State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs M/S Delhi Gujrat Fleet on 19 December, 2019
Daily Order IN THE STATE COMMISSION: DELHI (Constituted under Section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986) Date of Decision: 19.12.2019 First Appeal No. 243/2016 (Arising out of the order dated 04.08.2015 passed in complaint case No. 146/2012 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (Central), Kashmere gate, Delhi) In the matter of: The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Delhi Regional Office-2, 4-E/14, Jhandewlan Extension, New Delhi-110055 Having its Office at: Delhi Regional Office-2, Scope Minar, Laxmi Nagar, New Delhi-110092 Versus M/s. Delhi Gujarat Fleet Carrier Pvt. Ltd. Through its Managing Director, Shri Ashok Dhingra, Having its office at: 28/5-6, Near Kapashera Police Station, Samalkha, New Delhi-110037 .....Respondent CORAM Ms. Salma Noor, Presiding Member
1. Whether reporters of local newspaper be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not?
Ms. Salma Noor: Presiding Member Present appeal is filed under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the 'Act') against the impugned order dated 04.08.2015 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (Central), Kashmere Gate, Delhi (in short the 'District Forum') in complaint case no. 146/2012.
Along with appeal the appellant has moved an application for condonation of delay. According to the appellant there is a delay of 215 days in filing the present appeal.
Notice of this appeal was issued to the respondent who appeared and opposed the application by filing the reply.
I have heard the arguments of the parties and perused the material on record.
It is an admitted case of the appellant that the certified copy of the impugned order was received on 18.09.2015 at the office of the appellant.
Counsel for appellant states that the impugned order was sent to the office of counsel on 29.09.2015 by post which was received by the counsel on 06.10.2015. It is further stated that opinion was sent to the Divisional office on 10.10.2015 by the counsel. Thereafter, the Divisional office sent file to the Regional Office on 17.11.2015. It is stated that further file moved to the office for consideration and the same was received back by the Regional office on 22.12.2015. The Regional office decided on 27.01.2016 to challenge the impugned order. It is stated that meanwhile the respondent has consented for forging the salvage amount and the competent authority decided not to file appeal on 02.02.2016 and file was sent to competent authority. The competent authority sought information from Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Advocate and the same was received by the Head office on 17.03.2016 and the head office by vide email dated 31.03.2016 informed the regional office that the competent authority has decided to file the appeal. Thereafter, appellant has instructed the counsel for filing the appeal on 07.04.2016 through email and counsel for the appellant received the relevant papers along with the certified copy of the order on 12.04.2016 at New Delhi. The appeal is prepared and the same was sent to the signature and attestation on 18.04.2016. Thereafter, the appeal is filed hence delay of 215 days has been occurred.
Appellant has not disclosed the details regarding the date on which the approval from the competent authority was initiated, the name and the designation of the competent authority, the period taken by the Divisional office, Regional office and Head office and as to why such long period has taken and who was the person responsible for the time taken by the competent authority to give permission. Even the date on which the counsel was permitted to be engaged and the date on which the file was handed over to the counsel and most important the name of the counsel is not disclosed.
The explanation given for the delay is very casual which shows the careless attitude of the appellant. The delay cannot be condoned mechanically on the basis of very casual explanation. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government Departments.
It is well settled that "sufficient causes" for condoning delay in each case is a question of fact.
The meaning of the "sufficient causes" has been defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basavraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510, and has held as under:-
" 9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", in as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended, therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces not more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin V. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal V. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 L2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben Devraj Shah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412).
12. It is a settle legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flawing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that "sufficient cause" only mean adequate and enough reason which prevented a person to approach court within the period of limitation. Where a party remained inactive or has not acted diligently, this cannot be sufficient cause for condonation of such delay.
In Office of the chief post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media Ltd. & Anr.",II (2012) SLT 312 it was held by the Apex Court as under:
"In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of red-tape in the process. The Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitments. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The Law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the department for the delay except mentioning the various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay".
Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kailash Devi & ORs. AIR1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that:
"There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be constructed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of which is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence."
Supreme Court in "Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2013(1) CCC 910(NS) : IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)" laid down that:
It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matter and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras."
Observations made by Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
In view of the above discussion the explanation offered for the delay in this case is very casual and very stereo typed, the appellant has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons to condone the delay. In view of above discussion, application for condonation of delay is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed as being barred by limitation.
A copy of this order be sent to the parties free of cost as per rules and also to the concerned District Forum. Thereafter, the file be consigned to Record Room.
(Salma Noor) Presiding Member