioner had committed grave irregularities. It is stated in the counter denying the fact that the fourth respondent had left the society in the year 1987. In the counter, it is denied as to the facts leading to the removal of the fourth respondent from the membership and two others. The fourth respondent has categorically stated that the petitioner was requested to convene a meeting on a requisition sent to him by the fourth respondent and two others on 13-6-1995 to discuss the issues relating to change of the Secretary and Correspondent-ship of the College and for change in the designation of the office-bearers. As the petitioner failed to receive the requisition, the requisition was sent to one M. Venkateswara Rao, Joint Secretary and he, in turn notified to the members available, convening the Governing Body meeting on 16-5-1995. It is categorically stated in the counter that the meeting held on 16-5-1995 is in accordance with the Articles of Association of the Society. The meeting was attended by four members who constituted the quorum and passed the resolution removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship and Correspondent-ship and elected the fourth respondent in his place. In this background, it is contended by the fourth respondent in his counter, the action of the Governing Body is proper and there is no illegality. As required under S. 7 of the A. P. Grant-in-Aid Code, the second respondent has approved the change and therefore, no illegality is committed by the Governing Body.
12. I have heard Sri E. Manohar, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner, learned Addl. Advocate General representing respondents 1 to 3 and Sri G. Raghuram, counsel representing the fourth respondent at length.
13. The principal contention raised on behalf of the fourth respondent by Sri G. Raghuram, learned counsel is that Sri Tri-koteswara Swamy Educational Society is a private body and the action of the society, removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship is a private action and such an action is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The emphasis of Sri Raghuram is to say that private actions of private bodies are not amenable to writ jurisdiction as these bodies are not "State" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the petitioner had committed grave irregularities including financial irregularities and therefore, the Governing Body had no option than to pass a resolution removing him from the Secretaryship in the interests of the society and as such meeting of the Governing Body was convened on 16-6-1995 in accordance with the procedure and a resolution is also passed removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship by electing the fourth respondent in his place. It is further contended that as many as four members attended the Governing Body meeting which was convened on 16-6-1995 and therefore, the requirement of quorum has been fulfilled. When the quorum passed a resolution to remove the petitioner from the Secretaryship and elected the fourth respondent in his place, there is no illegality in such resolution. Referring to the action of the second respondent, it is stated by Sri Raghuram that the order passed by the second respondent is in accordance with S. 7 of the A. P. Grant'in-Aid Code and therefore, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice as alleged by the petitioner.
14. In support of his contention to say that the society is not a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and when the action taken by a body which is not a State, such actions are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Sri Raghuram has drawn my attention to the following decisions reported in G. Prakasha Rao v. The District Educational Officer, Kurnool, (1995) 3 Andh LT 425; Sri Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd , Amalapuram v. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 Andh Pra 171 (FB); L. R. Sharma v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 1 Serv LR 526 : (1982 Lab IC 317) (Delhi) and Committee of Management, Lakhauri Inter College v. Deputy Director of Education, Moradabad (sic).
15. In the wake of the sustained efforts by Sri G. Raghuram, learned counsel for the fourth respondent that the society is a private body and its resolution dated 16-6-1995 is a private action and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction, it has necessitated to examine as to whether the action of the respondents is amenable to writ jurisdiction or not.
16. The action of the Governing Body electing the fourth respondent as Secretary of the Society is sought to be approved by the second respondent. Passing of the resolution, electing the fourth respondent as Secretary, replacing the writ petitioner may fall within the domain of private action. When the action is sought to be approved by the second respondent who is the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh, the second respondent discharges a public duty while approving the action of the Governing Body. While discharging public duty, whether the element of fairness is present or not is to be seen. When it is found in this case that the element of fairness is conspicuously absent in the action of the public authority, the educational society though a private body, its action, insofar as it-does not effect the structure of the society could be said to be private action. But however, the action of the second respondent in approving the resolution of the Governing Body dated 16-6-1995 is in discharge a public duty. The society's main function is to manage a degree college which is admitted to grant-in-aid. Public interest is involved managing of the college. The society cannot do and undo things as per its whims and fancies. Its actions are to be within the framework of Articles of Association/Bye-laws. The petitioner is sought to be removed from the Secretaryship of the Society, when there is no provision in the Articles of Association, by a resolution. Could that be said that the action of the Governing Body is justifiable? The public duty involved in the society is fairness in its actions. The society, no doubt, is a private body and has its own Articles of Association. But public duty connotes not only involvement of public interest action but also its own action in accordance with the Articles of Association/ Bye-laws. If the society is not to function within the ambit of its own Articles of Association, I am inclined to say, such an action would be contrary to discharging public duty, public duly being the duty to manage the affairs of the society in accordance with its own bye-laws/Articles of Association. Therefore, the mischief that the public duty does not connote a private action has to be thrown out when fairness in such action is totally absent. Particularly when the action of the private body is sought to be approved by the State or public authority, the implied connotation to such action of the society could be held to be a public action. Failing to perform a public duty in accordance with the Articles of Association/Bye-laws, such an action could be brought within the ambit of writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, without regard to the society though not being the State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.
