Karnataka High Court
Shri.Shrikant S/O Dasharath Babagond vs Shri.Mahaveer S/O Dasharath Babagond on 27 September, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 27th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C. M. POONACHA
MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL NO. 100112 OF 2019
BETWEEN
SHRI.SHRIKANT
S/O. DASHARATH BABAGOND @ BABAGOUDA,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LR'S
1a. SMT. TRISHALA W/O. SHRIKANT S/O. BABAGOND
AGE: 58 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. HALEPET GALLI, TERADAL-587315.
TQ: JAMAKHANDI, DIST. BAGALKOT.
1b. NIKHIL S/O. SHRIKANT S/O. BABAGOND
Digitally signed
by AGE: 38 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
SHIVAKUMAR
SHIVAKUMAR HIREMATH R/O. HALEPET GALLI, TERADAL-587315.
HIREMATH Date:
2023.09.30 TQ: JAMAKHANDI, DIST. BAGALKOT.
12:04:42
+0530
1c. SMT. SUSHMA W/O. PRASHANT PARAMGOUDAR
AGE: 36 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. NEAR JAIN BASADI, HARUGERI-591220.
TQ: RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
1d. NISHANT S/O. SHRIKANT S/O. BABAGOND
AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. HALEPET GALLI, TERADAL-587315.
TQ: JAMAKHANDI, DIST. BAGALKOT.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. CHETAN MUNNOLI, ADV.)
2
AND
SHRI.MAHAVEER
S/O. DASHARATH BABAGOND @ BABAGOUDA
AGE: 59 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: TERADAL-587315,
TQ: JAMAKHANDI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. GIRISH A. YADAWAD, ADV.)
THIS MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL IS FILED U/SEC.43
RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DTD:
11.06.2019 PASSED IN R.A.NO.222/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE VII
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BELAGAVI, SITTING
AT CHIKODI, ALLOWING THE APPEAL FILED AGAINST THE
JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DTD: 13.07.2016 PASSED IN
O.S.NO.186/2015, ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL
JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS, ATHANI, ALLOWING
THE I.A. NO. 3 FILED UNDER ORDER 7 RULE 11(d) OF CPC.
THIS MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL, HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND RESERVED ON 13.09.2023, COMING ON FOR PRONUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, THIS COURT PRONUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The present appeal is filed by the Defendant under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC') challenging the judgment dated 11.06.2019 passed in R.A. No.222/2016 by the Court of VII Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi, sitting at Chikkodi (hereinafter referred to as 'First Appellate Court'). 3
2. The parties will be referred to as per their ranking before their Trial Court for the sake of convenience.
3. The Plaintiff who is arrayed as Respondent in the present appeal filed O.S. No.186/2015 on the file of Senior Civil Judge and JMFC., Athani (hereinafter referred to as the 'Trial Court') for declaration of title and for permanent injunction. The Plaintiff and the Defendant are brothers. It is the case of the Plaintiff that their father had five brothers and they have inherited properties from their ancestors and after the death of Ningappa, who was the elder brother of their father, another brother namely Sri Annappa was managing the joint family properties as 'Kartha'. During his lifetime, all the brothers engaged themselves in different occupations and business earned money and they purchased number of properties in the name of different persons. In respect of the said properties, there was a family arrangement and the said Annappa distributed the said properties and hence, the suit 4 properties including the other properties were given to the father of the parties and the name of the Defendant was entered in the revenue records.
4. It is the further case of the Plaintiff that in the family arrangement, the properties were partitioned as per the oral partition dated 09.07.1999 between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and thus, the Plaintiff has right and share in the suit properties from the time of his birth and the said properties are ancestral joint family properties. That the father of the parties died on 23.05.1999 and hence, on 09.07.1999, in the presence of well wishers and family members, the Plaintiff and Defendant, orally partitioned the properties and the Plaintiff was allotted western portion measuring 2 acres in R.S. No.461/3 (from total extent of 4 acres 1 guntas) and 2 acres 32 guntas in R.S. No.267/3 (from total extent of 5 acres 29 guntas) and southern portion of 2 acres 5 guntas in R.S. No.201/1 now renumbered as R.S. No.201/1B. Thereafter, on 5 10.07.1999 and 11.7.1999 the Plaintiff and Defendant took the elders to the agricultural lands, got the same measured and took the possession of the properties allotted to their respective shares. Hence, the parties came into possession and enjoyment of their share of the properties.
