Allahabad High Court
Ramesh Chandra (Singh) vs Hon'Ble High Court Of Judicature At ... on 3 December, 2010
Bench: Sunil Ambwani, Jayashree Tiwari
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 29 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 63418 of 2007 Petitioner :- Ramesh Chandra (Singh) Respondent :- Hon'Ble High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad And Others Petitioner Counsel :- Govind Saran Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,Amit Sthalekar Hon'ble Sunil Ambwani,J.
Hon'ble Mrs. Jayashree Tiwari,J.
1. We have heard Sri Govind Saran for the petitioner. Sri Amit Sthalekar appears for the High Court, Allahabad - respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Standing counsel appears for respondent No. 3 - the State.
2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of punishment dated 8.5.2007 passed by the Full Court of the High Court at Allahabad, withholding his two increments, without cumulative effect, (Annexure-1 to the writ petition); and the order dated 6.10.2007 passed on his review application, (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), to the effect that the review was not acceptable.
3. The petitioner retired as District Judge, Etah in the year 1999. In the year 1998, when he was serving as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Jhansi, a charge sheet dated 30.3.1998 was issued to him by the High Court, with the allegations that he had granted bail to the accused Ram Pal Singh on 22.6.1996, on extraneous consideration. A disciplinary enquiry was conducted against him, in which he was found to be guilty of granting bail to the accused. The enquiry report was considered for punishment by the Full Court. The Full Court by its resolution dated 20.11.1999 imposed a major punishment, of withholding two annual increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect. A review application filed by him was rejected.
4. The petitioner filed a writ petition No. 31769 of 2000, which was dismissed on 3.10.2005. By the same judgement, the petitioner was directed to show cause as to why the punishment imposed on him may not be substituted, by removing him from service. By the judgement dated 25.11.2005, after considering petitioner's reply, he was, by the judicial order, reduced to the rank next below, that is of Civil Judge (Senior Division).
5. The petitioner filed a Civil Appeal No. 2015 of 2006 in the Supreme Court. In a judgement delivered by a bench of Supreme Court, presided by Hon'ble K.G. Balakrishnan, the then CJI, it was found that the petitioner did not commit any misconduct in granting bail to the accused. The relevant portions of the judgement of the Supreme Court are quoted as follows: -
" We fail to understand as to how the High Court arrived at a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings solely based on the complaint, the contents of which were not believed to be true by the High Court. If the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. The appellant-officer was well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. Unlike provisions for granting bail in TADA Act or NDPS Act, there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail and if any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer for passing such an order, it would adversely affect the moral of subordinate judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise this power freely and independently.
This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, High Court must take extra care and caution.
... ... ... ... ...
... ... Of course, if the Judicial Officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Art. 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grass root level.
Apart from the merits of the case before us, we have also gone into the Confidential Reports of the appellant-officer. His integrity and honesty had never been doubted at any point of time. In some of the confidential reports except stating that the appellant-officer was not having smooth relationship with the advocates, no other adverse remarks had been entered. Two Senior Judges of the High Court have entered in his confidential register that the appellant is an officer of honesty and integrity. The fact that it was a case of daylight murder wherein two persons died, is not adequate to hold that the accused were not entitled to bail at all. Passing order on a bail application is a matter of discretion which is exercised by a Judicial Officer with utmost responsibility. When a co-accused had been granted bail by the High Court, the appellant cannot be said to have passed an unjustified order granting bail, that too, to an accused who was a student, and had been in jail for more than one year. If at all, the Inspecting Judge had found anything wrong with the Order, he should have sent for the officer and advised him to be careful in future. The punishment of reverting the appellant to the post of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), in the facts and circumstances of this case could only be termed as draconian and unjust. The appellant had been in the cadre of District Judge for eight years at the time this grave punishment of reversion to a lower rank was imposed on him. In our opinion, the punishment was clearly disproportionate to the lapse alleged to have been committed by him. The imposition of the punishment of withholding two increments with cumulative effect also appears to be disproportionate to the alleged lapse."
