Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ashok Kumar Meena vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi on 25 September, 2008
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH O.A. No. 1295/2007 New Delhi this the 25th day of September, 2008 Honble Mr. Justice V.K. Bali, Chairman Honble Mr. Justice M. Ramachandran, Vice Chairman (J) Honble Mr. L.K. Joshi, Vice Chairman (A) Ashok Kumar Meena, (D-3098) S/o Shri Chote Lal Meena, R/o Quarter No. C-2, Police Colony, Police Station Paharganj, New Delhi. Petitioner. (By Advocates S/Shri Shyam Babu, Pradeep Dahiya and Sachin Chauhan) Versus 1. Government of NCT of Delhi, Through its Chief Secretary, Players Building, I.P. Estate, New Delhi. 2. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters, I.P Estate, New Delhi. 3. Joint Commissioner of Police (Headquarters), Police Headquarters, I.P. Estate, New Delhi. Respondents. (By Advocate Shri Ajesh Luthra) O R D E R ON THE REFERENCE Honble Mr. Justice M. Ramachandran, Vice Chairman (J). An officer who had been overlooked for promotion to the post of Inspector (Executive) in the Delhi Police has preferred this Original Application. He had no adverse entries recorded in his confidential records, but presently has been advised that the DPC considered his case for promotion to list F, and they, after making objective assessment of his suitability on the basis of his service records, found that he has `continued punishments to his credit, and has graded him unfit. 2. After his appointment in 1990 as Sub Inspector, as a matter of fact, the applicant had been administered censure on seven occasions, the first on 5.2.1992 and the last time on 6.12.2004. Applicant argues that under Rule 17 of the Delhi Police (Promotion and Confirmation) Rules, 1980, seniority-cum-fitness is the criteria for promotion, and since he had not been issued any major penalty, the DPC was in error while adopting the yardstick referred to. He is aware of Annexure `D Circular issued by the Joint Commissioner of Police (Headquarters) dated 07.02.2005 but it does not at all stand in the way as far as he is concerned. The pleadings show that the applicant appeared to be in a dilemma i.e. whether to support the circular or oppose it, as he might have been unsure about the ultimate impact it would have made, as to whether it will make or mar his case. It is, however, submitted that they being a set of codified principles to be observed by the DPC while considering eligibility, the same ought to be followed, but with due application of mind. Counsel supported by Mr. Pradeep Dahiya particularly stresses on clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Annexure `D circular, to bring home the contentions as aforestated, simultaneously maintaining that the most relevant provision was Rule 17 (i) of the Delhi Police (Promotion and Confirmation) Rules, 1980. The pivotal issue, we note, is centered on the above piece of documents. For convenient reference, we may extract the circular dated 07.02.2005 below: The following principles shall be observed, in future, while holding Departmental Promotion Committee for admission of names to promotion lists:- The DPC should assess the suitability of the employees for promotion on the basis of their Service records with particular reference to the Confidential Reports for five preceding years irrespective of the qualifying service prescribed in the Service/Recruitment rules. Officers having at least three `good and above reports without any `below average or `adverse report, even for a small period during last five years may be empanelled. (If more than one CR has been written for a particular year, all the CRs for relevant year shall be considered together as the CR for one year). The service record of the officer during preceding 10 years in that particular rank shall be taken into account with particular reference to the gravity and continuity of punishment till date. Punishment on counts of corruption and moral turpitude are to be viewed seriously. Officers who have been awarded any major/minor punishment in the preceding 5 years on charges of corruption, moral turpitude and gross dereliction of duty to protect government property or major punishment within 2 years on charges of administrative lapses, from the date of consideration may not be empanelled. Officers whose names stand on Secret List shall not be considered fit as per S.O. No. 265 on the subject. Officers who have been awarded censure(s) during the last 6 months can (not?) be allowed to be brought on promotion list. However, the effect of censure debarring the official for promotion for six months from the date of award, shall continue. Result of officers, who are under suspension or facing DE or involved in Criminal Cases shall be kept in sealed covers. This supersedes earlier circular, issued vide this Hdqrs. Order No. 83135-234/CB-1, dated 03.12.1998. 3. Mr. Ajesh Luthra appearing on behalf of the Respondents, however, justifies the stand of the respondents. The circular, is directory in nature, but the respondents had at no time proposed to over reach the statutory rules, the obedience of which was a mandatory requirement. The DPC had proceeded on well-defined parameters, and they enjoy full discretion to devise method and procedure for objective assessment of the suitability of a candidate. Though not specifically put forward as a contention in the reply statement, counsel had also relied on Rules 5, 7 and 16 (i) of the Delhi Police (Promotion and Confirmation) Rules, 1980 to be noticed while the credentials of an officer are examined. The circular referred to by the applicants could be considered as operative only as an extension of said Rules. 