Delhi High Court
Olga Kazireva vs The State (Cbi) on 23 April, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001IVAD(DELHI)1040, 91(2001)DLT549
Author: R.C. Chopra
Bench: R.C. Chopra
ORDER R.C. Chopra, J.
1. This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code" only) challenges an order dated 11.4.2001 passed by Special Judge, Delhi remanding the petitioner to police custody in case RC No.5/2001 under Section 120-B read with Section 420 IPC and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State.
3. The facts relevant for disposal for this petition,briefly states, are that the petitioner an Uzbek national was arrested by the Customes officers on 28.8.2000 at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi while smuggling 27 bags of Chines silk worth 1.56 crores. In the course of disposal of her bail application, learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that there appeared to be some nexus between the petitioner and customs officials and as such, the matter required an enquiry through CBI.In pursuance of these observations and the order passed by the High Court on 13.2.2001, the above-referred case was registered by CBI on 30.3.2001 and the investigations were taken up. In the meanwhile, the petitioner was detained under Cofepsoa Act also under orders of the appropriate Government. Upon an application of the respondent CBI , learned Special Judge issued production warrants in pursuance of which the petitioner was produced in Court on 10.4.2001. She was formally arrested by CBI and an application for police remand was moved by CBI, which was adjourned to the next date on account of non-availability of counsel for the petitioner. On 11.4.2001 vide impugned order, the petitioner was remanded to police custody up to 23.4.2001.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned Special Judge on 11.4.2001 remanding the petitioner to police custody, mainly on the ground that learned Special Judge had no powers under Section 264 of the Code to issue production warrants in pursuance of which petitioner was produced before him and thereafter remanded to police custody. It is also contended that there were no good and sufficient grounds for remanding the petitioner to police custody as she had already been interrogated by the officers of customs and DRI while she was under detention and further interrogations even could be carried out in Central Jail itself.He submits that the impugned order remanding her to police custody was mechanically passed without there being sufficient grounds for her remand to police custody.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has got disputed that the Court exercising powers under Section 267 of the Code can require the attendance of a prisoner including a detenu under preventive detention. However, his argument ils that powers under Section 267 of the Code can be exercised when the attendance of a prisoner is required by a Criminal Court for an enquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. Relying upon a judgment of our own High Court in Harshad Mehta Vs. CBI, 1993 JCC 118, he submits that the terms "other proceedings" used in Section 267 for the Code does not include investigations and as such, learned Special Judge erred in law in coming to aid of the CBI, which needed attendance of the petitioner for investigations only. A perusal of the judgment referred to by learned counsel for the the petitioner makes it abundantly clear that Section 267 of the Code is to empower a Criminal Court to require the attendance of a prisoner for the purpose of enquiry, trial or other proceedings, pending in the Court and this provision does not at all cover the matters at the stage of investigation. Learned counsel for the respondent could not controvert this legal position. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding that learned Special Judge could not have issued production CBI for her production before the Court as no enquiry, trial or other proceedings as envisaged in Section 267 of the Code was pending before learned Special Judge.
6. The question for consideration, however, is as to the effect of the production order issued by learned Special Judge upon the proceedings initiated against the petitioner by the Court after her formal arrest by the respondent-CBI. The law is well settled that the procedural laws are hand-maiden of justice aimed at facilitating and advancing investigations, enquiries and trials with a view to dispense justice in accordance with law and cannot be permitted to subvert or negate the ends of justice. Their Lordships of Supreme Court of India Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.T.Thomas and Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.P.Sethi in State of M.P. Vs. Ram singh, clearly observed that procedural technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the Act and the overall public interest and the social object is required to be kept in mind while interpreting the laws. Therefore, although the production warrants issued by learned Special Judge were not strictly within the four corners of Section 267 of the Code, yet the arrest and remand of the petitioner in pursuance thereof was perfectly in accordance with law. The production of petitioner on the basis of aforesaid production warrants was not an illegality going to the root of the matter so as to affect further proceedings undertaken by learned Special Judge.In this view of the matter the production warrants issued by learned Special Judge do not affect the impugned order so far as it relates to grant of police remand.
7. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that there were no good and sufficient grounds for remanding the petitioner to police custody in as much as she had been interrogated earlier by the customs as well as DRI officials is also not sustainable for the reason that custodial interrogation of an accused is primarily aimed at getting more details in regard to the offence, offenders and the evidence in support thereof.It is also aimed at making efforts to discover more facts and to recover incriminating articles in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the mere fact that the petitioner had been interrogated prior to registration of the case by some other officers cannot be made a ground to disentitle the Investigating Officer of instant cases to interrogate the petitioner in relation to the case registered against her. The impugned order clearly shows that learned Special Judge had properly considered rival contentions made by the parties before remanding the petitioner to police custody and as such, it cannot be said that the remand order was passed mechanically or without there being any material or ground for passing thereof.
8. In view of the foregoing reasons , this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order remanding the petitioner to police custody does not suffer from any infirmity and as such, calls for no interference.
The petitioner, therefore, stands dismissed.