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[Cites 4, Cited by 0]

Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal

Apar Industries Ltd vs Surat-I on 5 February, 2024

CUSTOMS, EXCISE & SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
           West Zonal Bench At Ahmedabad

                      REGIONAL BENCH- COURT NO.3

                   Excise Appeal No. 10984 of 2021
(Arising out of OIA-CCESA-SRT-APPEALS-PV-024-2021-22 dated 12.10.2021 passed by
Commissioner of Central Excise, CUSTOMS & Service Tax-Surat-I)

APAR Industries Ltd.                                    ......Appellant
A-201/202, BEZZOLA COMPLES, CHEMBUR SION-TROMBAY ROAD
MUMBAI-MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA
                                   VERSUS

C.C.E. & S.T.-Surat-I                                   ......Respondent
NEW BUILDING...OPP. GANDHI BAUG,
CHOWK BAZAR,
SURAT, GUJARAT-395001

APPEARANCE:
Shri Prakash Shah, Sr. Counsel with Shri Mohit Raval & Shri Yash Prakash,
Advocates appeared for the Appellant
Shri Rajesh Nathan, Assistant Commissioner (Authorized Representative) for
the Respondent

CORAM:         HON'BLE MEMBER (JUDICIAL), MR. RAMESH NAIR
               HON'BLE MEMBER (TECHNICAL), MR. RAJU

                    Final Order No.___10324 /2024


                                               DATE OF HEARING: 23.11.2023
                                              DATE OF DECISION: 05.02.2024
RAMESH NAIR


      The brief facts of the case are that the Appellant is manufacturer of

transformer oil, aluminium conductor falling under chapter heading 27

and 76 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The

Appellant availed outward transportation service from GTA to transport

the goods from the factory to customer's premises and discharged

service tax under RCM on the said GTA services. The Appellant availed

the credit of the said service tax paid under RCM. However, due to

prevailing ambiguity regarding the admissibility of the credit the

Appellant reversed the said credit under protest.



1.1   The Appellant was issued a show cause notice dated 02.12.2009

demanding the wrongly availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on GTA

services under RCM for the period January 2005 to June 2007. The said
 2|Page                                                           E/10984/2021


demand of the wrongly availed CENVAT credit was confirmed by the

adjudicating authority, which was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals).

This    Tribunal,   vide   its   Order   dated   06.01.2020,   remanded   the

proceedings to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication. The

remand proceedings were also concluded by denying and confirming the

demand of the said credit by both the lower authorities. The present

appeal is against the Order of the Commissioner (Appeals) rejecting the

Appellant's appeal against the demand of the wrongly availed credit.



2.      Shri Prakash Shah along with Shri Mohit Raval, Advocates for the

Appellant submit that the Appellant availed the GTA services for outward

transportation of the final products on which the service tax is paid under

RCM by the Appellant and since the said services are availed for

transporting goods from the factory to the customer's premise, the said

service qualify as 'input service' and CENVAT credit of same is admissible

to the Appellant. The issue of admissibility of the credit on GTA service

for outward transportation is no longer res-integra as the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, Hon'ble High Courts and this Tribunal in various

judgments allowed the CENVAT of service tax paid on the outward

transportation services prior to the amendment of the definition of input

services under Rule 2(l) of CCR in March 2008. He placed reliance on the

following judgments: -

      Commissioner of Central Excise, Belgaum v. M/s. Vasavadatta
       Cements Ltd., 2018 (11) G.S.T.L. 3 (S.C.)
      Commissioner of Cus., C. Ex. & S.T., Guntur vs Andhra Sugars Ltd.,
       2018 (10) G.S.T.L. 12 (S.C.)
      Commissioner v. Parth Poly Wooven Pvt. Ltd., 2012 (25) S.T.R. 4
       (Guj.)
      Commr., CGST &C.Ex., Vadodara-II Vs. Gujarat Guardian Limited,
       2018 (12) G.S.T.L. 300 (Guj.)
      ABB Limited vs CCE, Bangalore, 2009 (15) STR 23 (Tri.-LB)
 3|Page                                                          E/10984/2021


