Gujarat High Court
Thakore Karshanji Hathiji Since Decd ... vs Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, on 4 February, 2020
Author: A. S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6148 of 2018
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
==========================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to
see the judgment ? No
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ? No
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any No
order made thereunder ?
==========================================================
THAKORE KARSHANJI HATHIJI SINCE DECD THROUGH LH
Versus
GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL, & 4 other(s)
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR VIMAL A PUROHIT(5049) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,1.1,1.2,1.3
for the Respondent(s) No. 5,5.1
MR ROHAN N SHAH, AGP (1) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
MR DHRUV K DAVE(6928) for the Respondent(s) No. 5.1.2,5.1.3,5.1.4
NOTICE SERVED BY DS(5) for the Respondent(s) No. 4
UNSERVED REFUSED (N)(10) for the Respondent(s) No. 5.1.1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
Date : 04/02/2020
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Shah waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 to 3. With the consent of the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the writ petition is finally heard.
2. At the outset, learned advocate Mr.Dave appearing for the private respondents has submitted that the respondent No.5.1.1 may be deleted. The request is acceded to. Registry shall delete the respondent No.5.1.1 from the array of the parties.
Page 1 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT
3. The present petition has been filed, inter alia, for the following relief:
A. YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the Ld. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN/BA/233 of 2014;
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx"
4. The private respondents have challenged the order dated 20.11.1958 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT before the Deputy Colletor (L.R.), Kadi after a period of more than 50 years, the said fact is not disputed.
5. From the record, it is established that the land bearing survey No.550 of Village Sadra, Taluka Kadi, District Mehsana was originally running in the name of deceased Parkhanji Mulji @ Umaji. The respondent No.5.1.1 to 5.1.4 are his legal heirs.
5.1 Thereafter, the Mamlatdar and ALT has initiated the proceedings under Section 32G of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ("Tenancy Act") which came to be registered as Tenancy Tribunal Case No.196 of 1958-59. In the aforesaid proceedings, it is observed that by way of an oral agreement, which was made in favour of the father of the present petitioner in the year 1956-57, the land in question was transferred. After observing the same, the Mamlatdar and ALT vide order dated 20.11.1958 had withdrawn the aforesaid proceedings and thereby Page 2 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT directed to initiate the proceedings under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act for regularization of sale transaction in favour of the tenant, i.e., the predecessor of the present private respondents.
After the proceedings were initiated on the instructions issued by the Mamlatdar, the Extra Aval Clerk vide communication dated 05.09.1960 had observed that in view of the ratio laid down by this Court in Special Civil Application No.741 of 1959 vide judgment dated 09.12.1959, the present petitioners, who were also similarly situated, therefore, as per the provisions of Section 84-C, penalty of Rs.1 was imposed for regularization of the sale. It further transpires that on 20.12.1960, a noting was forwarded to the Talati, the tenant, the original owner and the Tribunal for depositing a cost of penalty of Rs.1 and after depositing the aforesaid amount by the father of the present petitioners on 08.03.1961 and subsequently, a certificate with respect to the same was also issued by the Extra Aval Clerk on 20.03.1961 and the entry with respect to the sale transaction came to be mutated in the revenue record vide Entry No.700 dated 01.03.1961 and the same was subsequently certified by the competent authority. The name of the father of the present petitioners was reflected in the revenue record as well as the father of the present petitioners was in continuous occupation and possession of the land in question. After the death of the father of the present petitioners in 1985, the name of the legal heirs came to be mutated in the revenue record and an Entry No.1859 came to be mutated in favour of the petitioners in the family arrangement.
5.2 It appears that the present private respondents had approached the Deputy Mamlatdar with regard to the aforesaid entries and the orders made by the concerned authorities in the year 1960 and accordingly, a notice was issued to the present petitioners. The private respondents have contended that the land in question was an ancestral land and the ancestor of the respondents had made an application under Section 31(1) of the Page 3 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT Tenancy Act, however, the same was rejected and, thereafter, the Mamlatdar and ALT had initiated the proceedings under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act. It was also observed that the proceedings under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act came to be withdrawn vide order dated 20.11.1958 and a direction was issued to proceed under Section 84-C and, therefore, the subsequent proceedings were concluded by the Extra Aval Clerk resulting into transaction in favour of the father of the present petitioners regularizing such land. After hearing the concerned authorities, the Deputy Collector by the order dated 25.08.2014 rejected the appeal filed by the private respondents while observing that the land in question was transferred by the ancestor of the private respondents by way of an oral agreement as well as statement with respect to the same recorded by the Mamlatdar and ALT and subsequently, the Extra Aval Clerk had followed the direction issued by the competent authority and had regularized the sale in favour of the father of the present petitioners and, therefore, there was no error on the part of the authorities below. Being aggrieved by the said order, the private respondents preferred a revision application before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal ("the GRT") and the GRT, after hearing the concerned parties, had allowed the revision application by setting aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector.