5. It is the further case of the Plaintiff that when they attempted to get the revenue entries changed in their names, they were informed that they are required to execute a memorandum of partition and hence, a memorandum of partition was drawn up as per the partition which took place on 09.07.1999 which was signed by the elders and accordingly, on 07.10.1999, Wardi was submitted to the revenue authorities and the names were entered in the revenue records. At the time, the Plaintiff requested the Defendant that his name be entered in the revenue records of the suit properties and the Defendant informed the Plaintiff he will look into the same. Hence, believing his words, the Plaintiff continued enjoying the 6 suit properties. However, the Defendant raised objections to the same. Hence, the Plaintiff has filed the suit for declaration and consequential relief of permanent injunction.
6. The Defendant entered appearance in the suit and contested the case of the Plaintiff by filing written statement denying the case of the Plaintiff. The Defendant contended inter alia that the suit properties belong to the uncle of the parties namely Sri Annappa who had cloth business at Terdal and he did not inherit any properties from his ancestors. That the brothers of the father of the parties were also engaged in different occupation. That the uncle of the parties namely Annappa out of his income from the cloth business purchased the suit properties and they were his self acquired properties and neither the father of the parties or any of the other brothers had any right, title or interest in the said properties. That the uncle of the parties Annappa, had special love and affection towards the 7 defendants as also another cousin Bharamppa Paris Babagonda and accordingly, he orally relinquished his right in the suit properties in favour of the defendant and the said Bharamappa and in pursuance of the same, gave Wardi to enter his name in the revenue records. Hence, the suit properties and R.S. No. 202/1 were the absolute properties of defendant and Bharamappa and they were treated as such.
7. It is the further case of the defendant that the said Bharamappa who was the joint owner of the properties gave up his share in R.S. No.201/1 and 202/1 in favour of his brother Balappa who started jointly enjoying the said properties along with the said defendant. That later in the year 1994, there was a partition between Balappa and the Defendant and in the said partition, the Defendant was allotted southern portion measuring 2 acres 15 guntas out of R.S. No.202/1 and southern portion measuring in R.S. 8 No.201/1 measuring 2 acres 5 guntas later renumbered as 201/1B (suit property).
8. It is the further case of the Defendant that even though other properties between the plaintiff and defendant have been orally partitioned during lifetime of their father, since the suit property R.S. No.201/1B and portion of R.S. No.202/1 situated at Shegunashi village were the absolute properties of the defendant, they continued to be in the ownership of the Defendant and he continued in possession and enjoyment of the said properties and carried out various improvements. Various other factual defences were putforth by the Defendant in the Written Statement. The Defendant also contended that the suit was barred by time.
9. The Defendant also filed I.A. No.3 under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC. It is the specific case of the Defendant in the said application that at para No.IV of the plaint, the Plaintiff pleaded that cause of action arose when 9 the Defendant filed his objections to the Wardi which was filed by the Plaintiff to get his name entered in the revenue records and consequent to the objections filed by the Defendant, the Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and injunction. It is the case of the Defendant that he filed his objection to the Wardi on 31.01.2012 and as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, a suit for declaration has to be filed within three years from the date when the cause of action first accrued. Hence, as per the case of the Plaintiff since cause of action first accrued when the Defendant filed objections to the application filed by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff ought to have filed the suit within three years from 31.10.2012 i.e., on or before 31.10.2015. The suit admittedly having been filed on 23.11.2015 the same is barred by limitation.
