Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Kesani Yedukondalu vs The State Of A.P., And Another on 8 January, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No.2513 OF 2018
ORDER:
The present criminal petition is filed seeking to call for the records pertaining to FIR No.210 of 2017 dated 01.08.2018 before the Bhimunipatnam Police Station, Visakhapatnam City and to quash the same.
2. Whereas the police registered the crime for the offences punishable under Sections 447 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") and Sections 3 and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing Act (for short "the Act").
3. The present criminal petition is assailed on the sole ground that, as per the complaint lodged by the 2nd respondent, the offence took place on 13.09.2011 and the report was lodged before the police on 01.08.2017, there is a delay of six years.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Sections 3 and 4 of the Act has no application to the petitioner, as the special Court has not given any finding that the petitioner is a land grabber. To that effect, he relied on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl.P.No.3157 of 2007 dated 17.09.2010. Whereas, the High Court had set aside the Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, on the ground that no finding was recorded by the special Court that 2 the petitioner therein is a land grabber, with a finding that: to constitute an offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, a Special Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area has to record a specific finding on the proceedings initiated under the Act, to the effect that the accused is a land grabber, then only the accused can be prosecuted for the said offences. In the absence of such finding, the proceedings cannot be initiated under the Act.
5. In the present case also no such finding was recorded by the special Court that the petitioner is a land grabber. Therefore, the said order is squarely applicable to the present facts of the case. Hence, the proceedings initiated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are hereby quashed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported as Hasmukhlal D.Vora and another v. The State of Tamil Nadu1 for the proposition that:
inordinate delay, if not reasonably explained, can be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
7. In the present case, the offence took place on 13.09.2011 and the report was lodged before the police on 01.08.2017, the delay was not explained in the report. As the delay was not explained properly in the report, an adverse influence can be drawn, as per the judgment referred supra.
1 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 3
8. Learned counsel for the unofficial respondent submits that this Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and he relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported as M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and others2 whereas, the Hon'ble Apex Court laid the guidelines, relevant paragraphs of the guidelines extracted hereunder:
23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process 2 2021 AIR (SC) 1918 4 of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
9. In the present case it appears that the report was lodged by the 2nd respondent/defacto complainant with a malafide intention, as the offence took place in the year 2011 and complaint was lodged in the year 2017and the reasons for such delay was not explained and also as incorporated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and as per the judgment referred supra land grabbing act comes into force only when a specific finding was given by the special Court. In order to secure the ends of justice and as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, referred supra, delay is a ground for quashing the FIR.
10. In order to secure the ends of justice, this Court feels it appropriate to allow the criminal petition. Hence, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the FIR No.210 of 2017 dated 01.08.2018 is hereby quashed.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Criminal Petition shall stand closed.
________________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO Date:08.01.2024 KBN 5 86 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHARA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.2513 OF 2018 Date:08.01.2024 KBN