4. The bone of contention as we take note of the submissions appeared to be the impact that was to be recognized because of the presence of clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of the Circular. The applicant although had not been subjected to any major penalty, however, had been administered censures on seven occasions, and the impugned order made special reference thereto. The terms of the circular if interpreted purposively and by a soft-pedaling would have been definitely to his advantage, counsel submits. 5. The Division Bench earlier while hearing the matter was of opinion that the contentions adopted by the parties although based on earlier precedents, indeed required to be gone into deeper, especially since the full impact of the rule had not been highlighted in any of the decided cases and there were apparently conflicting positions propagated. Since the issues were of considerable importance and were most often required to be applied, the question was directed to be posted before a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement. The questions for answer could be formulated as following: To what extent Rules 5,7 and 17 of Delhi Police (Promotion and Confirmation) Rules have relevance while the DPC considers the suitability of an officer for promotion? What role could be assigned to the circular dated 07.02.2005 for influencing the selection process referred to above? In matters of applying guidelines as above if a meaningful reconciliation is called for, what are the principles to be followed? 6. The circular of 07.02.2005 is an improvement made to the earlier circular dated 02.12.1994, which in its turn modified circular dated 23.09.1992. Mr. Shyam Babu submits that the promulgation of the circular itself may indicate that the rules required augmentation. When they were formulated, the authorities concerned should be considered as being aware of the presence and scope of the Rules. Administrative instructions could be issued by competent authorities so as to supplement statutory rules. The upper limit of the power should be to ensure that they did not run counter to the rules. 7. In the course of arguments, he submitted that the authority of the circular at least as of now could not be doubted, as their validity and enforceability have been upheld on more than one occasion by the High Court. But what is really relevant was Rule 17 of Promotion and Confirmation Rules. In matters of promotion as in the present case, counsel conceded that excepting to prescribe the field of choice, no other details were forthcoming from them. What perhaps falls out is only that selection is to be made on recommendation of the DPC and enlistment is to be on principles of seniority. 8. Counsel submits that for that reason perhaps the necessity for detailed norms to be followed by the DPC might have been thought of. Circular was the product. As far as the applicant is concerned, he was qualified and fell within the field of choice. Going by the circular, as on the date of consideration in 2006, he had no disability, arising out of the previous censures, since the last censure was issued in December, 2004. The circular is to be read as a whole. On interest of efficiency and so as to overcome any heartburn to the meritorious hands, by virtue of experience gathered, the Administration is deemed to have laid down guidelines to serve a specific purpose. In essence clauses (iii) and (v) were to ensure that a person who had courted a minor punishment, especially when the lapse alleged did not involve an incident suggestive of moral turpitude, he was not to be eternally debarred. But in the present case since the DPC had far exceeded the intent of the circular, interference was required. 9. Supporting the submissions, Mr. Dahiya points out that by overlooking the circular the DPC had been party to an indiscretion, and the said reason alone would justify the Tribunal to interfere in the matter, on the authority of the Supreme Court, gatherable from the decision in S.B. Bhattacharjee Vs. S.D. Majumdar and Ors. (2008 (1) SCC (L&S) 21). He had particularly referred to Paragraph 38 thereof, which was in the following terms: In a given case, and in absence of rule, the Court might have been justified to hold that the DPC must take into consideration the merit and merit only. However, in a case of this nature, where the State lays down the procedures as to how and in what manner the merit and suitability to be adjudged, it was obligatory on the part of the Commission to follow the same in its letter and spirit. The case at hand shows that it can in a situation of this nature prove to be disastrous to an employee, if any other construction is given. 10. Mr. Luthra on behalf of the respondents points out that the Rules are the basic guidelines, and the terms of the circular are subservient thereto. In orders to minimize arbitrariness, the guidelines were issued for the DPC to follow. Sufficient discretion for play of joints should be deemed as given to the DPC as there was no ambiguity, either in the rules or the circular. 