Madras High Court
Mottaiyandi Chettiar (Died) vs Saroja (Died) on 24 November, 2016
Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 (NOC) 726 (MAD.) (MADURAI BENCH)
Author: S.S.Sundar
Bench: S.S.Sundar
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 24.11.2016
Reserved on: 02.11.2016
Delivered on: 24.11.2016
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.S.SUNDAR
Appeal Suit No.331 of 1994
C.M.P.No.6171 of 1994
1.Mottaiyandi Chettiar (Died)
2.Muthulakshmi
3.Mohan
4.Saravanan
5.Meenatchi
6.Senthil Kumar
7.Pushpavalli
8.Karthikeyan ... Appellants/Defendants
(Appellants 2 to 8 brought on record as LRs of the deceased sole appellant
vide Court order dated 29.11.2014 made in M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2011 in
M.P.(MD)No.2 of 2010 in A.S.No.331 of 1994 by ASJ)
-Vs-.
1.Saroja (Died)
2.Gurusami (Died)
3.Balamurugan ... Plaintiff / Respondent
(2nd respondent is brought on record as LRs of the deceased sole respondent
as per orders of Court dated 31.12.2003 made in C.M.P.Nos.1442 and 1443 of
2003.)
(3rd respondent brought on record as LRs of the deceased second respondent,
vide Court order dated 11.08.2016 made in C.M.P.(MD) Nos.7155 to 7157 of 2016
in A.S.(MD)No.331 of 1995 by RMJ.)
Prayer: Appeal Suit filed under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code, against
the judgment and decree dated 21.12.1993 made in O.S.No.66 of 1992 by the
learned Sub Judge, Ramanathapuram.
!For Appellants : Mr.R.Saminathan
for M/s.Raja Raman
^For Respondent 3 : Mr.M.S.Balasubramania Iyer
:JUDGMENT
The defendant in the suit in O.S.No.66 of 1992 on the file of the Sub Court, Ramanathapuram, is the appellant in this appeal. Since the appellant died during the pendency of this appeal, his legal representatives namely appellants 2 to 8 are prosecuting this appeal. The first respondent in this appeal is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.66 of 1992. The first respondent also died during the pendency of this appeal. The second respondent namely the husband of the first respondent was brought on record, as the legal representative of the deceased first respondent. The second respondent also died subsequently and the third respondent in the appeal was brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased second respondent on the basis of a Will alleged to have been executed by the second respondent.
2.The deceased first respondent filed a suit in O.S.No.66 of 1992 for declaration of her title to the suit properties and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the deceased first appellant from interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties.
3.The case of the plaintiff in the suit are as follows:
3.1.The suit properties and numerous other items belonged to one Somasundara @ Ramanathan Chettiar by virtue of a registered partition deed dated 17.06.1954 entered into between the said Ramanathan Chettiar and his brother's son Sundararajan Chettiar. The said Ramanathan Chettiar is the father of the plaintiff and upon the death of the said Ramanathan Chettiar, on 16.07.1991, the plaintiff, being his only daughter, is the sole heir of Ramanathan Chettiyar.
3.2.After the death of Ramanathan Chettiar, the plaintiff inherited the suit properties as an absolute owner and that she is in physical possession and enjoyment of the properties and other properties.
Since the defendant, the first appellant herein was making attempts to interfere with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment, the plaintiff stated that she was obliged to file the suit for declaration and consequential injunction. It is admitted that the defendant is the sister's son of the plaintiff's father, Late Ramanathan Chettiar.
3.3.The suit was contested by the defendant. Though the defendant admitted that the suit properties belonged to Ramanathan Chettiar, the father of the plaintiff, the defendant claimed title on the basis of the Will alleged to have been executed by the said Ramanathan Chettiar in favour of the defendant. Since the alleged Will is in respect of the properties of Ramanathan Chettiar, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for after holding that the Will dated 23.06.1991 is a suspicious document and that the defendant has not proved the due execution of the Will by the testator in a sound disposing state of mind. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the present appeal has been filed by the defendant.