6. Learned advocate Mr.Purohit appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the GRT has absolutely failed in entertaining the revision application after a period of 56 years. He has submitted that absolutely there is no observation by the GRT on the aspect of delay, which was rightly observed by the Deputy Collector in his order. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685 and in the case of Postmaster General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd and Anr, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and in Page 4 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in AIR 1962 SC 361. He has submitted that the Deputy Mamlatdar, after considering all these aspects, has rightly held that after a delay of so many years, the appeal of the petitioner could not have been entertained.
6.1 Learned advocate Mr.Purohit has further submitted that the GRT has failed to appreciate the aspect that the sale transaction was entered between the parties in the year 1956 and 1957, therefore, the provisions of Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act would not be applicable. He has submitted that in fact the GRT did not appreciate the fact that the predecessor of the present petitioners, Thakore Karshanji Hathiji, was a tenant and in fact the father of the private respondents, Gambhirsinh Parkhanji was the owner and vendor of the said land. He has submitted that as per the provisions of Section 84-A of the Tenancy Act, the transfer between the landlord and the tenant shall not become invalid and such transfer can be regularized by imposing penalty of 1% of the consideration of Rs.100/-, whichever is less. However, in case of non-depositing of the penalty or for other purpose, the Mamlatdar may initiate the proceedings under the provisions of Section 84-C sub-sections (3) to (5) and, therefore, as far as the present private respondents are concerned, they do not have locus even if it is found that the transaction is in violation of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. He has submitted that at the relevant time, the provision of Section 84- B of the Tenancy Act was satisfied as the penalty of 1% of consideration of Rs.100/- was also deposited.
6.2 Learned advocate Mr.Purohit has further submitted that the provisions of Section 32G of the Tenancy Act are not applicable in the present case. He has further submitted that the judgment and order of the GRT is based primarily on the judgment of this Court dated 09.12.1959 passed in Special Civil Application No.741 of 1959 Page 5 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT and the same would not apply in the case of the present petitioners. He has submitted that the judgment proceeds on the basis of the rights of the tenants in view of the Tenancy Act. He has submitted that in the present case, it is an admitted fact that the predecessor of the petitioners was the tenants and the predecessor of the private respondents was the original owner or the vendor. He has submitted that in fact the provisions of Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act cannot be read in isolation but are to be read in conjunction with Section 84-B, wherein certain transfers made between appointed date and commencement of amending Act, 1955 as declared invalid. He has submitted that the petitioners have satisfied the provisions of Section 84-B sub-section (1) as they had paid the penalty as specified therein at the relevant time and the same was also accepted. He has submitted that there is a sale transaction and the same reveals that the land is purchased by paying Rs.600/- before 1957. He has submitted that the private respondents cannot take shelter under the provisions of Section 31 of the Tenancy Act as the subject land was in fact purchased by the predecessor of the present petitioners by paying the consideration of Rs.600/-. Thus, he has submitted that after a passage of so many years, the private respondents have tried to resurrect the things and thus, the order passed by the Deputy Collector was justified and hence, the impugned order of GRT may be set aside. In support of his submission, learned advocate Mr.Purohit has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2011 Law Suit (Guj) 1091, in the case of Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.
7. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Dave appearing for the private respondents has submitted that the order of the GRT does not require any interference and the same is appropriately passed. He has submitted that no proceedings under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act were carried out by the Mamlatdar and the same were undertaken by the Extra Aval Karkun and the GRT, while making Page 6 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT such observations in this regard, has rightly set aside the order of the Deputy Mamlatdar. He has invited the attention of this Court to the observations made by the Deputy Collector that at the relevant time in the year 1958, an application was made by the present private respondents under the provisions of Section 31(1) of the Tenancy Act, however, the same was not considered and no proceedings under Section 84-C were carried out and, therefore, the sale transaction, which had taken place in the year 1958, was invalid and the land is required to be restored to the present private respondents. Thus, he has submitted that no interference is required.
7.1 Learned advocate Mr.Dave has also referred to the provisions of Section 31 of the Tenancy Act and invited the attention of this Court to the judgment dated 09.12.1959 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No.741 of 1959 and has submitted that the entire transaction is de hors the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the judgment and order passed by the GRT may not be interfered.
8. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. The relevant documents as pointed out by them are also perused.