11. We may examine the questions in this background. Reliance had been placed by the applicants on WP (C) 2189/98, Union of India Vs. Virender Singh, decided by a Bench of the Delhi High Court, on 18.12.2001. It arose from a case when the Principal Bench of Tribunal had (in OA 746/95) set aside the orders passed by the Delhi Police. The applicant there had been found as unfit for inclusion in Promotion List F-1 by the DPC. The circular in operation was of 23.09.1992. Tribunal noted that the applicant qualified himself for consideration, and that he had not been awarded any punishment on charges of corruption. Nor was he having any other disability, but for the two censures issued to him. It was noticed that the circular permits that officers who have been awarded censures with no other punishments are to be brought on promotion list, after a specified period. Since the DPC had not recorded that the censures issued specifically were in respect of issues involving moral turpitude, the finding by DPC to tag him unfit, required to be reviewed. 12. The High Court had upheld the orders. In the course of discussion, it was held that the DPC could have examined as to whether censures admonished were for lapses involving moral turpitude. Counsel submits that perhaps this was the appropriate yardstick to be employed. Our attention was thereafter drawn to yet another decision of Delhi High Court dated 11.01.2002 in CW 4821/01 (W/HC Tejwati Vs. Union of India & Ors.). The Original Application, OA 851/2000 filed by the applicant happened to be dismissed. The Tribunals order consequently had been subjected to challenge. Punishment of censure had been awarded to her on the ground that she had accepted illegal gratification from a person accused of pick pocketing. Understandably, she was declared as unfit by DPC. Relying on the Rules, the Tribunal too had held that no interference was warranted. Before the High Court, controverting the submissions made by the applicant that she had been subjected to arbitrary treatment, the Department had taken a stand that the circular dated 02.12.1994 and Rule 5 of the Promotion and Confirmation Rules gave them full jurisdiction to deal with and reject the promotional claims of an erring officer. The question posed by the High Court was as to which of the two had real application, as also the Rule to be adverted to. It had been held as following: Having given our anxious consideration to the matter, we are of the opinion that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that Rule 15 has to be given effect to before the general principles of promotion as contained in Rule 5 thereof has no substance. Before a person can be promoted to a higher grade or higher rank his/her name must appear in the list as provided for in rule 15 of the said Rules. Once the name of a candidate is empanelled in List d-1, he/she shall be automatically promoted as and when vacancies arise. Thus even for the purpose of empanelment of the candidates in List D-1 the general principles of promotion as also the guidelines issued by the respondents on 2nd December, 1994 would apply. 13. However, the emphasis made by Mr. Shyam Babu was about the last paragraph of the judgment. The Division Bench had held that the applicant there had been charged with misconduct involving corruption and dishonesty. Observation was that Evidently the punishment awarded has a direct nexus with the honesty. Clause 2 and 3 of the circular, according to the High Court, justified rejection of a claim of an officer who had been punished for major penalties. Counsel points out that the above clauses are substantially clause 2 and 3 here also. Therefore, the case of censure, the conduct, which led to the stricture required to be meticulously noticed, and this circumstance had been forgotten insofar as the applicant was concerned. 14. Next, the counsel had referred to V.D. Madan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (CWP 1354/01) decided by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court on 15.07.2002. It was Writ Petition filed by a police officer, who was declared as unfit by the DPC. OA filed by him was rejected, since the Department, had found the officer unfit for promotion as he had been issued penalty of censures and it could not have been irregular. Respondents had contended that a Government servant was to have requisite grading of ACR, but simultaneously adverse entries in the shape of minor/major penalty cannot be overlooked because what is relevant is the total records of service. Nothing could have been eschewed. Consequently, the Tribunal held that, The punishments are for acts of omission or commission, they also are indicative of the applicants suitability for promotion. The punishment has necessarily to be taken into account in the same manner as any adverse remark, which may otherwise be recorded. 15. Disagreeing with the statement of law as recorded by the Tribunal and considering the `core question as interpretation of the circular, the High Court opined that, There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the respondents are bound by the aforementioned circular letter. In that view of the matter, the minor punishments of censure awarded against the petitioner, in our opinion, could not be taken into consideration. 16. The Bench had also adverted to Virender Singhs case (cited supra) and observed that it has categorically been held that so far as punishment of censure is concerned, the same is wiped off within six months. 