17. Article 12 of the Constitution of India manifests even though a body of persons may not constitute "State" but when its actions are to be supported by the State or public authority, that part of the action which is sought to be supported by the State or public authority, is amenable to writ jurisdiction. It cannot be accepted that private actions, though are to be approved by the State or a public authority, are only to be called in question in other forums constituted. I do not think such a narrow interpretation could be given to Art. 226 of the Constitution which conferred wide powers on this Court to issue prerogative writs including the writ of mandamus, even though a body of persons may not constitute "State", on the ground of failure to perform public duty.
18. The second respondent accepted the report submitted by the fifth respondent and approved the resolution of the Governing Body on 5-7-1995. The second respondent, in all fairness should have examined whether the Governing Body meeting held on 16-6-1995 and the resolution thereon is in accordance with the Articles of Association.
19. Sri Trikoteswara Swamy Educational Society is formed only for the purpose of establishing an educational institution. The educational institution in this case being Sri Nandamuri Basava Taraka Rama Rao Degree College, Narasaraopet. It is not disputed that the said college under the management of the said society is admitted to grant-in-aid. The society has seven members as its Governing Body and also the General Body. From among these seven members, President and Secretary are to be elected by them. It does not matter who becomes the Secretary and who become the members. The fact remains that elections do take place. The Articles of Association placed before me fails to disclose any provision removing the elected Secretary of the Governing Body. The tenure of the office bearers is three years or till the fresh elections are held. Since there is no provision to remove the Secretary and elect somebody in his place, the resolution dated 16-6-1995 passed by the Governing Body, in my view, is without authority and is not in accordance with the Articles of Association. It is well settled that the procedure contemplated for convening a meeting is to issue necessary notice to all members. There cannot be any dispute as to the issuance of notice for convening a meeting to all the members of the society.
20. Admittedly, there are seven members in the Governing Body. The material placed before this Court discloses that notices were sent to only four members out of seven members by the Joint Secretary of the Society. There cannot be any problem to accept that the Joint Secretary is also competent to convene a meeting. Whether the Joint Secretary while convening the meeting has followed the procedure of issuing notices to all members of the Governing Body is the question to be examined. It is not disputed before me by the respondents that notices were sent to al! the members of the Governing Body. It is also not disputed that there are seven members who constituted the Governing Body. Therefore, il is clear that notices were sent to only four members out of seven members for convening the meeting on 16-5-1995. It is also clear that only these four members attended the Governing Body meeting which was held on 16-6-1995.
21. In Horsley's "Meetings, Procedure and Practice", Second Edition, at page 15, in item No. 204, while referring to notice at item No. 201, it has been indicated as under:
"It is important that all persons with entitlement or obligation to attend a meeting need to be notified, suitably in advance, of the time when and place where it will be held and the nature of the business to be dealt with."
22. At item No. 206, it is indicated thus:
"Where rules provide for notice of meeting to be given to all members and the organisation has some members who are not entitled to vote at the meeting, if notice is not given to the latter members, the meeting is invajidly convened and resolutions passed at it are not valid."
Shackleton in his book "The Law and Practice of Meeting" under Chapter 5, referring to general principles of notice, indicates as under:
When notice is necessary, the following general rules must be observed :
1. Every person entitled to attend the meeting must be notified unless there is express reason for not sending notice under the regulations governing the meeting.