3.4.As indicated earlier, the plaintiff in the suit died during the pendency of this appeal and her husband was impleaded as the second respondent. Even the husband of the plaintiff, namely, the second respondent, died during the pendency of the appeal, without any issues, through her wife. Hence, the third respondent who claimed to be the legatee under the Will executed by the second respondent dated 01.11.2013, came on record as a person on whom the cause of action survives.
4.The learned counsel for the appellant though raised various grounds in the appeal argued that the appeal has to be allowed on the short ground that the plaintiff having inherited the suit properties from her father and having died intestate and issueless, the properties will revert to the heirs of her father and not to her husband or his heirs in view of Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the suit properties are the properties of the plaintiff's father. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff died intestate and without any issues. In such circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has merits on the conjoint reading of Section 15(1), Section 15(2) and Section 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Sections 15 and 16 read as follows:
?15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus.? (1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16,?
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre- deceased son or daughter) and the husband;
(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),?
(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.
16. Order of succession and manner of distribution among heirs of a female Hindu.?The order of succession among the heirs referred to in section 15 shall be, and the distribution of the intestates property among those heirs shall take place according to the following rules, namely:?
Rule 1.?Among the heirs specified in sub-section (1) of section 15, those in one entry shall be preferred to those in any succeeding entry and those included in the same entry shall take simultaneously.
Rule 2.?If any son or daughter of the intestate had pre-deceased the intestate leaving his or her own children alive at the time of the intestate?s death, the children of such son or daughter shall take between them the share which such son or daughter would have taken if living at the intestate?s death. Rule 3.?The devolution of the property of the intestate on the heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) and in sub-section (2) to section 15 shall be in the same order and according to the same rules as would have applied if the property had been the father?s or the mother?s or the husband?s as the case may be, and such person had died intestate in respect thereof immediately after the intestate?s death.?
5.Section 15(2) is not controlled by Section 16. Hence, on a plain reading of Section 15(1) and 15(2), it can be seen that Section 15(2) is an exception, recognising a different mode of devolution in respect of properties inherited by a female Hindu, from her father or mother. In the absence of any issues, the properties inherited by a female from her father or mother, will go to the heirs of her father after her life time and the husband of the female will be excluded from inheriting the properties after her life time. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention has relied upon several judgments which are considered in the following order:
5.1.In the case of Radhika v. Aghnu Ram Mahto reported in (1994) 5 SCC 761, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
?3. A reading thereof clearly indicates that for the property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, in other words female's paternal side, in the absence of her son, daughter or children of the predeceased son or daughter, the succession opens to the heirs of the father or mother and not to Class I heirs in the order specified in sub-section (1) of Section 15 and in the order of Section 16. In other words, the children and the children of the predeceased son or daughter of the Hindu female alone are entitled to get such property. Thus, husband stands excluded from the succession to the property inherited by female Hindu from her father's side.
Accordingly, we hold that since the mother of the appellant had inherited the suit property from her grandfather, her husband-respondent stood excluded from intestate succession to the estate left by her.?
Hence, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above judgment that in respect of the properties of a female Hindu inherited by her father or mother, after the death of female Hindu, the properties will go only to her children and not to her husband. The facts of the case on hand is not similar to the facts in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is without reference to Rule 1 of Section 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which says that the heirs specified in the same entry shall take simultaneously. Since children of female Hindus under her husband are specified as heirs in the same entry, children and husband are entitled to take simultaneously and the children may not exclude the female's husband. Hence, it is very difficult to accept the proposition in view of Rule 1, Section 16 of the Hindu Succession Act which was not adverted to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above judgment. In the present case, the plaintiff died without any issues and hence, the plaintiff's husband stood excluded from intestate succession to the estate of the plaintiff.