10. The Plaintiff filed his objection to the said application. The trial Court by its order dated 13.07.2016, allowed I.A.3 filed by the Defendant and dismissed the suit 10 as hit by Article 58 of the Limitation Act. Being aggrieved, the Plaintiff preferred R.A. No.222/2016. The Defendant entered appearance before the First Appellate Court and contested the said appeal. The First Appellate Court by its judgment dated 11.06.2019, allowed the appeal filed by the Plaintiff and remanded the matter to the Trial Court to decide the suit on its merits. Being aggrieved the present appeal is filed.
11. Sri Chetan Munnoli, learned counsel for the appellant assailing the judgment of the First Appellate Court vehemently contends that the suit having been instituted more than three years after the objection filed by the Defendant which, admittedly, is the cause of action for the suit, having regard to the specific wordings of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. He further submits that the Trial Court having correctly appreciated the factual and legal aspects, allowed I.A. 3 filed by the Defendant which has been erroneously interfered with by 11 the First Appellate Court. Hence, he seeks for setting aside the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. In support of his contentions he relied on the following judgments:
i) Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra
Murthy Vs. Syed Jalal1;
ii) Raghwendra Sharan Singh Vs.
Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by
legal representatives2;
iii) P.R. Chenna Reddy Vs.
Parvathamma and others3;
iv) Khatri Hotels Private Limited and
another Vs. Union of India and
another4;
v) Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji
Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through
legal representatives and others5;
vi) M/s. Durga Projects and
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Sri S.
Rajagopala Reddy and others6;
1
2017 (13) SCC 174
2
2020(16) SCC 601
3
2021 SCC OnLIne Kar 15828
4
(2011) 9 SCC 126
5
(2020) 7 SCC 366
6
ILR 2019 KAR 4739
12
vii) Ramisetty Venkatanna and
another Vs. Nasyam Jamai Saheb
and Others7.
12. Per contra, Sri Girish A. Yadawad, learned counsel for the Defendant contends that the point of limitation urged by the Defendant in I.A. No.3 is a mixed question of law and fact and the same is required to be be adjudicated after a full-fledged trial. He submits that suits involving adjudication of valuable rights of parties in immovable properties ought not to be rejected at the threshold and a full-fledged trial is required to be conducted as various factual aspects are required to be appreciated in the course of trial. He further submits that the First Appellate Court having been rightly re-appreciated the factual and legal aspects, has rightly set aside the order of the trial Court and remanded the suit for adjudication after a full-fledged trial, which judgment ought not to be interfered with by this Court in the present appeal. In 7 2023 SCC OnLine SC 521 13 support of the contentions, the learned counsel relied on the following judgments:
i) P.V.Guru Raj Reddy v.
P.Neeradha Reddy8;
ii) Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar9;
iii) Sri Biswanath Bank v. Sulanga
Bose10;
iv) Salim D.Agboatwala & Ors., v.
Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar &
Ors.,11
13. I have considered the submissions of both the learned counsel and perused the material available on record. The question that arise for consideration is 'Whether the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is liable to be interfered with?'
14. The essential facts are undisputed, inasmuch as the Plaintiff in the plaint has specifically averred at para 8 (2015) 8 SCC 331 9 (2018) 6 SCC 422 10 (2022) 7 SCC 731 11 Civil Appeal No.5641/2021, DD 17.9.2021 14 No.IV that the cause of action first arose when the Defendant objected to an application filed by the Plaintiff for change of revenue records. It is undisputed that the Defendant filed his objections on 31.10.2012 and that the suit was filed on 23.11.2015. Article 58 of the Limitation Act states as follows:
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
58. To obtain any other Three years When the right to sue declaration first accrues
15. Hence, it is clear that the suit is filed after a lapse of three years from the date on which the defendant objected to the Plaintiff's application for change of revenue entries. The Trial Court while allowing the application, noticed the aforementioned factual situation as well as Article 58 of the Limitation Act and noticing various judgments has recorded a finding that the suit is barred by time. The Trial Court has further noticed that the disposal of RTS Proceedings before the Tahsildar, Athani or 15 Assistant Commissioner, Chikodi or the Deputy Commissioner, Belagavi, is no way concerned in order to satisfy whether the suit is barred by limitation. Hence, the trial Court recorded a categorical finding that the right to sue arose for the first time on 31.10.2012 and successive violation of right of the Plaintiff will not give a fresh cause of action to file the suit.