6. The Supreme Court consequently set aside the judgements of the High Court dated 3.10.2005 and 25.11.2005, with directions to post the petitioner to the cadre of District Judge, and pay all monetary benefits due to him as a consequence thereof. The Supreme Court also set aside the order of the Full Court imposing the penalty of withholding two increments to the petitioner with cumulative effect, and remitted the matter to the Full Court to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment on the petitioner. The operative portion of the judgement of the Supreme Court is quoted as under:-
"Consequently, we set aside the Judgment of the High Court dated 3.10.2005 and also the Judgment rendered by the very same court on 25.11.2005. The appellant shall be immediately posted to the cadre of District Judge and paid all monetary benefits due to him as a consequence thereof. We also set aside the initial order passed by the Full Court of the High Court imposing the penalty of withholding two increments to the appellant with cumulative effect.
As the Full Court alone is the ultimate competent authority to consider all disciplinary matters and has indeed taken the decision impugned before us, we remit the matter to the Full Court to consider afresh the question of imposition of appropriate punishment on the appellant.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly."
7. The petitioner filed an application dated 8.3.2007 along with copy of the judgement of the Supreme Court dated 26.2.2007. The Full Court considered the matter again, and modified the punishment order by withholding two increments without cumulative effect. The decision was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 8.5.2007 of the Registrar General of the High Court, with a copy to the Additional Director, Treasuries, Allahabad. The petitioner filed a representation dated 24.8.2007 to review/recall the order dated 8.5.2007. He was informed by letter dated 6.10.2007 of the Registrar (Confidential) that the High Court has considered the representation and has been pleased to pass an order that the representation for review is not acceptable, giving rise to this writ petition.
8. It is submitted by Sri Govind Saran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that after the findings recorded by the Supreme Court as above, it was not open for the High Court to have reconsidered the question of accepting the enquiry report, and to punish the petitioner again by reducing it from the punishment of withholding two increments with permanent effect, to the punishment of withholding two increments without cumulative effect.
9. Sri Govind Saran submits that the Supreme Court had considered the merits of the matter, and had found that no charges were made out against the petitioner at all. The charge of extraneous consideration was not proved. The Supreme Court also found that prima facie there was no material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of the duty or acting in a manner to unduly favour a party. The petitioner, it was held, had not passed an order actuated by corrupt motive. Unless these ingredients were established, the disciplinary proceeding could not be initiated against a judicial officers.
10. Sri Govind Saran further submits that in fact the Supreme Court had found that the petitioner could not be said to have passed an unjustified order granting bail, that too to an accused who was a student and had been in jail for more than one year. The Supreme Court further observed that if at all, the Inspecting Jude found anything wrong with the officer, he should have advised him to be careful in future. The punishment of reverting the petitioner to the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division), in the facts and circumstances of the case, could only be termed as "draconian and unjust".
11. Sri Govind Saran further submits that the Supreme Court further considered the length of service of the petitioner, and examined his service record to find out if there was anything against his integrity. In some of the confidential reports it was stated that the officer was not having smooth relationship with the Advocates, but no adverse remarks had been entered. It was found that two Senior Judges of the High Court have entered in his confidential register, that the petitioner is an officer of honesty and integrity. In the circumstances, there was absolutely no justification for the Full Court to have awarded punishment. In fact after the Supreme Court had set aside the findings of the enquiry officer, there could be no material whatsoever for the High Court to have reconsidered the matter for accepting the same enquiry report and in granting punishment, and that too after the High Court posted the petitioner as District Judge. The order of remand of the Supreme Court to the Full Court to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment, could not have been taken as a direction to reconsider the matter and award a lesser punishment.
12. Sri Amit Sthalekar submits that on the admitted facts, the Supreme Court had, after setting aside the punishment of reduction in rank and punishment by the judgement of the Court, and of two increments with cumulative effect by the Full Court, directed the Full Court to consider afresh the question of imposition of appropriate punishment. The Full Court in its wisdom considered the matter of punishment that a lesser punishment would be sufficient and awarded the punishment of withholding two increments without cumulative effect. He submits that the Full Court's considered the matter of punishment was in exercise of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, read with Punishment and Appeal Rules. It found that since the enquiry report was accepted by the Full Court, a lesser punishment of withholding two increments without cumulative effect, would be sufficient. The court on judicial side ordinarily should not interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded to Judicial Officers.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, and find that the Supreme Court had exonerated the petitioner from the charge of granting bail on extraneous consideration, which according to the Supreme Court did not constitute any charge of misconduct at all. The Supreme Court also reiterated the established law on which the High Court, in exercise of its discretionary power, can punish a Judicial Officer.
