Vidya Mandir Mandal Thr. Secretary And ... vs Anil Sakharam Kamble And Anr on 7 April, 2026

[Cites 2, Cited by 0]

Bombay High Court

Vidya Mandir Mandal Thr. Secretary And ... vs Anil Sakharam Kamble And Anr on 7 April, 2026

Bench: Milind N. Jadhav

2026:BHC-AS:16560
WP.1202.2022.doc

Ajay

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.1202 OF 2022

Vidya Mandir Mandal and Anr. .. Petitioners
Versus
Anil Sakharam Kamble and Anr. .. Respondents
....................
 Mr. Vinayak R. Kumbhar. a/w. Ms. Aniket S. Phapale and Mr.
Rajendra B. Khaire i/b. Ms. Ashwini N. Bandiwadekar, Advocates
for Petitioners.
 Mr. Aniruddha A. Garge a/w. Mr. Kashyap Bhalerao and Mr. Yesh
Gangal, Advocates for Respondent No.1.
 Mr. A.I. Patel a/w. Mr. P.G. Sawant, AGP for Respondent No.2 -
State.
....................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : APRIL 07, 2026.
P.C.:
1. Heard Mr. Kumbhar, learned Advocate for Petitioners, Mr.

Gharge, learned Advocate for Respondent No.1 and Mr. Patel, learned

AGP for Respondent No.2 - State.

2. Writ Petition is filed on 14.01.2022 by Vidya Mandir Mandal

the Management / Trust of the Petitioner No.2 - School. Respondent

No.1 is the employee and Respondent No.2 is the Education Officer /

State. Judgment dated 06.12.2021 passed by School Tribunal, Pune is

assailed in the present Writ Petition. Petition is not admitted till today

and by consent of parties it is heard finally.

3. Briefly stated the relevant facts are as follows; Respondent

No.1 - Employee filed statutory appeal under section 9 of Maharashtra

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Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,

1977 (for short "MEPS Act, 1977") to challenge order of forced

retirement dated 25.06.2018 issued by the Chairman of Petitioner No.1

- Trust. Respondent No.1 belongs to SC category and he was

appointed as Junior Clerk in the year 1999 on clear vacant and

permanent post in Respondent No.2 - School after following the due

process of law. The Education Officer granted approval for Respondent

No.1's appointment on 10.05.1999.

3.1. In the year 2007, when post of Senior Clerk became vacant,

he applied for promotion accordingly and in 2012 was promoted as

Senior Clerk. From 2016 onward, he was repeatedly harassed by

Headmaster of the School and Treasurer of Petitioner No.1 - Trust. He

therefore filed Police Complaint under the Atrocities Act against them

which is still pending. On 23.09.2017 Headmaster of the School issued

show cause notice to him which was duly replied to by him on

09.10.2017. The Headmaster once again by letter dated 13.10.2017

called for a fresh explanation which was given by him on 25.10.2017.

Further explanation was called upon by the Joint Secretary of

Petitioner No.1 - Trust from Respondent No.1 - Employee on

15.10.2017 which was also replied to by him on 25.11.2017.

Thereafter Chairman of the Petitioner No.1 - Trust issued Show cause

Notice dated 13.01.2018, inter alia, by which Enquiry Committee was

set up to conduct enquiry against him. Respondent No.1 requested for

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documents relied upon by the Management / School by letter dated

19.01.2018 which was not replied to or given to him.

3.2. Three meetings were thereafter held before the Enquiry

Committee and without following due process of law, Enquiry Report

dated 03.04.2018 was submitted by two members of the Enquiry

Committee despite objection raised by Respondent No.1 to the

procedure of conducting the enquiry. On 16.06.2018, nominated

member of the Respondent No.1 - Employee submitted his report

following which on 25.06.2018 Respondent No.1 - Trust issued a hand

written letter of forced retirement / termination with immediate effect

under the signature of Chairman of the trust.

3.3. Being aggrieved Respondent No.1 filed statutory Appeal

before the School Tribunal which was contested by the Trust and the

School. The learned Tribunal decided the Appeal by virtue of

impugned judgment dated 06.12.2021 and set aside the termination

letter dated 25.06.2018 after declaring it as illegal with consequential

direction to reinstate the employee on his original post with full

backwages and consequential benefits.