16. The first Appellate Court upon a re-appreciation of the necessary facts has recorded a finding that the point of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Further, the First Appellate Court has recorded a finding that the Plaintiff is claiming title of the suit property on the basis of the oral partition dated 09.07.1999 and that the cause of action began from the said date. The First Appellate Court further noticed that the Trial Court has not framed any issue regarding limitation and the same is required to be tried after the evidence is adduced. It further recorded a finding that the question of going into the bar of limitation 16 on an application filed under Section 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure would not arise. The First Appellate Court further noticed that the relief sought in I.A.3 and the order passed by the Trial Court and held that since the relief sought in I.A. 3 is not to dismiss the suit and the trial Court having dismissed the suit, the same is erroneous.
17. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the Petitioner/defendant are considered as follows:
i) In the case of Mandanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"7. The plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order VII Rule 11, CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of 17 action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when, the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage."
(emphasis supplied)
ii) In the case of Raghwendra Sharan Singh2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"9. Now, so far as the application on behalf of the original plaintiff and even the observations made by the learned trial court as well as the High Court that the question with respect to the limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which can be decided only after the parties lead the evidence, is concerned, as observed and held by this Court in Sham Lal [Sham Lal v. Sanjeev Kumar, (2009) 12 SCC 454 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 741] ; N.V. Srinivasa Murthy [N.V. Srinivasa Murthy v. Mariyamma, (2005) 5 SCC 548 : AIR 2005 SC 2897] as well as in Ram Prakash Gupta [Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta, (2007) 10 SCC 59] , considering the averments in the plaint if it is found that the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the same can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. "18
iii) In the case of P.R. Chenna Reddy3 a co- ordinate Bench of this Court noticing the facts of the case and the relevant legal position as laid down in various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the period of limitation has interfered with the order of the trial Court dismissing the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) of CPC, allowed the said application and rejected the plaint.
iv) In the case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited and another4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considering the language of Article 58 of the Limitation Act held as follows:
"30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word `first' has been used between the words `sue' and `accrued'. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation 19 counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued."
(emphasis supplied)
v) In the case of Dahiben5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considering Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act and the judgment in the case of Khatri Hotels4 has held as follows:
"28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh,13 held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words "right to sue" means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected."
vi) In the case of M/s. Durga Projects6, a co- ordinate Bench of this Court considering the facts of the case and the legal position as is forthcoming from the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that 20 the suit is barred by time and allowed the revision petitions and rejected the plaint.
vii) In the case of Ramisetty Venkatanna7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, noticing the averments of the plaint held that the same are vexatious and discloses illusory cause of action and is barred by limitation, interfered with the judgment of the Trial Court has allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) of CPC and rejected the plaint.
18. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the Respondent/Defendant are considered as under:
i) In the case of P.V.Guru Raj Reddy8 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"5. Rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC is a drastic power conferred in the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. The conditions precedent to the exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, therefore, are stringent and have been consistently held to be so by the Court. It is the averments in the plaint that have to be read as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law. At the stage of exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, the 21 stand of the defendants in the written statement or in the application for rejection of the plaint is wholly immaterial. It is only if the averments in the plaint ex facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof the suit appears to be barred under any law the plaint can be rejected. In all other situations, the claims will have to be "
adjudicated in the course of the trial.
(emphasis supplied)
ii) In the case of Chhotanben9 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. ........."
