Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagtar Singh & Others vs State Of Punjab & Another on 14 September, 2010
Author: Mehinder Singh Sullar
Bench: Mehinder Singh Sullar
Crl.Misc.No.M-23721 of 2010 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Date of Decision:-14.9.2010
Jagtar Singh & others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab & another ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR
Present:- Mr.Amardeep Singh Walia, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr.Shilesh Gupta, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab.
Mr.Rishi Kaushal, Advocate with respondent No.2.
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral)
The symposium of the facts, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of present petition and emanating from the record, is that the land of the complainant Dharam Singh adjoins the land of Jagtar Singh. On 4.8.2003 at about 11 A.M., the accused came to the spot and raised the objection of constructing boundary (dol) in between the fields of the parties. The complainant advised them to get the land demarcated afresh. He avoided the untoward incident and went away to his house. According to the prosecution, thereafter the accused wrongly parked their tractor in the way of the complainant. When the complainant requested them to allow to pass his motorcycle through the street, then the accused attacked him with a spade and caused injuries on his left leg and finger of right hand.
2. Levelling a variety of allegations, in all, according to the prosecution, on 4.8.2003, the accused caused injuries to the complainant on his left leg and finger of right hand. On the basis of aforesaid allegations and in the wake of statement of complainant Dharam Singh, the present case was registered against the petitioners, vide FIR No.122 dated 4.8.2003 (Annexure P1) on accusation of Crl.Misc.No.M-23721 of 2010 2 having committed the offence punishable under sections 323, 324, 326 and 341 IPC by the police of Police Station Makhu, Distt.Ferozepur, in the manner described here-in-above.
3. It is not a matter of dispute, rather it is stated at the bar by the learned counsel for the parties that the charges have already been framed against the petitioners in this case. During the pendency of the trial of the case, the good sense prevailed and the matter was compromised between the parties at the intervention of respectables, friends and relatives. They have settled all the disputes and decided to live peacefully.
4. In this manner, the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the FIR (Annexure P1) and all subsequent proceedings thereto on the basis of compromise, invoking the provisions of section 482 Cr.PC, inter-alia, pleading that the parties have executed the compromise deed (Annexure P2). The complainant also filed the affidavit (Annexure P3) in this respect. In order to substantiate the validity of the compromise, the parties, vide their separately recorded statements, reiterated and have stated that they have compromised the matter with the intervention of respectables, friends and relations and prayed for quashing of the criminal proceedings. As per compromise deed, the parties have amicably settled their dispute; removed all the grievances; do not want to proceed against each other; the complainant does not want to pursue the FIR and the parties will not raise any dispute in future.
5. Above being the position on record, now the sole question that arises for determination in this petition is as to whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to quash the criminal prosecution or not?
6. Having regard to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to me, justice would be sub-served if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter in this relevant behalf. Crl.Misc.No.M-23721 of 2010 3
7. The theory of penology/strict punishment underwent a drastic change with the passage of time and the evolution of law of settlement appear on the scene, which is primarily based on the theory of reformation of the accused. The statutory penal provision pales into insignificance in the wake of insertion of new Chapter XXI-A by Amendment Act No.2 of 2006 and amendment in expansion of scope of compounding the offences under section 320 Cr.PC. At the same time, the law of settlement of criminal disputes by virtue of compromise is not res- integra and is well settled. The clear and explicit intention of the Legislature was transformed in reality by Hon'ble Apex Court in cases Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors. 2008(4) RCR (Criminal) 827; B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana 2003 (2) RCR (Crl.) 888 (SC) and Full Bench of this Court in case Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052.
8. The epitome of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments is that the power under section 482 Cr.PC has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever- lasting congeniality in society and resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is adhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery if the statement is fair being free from under pressure.
9. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma's case (supra), has restricted the scope of quashing the criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise in serious offences and ruled (para 33) as under:-
"There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395, 397 or 304B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.PC, or in writ jurisdiction on Crl.Misc.No.M-23721 of 2010 4 the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot."
10. Meaning thereby, the High Court has unlimited power to quash the criminal proceedings, relatable to injury cases, on the basis of lawful settlement within the frame work and restriction depicted by Hon'ble Apex Court.
11. As is evident from the record that in the instant case, the parties are lawfully agreed to settle the dispute. The restriction of heinous offences emanating from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma's case (supra) is not at all attracted to the present case. Therefore, to my mind, there is no impediment in translating the wishes of the parties into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner as guaranteed by and as contemplated in the Constitution of India.
12. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the instant petition is hereby accepted. Consequently, FIR No.122 dated 4.8.2003 (Annexure P1) and all other subsequent proceedings thereto are quashed and all the petitioners are acquitted of charges framed against them, in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
14.9.2010 (Mehinder Singh Sullar) AS Judge