3.4. The Management / Trust was directed to comply with the

order within 30 days i.e. on or before 06.01.2022. Petition was filed on

16.01.2022 in this Court. From the record it is seen that save and

except for filing the Petition, Petitioner No. 1 - Trust and Petitioner

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No. 2 - School did not obtain ad - interim / interim relief and kept the

Petition pending. This Court in its present roster listed the matter for

hearing on several dates beginning from 03.09.2025 and Petition was

finally heard on several dates and arguments were eventually

concluded on 27.03.2026.

4. Mr. Garge, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent No.1

- Employee informed the Court that during pendency of the Petition,

Petitioner crossed the age of superannuation and therefore stood

retired. He would submit that therefore Petition be heard finally so

that it will enure to the benefit of the Respondent No.1 - Employee as

his retirement dues are to be computed and they are withheld to the

detriment of Respondent No.1. He would submit that Petitioners -

Trust / School Management did not abide by the order passed by the

Tribunal of reinstatement of Respondent No.1 hence at the request of

Respondent No.1 the Petition is heard finally by consent of parties. It is

seen that despite the above facts, no urgency whatsoever is/was shown

by the Trust / Management / School for hearing the Petitioner finally.

It is only at the repeated behest of Mr. Garge that Petition is heard

finally.

5. Mr. Kumbhar, learned Advocate appearing for Petitioners

would submit that Petitioner No.1 is an Educational Institution / Trust

which runs Petitioner No.2 - Government Recognized Aided Secondary

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School. He would fairly concede that Respondent No.1 was initially

appointed as Class IV Employee in the year 1990 and later on

promoted as Junior Clerk on 10.05.1999 and thereafter as Senior Clerk

in July 2012 and he served the Institution as permanent employee

until his termination on 25.06.2018. He would submit that conduct

and behavior of Respondent No.1 was not satisfactory, hence

departmental inquiry was initiated against him for his arrogant and

irresponsible behavior towards staff and students. He would submit

that memos were issued to him for dereliction in work in the year

2007, 2008 and 2017 before conducting the departmental inquiry.

5.1. He would submit that the Enquiry Committee followed the

due process of law and recommended termination of Respondent No.1

- Employee from service. Without going into further merits and details

of challenge to the impugned Judgment passed by the School Tribunal,

he would in the alternate submit that Management of the School has

not taken any benefit with regard to the vacant post from which the

Respondent No.1 was terminated after his compulsory retirement /

termination. He would therefore urge the Court to consider the fact

that in the event if the impugned Judgment is upheld by the Court,

benefit of backwages, continuity in services and all retiral benefits due

to Respondent No.1, be directed to be paid by Respondent No.2 -

Education Officer / State since the said vacant post of Respondent

No.1 - Employee was 100% aided post and the School / Trust has kept

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it vacant.

5.2. He would persuade me to pass such directions on the ground

that Petitioners have not taken any benefit from the State with regard

to the said post on which Respondent No.1 was employed after his

termination and had not appointed any other person on the said post

until the date of his superannuation. He would submit that admittedly

Petitioners have not received neither claimed any grant in aid from the

State or the Respondent No.2 - Education Officer with regard to the

post occupied by the Respondent No.1 post his termination. Hence he

would urge appropriate orders to be passed for disposal of the Petition.

6. PER CONTRA, submissions urged by the Petitioners on

merits are vehemently objected to by Respondent No.2 - Education

Officer. Mr. Patel, learned Senior AGP appearing on behalf of

Respondent No.2 would submit that Petitioners have come up with a

completely new relief seeking permission to conduct fresh

Departmental Enquiry against Respondent No.1 in their Petition which

cannot be allowed since this new relief was never pleaded before the

School Tribunal neither was any material produced by them in support

of this relief. He would submit that Petitioner No. 2 - School being an

aided institution ought to have followed Rule 28 along with Section 4

of the MEPS Act, 1977 to impose punishment upon Respondent No.1 -

Employee before termination of his services for the alleged misconduct

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committed by him. He would submit that Petitioners cannot place

reliance on Government Resolution dated 14.031978 since it was

notified prior to framing of MEPS Rules, 1981. He would submit that

MEPS Rules came into force in 1981 and hence they overrule the

previous Government Resolution notified on 14.03.1978. He would

submit that Petitioners did not rely on Government Resolution dated

14.03.1978 before the School Tribunal and hence now cannot be

allowed to rely on the same before this Court.