5.2.In the case of Bhagat Ram (Dead) v. Teja Singh reported in (1999) 4 SCC 86, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
?6.On perusal of the two sub-sections we find that their spheres are very clearly marked put. So far sub-section (1), it covers the properties of a female Hindu dying intestate. Sub-section (2) starts with the words `Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)'. In other words, what falls within the sphere of sub-section (2), sub-section (1) will not apply. We find that Section 15(2)(a) uses the words `any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother', Thus property inherited by a female Hindu from her father and mother is carved-out from a female Hindu dying intestate. In order words any property of female Hindu, if inherited by her from her father or mother would not fall under sub-section (1) of Section 15. Thus, property of a female Hindu can be classified under two heads : Every property of a female Hindu dying intestate is a general class by itself covering all the properties but sub-section (2) excludes out of the aforesaid properties the property inherited by her from her father or mother.?
5.3.It is to be seen that the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was decided without noticing the fact that the sole respondent was no more when the case was decided. Hence, the judgment above referred to was recalled at the intervention of the legal heirs of the respondent before the Supreme Court and the matter was re-heard and fresh orders were passed by a judgment dated 06.11.2001. The same was reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court
1. After referring to Sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
?8.We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the Counsel for the respondents. Admittedly, Smt. Santi inherited the property in question from her mother. If the property held by a female was inherited from her father or mother, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased, including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter, it would only devolve upon the heirs of the father and, in this case, her sister Smt. Indro was the only legal heir of her father.?
5.4.In the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the fact that Section 15(2) was not there in the statute when Hindu Succession Bill, 1954, was originally introduced in the Rajya Sabha and that it came to be incorporated on the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament. The reason given by the Joint Committee, as found in Clause 17 of the Bill, reads as follows:
?While revising the order of succession among the heirs to a Hindu female, the Joint Committee have provided that, properties inherited by her from her father reverts to the family of the father in the absence of issue and similarly property inherited from her husband or father-in-law reverts to the heirs of the husband in the absence of issue. In the opinion of the Joint Committee such a provision would prevent properties passing into the hands of persons to whom justice would demand they should not pass.?
5.5.As seen from the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament, the legislative intend in introducing Section 15(2) to operate as exemption to Section 15(1) is very clear.
5.6.In the case of V.Dandapani Chettiar v. Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead) by LRs and others reported in 2003 (4) CTC 122, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
?9.The above section propounds a definite and uniform scheme of succession to the property of a female Hindu who dies intestate after the commencement of the Act. This section groups the heirs of a female intestate into five categories described as Entries (a) to (e) and specified in sub- section (1). Two exceptions both of the same nature are engrafted by sub- section(2) on the otherwise uniform order of succession prescribed by sub- section (1). The two exceptions are that if the female dies without leaving any issue, then (1) in respect of property inherited by her from her father or mother, that property will devolve not according to the order laid down in the five Entries (a) to (e), but upon the heirs of the father; and (2) in respect of property inherited by her from her husband or father-in-law it will devolve not according to the order laid down in the five Entries (a) to
(e) of sub- section (1) but upon the heirs of the husband. The two exceptions mentioned above are confined to property 'inherited' from the father, mother, husband and father-in-law of the female Hindu and do not affect property acquired by her by gift or by device under a Will of any of them. The present Section 15 has to be read in conjunction with Section 16which evolves a new and uniform order of succession to her property and regulates the manner of its distribution. In other words, the order of succession in case of property inherited by her from her father or mother, its operation is confined to the case of dying without leaving a son, a daughter or a children of any pre-deceased son or daughter.