17. Mr. Shyam Babu submits that this was a finding, and a pronouncement of the legal position, which never could have been overlooked. By way of conclusion, it was submitted that in the light of the above authoritative pronouncement, reliance on the outdated censure orders were unwarranted. According to him, even if Rule 5 or 7 applies in matters of promotion, the total impact of the circular and the reason for introducing them could not have been overlooked. The judgments of the High Court also had suggested that the circumstance leading to the `Censure might have, of course, a bearing. That is, if the lapses were in respect of corruption or one evidencing a conduct of moral turpitude, it would have continued to operate against the promotability of a person, but not otherwise. The censures administered on the applicant were not lapses, which were to be taken as dubbing him a morally degraded individual. 18. In reply, Mr. Luthra argued for a position that the judgments relied on by Mr. Shyam Babu, in effect, had been contextually found as not laying down the correct proposition. He submits that the circulars issued from time to time on the subject have been found as authorized, and were mandatorily to be followed. It was idle to contend that a particular clause alone could be applied to a case, since the document required to be read and understood as a whole. What could be gatherable from the decisions cited by the applicants is that Rules 5,7 and 17 had total application, and the guidelines of the circular also had full play. The feature of regularity of `censures operated in its own strength, and even if all other circumstances could be relegated to the background, as far as the applicant is concerned, the effect of the clause was total, and the decision of DPC could not have been faulted. 19. Counsel had invited our attention to Harish Chand Yati Vs. Commissioner of Police. OA decided by the Principal Bench on 18.07.1996. He highlights that Clause (v) of the Circular of 1992 (Clause (v) of Annexure D) had been explained by the Bench and it had been held that even after the six-month period, it could not be considered as irrelevant. This is because of the simple reason that the Authority was obliged to take into account the total record of service of a person. Citing the order passed by a Bench of the Tribunal in OA 748/2004, Mr. Luthra submits that the presence of regularity and continuity of censures also had been found by the Bench as a disabling circumstance for an employee to claim promotion. 20. Standing Counsel had also invited our attention to the recent judgment of the Delhi High Court in WPC 1385/07, dated 13.09.2007, titled as Commissioner of Police Vs. Rajender Singh. He contends that the observations in this later judgment could be considered as having erased the expositions made by the earlier judgments on the subject. Vishnu Dev Madans case (cited supra) had been noticed, and according to the counsel, the Bench was not prepared to follow the same. For appreciating the contention, we may presently advert to the circumstances, in which the matter had come to the High Court, and how the issue was dealt with. 21. When Rajender Singhs claim for promotion arose, ostensibly for the reason that he had been recipient of six censures, DPC had not cleared him. OA 1354/2001 thereupon had come to be filed. Relying on Vishnu Dev Madan, and accepting the plea that two years had passed after the last censure was issued, a Division Bench of the Tribunal had granted him reliefs, whereby his claims were to be reconsidered. Writ petition was filed at the instance of Commissioner of Police. 22. The High Court had found that during the time circular of 23.09.1992 was in operation. This has been extracted in full in the order. The Division Bench in Paragraph 7 of the judgment noticed that the effect of penalty of censure would have been that promotion could be given effect to, although an officer was found suitable, after a period of six months from the date of penalty. Censure by itself would not have had effect of disabling him from being considered for promotion; it had impact on the date of the benefit. The circular also required that the total record of the officer, with particular reference to the gravity and continuity should receive attention. It had been observed as following: The `total record of an officer would include all commendations and penalties in the service record of the officer. It would also include the major and minor penalties. Merely because the minor penalties may have a direct impact only for a limited period, such as Censure or reduction in pay for a limited period, which does not have an effect of postponing future increments, it does not mean that such penalties would cease to be a part of the `total record of the office. This aspect has not been appreciated by the Tribunal. Therefore, mere meritorious record, as reflected in the ACRs is not sufficient, and the candidate also has to be one, who is not unsuitable for promotion to the higher rank. Thereafter, the observation in Vishnu Dev Madan had been noticed, but the same had not been followed, the Division Bench opting to distinguish it on the facts. Mr. Luthra submits that the suitability of a candidate, with full reference to his entire records, commendations as well as criticism was required to be considered by the DPC. This, according to him, went well with his contention that the statutory rules, and the guidelines supplied by the circulars simultaneously required to be applied. 