6.1. He would refer to and rely upon the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of Educational Society, Tumsar and Others Vs. State

of Maharashtra and Others1 to contend that when the School Tribunal

finds termination order to have been illegally passed and directs

payment of back wages, then the School and Trust are obligated to pay

the back wages to the terminated employee. He would also refer to

and rely upon two decisions of this Court in the cases of Rajapur

Shiksham Prasarak Mandal Ratnagiri Vs. State of Maharashtra and

Ors.2 and Rangdas Swami Shikshan Mandal and Others Vs. Mutyal

Vilas Rambhau and Others3 to contend that Government Resolution

dated 14.03.1978 cannot apply to the facts of the present case since

there was a specific provision contained in the statute authorizing the

School Tribunal to direct the School / Trust to pay backwages. He

1 (2016) 3 SCC 512
2 Writ Petition No.757 of 2016 decided on 18.04.2018
3 2023 SCC OnLine 2160

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would submit that the School Tribunal has correctly directed

backwages to be paid by Petitioners hence they cannot shift the burden

of backwages on the Respondent No.2 - Education Officer by taking

recourse to Government Resolution dated 14.03.1978 or by making

alternate submission that the Petitioners did not obtain benefit of grant

against the vacant post vacated by Respondent No.1 pursuant to his

termination.

7. In so far as Respondent No.1 is concerned Mr. Garge,

learned Advocate persuades the Court to pass appropriate directions so

that Respondent No.1 does not suffer any further. He would submit

that Respondent No.1 has already crossed his retirement age and

therefore stands superannuated from service. He would submit that he

was admittedly employed as a permanent employee from 1990 until

his forced termination in 2018 after 28 long years and hence he was a

permanent employee.

7.1. He would submit that findings in the impugned order passed

by the School Tribunal are such that it was incumbent upon the

Petitioners to have reinstated Respondent No.1 on or before

06.01.2022 which they failed to do. He would submit that it does not

therefore now lie in the mouth of the Petitioners to contend that

Respondent No.2 - Education Officer / State should pay the backwages

and all other benefits to Respondent No.1 which may eventually lead

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to further delay. He would submit that such an argument was or could

have been open for the Petitioners if they would have abided by the

impugned order passed by the tribunal allowed him to retire

honourably.

7.2. He would submit that Petitioners did not even obtain a stay

of the impugned judgment and allowed Respondent No.1 to retire by

merely filing the present petition and keeping it pending. He would

submit that conduct of the Petitioners clearly smacks of arrogance,

arbitrariness and high handedness. He would submit that the alternate

submission made by the Petitioners do not enure for the benefit of

Respondent No.1 and renders the impugned order futile despite it

having been passed on merits. He would submit that in any event this

Court should consider passing appropriate directions so that further

ignominy of Respondent No.1 - Employee who had served the

Petitioners as permanent employee for 28 long years is ended by the

Court.

7.3. On merits of the matter he would vehemently submit that if

the findings returned in the impugned judgment are perused they

would shock the conscious of the Court. He would submit that the

Enquiry conducted by the Petitioners is completely vitiated as they

have not followed the due process of law. He would submit that

ground of dereliction and conduct of Respondent No.1 as alleged by

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the Petitioners as per the memos issued in 2007 and 2008 for

conducting the Enquiry in 2018 is out-rightly rejected by the learned

School Tribunal. He would submit that in such facts the judgment of

the School Tribunal deserves to be upheld and the same is now

realized by the Petitioners and hence the Petitioners have urged the

Court to consider their alternate submission. He would submit that

right of the employee namely Respondent No.1 be protected by this

Court by passing appropriate orders and the Petition be dismissed with

costs.