10.Sub-section (2) of Section 15 carves out an exception in case of a female dying intestate without leaving son, daughter or children of a pre- deceased son or daughter. In such a case, the rule prescribed is to find out the source from which she has inherited the property. If it is inherited from her father or mother, it would devolve as prescribed under Section 15(2)(a). If it is inherited by her from her husband or father-in-law, it would devolve upon the heirs of her husband under Section 15(2)(b). The clause enacts that in a case where the property is inherited by a female from her father or mother, it would devolve not upon the other heirs, but upon the heirs of her father. This would mean that if there is no son 01 daughter including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter, then the property would devolve upon the heirs of her father. Result would be - if property is inherited by a female from her father or her mother, neither her husband or his heirs would get such property, but it would revert back to the heirs of her father.?
5.7.In the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Ayi Ammal v. Subramania Asari and another reported in AIR 1966 Madras 369.
5.8.Again in the case of S.R.Srinivasa and others v.
S.Padmavathamma reported in 2010 (5) CTC 364, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has followed earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and reiterated the position. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was followed by a Single Judge of this Court in a case of Govindasamy v. E.Muthulakshmi and others reported in 2014 (1) MWN (Civil) 704. Similar view was expressed by an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Visalakshi Ammal v. Chelliah Pillai and others reported in 1988-2-L.W. 389 and in another judgment of this Court in the case of Komalavalli Ammal and another v. T.A.S.Krishnamachari and another reported in 1990-2-L.W. 598. Further, it has been held that property of female Hindu inherited by her from her parents would devolve on the heirs of her father as per Sub Section 2 of Section 15 and not on the heirs of her husband or husband in several judgments of this Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court.
5.9.Justice Chinnapa Reddi sitting as a Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case in Bhimadas and others v. P.Kanthamma (died) and others reported in AIR 1974 Andhra Pradesh 266 has accepted the proposition, relying upon the text by Prof.J.Duncan M. Derrett in his 'Introduction to Modern Hindu Law' in paragraph 622 which is extracted as below:
"The exceptions to the general rule are motivated by a clear (and traditional) desire that property shall not pass from family to family merely by a female's death intestate. Where property was inherited by her from her parent or parents, it shall not pass to her husband or to her husband's heirs where she dies without children or children of predeceased children. If such children or grand-children survive her there is no objection to the husband taking a share even in such property, otherwise he is excluded, and so are his heirs, and the property goes to the 'heirs of the father'.?
6.Uniformly the interpretation which is conveyed by the plain language of Section 15(1) and Section 15(2) has been accepted by all the High Court in several Judgments and I enumerate some of them for reference:
(i) In Her Jesa Kachra and others v. Marani Jayani Lakhman reported in AIR 1979 Gujarat 45.
(ii) In Raghuwar v. Janki Prasa reported in AIR 1981 Madhya Pradesh 39.
(iii) In Thippeswamy and others v. Sri. Rangappa and others reported in 2013 Supreme (Kar) 843.
7.As against the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant to dismiss the suit because of the devolution of the suit properties on the heirs of plaintiff's father upon the death of the plaintiff the learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that on a true interpretation of Section 15 and Section 16, the husband of the plaintiff cannot be excluded from inheritance and that on a proper and harmonious interpretation of Section 15(1) and Section 15(2) in the light of Section 16, the properties will go only to her husband, in the present case.
8.The next submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the defendant who set up a Will alleged to have been executed by Ramanathan Chettiar, cannot be allowed to abandon his own case and seek any relief or make any claim on the basis of a new case in this appeal. Since the whole argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is contrary to the plain language of Section 15(1) and (2) read with Section 16 and the pronouncement of various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the respondent was requested to make his submission in writing so as to precisely record his submissions. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted as follows:
8.1.As per Section 15 and Section 16 of the 1956 Act the son, daughter, including the son or the daughter of the predeceased son or the daughter as the case may be and the husband will be entitled to inherit simultaneous the estate of the deceased female, each getting a equal share and in case where the children of the predeceased son and the predeceased daughter, their respective heirs together will become entitled to one share alone. Therefore, the relatives mentioned in Sub Section 1(a) of Section 15 of the 1956 Act will be entitled to inherit the properties of the deceased female Hindu to the exclusion of the other relatives mentioned in Sub Section 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d) of Section 15 of the 1956 Act. Therefore, when the son or the daughter or the husband is available to inherit the estate of the deceased, he or she as the case may be, alone, will be entitled to inherit the estate to the exclusion of all other heirs mentioned in the succeeding sub-sections. Therefore when the husband is available to inherit the estate of his deceased wife, all her other relatives, whether mentioned in the Sub Section 1 and Sub Section 2 of Section 15 of the 1956 Act, will be excluded.