(emphasis supplied)
iii) In the case of Sri Biswanath Bank10 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"7. Now, so far as the issue whether the suit can be said to be barred by limitation or not, at this stage, what is required to be considered is the averments in the plaint. Only in a case where on the face of it, it is seen that the suit is barred by limitation, then and then only a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d)CPC on the ground of limitation. At this stage what is required to be considered is the averments in the plaint. For the 22 aforesaid purpose, the Court has to consider and read the averments in the plaint as a whole.
7.1. From the aforesaid decision and even otherwise as held by this Court in a catena of decisions, while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court has to go through the entire plaint averments and cannot reject the plaint by reading only few lines/passages and ignoring the other relevant parts of the plaint.
8. In the present case, while holding that the suit is barred by limitation, the High Court has considered only the averments made in Para 4 and has not considered the entire plaint averments. "
(emphasis supplied)
iv) In the case of Salim D.Agboatwala & Ors.11 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"10. Insofar as the rejection of plaint on the ground of limitation is concerned, it is needless to emphasis that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. It is the case of the appellants/plaintiffs that only after making inspection of the records in connection with the suit land available in the office of defendant No.3 (Court Receiver) that they came across the correspondence and documents relating to the transactions and that the proceedings before the ALT were collusive, fraudulent and null and void. The appellants/plaintiffs have even questioned the authority of the Court Receiver to represent them in the tenancy proceedings.
11. The above averments may or may not be true. But if the plaintiffs succeed in establishing the above averments, the issue of limitation cannot be put against the plaintiffs. Generally a party, who never had any notice of a particular proceeding before a quasi-judicial 23 authority, is entitled to approach the Court upon gaining knowledge of the proceedings. Limitation cannot be put against such a party."
(emphasis supplied)
19. Having regard to the judgments relied on by both the learned Counsel, as noticed above, it is a settled proposition of law that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC only the averments made in the plaint are required to be considered. The averments made in the plaint have to be read as a whole. Only a few averments in the plaint ought not to be read in isolation, ignoring the other averments in the plaint. Further, to reject a plaint by taking recourse to Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, the plaint should ex facie be barred by law.
20. In the present case, the Appellant/Defendant relied on para 4 of the plaint and has contended that the averments made by the Plaintiff that the cause of action to sue arose when the Defendant filed his objections to the Wardi filed by the Plaintiff to get his name entered in the 24 revenue records in respect of the suit property. The Defendant has averred in his written statement and in the affidavit accompanying IA.3 that he has filed the objections on 31.10.2012 and hence, has taken a contention that by virtue of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the suit of the Plaintiff ought to have been filed within three years from the date of his objections and hence, the suit of the Plaintiff having been filed beyond the period of three years, is barred by law and liable to be rejected.
21. It is relevant to note that the Plaintiff is claiming right to the suit property by virtue of the oral partition alleged to have accrued on 9.7.1999 between the Plaintiff and Defendant which has been subsequently acted upon, as has been detailed in the plaint. Thereafter, the Plaintiff has averred that when he made an application to enter his name in the revenue records and when the same was objected to, the cause of action to file the suit for declaration arose.
25
22. Having regard to the entirety of the case set out by the Plaintiff in the plaint, if the same is read as a whole, it is clear that various factual aspects arise for consideration, which are required to be adjudicated during the course of trial.
23. It is also relevant to note that in the present suit where valuable rights of parties in immovable property are required to be adjudicated, by no stretch of imagination can the suit of the Plaintiff be held to be frivolous or vexatious so as to invoke drastic power as contemplated under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. While considering IA.3 filed by the Defendant it would be erroneous to read only para 4 of the plaint with regard to cause of action in isolation to the other averments made in the plaint, wherein the Plaintiff has set out the manner in which he asserts right, title and interest in the suit property.
24. In view of the aforementioned, the Appellant has failed in demonstrating that the order passed by the First 26 Appellate Court is in any manner erroneous or illegal and warrants interference by this Court in the present appeal. Accordingly, the question framed for consideration is answered in the negative.
25. Hence, the above appeal is dismissed as being devoid of merit.
(Sd/-) JUDGE BS