8. I have heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties

at the bar. Submissions made by all 3 parties have received due

consideration of the Court.

9. At the outset, it is seen that Petitioners have challenged the

Judgment of the School Tribunal on merits. Though the said Judgment

is a detailed Judgment which considers every facet of the enquiry

conducted by the Petitioners and rejects the case of the Management

with cogent reasons, what is seen is that Petitioners have not abided by

the directions contained therein neither Petitioners have obtained a

stay of the said Judgment. Petitioners have merely filed the present

Petition and kept it pending for years together and in the interregnum

allowed Respondent No.1 to superannuate and cross his retirement

age. Such conduct of the Petitioners is not appreciated by the Court at

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all.

10. In this regard, findings returned by the School Tribunal in

paragraph No. 11 and 12 in so far as the conduct of Enquiry is

concerned deserves to be noted by the Court for adjudicating the

present Petition. It is seen that notices were issued to Respondent No.1

- Employee on 23.09.2017, 13.10.2017, 15.11.2017 and 13.013.2018,

but perusal of the same show that save and except these notices, there

is not a single letter of allegation containing any specific charges issued

by Petitioners against Respondent No.1. Once admittedly if there is no

specific letter of allegations issued, chargesheet cannot be issued on

the basis of mere notices which do not imply any charges. It is seen

that no chargesheet was either issued by the Management but in the

written notes filed by the Management before the School Tribunal /

reference is made to issuance of chargesheet on 13.01.2018 which is

infact not the chargesheet at all. The letter dated 13.01.2018 is once

again a mere letter calling upon Respondent No.1 to nominate his

representative for formation of Enquiry Committee. The learned

Tribunal has concluded that no chargesheet is issued in the present

case, neither any explanation from Respondent No.1 is called upon.

11. It is seen that chargesheet is the foundation on the basis of

which the delinquent employee is made aware of the charges levelled

against him. Issuance of chargesheet gives the delinquent employee a

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chance to explain his defense against the charges levelled against him.

In this regard, paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 of the impugned Judgment

are material and are reproduced below for ease of reference:

"11) It appears from the inquiry record that, the inquiry was
concluded in three meetings. The first meeting was held on
17/01/2018, second meeting was held on 28/02/2018 and last
meeting was held on 26/03/2018. In first two meeting no proceeding
was taken place. In the second meeting the representative of
delinquent has submitted an application with the convener and thereby
demanded the copy of charge sheet. It appears from the inquiry record
that, the convener and committee members have declined to accept the
request for supplying the copy of charge sheet. It appears from the
inquiry record that, at the time of third meeting also charge sheet was
not supplied to the delinquent. In third meeting it was held on
26/03/2018 total five witnesses were examined. Out of these five
witnesses opportunity of cross examination of two witnesses were
granted. So far as other three witnesses are concerned, it appears that,
on the same day evidence of one Smt.Mahajan (witness no.3) Shri.Tare
(Witness No.4), Shri.Potdar (witness No.5) were also examined. It
appears from the entire inquiry record that, the representative of
delinquent has asked for permission to cross examine the witness
Shri.Potdar/witness No.5, however. permission was not granted to him
and reason assigned that, already his evidence was over, however, it is
clear that the representative of delinquent had asked for permission to
cross examine the witness at the time of recording of evidence of that
witness itself, therefore, certainly it was necessary for the inquiry
committee to grant the permission to cross examine, however that
permission was not granted.
12) It also appears from the inquiry record that, at the time of third
meeting itself the representative of appellant has filed one complaint
with convenor and by that he has demanded the names of witnesses,
copy of charge sheet, so also he asked for permission to examine
witnesses; however at that time that permission was not granted.
Certainly this mode adopted by the inquiry committee was against the
settled principles of conducting departmental inquiry. By rejecting the
application of delinquent for supplying copy of charge sheet, so also for
permission to conduct the cross examination certainly the inquiry
committee has obstructed the delinquent/appellant from defending
himself at the time of departmental inquiry. Therefore considering
these facts, I come to the conclusion that the inquiry in question was
not conducted by following provisions under rule 36 and 37 of MEPS
Rules, 1981. Therefore considering all these aspects, I came to the
conclusion that, the inquiry in question as well as the report prepared
by the inquiry committee on the basis of said inquiry is against the
provisions of law. Certainly, the respondent's institution has passed the
impugned order of termination/compulsory retirement dated
25/06/2018 on the basis of said inquiry report, therefore, the said

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order is also cannot be said as legal one."