This position is strengthened on the closer reading of Section 16 of the 1956 Act.
8.2.Only in the absence of any of the relatives mentioned in Sec.15(1)(a) of the 1956 Act, the other relatives mentioned in Sub Sec.1(b) or 1(c) or 1(d) will be entitled to inherit. Only in such cases the order of preference among those heirs is modified under Sub Section 2 of Section 15 of the 1956 Act. It provides that if any property was inherited by the deceased female Hindu from her father, then in the absence of any of the heirs mentioned in sub-section 1(a), the heirs of the father will have to be preferred as against the heirs of the husband. Similarly if any property was inherited by the deceased female from her husband, then the heirs of the deceased husband will have to be preferred to inherit that estate to the exclusion of the heirs of her deceased father. For instance, if the deceased female had inherited some properties from her father and some other properties from her husband, then with respect to each those estates the heirs will have to be preferred as mentioned Sub-Section 2 of Section 15 of the 1956 Act. Therefore, under Section 15(2) the inheritance to the estate of deceased female Hindu will depend upon the fact whether she inherited that estate from and it will be modified as among the father or the husband as case may be the heirs of the father or the husband as the case may be. Therefore the term "not-with-standing" will have to be considered and properly understood in the context of Section 15 and Section 16 of the 1956 Act. It will not be appropriate and will not be proper to urge that in the absence of the son and the daughter, the husband will not be a heir at all and that, if any property was inherited by the deceased from her father, that property will have to be inherited only by the heirs of the father alone to the exclusion of the husband also. Such an interpretation will lead to absurdity and an absurdity has to be avoided while interpreting any statute.
8.3.An enactment will have to be construed harmoniously giving a definite meaning to each and every word adopted and utilize in that enactment without omitting even one word in that enactment and without adding any word to that enactment. If properly construed Sub Section 2 of Section 15 is not in derogation of sub section 1 of Section 15, but it provides only some modification in the line of succession among the heirs mentioned in the sub- section 1(b) and in the Sub-Section 1(c) and in the Sub-Section1(d).
8.4.Prior to the 1956 Act, the law of inheritance applicable to the Sridhana property or the property belonging to a female Hindu is quite different from the law applicable to inheritance of estate of any male Hindu, whether the property is a joint family property or a self acquire property. Under the 1956 Act several changes were made to the Hindu Law relating to inheritance. Therefore, applying the Heydon rule of interpretation Sec.15 and Sec.16 of the 1956 Act will have to be harmoniously construed.
9.The learned counsel for the respondent then relied upon several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which are as follows:
(i) In K.S.E. Board v. Indian Aluminium Co., reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1031.
(ii) In Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 703.
(iii) In The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow v.
M/s.Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur reported in (1975) 4 SCC 22.
(iv) In State of Orissa and others v. Arakhita Bisoi reported in (1977) 3 SCC 242.
(v) In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless Co. reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424.
(vi) In S.Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. reported in (1996) 4 SCC
596.
(vii) In Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2239.
(viii) In M/s.British Airways Plc. v. Union of India reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 391.
(ix) In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 3240.
(x) In Sri Ram Saha v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 5080.
(xi) In L.Gowramma (D) by LR. v. Sunanda (D) by LRs and another reported in 2016-4-L.W.814.