      Evonik Specialty Silica India Private Limited vs C.C.E. & S.T. -Surat-
       II, 023 (11) TMI 261 - CESTAT Ahmedabad
      India Cements Ltd vs CCGST & CX, Trichy - 2022 (5) TMI 904 -
       CESTAT Chennai


It is his submission that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of CCE v. Ultratech Cement Ltd., 2018 (9) G.S.T.L. 337 (S.C.)

though analysed the definition of the input services post amendment

effective from April 2008, it was held that the benefit of credit was

available beyond the place of removal only upto 31.03.2008. The Board

vide its Circular no. 1065/4/2018-CX., dated 8.6.2018 clarified that

CENVAT credit of GTA services after the amendment shall be available

only upto the place of removal. The period of dispute in the present case

being prior to amendment, the Appellant is eligible to the credit of GTA

services for outward transportation.



2.1     Further, he brought to our notice that on the very issue for other

unit       of     the     Appellant,     the     adjudicating      authority,

BelapurCommissionerate, by relying on the judgment in the case of

Vasavadatta (supra) has sanctioned the refund of the credit availed on

GTA service for outward transportation and reversed subsequently.



3.      On the other hand, Shri Rajesh Nathan, Learned Assistant

Commissioner (AR) appearing on behalf of the Revenue reiterates the

finding of the impugned order.



4.      We have carefully considered the submissions made by both sides

and perused the records. We find that this second round of the litigation

and dispute relates to admissibility of CENVAT credit on the GTA services

availed for outward transportation of goods manufactured by the

Appellant from their factory gate till customers premises. The Appellant
 4|Page                                                        E/10984/2021


is clearing the manufactured goods at ex-factory price and provides

additional service of delivering the said goods to customers premise, for

which the Appellant is availing GTA services and service tax on such

services was paid under RCM. The definition of 'input service' as it stood

prior to and after 1.4.2008 is reproduced as under:



      "Prior to 01.04.2008:
      (i) used by a provider of taxable service for providing an
      output service; or

      (ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in
      or in relation to the manufacture of final products and
      clearance of final products from the place of removal,
      and includes..............

      W.e.f. 01.04.2008:
      (i) used by a provider of taxable service for providing an
      output service; or

      (ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in
      or in relation to the manufacture of final products and
      clearance of final products upto the place of removal,
      and includes.............."


From the above definition, it can be seen that prior to 1.4.2008, in sub-

clause (ii) any service used by the manufacturer whether directly or

indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and

clearance of final products from the place of removal, is covered under

the definition of input service. However, post 01.04.2008, only those

services which are used upto the place of removal were covered within

ambit of input services. The period involved in the present appeal is prior

to 01.04.2008.



5.    The adjudicating authority and the appellate authority denied the

CENVAT credit on the ground that the sale was not on FOR basis and the

sale was at factory gate. The price on which the excise duty was paid did

not include the cost of transportation.
 5|Page                                                               E/10984/2021


6.    The issue is considered by various judgements, which are

discussed hereunder, which clearly hold that, prior to 01.04.2008, the

outward transportation services were specifically covered by main body

of the definition of input service, which provides for means part of the

definition and it is not necessary to examine the inclusive part of the

definition of input services.



7.    The Hon'ble Apex Court in Andhra Sugars Limited-2018 (10) GSTL

12, in paragraph 8 clearly holds that "once it is accepted that the place of

removal    is    the   factory     premises   of   the    assesee,   the    outward

transportation from the said place would clearly amount to input

services. That place can be warehouse of the manufacturer or it can be

customer‟s place if from the place of removal the goods are directly

dispatched      to   the   place   of   the   customer.    One   such      outbound

transportation from the place of removal gets covered by the definition of

input service."