12. In the facts of the present case, admittedly no chargesheet

was issued and therefore Respondent No.1 was deprived of his

valuable right of giving his explanation to the alleged charges which

culminated in his forced termination. Further regarding conduct of

enquiry also the Petitioners are at fault. From this and the overall

circumstances it is concluded by the School Tribunal that the entire

enquiry stood vitiated as it was conducted in gross violation of the

principles of natural justice. As noted above, Petitioners did not stop at

this. The manner in which Petitioners conducted the Departmental

Enquiry is also against all cannons of justice. The entire Enquiry was

conducted in three meetings.

13. The three meetings were held on 17.01.2018, 22.08.2018

and 26.03.2018. It is seen and borne out from the record that in the

first two meetings no proceedings whatsoever took place whereas in

the third meeting request of supplying copy of chargesheet sought for

by Respondent No.1 was not adhered to by Petitioners. Further in the

third meeting, on the same day out of 5 witnesses examined by the

Enquiry Committee opportunity of cross examination of only 2

witnesses was granted to Respondent No.1 and the minutes and record

show that request to cross examine the other 3 witnesses was not

granted by the Enquiry Committee on the premise that their evidence

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was already over.

14. The learned Tribunal has therefore held that the procedure

adopted by the Enquiry Committee is against all settled principles of

conducting Departmental Enquiry and the Enquiry Committee itself

obstructed Respondent No.1 from explaining himself in the

Departmental Enquiry and considering this the learned School Tribunal

has held that the Enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Committee was not

held as per the statutory provisions of Rules 36 and 81 of the MEPS

Rules, 1981, and therefore the order of termination / compulsory

retirement cannot be said to be a legal order. Further until his

retirement / superannuation age, Respondent No.1 was not employed

elsewhere and Petitioners have not brought any such material on

record. In such circumstances, request made by the Petitioners for

remand and fresh enquiry cannot be considered and countenanced. In

this regard,findings returned in paragraph Nos.9 and 10 of the

impugned Judgment are found to be correct appreciation of the

material on record and are reproduced below for ease of reference:-

"9) Thus as discussed above, the appellant has contended that, the
formation of inquiry committee was not proper. The management had
not followed provisions under rule 33 to 37 of MEPS rules, 1981. The
management has not issued statement of allegations and charge sheet
to the appellant. Thus the opportunity of giving explanation in respect
of charges was denied by the management. Opportunity of cross
examination of witness was not given to the appellant nor was the
opportunity to examine witnesses granted to him. All these submissions
of appellant were denied by the respondents.
10) Admittedly, the respondents have issued show cause notices to
the appellant dated 23/09/2017, 13/10/2017, 15/11/2017 and lastly