2. The notice must be clear and if any special business is to be transacted, this must be clearly stated.
3. The notice must not be ambiguous, e.g., notice convening meeting for Monday, July 4, when in fact Monday was July 5, could be ambiguous, and the Courts would probably hold that business transacted at such a meeting would be invalid.
4. The notice must be served strictly in accordance with the regulations of the body on whose behalf . it is given and if any particular method is prescribed by statute or regulation having the force of law this also must be observed.
Failure to give proper notice may invalidate the meeting.
23. It is not the case of the respondents that all the members of the Governing Body are not entitled to attend the meeting. Therefore, when there are no express reasons to prevent three other members from out of seven members, from attending the meeting of the Governing Body scheduled on 16-6-1995, issuing notice only to four members and convening a meeting of four members, in my view, cannot be held to be a validly constituted meeting and the business transacted in such meeting is invalid.
24. It is interesting to note that no provision is made in the Articles of Association of the Society to remove the Secretary of the Society. When there is no provision to remove the Secretary, it assumes significance to say, the Society has no authority to remove the Secretary from the Governing Body till he completes his tenure. In this background, the act of convening a meeting by the Joint Secretary, as seen from the proceedings, at the behest of few members of the society, for removing the Secretary itself is illegal and without any authority. Therefore, passing the resolution removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship in the meeting so convened cannot be held to be a proper removal in accordance with the Articles of Association of the Society. To add insult to injury, not issuing notice to all the members of the Governing Body for the purpose of convening the meeting on 16-6-1995 is fatal to the proceedings and therefore, in my view, the entire proceedings including that of passing of resolution dated 16-6-1995 is vitiated and invalid.
25. In this background, is it open to the fourth respondent to say that the decision of the society is a private affair not amenable to writ jurisdiction as the society is not a Slate within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary that the society to be a "State" amenable to writ jurisdiction. But the action of the society basing on the unauthorised and illegal resolution, removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship of the Society is sought to be approved by the second respondent who is a public authority and when once a party seeks to sustain its unauthorised actions by seeking approval of a public authority who is competent to approve such action and such authority fails to apply its mind and approves . the illegal action, could it be said that the action of such authority cannot be called in question under Art. 226 of the Constitution? If a public authority who has a public duty to discharge, fails to do so, such an action can no doubt be amenable to writ jurisdiction. The public duty in this case is that the society should have followed the procedure prescribed for convening the meeting by issuing notices to all concerned. Having failed to do so, it is not open to the society to justify its action by contending that the action cannot be questioned in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. As has been discussed by me in the foregoing paras, I am clear in my mind that the element of public duty wherever is present, failure to discharge such public duty, that part of action is certainly amenable to writ jurisdiction. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani, , is very much clear on this aspect.
26. The decisions referred to by Sri Raghuram, learned counsel for the fourth respondent in support of his contention that the action of the private body is not amenable to writ jurisdiction, I am afraid, the ratio laid down in these decisions cannot be made applicable to the set of circumstances present in this case. The decision of my learned brother M. H. S. Ansari, J., cited (1995 (3) Andh LT 425) (supra) to say that the action of a private body is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. I do not think this aspect has been examined by my brother. M. H. S. Ansari, J. The case before brother M. H. S. Ansari, J. was when an order is passed under S. 7 of the A. P. Grant-in-Aid Code, whether notice is to be preceded before passing an order. In that context, brother Ansari, J. held that notice need not be necessary as there is no provision. I do not wish to say on this aspect as this Court is not primarily concerned as to the requirement of notice before passing the order under S. 7 of the Grant-in-aid Code. In an appropriate situation, I may indicate my view as to the requirement of such notice, in an appropriate case. The decision of the Division Bench referred to by Sri Raghuram, counsel for the fourth respondent, cited (AIR 1990 Andh Pra 171) (supra), that private actions cannot be questioned in writ jurisdiction, I do not think, the Division Bench intended to say so as contended by the learned counsel. On the contrary, the Division Bench has held thus:
"Area in which Art. 226 of the Constitution of India shall operate, however, is not confined to commands to authorities which satisfy the definition of 'State', in Art. 12 of the Constitution. A person or authority, not necessarily an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution can always be subjected to writ jurisdiction of the Court, provided he has a public duty to perform and has failed to perform the duty or has some command of public law under which he has to discharge some part of the sovereign functions."