8.    In Commissioner of Central Excise, Belgaum v. M/s. Vasavadatta
Cements Ltd., 2018 (11) G.S.T.L. 3 (S.C.), it is held that:
      "7. As mentioned above, the expression used in the aforesaid
      Rule is "from the place of removal". It has to be from the place of
      removal upto a certain point. Therefore, tax paid on the
      transportation of the final product from the place of removal upto
      the first point, whether it is depot or the customer, has to be
      allowed.

      8. Our view gets support from the amendment which has been
      carried out by the rule making authority w.e.f. 1-4-2008 vide
      Notification No. 10/2008-C.E. (N.T.), dated 1-3-2008 whereby the
      aforesaid expression "from the place of removal" is substituted by
      "upto the place of removal". Thus from 1-4-2008, with the
      aforesaid amendment, the Cenvat credit is available only upto the
      place of removal whereas as per the amended Rule from the place
      of removal which has to be upto either the place of depot or the
      place of customer, as the case may be. This aspect has also been
      noted by the High Court in the impugned judgment in the following
      manner :

      "However, the interpretation placed by us on the words „clearance
      of final products from the place of removal‟ and the subsequent
      amendment by Notification 10/2008-C.E. (N.T.), dated 1-3-2008
 6|Page                                                        E/10984/2021


     substituting the word ‟from‟ in the said phrase in place of „upto‟
     makes it clear that transportation charges were included in the
     phrase „clearance from the place of removal‟ upto the date of the
     said substitution and it cannot be included within the phrase
     „activities relating to business‟."

     9. In view of the aforesaid discussion we hold that the appeals are
     bereft of any merit and are accordingly dismissed."


8.   In Commissioner v. Parth Poly WoovenPvt. Ltd., 2012 (25) S.T.R. 4

(Guj.), the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court held thus:

     "18. Bearing in mind the above judicial pronouncements, if we
     revert back to the definition of the term „input service‟, as already
     noticed, it is coined in the phraseology of "means and includes".
     Portion of the definition which goes with the expression means, is
     any service used by the manufacturer whether directly or indirectly
     in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance
     of final products from the place of removal. This definition itself is
     wide in its expression and includes large number of services used
     by the manufacturer. Such service may have been used either
     directly or even indirectly. To qualify for input service, such service
     should have been used for the manufacture of the final products or
     in relation to manufacture of final product or even in clearance of
     the final product from the place of removal. The expression „in
     relation to manufacture‟ is wider than „for the purpose of
     manufacture‟. The words „and clearance of the final products from
     the place of removal‟ are also significant. Means part of the
     definition has not limited the services only upto the place of
     removal, but covers services used by the manufacturer for the
     clearance of the final products even from the place of removal. It
     can thus be seen that main body of the definition of term „input
     service‟ is wide and expansive and covers variety of services
     utilized by the manufacturer. By no stretch of imagination can it be
     stated that outward transportation service would not be a service
     used by the manufacturer for clearance of final products from the
     place of removal.
     19. When we hold that outward transportation would be an input
     service as covered in the expression „means‟ part of the definition,
     it would be difficult to exclude such service on the basis of any
     interpretation that may be offered of the later portion of the
     definition which is couched in the expression „includes‟. As already
     observed, it is held in several decisions that the expression
     „includes‟ cannot be used to oust any activity from the main body
     of the definition if it is otherwise covered by the expression
     „means‟. In other words, the expression 'includes' followed by
     'means' in any definition is generally understood to be
     expanding the definition of the term to make it exhaustive,
     but in no manner can the expression 'includes' be utilized to
     limit the scope of definition provided in the main body of the
     definition. To our mind this was also not the intention of the
     Legislature in the present case."
 7|Page                                                      E/10984/2021


9.   In Commr., CGST & C. Ex., Vadodara-II Vs. Gujarat Guardian

Limited, 2018 (12) G.S.T.L. 300 (Guj.), the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court

held thus:

     "2. It is not in dispute that the issues arising in the present Tax
     Appeal are squarely covered by the judgment in case of
     Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs v. Parth Poly WoovenPvt. Ltd.
     reported in 2012 (25) S.T.R. 4 in which it was observed as under:


         18. Bearing in mind the above judicial pronouncements, if we
         revert back to the definition of the term „input service‟, as
         already noticed, it is coined in the phraseology of "means and
         includes". Portion of the definition which goes with the
         expression means, is any service used by the manufacturer
         whether directly or indirectly in or in relation to the
         manufacture of final products and clearance of final products
         from the place of removal. This definition itself is wide in its
         expression and includes large number of services used by the
         manufacturer. Such service may have been used either directly
         or even indirectly. To qualify for input service, such service
         should have been used for the manufacture of the final
         products or in relation to manufacture of final product or even
         in clearance of the final product from the place of removal. The
         expression „in relation to manufacture‟ is wider than „for the
         purpose of manufacture‟. The words „and clearance of the final
         products from the place of removal‟ are also significant. Means
         part of the definition has not limited the services only upto the
         place of removal, but covers services used by the manufacturer
         for the clearance of the final products even from the place of
         removal. It can thus be seen that main body of the definition of
         term „input service‟ is wide and expansive and covers variety of
         services utilized by the manufacturer. By no stretch of
         imagination can it be stated that outward transportation service
         would not be a service used by the manufacturer for clearance
         of final products from the place of removal.


         19. When we hold that outward transportation would be an
         input service as covered in the expression „means‟ part of the
         definition, it would be difficult to exclude such service on the
         basis of any interpretation that may be offered of the later
         portion of the definition which is couched in the expression
         „includes‟. As already observed, it is held in several decisions
         that the expression „includes‟ cannot be used to oust any
         activity from the main body of the definition if it is otherwise
         covered by the expression „means‟. In other words, the
         expression 'includes' followed by 'means' in any
         definition is generally understood to be expanding the
         definition of the term to make it exhaustive, but in no
         manner can the expression 'includes' be utilized to limit
         the scope of definition provided in the main body of the
         definition. To our mind this was also not the intention of the
         Legislature in the present case.
 8|Page                                                         E/10984/2021


          20. There, of course, are certain areas which still remain to be
          cleared. It was vehemently contended before us by the counsel
          for the Revenue that later portion of the definition which
          provides for the inclusion clause limits the outward
          transportation service up to the place of removal. That being
          so, according to them, the outward transport service utilized by
          the manufacturer beyond the place of removal would not qualify
          as an input service within the definition of Rule 2(1). We may
          only notice two things in this regard. Firstly, in our view, when
          we find that outward transport service is covered by the main
          body of the definition which provides for means part, as
          specifically including any service directly or indirectly in or in
          relation to manufacture of final product or clearance of final
          product from the place of removal, no interpretation of the later
          part of the definition would permit us to exclude such a service
          from the sweep of the definition. Secondly, we notice that the
          definition of the term „input service‟ came to be amended with
          effect from 1-4-2008 and instead of words "clearance of final
          products from the place of removal", the words "clearance of
          final products upto the place of removal" came to be
          substituted. What would be the position if the case had arisen
          after 1-4-2008 is a situation we are not confronted with. We,
          therefore, refrain from making any observations in this regard.
          We, however, cannot help noticing the change in the statutory
          provisions which is at the heart of the entire controversy.
          Insofar as the cases on hand are concerned, the statutory
          provisions cover the service used by the manufacturer in
          relation to the manufacture of the final products or even the
          clearance of final products from the place of removal.


          22. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that the outward
          transport service used by the manufacturer for transportation of
          finished goods from the place of removal upto the premises of
          the purchaser is covered within the definition of "input service"
          provided in Rule 2(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004."