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on 13/11/2018. It appears that, the appellant has given reply of all
these notices. Admittedly the appellant was permanent employee of
respondent's management, therefore, certainly if at all the management
was intending to initiate departmental inquiry against the appellant for
the misconduct and wilful and persistence negligence in duty as
mentioned in the notice dated 23/09/2017 in that event it was
necessary for the management to follow the procedure for conducting
departmental inquiry laid down in rule 36 and 37 of MEPS Rules,
1981. It was necessary for the management to issue letter of
allegations, so also it was necessary for to call for explanation within a
period of 7 days from the date of receipt of such statement of
allegations. After receipt of explanation of statement of allegations if it
was found by the management that, same is not satisfactory, in that
event within a period of 15 days it was necessary for the management
to take the decision in respect of formation of inquiry committee. Later
on it was necessary to form the committee in view rule 36 of MEPS
rules 1981. After the formation of inquiry committee it was necessary
for the management to hand over the copy of charge sheet containing
specific charges along with statement of allegation to the convenor of
inquiry committee, so also it was necessary on the part of the
management to forward the copy of the same to the delinquent
employee i.e. the appellant. This procedure is laid down in rule 37.
Now so far as the procedure followed by the respondents is concerned:
it appears that the respondents have issued notices dated 23/09/2017,
13/10/2017, 15/11/2017 and 13/01/2018. It appears that, the
management had not issued letter of allegations. For the sake of
arguments if it is presumed that the respondents have issued all the
above referred four notices, but except these four notices it appears
that, no specific letter of allegations was issued containing charges.
Moreover, so far as the issuance of charge sheet is concerned; it
appears that the respondent no.1 and 2 were appeared in the case and
at that time they have filed reply. In the said reply nowhere it is
submitted by the respondents that they have issued charge sheet to the
appellant, however surprisingly at the time of argument the
respondents have filed written notes Exh.22 and in the said written
notes it is mentioned by the respondents that, they have issued charge
sheet on 13/01/2018 U/s.4 (1) of MEPS Act, 1977 read with rule 28
and 33 of MEPS Rules, 1981. The respondents have filed the entire
enquiry proceeding on record. In the said proceeding at Sr.no.8 the
notice dated 13/01/2018 is produced by the respondents themselves.
On perusal of said notice it appears that the said notice was issued to
the appellant by the Chief Executive Officer of respondent's institution.
It also appears that by the said notice the appellant was called upon to
communicate his name of representative for the purpose of formation
of inquiry committee and admittedly there is no whisper in the said
notice about charges levelled against appellant, therefore by no stretch
of imagination it can be said that the said notice is charge sheet or said
notice can be considered as a "Charge Sheet". From this fact itself it can
be easily gathered that the inquiry in question was initiated against the
appellant without issuing proper charge sheet and without calling his
explanation in that regard. Thus from these facts itself it can be
gathered that, the respondents have committed the breach of rule 36
by not issuing charge sheet to the appellant. Charge sheet can be

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considered as a base of every departmental inquiry. The object behind
issuing charge sheet is to inform the delinquent about the charges
levelled against him. So also the charge sheet is. an opportunity to the
delinquent to explain his defence in respect of charges. Admittedly in
the present case the respondents have not issued the charge sheet,
therefore, certainly the appellant delinquent deprived of his valuable
right of explanation in respect of charges. From this fact itself, it can be
easily gathered that the inquiry was conducted against the principles of
natural justice.

15. In such facts and circumstances the learned School Tribunal

has given its imprimatur in paragraph Nos. 13 to 15 with regard to

payment of backwages, retirement benefits, all other benefits to the

Respondent No.1 while relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court

in the case of State of Punjab vs. Harbajan Singh Greasy4 which in my

opinion does not call for any interference whatsoever. Paragrapgh Nos.

13 to 15 of the impugned Judgment are reproduced below for ease of

reference:

"13) It appears from the record that, the respondents have issued
order dated 25/06/2018 and by the said order appellant is
compulsorily retired from service. The appellant as well as
respondents have produced the order in question on record. It appears
from the said order that, though it is mentioned by the respondents
institution that, the appellant is being compulsorily retired on
25/06/2018 but it appears that it is mentioned in the order itself that
the order is passed as per rule 31(2)(ii) of MEPS Act, 1977. Not only
this though the respondents have pleaded in their written statement
that, after the compulsory retirement of appellant retirement benefits is
already given, however it appears that it is further pleaded that no
salary or allowance and emoluments and back wages are admissible to
the appellant. It is also pleaded that the appellant is entitled to full
back wages benefits as per law, however the appellant has not so far as
co-operated with the head master this pleading of head master is
vague. Not only this the respondents have not filed any documents
from which it can be gathered that the retirement benefits were given
to the appellant. Hence though the word "compulsorily retired" is used
in impugned order, still said order cannot be considered as order of
"compulsory retirement" but said order can be considered as
"Termination". From this fact itself it can be gathered that, the
4 1996(9) SCC 322