Therefore, the Division Bench, in my view, never intended to say that the action of the Governing Body though not 'State'within the meaning of Art. 12 is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.
27. In the decision cited (supra), the power of High Court under Art. 226 has been considered elaborately by the Supreme Court. At para 19, the Supreme Court has observed thus:
"What is relevant is the nature of duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied."
At para 21, the Supreme Court further made an interesting observation which is as under:
"The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Art. 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition."
I am probably swayed away with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the above decision and say that mandamus is available to the writ petitioner in the set of issues for consideration in this case
28. The principal grievance of Sri E. Manohar, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner is on the action of the second respondent who has approved the resolution dated 16-6-1996 passed by the Governing Body of the said society. A reading of the order failed to impress me that the second respondent has applied her mind before accepting the report submitted by the fifth respondent. The second paragraph of the impugned proceedings dated 5-7-1995 makes an interesting reading. Basing on the same, the second respondent has approved the removal of the petitioner from the Secretary and Correspondentship of the Society and College which is extracted as under:
"Dr. N. M. Rahman, Special Officer, A. C. College, Guntur was directed to verify all the original records pertaining to the proposal and submit his detailed report. The Special Officer, A. C. College, Guntur, after due enquiry and verification of the college records has submitted his report recommending for approval of the change of Correspondentship in favour of Sri Kodela Sivaprasada Rao, since the resolution of the Governing Body passed as per the provisions of the bye-, of the Society."
A reading of this paragraph leaves no doubt to say that the second respondent has been carried, away with the impression that the resolution of the Governing Body is in accordance with the procedure contemplated in this regard and is in tune with the bye-laws of the society. Had the second respondent verified the Articles of Association of the Society, she would not have come across any provision to remove the Secretary of the Society. That apart, had the second respondent seen the minutes of the meeting held on 16-6-1995, the second- respondent would have realised that notices to all members were not sent, convening the meeting on 16-6-1995. Probably, the second respondent was carried away with the impression that the fifth respondent has examined the Articles of Association and also the procedure followed by the Governing Body on 16-6-1995. Basing on such presumption, the second respondent accepted the report of the fifth respondent and approved the resolution of the Governing Body removing the petitioner from Secretary-
ship under S. 7 of the A. P. Grant-in-Aid Code. It is not to say that the second respondent has no power to pass an order under S. 7 of the A. P. Grant-in-Aid Code. But such an order which has the effect of removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship by replacing with the fourth respondent, the second respondent, in normal circumstances, ought to have examined the facts of the case and could have passed appropriate order.
29. As discussed above, I am not persuaded to hold that the second respondent has applied her mind before approving the resolution of the Governing Body which is dated 16-6-1995, removing the petitioner from the Secretaryship and electing the fourth respondent as Secretary of the Society and Correspondent of the College. If it is to be-accepted that the second respondent has applied her mind, it must be borne out from the impugned order, the application of mind on the question involved in the resolution passed by the Governing Body on 16-6-1995. The second respondent should have also recorded brief reasons in support thereof. As seen from the impugned order, I do not think that the second respondent has applied her mind and has recorded reasons except accepting the report of the fifth respondent in toto without verifying the veracity of the report. Though it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that even the fifth respondent who conducted an enquiry and submitted a report to the second respondent, no notice was given to him as to the holding of enquiry and in such background, the report itself is vitiated, I do not think, it is necessary for this Court to go into that aspect as it is not relevant for the purpose of deciding this writ petition.
30. As discussed above, I am inclined to hold that the petitioner is entitled to seek a writ of mandamus against the respondents. Accordingly, the proceedings dated 5-7-1995 issued by the second respondent are set aside.
31. Since the petitioner has sought a mandamus seeking to set aside the order passed by the second respondent and has sought such other order or orders from this Court, as I have set aside the order of the second respondent in proceedings dated 5-7-1995, the petitioner is entitled for a direction which would keep him in his place as Secretary of the Society which post he was holding prior to passing of the resolution dated 16-6-1995 by the Governing Body. Accordingly, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to function as the Secretary of Sri Trikoteswara Swamy Educational Society, Narasaraopet and Correspondent of NBT & NCV College till his tenure of three years is completed or till the next election to the Governing Body is held in accordance with the Articles of Association of the Society.
32. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above. No costs.
33. Petition allowed.