       3. In the result, Tax Appeal is dismissed."


10.    We also find that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Ultratech Cement Ltd., 2018 (9) G.S.T.L. 337 (S.C.) has held that the

benefit which was admissible even beyond the place of removal was post

amendment restricted upto the place of removal. The relevant para is as

under:



      "7. It may be relevant to point out here that the original definition
      of „input service‟ contained in Rule 2(l) of the Rules, 2004 used the
      expression „from the place of removal‟. As per the said definition,
      service used by the manufacturer of clearance of final products „from
      the place of removal‟ to the warehouse or customer‟s place etc., was
      exigible for Cenvat Credit. This stands finally decided in Civil Appeal
      No. 11710 of 2016 (Commissioner of Central Excise Belgaum v. M/s.
 9|Page                                                           E/10984/2021


      Vasavadatta Cements Ltd.) vide judgment dated January 17, 2018.
      However, vide amendment carried out in the aforesaid Rules in the
      year 2008, which became effective from March 1, 2008, the word
      „from‟ is replaced by the word „upto‟. Thus, it is only „upto the place
      of removal‟ that service is treated as input service. This amendment
      has changed the entire scenario. The benefit which was admissible
      even beyond the place of removal now gets terminated at the place
      of removal and doors to the Cenvat credit of input tax paid gets
      closed at that place. This credit cannot travel therefrom. It becomes
      clear from the bare reading of this amended Rule, which applies to
      the period in question that the Goods Transport Agency service used
      for the purpose of outward transportation of goods, i.e. from the
      factory to customer‟s premises, is not covered within the ambit of
      Rule 2(l)(i) of Rules, 2004. Whereas the word „from‟ is the indicator
      of starting point, the expression „upto‟ signifies the terminating
      point, putting an end to the transport journey."


11.    In view of above judgments, we hold that the Appellant is entitled

to CENVAT credit of service tax paid under RCM for transportation of

goods from its factory to customer's premises. No case is made out by

the revenue for denial of the CENVAT Credit on the ground that goods

were not sold on FOR basis.



12.    As regards the inclusion of the cost of transportation in the
assessable value of the goods cleared by the Appellant, we find that this
very issue was considered by the Larger Bench's in the case of ABB
Limited - 2009 (15) STR 23 (Tri.-LB), which was ultimately upheld by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Vasavdatta (Supra), and in which it is
held as under:


      "18. For admissibility to credit for outward transportation there is
      no requirement that the cost of freight should enter into the
      transaction value of the manufactured goods. According to the
      department, since the cost of outward transportation does not form
      part of the transaction value of the manufactured goods as defined
      in Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, any service tax paid for
      the outward transportation of goods from place of removal cannot
      be allowed as credit to the manufacturer, although, the question of
      denial of credit does not arise if the cost of freight is included in the
      transaction value. However, this stand is not tenable. In other
      words, credit is not to be automatically disallowed in those cases
      where the freight cost does not form part of the transaction
      value.............
      ........................

22. There is an additional reason for holding that CENVAT credit is admissible on services even if the value thereof is not part of the value subjected to duty. This is because the interpretation of the expression "input services" cannot fluctuate with the change in the 10 | P a g e E/10984/2021 definition of "value" in Section 4 of the Central Excise Act and cannot vary depending on whether the goods are levied to duty under Section 4A of the Central Excise Act or tariff value under Section 3(2) of the Central Excise Act or the product attract specific rate of duty.............."

13. Following the decision of the larger bench in ABB Limited, we hold that non-inclusion of the costs of the transportation in assessable value is no ground to deny the CENVAT credit.

14. We further find that demand in the present case relates to the period January, 2005 to June, 2007 and the show cause notice was issued on 02.12.2009. The entire demand is beyond normal period of one year. The issue involved is of interpretation of Cenvat Credit Rules and on this issue there are number of judgements. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the Appellant had a mala fide intention to evade the excise duty by taking the wrong credit. We do not find any suppression of fact or misstatement on the part of the Appellant. Thus, we are of the opinion that extended period cannot apply in the facts of the present case.

15. We accordingly set aside the impugned order both on merits and on limitation. The Appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any.

(Pronounced in the open court on 05.02.2024) (RAMESH NAIR) MEMBER (JUDICIAL) (RAJU) MEMBER (TECHNICAL) Neha