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respondent's intention was to impose the major penalty of termination
of service, because the said penalty is provided in rule 31(2)(ii). Hence
though the word "compulsory retired" is used in the impugned order,
but still said order can be said an order of "termination", therefore this
Tribunal is having jurisdiction to deal with the present case. As
discussed above, I have already held that the inquiry in question so also
the report of inquiry committee based on that inquiry is against the
provisions of law. Hence I hold that, the termination in question issued
on the basis of such faulty inquiry and the report is illegal, therefore,
the said termination order is liable to be set aside.
14) Now so far as the submission on behalf of the respondents that.
opportunity needs to be granted to the respondents to conduct de nova
inquiry is concerned; in this regard the learned counsel for the
respondents argued that, if this tribunal came to the conclusion that
the inquiry committee was not constituted as per the provisions of
MEPS Act, 1977 and MEPS Rules, 1981 in that circumstances
opportunity can be granted to the respondent management to conduct
de nova inquiry. In support of the contention the learned counsel relied
on decision State of Punjab Vs. Dr.Harbhajan Singh Greasy reported in
1996 (9) SCC 322. In which it is held by Hon'ble Apex Court that,
"when the inquiry was found to be faulty it could not be proper to
direct reinstatement with consequential benefits. Matter required to be
remitted to the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure from the
state at which the fault was pointed out and to take action according to
law. The consequential benefits would depend upon the result of
inquiry and order passed thereon.". It was also held that "since the
respondent had retired from his service now no useful purpose will be
served in directing to conduct inquiry afresh" However, facts of the
cited case is not identical with case in hand, because in that case
during the pendency of proceeding the delinquent therein reached to
the age of superannuation, therefore, it was held in that case that as
the employee is retired hence no useful purpose will be served
directing to conduct inquiry afresh". However, in the present case, the
appellant was not reached to the age of superannuation hence with due
respect to the preposition laid down in above referred case law I came
to the conclusion that the said case law is not helpful to the
respondents.
15) Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and
considering material brought on record by the parties, I come to the
conclusion that the appellant has proved the fact that, the management
had terminated his service by virtue of impugned order dated
25/06/2018. The said order was issued on the basis of inquiry which
was not held as per the provisions of law. Therefore the inquiry in
question, inquiry committee's report as well as impugned order of
termination all are against the provisions of law. Considering these
facts, I have already held that, the impugned termination order cannot
be sustained and same is liable to be set aside. So far as the relief
claimed by the appellant is concerned, certainly as the inquiry is
declared as vitiated as not conducted as per the provisions of law, so
also the report is also held as against provisions of law and the
termination order based on such inquiry report is also held as against

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the provisions of law, hence I came to the conclusion that the appellant
is entitle for the relief of reinstatement as prayed along with back
wages and consequential benefits. Therefore I answer Point No.1 & 2 in
the affirmative and in answer to point no.3 I pass following order.
ORDER

The appeal is allowed as under-:

1. The impugned order of otherwise termination dated 25/06/2018 is hereby declared as illegal and same is hereby quashed and set aside.

2. The respondent No.1 management is hereby directed to reinstate the appellant on his original post with full back wages and consequential benefits.

3. The respondent no.1 management is hereby directed to comply with the above order within 30 days."

16. On overall consideration of the material placed on record, I am of the opinion that the findings returned in paragraph Nos.9 to 15 of the Tribunal's order are such that it does not entitle the Petitioners (Management / Trust - School) to maintain and challenge the Judgment of the School Tribunal on any ground whatsoever as stated in the Petition, even though the Petitioners may not have appointed any other person in place of Respondent No.1 after his forced retirement / termination in 2018. However, that in itself does not give the Petitioners any substantive right to urge their alternative submission to the Court asking the Court to uphold the impugned Judgment of the Tribunal, but direct State Government to pay all backwages and benefits due to Respondent No.1 as directed by the said Judgment. Infact this clearly is an afterthought on the part of the Management / Petitioners in view of the merits of the matter and in my opinion a completely preposterous to make to now save its skin and 18 ::: Uploaded on - 07/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 08/04/2026 00:23:03 ::: WP.1202.2022.doc overcome the impugned judgment. Respondent No.1 worked for 28 long years with Petitioners, he was a permanent employee governed by the provisions of the MEPS Act and Rules and Petitioners have not followed the due process of law before forcefully terminating him.

Hence the alternate submission argued by the Petitioners is rejected by the Court.

