Jharkhand High Court
Sandhya Kumari vs Mithilesh Kumar on 27 November, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.156 of 2025
Sandhya Kumari ... Appellant
Versus
Mithilesh Kumar ... Respondent
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Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Nikhil Ranjan, Advocate For the Respondent: Mr. Rajendra Prasad Gupta, Advocate
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Order No.04/Dated: 27.11.2025 I.A. No. 11525 of 2025
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 378 days in filing the instant appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/wife:
2. The ground has been taken that the appellant was not aware to the pending proceeding in the judgeship of Dhanbad.
3. The reason has been assigned that prior to filing of the present appeal, another matrimonial case was filed in the Family Court at Patna in matrimonial case no. 643 of 2023 but was withdrawn and subsequent thereto the fresh application has been filed in the court of the Family Judge at Dhanbad, of which appellant was not aware of.
4. It has been stated that the appellant has learnt about the judgment of dissolution of marriage passed in 1 Original Suit No. 837 of 2023 and immediately thereafter arranged funds and approved the advocate funds for the purpose of procuring the documents from where she has come to know that in span of barely four months judgment in the aforesaid suit was pronounced.
5. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground as also by giving submission that since it is a question of the future survival of the wife and, as such, the matter may be heard on merit and if it will not allow to be heard due to the technicalities on the issue of limitation the appellant will suffer irreparable loss and injury which cannot be compensated.
Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband:
6. Mr. R.P. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground that she was having no knowledge about the pending proceeding at Dhanbad, rather, the notice which was issued to her was refused to be received by the family members.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent-husband has further submitted that the delay of 378 days has not properly been explained saying it to be the sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the aforesaid delay. 2
8. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the reasons assigned in the instant interlocutory application, therefore, are not fit to be considered as sufficient cause to condone the delay. Analysis
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
10. We are conscious that irrespective of the period of delay if the sufficient cause is being shown by the party at the delay is to be condoned. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in "Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer", [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and 3 circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10.In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been 4 furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or 5 deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
11. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent 6 manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.
12. The Court has proceeded to examine the rival submission advanced on behalf of the parties on the touchstone of the aforesaid proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
13. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 378 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned Judgment of dissolution of marriage on merit.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application being I.A No. 11525 of 2025 on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.
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15. From perusal of the said Interlocutory Application, it is evident that the ground for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, has been mentioned at paragraphs 4,5, 6 and 7 of the interlocutory application is that passing of the order/judgment dated 04.01.2024 and decree dated 12.01.2024 by learned family court was not within the knowledge of the applicant/appellant and as soon as the applicant came to know about the judgment and decree, she had arranged funds and approved the advocate in Dhanbad for procuring documents wherefrom she learnt that in very haste manner the decree of dissolution of marriage has been passed by the learned Family Court and after getting opinion from her advocate, the applicant/appellant filed first appeal before this Court without any further delay, for ready reference, paragraph 4,5 6 and 7 of the instant interlocutory application are being quoted hereunder as :-
4. That it is humbly stated and submitted that after facing much difficulty, contacted the learned counsel in Dhanbad as no cause of action has arisen in Dhanbad and wrongly the order has been obtained.
5. That it is pertinent to note here that earlier the divorce case was filed in Patna family court which was numbered as matrimonial case number 643/2023. The said application was withdrawn and subsequently a case was filed in Dhanbad without any knowledge to the applicant and that she was not able to contest the said case.8
6. That it is most humbly stated and submitted that as soon as the apparent learnt about the order in divorce case immediately arrange funds and approve the advocate in Dhanbad for procuring documents where she learnt that in a span of barely 4 months judgement in the divorce case was pronounced without affording proper opportunity to the app, and without any knowledge to the applicant about the pendency of the said case.
7. That is further stated and submitted that the respondent has concealed various cases between the parties and dispute between the parties with respect to domestic violence and under such concealment, the said order of divorce was obtained."
16. Thus, from the aforesaid paragraphs it is evident that earlier a divorce case being matrimonial case number 643/2023 was filed by the respondent husband in Patna Family Court but the same was withdrawn and subsequently suit for dissolution of marriage was filed before the Dhanbad Family Court and further the question of jurisdiction has also been raised in this interlocutory application by stating that no cause of action has arisen at Dhanbad.
17. It is admitted fact that the respondent/ petitioner/husband is working as deposition writer in the Court of Addition District Judge I Dhanbad.
18. It is further admitted fact herein that earlier suit of dissolution has been filed before Family Court at Patna which was subsequently withdrawn and present before the 9 Family Court at Dhanbad and same was adjudicated within span of four Months, therefore, the ground as raised by the appellant/wife that she was not aware about the passing of the said decree of dissolution of marriage by the Family Court Dhanbad, appears to be correct at first instance.
19. Further it has been contended by appellant herein that no cause of action has arisen at Dhanbad, therefore the order of dissolution of marriage has been obtained wrongly by the respondent/husband.
20. From the aforesaid fact it is evident that question of jurisdiction has been raised herein, therefore in such circumstances, it is considered view of this Court that the instant appeal should be heard on merit for proper appreciation of jurisdiction.
21. Moreover, in a matrimonial dispute a liberal approach is to be taken for the purpose of dealing with the limitation instead of dismissing the case on the technical ground i.e. on the ground of delay.
22. If the case will be dismissed on the issue of limitation, then the issue which is to be considered on merit will remain be unconsidered, which in the considered view of this Court will not be said to be proper. 10
23. This Court considering the aforesaid reason, is of the view that the present interlocutory application is to be allowed, accordingly, stands allowed.
24. In consequence, thereof, the delay in filing the instant appeal is hereby, condoned.
25. The instant interlocutory application, accordingly, stands disposed of.
26. Post this matter under the appropriate heading on 11th December, 2025 for hearing on the issue on merit.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Dated: 27th November, 2025 Rajnish/Suman 11