14. The Supreme Court not only set aside the judgement of the High Court dated 3.10.2005 by which the writ petition was dismissed, but also the judgement rendered by the very same court on 25.11.2005 awarding punishment of reduction in rank, and directed the officer to be posted to the cadre of District Judge, with all monetary benefits due to him as a consequence thereof. The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to set aside the initial decision passed by the Full Court dated 20.11.1999, imposing penalty of withholding two increments to the petitioner with cumulative effect.
15. We find substance in the arguments of learned counsel of the petitioner, that the Full Court should have considered the findings, and the principles of law in awarding punishment to Judicial Officers, for which a reminder was sent by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has consistently held, as it is quoted with approval by Hon'be the Chief of India, in his judgement as follows:-
"In Iswar Chandra Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 1395, this Court observed that while exercising control over subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court is under a Constitutional obligation to guide and protect subordinate judicial officers. An honest and strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries. If complaints are entertained in trifling matters and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints, no judicial officer would feel secure and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect honest judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
In K.P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 1031, where the High Court reversed the order passed by the lower court making remarks about interestedness and motive of the lower court in passing the unmerited order, this Court observed that one of the functions of the higher court is either to modify or set aside erroneous orders passed by the lower courts. Our legal system acknowledges fallibility of Judges. It has to be kept in mind that a subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure - contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. He does not enjoy the detached atmosphere of the higher court. Every error, however gross it may be, should not be attributed to improper motives. The Judges of the High Court have a responsibility to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. No greater damage can be done to the administration of justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary if the higher courts express lack of faith in the subordinate judiciary for some reason or other. That amounts to destruction of judiciary from within.
In Kashi Nath Roy v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3240, this Court observed under a similar circumstance that in our system appellate and revisional courts have been set up with the presupposition that the lower courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in decision-making in law and in fact. The higher courts have been established to correct errors. In cases where intolerable error is pointed out, it is functionally required to correct the error in an appropriate case and in a manner befitting maintaining dignity of the court and independence of the judiciary. The higher court should convey its message in the judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellowed but clear and result-oriented and rarely a rebuke.
In series of other cases also, this court disfavoured the practice of passing strictures or orders against the subordinate officers. (See : Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1157; Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S. N. Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 453).
In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2881, this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the Judicial Officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Art. 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level."
16. The Supreme Court categorically found that the charge against the petitioner did not amount to misconduct. The petitioner had not granted the bail for extraneous considerations. The Supreme Court has held, in uncertain terms, that the accused deserved to be granted bail both on the grounds that the co accused were granted bail, and that the fact that he was a student, lodged in jail for more than one year. On these findings, the High Court could not have accepted the enquiry report, for considering and deciding the question of imposition of punishment. If the charges were not established, as it was clearly held by the Supreme Court, it was not open to the Full Court, to deliberate over the matter, and to award punishment.
17. We find that in view of the observations made in the judgement of the Supreme Court, the High Court, did not have any discretion left with it, in the proceeding, to punish the petitioner, even with a lesser punishment. The High Court completely misunderstood, the directions issued to it, to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment. The advice given on judicial side, was binding on the Court on administrative side. After the Supreme Court found that, the petitioner cannot be said to have passed an unjustified order granting bail, and there was no allegation of receiving illegal gratification for granting bail, the enquiry report, on the same charges could not be relied upon to consider the question of punishment.
18. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of punishment dated 8.5.2007 and also the order dated 6.10.2007 passed on the review application are set aside. The petitioner will given all consequential benefits, as expeditiously as possible.
Order Date :- 3.12.2010 nethra