17. It appears that findings returned in the Judgment delivered by the School Tribunal are such that Petitioners are now forced to make the alternate submission of upholding the Judgement, but that in itself does not absolve the Petitioners from their highhanded and arbitrary, rather their reckless illegal action of termination / forced compulsory retirement of Respondent No.1 without following the due process of law. On merits the Petitioners have in the facts of the present case thrown caution to the wind and in my considered opinion have acted in the most malafide manner without following the due process of law. Such conduct of the Petitioners do not entitle them to any relief whatsoever in the facts and circumstances of the present case. If Petitioners have committed a gross mistake in not following the due process of law then they have to be held responsible for the same as has been done by the learned Tribunal.

18. Be that as it may, I do not wish to therefore consider the alternate submission urged by Petitioners. The said submission is 19 ::: Uploaded on - 07/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 08/04/2026 00:23:03 ::: WP.1202.2022.doc made only on the eve of hearing of the Petition despite such stand not been pleaded in the Petition.

19. In so far as Judgment dated 06.12.2021 is concerned the same is passed on merits in accordance with law by duly considering the material on record and the case of the parties before the Tribunal. It is seen that right since inception Petitioners have not complied with even a singular statutory provision namely Rules 28 to 37 of the MEPS Rules, 1981 for termination and in conducting the enquiry and have derelicted at every stage. The findings returned by the School Tribunal, in paragraph No.9 to 15 of Judgment dated 06.12.2021 are well reasoned findings which are therefore required to be upheld and confirmed, they call for no interference whatsoever, hence Judgment dated 06.12.2021 is upheld and confirmed.

20. Resultantly, Writ Petition fails. In the Petition, Petitioners have prayed for the relief of fresh departmental inquiry but did not press this prayer at all during arguments, Petition was filed and no interim order was obtained and kept pending and Respondent No.1 was allowed to superannuate and retire. Further while arguing the Petition before me, Petitioners have argued the alternate submission which is a completely different relief which is not even pleaded in the Petition.

21. Submissions made by parties have to find place in their 20 ::: Uploaded on - 07/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 08/04/2026 00:23:03 ::: WP.1202.2022.doc respective pleadings and such is not the case of the Petitioners before me in so far as the alternate submission is concerned. The alternate submission argued by Petitioners is not contained in the original pleadings at all.

22. In the present case admittedly, Respondent No. 1 was terminated on 25.06.2018. The School Tribunal passed impugned judgment on 06.12.2021 directing his reinstatement and payment of backwages. Petition was filed in the year 2022 and was kept pending without interim reliefs. In the meanwhile ultimately on 31.08.2024 Respondent No. 1 passed the age of superannuation / retirement. Respondent No. 1 has filed affidavit that he was not employed elsewhere during the said period. Hence in view of the aforementioned observations and findings, the Writ Petition is dismissed.

23. In view of dismissal of Writ Petition, the Petitioners are directed to pay the entire amount of backwages as ordered by the Tribunal due and payable to the Respondent No.1 - Employee after computing the same and taking approval from Respondent No.2 within a period of 4 weeks from today. The calculations shall be forwarded by Petitioners to Respondent No.2 within 2 weeks from today and approval shall be accorded by Respondent No.2 within one week thereafter and payment of the entire amount shall be done by 21 ::: Uploaded on - 07/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 08/04/2026 00:23:03 ::: WP.1202.2022.doc Petitioners as per the Tribunal's Judgement within 4 weeks from today. The entire amount of backwages shall be payable by Petitioners alongwith 6% simple interest to the Respondent No.1 - Employee as directed. Respondent No.1 shall sign all papers and service book within one week and Petitioners shall prepare the same forthwith for submitting to the Respondent No.2 for approval. The above timeline shall be strictly followed by the President / Secretary of Petitioner No.1 without any further delay or dereliction.

24. Writ Petition is dismissed with the above directions.





                                                       [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]

Ajay               Digitally
                   signed by
                   RAVINDRA
       RAVINDRA    MOHAN
       MOHAN       AMBERKAR
       AMBERKAR    Date:
                   2026.04.07
                   20:01:35
                   +0530




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