10.The learned counsel for the respondent, from the above judgments, submitted the following propositions on the interpretation of the statute:
10.1.Every statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be a harmonious one. It is not permissible for the courts to proceed on the basis that the legislation had enacted any provision by oversight. If any mistake has crept into the section it is for the legislature to correct the same and it is not for the courts to proceed on the supposition that the same was enacted by oversight.
10.2. An enactment being the Will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which over-rides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intend of the legislature that made it. The Will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land and demands perfect obedience.
10.3.The rule of harmonious construction should be applied and in applying the rule, the court will have to remember that to harmonise is not to destroy and that in interpreting the statutes the courts will always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect and a construction which defeats the intention of the rule-making authority must be avoided.
10.4.It is the cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute, two provisions which are in (apparent) conflict with each other such that both of them cannot stand, they should, if possible, be, so interpreted that effect can be given to both, and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except as a last resort. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction.
10.5. Interpretation must depend on text and context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say that if the text is the texture, context is the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
That interpretation is the best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word.
10.6.The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and therefore this court has held in several cases that a construction that reduces one of the provisions a dead letter is not a harmonious construction as one part being destroyed and consequently the court should avoid such a construction.
10.7.It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give affect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the court to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such a construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
10.8.If two interpretations are possible, the one which promotes or favours the object of the Act and the purpose it serves is to be preferred. At any rate, under the guise of purposeful interpretation the courts cannot re-write the statute.
11.After referring to the principles on the interpretation of a statute, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in all the above judgments, out of context, the learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is not applicable to a case where the female Hindu dies intestate leaving her husband who is entitled to inherit her properties along with her children. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent are devoid of any merits having regard to the plain language of the relevant provisions. When the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court has specifically reiterated the legal position that Section 15(2) is an exemption, the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent are absurd. None of the principles on the interpretation of statutory provisions, having regard to its contextual bearing can lend any support to the artificial interpretation that is propounded by the learned counsel for the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent finally submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has accepted his interpretation in a recent judgment in the case of L.Gowramma (Dead) by LR. v. Sunanda (Dead) by LRs and another reported in 2016-4-L.W. 814. First of all, in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with a case involving the interpretation of Section 4 of the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act, 1933 (Mysore Act No.X of 1933). Section 4 of the said Act provides that widow of a male Hindu are given preference to the daughters. The order of succession provided in Section 4 was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by holding that succession of Hindu male dying intestate will vest only with the widow under Section 4 (1)(ii) to the exclusion of the daughters who are only mentioned in the subsequent clause by virtue of the specific expression ?in the following order?. Absolutely, this Court is not able to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent relying upon the above judgment which has no application to the present case.
12.The learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that it is open to this Court to follow that decision, which according to him, is correct. No other judgment is brought to my attention to show that a view contrary to the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments above referred to has been expressed. In such circumstances, all the contentions of the respondent are rejected. One of the residuary arguments that was advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the defendant cannot abandon his right and seek new relief based on a new claim.
13.It is a well settled proposition that the appellate Court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, is entitled to take into consideration the subsequent events for the purpose of molding the relief as envisaged under Order VII, Rule 7 read with Order 41 Rule 33 of C.P.C. Since the suit properties would revert to the heirs of the plaintiff's father, the cause of action does not survive on the second respondent upon the death of plaintiff. Since it is admitted that the plaintiff who is the first respondent in this Appeal died intestate and without any issues, I have no other option but to hold that the whole properties can only be inherited by the heirs of the plaintiff's father. It is not in dispute that the appellant is the son of the sister of Ramanathan Chettiar. Hence, he is also one of the heirs of the plaintiff's father. This Court is not in a position to ascertain whether there are other heirs in the line of succession to the plaintiff's father. At this stage, it is not necessary to go into the issue as the husband of the plaintiff and the person claiming under him including the third respondent is not entitled to any declaratory relief as against the appellants. Hence, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court in O.S.No.66 of 1992, dated 21.12.1993 by the Subordinate Court, Ramanathapuram, is set aside. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
.