23. At least at the conclusion of the hearing, we have come to note that there is consensus between the parties that the Rules have to be followed, and the guidelines supplied by the circular also requires to be borne in mind by the DPC. We may, therefore, identify the landmarks, as could be located from the submissions made: Administrative authorities are always expected to follow the prescribed norms with undivided attention. (See 2008 (1) SCC (L&S) 21) The presence of circulars is a reality. They have been issued with proper authority, and require to be duly taken notice of. (WP (C) 2189/98) DPC enjoys the power to make recommendations, and has the freedom to weed out ineligibles on predetermined parameters. 24. We do agree with Mr. Luthra that while considering Rajender Singhs case, the Division Bench of the High Court could be found as having certain amount of reservations, in the matter of following the earlier decision, viz Vishnu Dev Madan. Although ultimately distinguished on facts, the observation in Vishnu Dev Madan that so far as punishment of censure is concerned, the same is wiped off within six months, in effect has not found acceptance or endorsement. While making the said observation, the earlier Bench had drawn support from CWP 2189/98, as acknowledged, but a critical examination of the relied on judgment (Virender Singh) would reveal that the Bench had not made any such observations. 25. In Virender Singh, the Standing Counsel had expressed concern that the judgment of the Tribunal could be cited as an authority for a proposition that a censure becomes invalid after a period of six months for any purpose. It was, therefore, required to be expunged. But reassurance had come from the High Court, pointing out that the issue had become academic, and more importantly, by observing that `nor does the Tribunal pronounce so conclusively to invalidate petitioners action. Perhaps while making the cited observations in Vishnu Dev Madans case, the above circumstance had not been gone into. 26. But ultimately the later decision confined itself to the facts specifically as available there, and the discussions leading thereto precisely become relevant here. According to the Court, when total records of an officer were to be taken note of, it was to include minor and major penalties. A censure or reduction in pay for a limited period may not have effect in postponing future increments, but that did not mean that such penalties would cease to be part of total service records of the officer. Unblemished ACR alone was not sufficient, but the officer should be one not unsuitable for promotion. It is highly relevant to note that in respect of Rajender Singh, the High Court found that five of the six penalties suffered by him come within a five-year period. Further, the circumstances, in which censures had been issued, did have an element of moral turpitude. 27. We also find that elucidative observations had come to be recorded by a Division Bench in OA 2438/96. There a contention raised on the basis of Rule 7 (ii) of the Promotion Rules was found as unacceptable, as the Tribunal examined the impact of Rule 8 (d) (i) of the Punishment and Appeal Rules. If a more serious penalty was not to interfere with the claims of promotion, less should have been the impact by a censure, it was held. 28. As such we are of the opinion that there is no conflict of view necessitating us to opt or prefer one decision in favour of any other view taken. Censures are to be taken note of but the underlying reasons for the authority for awarding the penalty also has relevance, and the DPC is not to act mechanically. 29. Therefore, we hold that, The circulars issued are not the lone guidelines, statutory rules require to be followed in letter and spirit. Taking note of the statutory Scheme, as augmented by the circulars, the total service records, positive and negative, including major and minor penalties are required to be scanned by the DPC before they make a recommendation. 30. The general trend as could be gatherable from the circular is that perpetual bar of promotion is not envisaged, as in such case a person resigned to such a fate may have little to offer in his career thereafter. On this basis, it would be safe to assume that if an officer at some point of his career had occasion to receive censure that alone should not, for all time, block his promotional opportunities. The effect of a minor penalty of censure would operate to deny him promotion, even if adjudged as fit, for a period of six months. But if the censure was required to be administered for a conduct involving corruption, moral turpitude, violence, defiance and the like, the benefit of six months period may not be claimable, even if technically he may be in a position to assume promotability after the six months period as appearing in the circular. The regularity spoken to by the circular also could be applied only subject to the above position, namely, that the proceedings leading thereto should have traits of moral turpitude. On the issue of regularity, we have been constrained to express our view as above, since as of now it is an appendage to clause (ii) of the circular. It may be within the powers of Administration to prescribe that an officer, who receives censures for whatever reasons regularly could be considered as ineligible for getting a clearance by the DPC by incorporating changes in the circular. 31. We remit the matter to the Division Bench for considering the O.A. on merits. Per Justice V. K. Bali, Chairman:
I have gone through the judgment authored by Justice M. Ramachandran, Vice-Chairman (J). I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Honble Vice-Chairman on the questions framed for adjudication by the Full Bench. I may only add to the thought process of the Honble Vice-Chairman while arriving at the conclusions drawn by him. General principles of promotion are contained in rule 5 of the Delhi Police (Promotion and Confirmation) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter to be referred as the Rules of 1980). Rule 5(i) which may be relevant for adjudication of the issue by the Full Bench, reads as follows:
(i) Promotions from one rank to another and from lower grade to the higher grade in the same rank shall be made by selection tempered with seniority. Efficiency and honesty shall be the main factors governing selection. Zone of consideration will be determined in accordance with the rules/instructions issued by the Government from time to time. A confirmed Assistant Sub Inspector (Executive) having minimum of six years of service in the said rank, is eligible for List E-I (Exe.), i.e., Sub Inspector (Exe.). In view of rule 16(i) of the Rules of 1980, selection has to be made on recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee. Rule 16(i) of the Rules reads thus:
Confirmed Assistant Sub-Inspectors (Executive), who have put in a minimum of 6 years of service in the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector (Executive), shall be eligible for List-E-I (Executive). The selection shall be made on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee. The Assistant Sub-Inspector so selected, shall be brought on List E-I in order of their respective seniority, keeping in view the vacancies in the rank of Sub-Inspectors (Executive) likely to occur in the following one year. Subject to the medical fitness by the Civil Surgeon the selected Assistant Sub-Inspectors (Executive) shall be sent for training in the Upper School Course. On successfully completing the Upper School Course, their names shall be brought on promotion List E-II (Executive) in order of their respective seniority in List E-I for promotion to the rank of Sub-Inspector (Executive) as and when vacancies occur. Perusal of provisions of the Rules reproduced above would clearly manifest that promotion is by way of selection, tempered by seniority, and efficiency and honesty are the main factors governing selection. Once, seniority is not the sole criteria governing promotion, and selection is to be made keeping in view the efficiency and honesty, I would have no doubt in my mind that the service record of the applicant is relevant and censure(s), which are admittedly minor penalty under rules, shall have to be taken into consideration. The circular reproduced above also refers to the service record, which can only mean the entire service record. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police v Rajender Singh (supra) also held likewise as has been already reproduced in para 22 of the judgment. Normally, therefore, when promotion is by way of selection, the entire record of an employee becomes relevant and has to be taken into consideration. In the present case, however, whereas it is true that efficiency and honesty are main factors governing selection, and that censures, in any case, would reflect upon efficiency of an employee, the respondents have themselves laid down the parameters of efficiency by issuing circulars from time to time, as mentioned above. In the parameters laid down in the circulars for efficiency for promotion, what may come in the way of an employee so as not to be promoted, are such censure(s) which may have the element of corruption and moral turpitude during the last ten years in that particular rank. As per clause iii) of the circular, officers who might have been awarded even a minor punishment, as indeed censure is a minor punishment, in the preceding five years on charges of corruption, moral turpitude and gross dereliction of duty to protect government property, may also not be promoted, but the officers who have been awarded censure(s), and the word censure(s) would have any number of the same during last six months, cannot be brought on the promotion list. However, the effect of censure debarring the official for promotion for six months from the date of award shall continue. Once, there is a reference of minor punishment having the element of corruption, moral turpitude and gross dereliction of duty to protect government property in a separate clause, i.e., clause iii), the censure(s) separately referred to in clause v) which do not have the element of moral turpitude and dereliction of duty to protect government property, thus cannot come in the way of promotion except to the limited extent as mentioned in clause v) itself. Once, the respondents have themselves laid the parameters of efficiency and censure(s) other than involving moral turpitude etc. are not to be taken into consideration in the matter of promotion, the respondents cannot withhold promotion of an employee only on such censure(s). Any other interpretation may also lead to discriminatory treatment that may be meted to persons similarly situate. In a given case, the circular with regard to censure(s) as envisaged in clause v) may be taken as a good ground for debarring a person for promotion, whereas in the other, it may well be said by the respondents that such censure(s) would not debar a person for promotion to the next higher rank.
(L.K. JOSHI) (M. RAMACHANDRAN) (V.K. BALI) VICE CHAIRMAN (A) VICE CHAIRMAN (J) CHAIRMAN