9. Before the Court proceeds on deciding the merits of the matter, it is pertinent to note that the present petitioners are the legal heirs of one Thakore Karshanji Hathiji, who was the tenant and the private respondents are the legal heirs of one Gambhirsinh Parkhanji, who was the land owner. The documents on the record reveal that on 20.11.1958, the Mamlatdar and ALT had initiated the proceedings under Section 32-G of the Tenancy Act, which came to be registered as Tenancy Tribunal Case No.196 of 1958-59 and on 20.11.1958, the Mamlatdar and ALT had withdrawn the aforesaid proceedings and thereby directed to initiate the proceedings under Page 7 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act. Accordingly, Extra Aval Clerk vide communication dated 05.09.1960 had observed that the decision of this Court in the judgment dated 09.12.1959 passed in Special Civil Application No.741 of 1959 is required to be satisfied and as per the provisions of Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act, a penalty of Rs.1 was required to be imposed for regularization of the sale. The proceedings of 20.11.1958 specifically reveal that there was a sale transaction of Rs.600/- amongst the parties with regard to the sale of the land and the predecessor of the present petitioners, Thakore Karshanji Hathiji, who was a tenant had purchased the land from Gambhirsinh Parkhanji, the predecessor of the private respondents by sale consideration of Rs.600/-. On 20.12.1960, the aforesaid noting was also forwarded to the Talati, the tenant, i.e., the predecessor of the present petitioners, the original owner. i.e., the predecessor of the present private respondents and to the Tribunal for depositing an amount of penalty of Rs.1/- and accordingly, the said amount was deposited by the father of the present petitioners on 08.03.1961 and subsequently, a certificate with respect to the same was issued by the Extra Aval Clerk on 20.03.1961. Thus, these proceedings ended by the order dated 20.03.1961 and the private respondents after a passage of more than 50 years have tried to resurrect the things by alleging that the transaction entered by their forefather was illegal and the proceedings under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act were required to be initiated as the transaction can be said to be invalid and in violation of the provisions of the Tenancy Act.
10. In the considered opinion of this Court, the grievance is hopelessly time barred as they have slept over their rights till 2013. It is also pertinent to note that the proceedings were initiated by Gambhirsinh Parkhanji, i.e., the predecessor of the private respondents till the year 2013. These aspects were rightly considered by the Deputy Collector in the order dated 25.08.2014.
Page 8 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT The Deputy Collector has also considered the observations made by this Court in the judgment dated 09.12.1959 passed in Special Civil Application No.741 of 1959. After observing the aforesaid facts, the Deputy Collector has held the regularization in favour of the present petitioners and the appeal of the respondents were rejected.
11. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah (supra) has held thus:
"16. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub- Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive upto 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos.1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, Page 9 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT 1976. There is no finding by the Sub-Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976 was obtained fraudulently.
17. It is clear from the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where a statute provides any suo- motu power of revision without prescribing any period of limitation, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time and what is 'reasonable time' has to be determined on the facts of each case. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bonafide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as Land Ceiling Act) etc. Even the two judgments of the Supreme Court which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants explain the same principles of law that a reasonable period would be taken upon the factual circumstances of the concerned case. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine the question. The Court/authority considered the question whether the period is reasonable or not as to take into account surrounding circumstances and the relevant factors to decide that question. In the present case, we find that the original owner i.e. the appellants very consciously entered into a transaction way back in the year 1970 and sold land to respondent No.1. It is not their case that at the relevant point of time they were mislead by respondent No.1 herein in any manner or that any fraud was played upon them by respondent No.1 in entering into the transaction and on their own free will and volition they executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1 and accepted the sale consideration. No steps were taken by them for a period of almost 15 years and it is only when the Mamlatdar and ALT, Gandhinagar thought fit to take transaction in suo-motu Page 10 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT review that all of a sudden a thought came in the mind of the appellants to say that the transaction was illegal or invalid and now the land should be restored to them as it is.
18. Secondly, apart from the issue of reasonable time or reasonable period, what is that legal right in favour of the appellants herein to claim that the land should be restored in their favour? We have answered this issue quite elaborately in an identical case while deciding Letters Patent Appeal No.433 of 011 on 28.04.2011 wherein, we have observed as under:-
"We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the petition on the ground that the appellants have no locus standi and, therefore, no relief can be granted in favour of a transferor who himself has violated the provisions of law by entering into a transaction."
We are of the view that the position of law is very clear. Firstly, to maintain a petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, the party aggrieved must show that any of his fundamental rights or any other legal rights have been infringed and thereby the party is aggrieved by such infringement. Who can be said to be "a person aggrieved" ? One of the meanings is that "a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision", if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved, if a legal burden is imposed upon him. Can it be said that the appellants would fall within the words "persons aggrieved" or "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest". On the contrary, this is an appeal by Page 11 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT persons who are trying to take advantage of their own wrong. The maxim: "Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is very much applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The maxim: "Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is one of the salient tenets of equity. The appellants cannot secure the assistance of a court of law for enjoying the fruit of their own wrong.
We may refer the decision of the Supreme Court explaining this principle of law, in the matter of Union of India and others v/s. Major General Madan Lal Yadav [Retd.], reported in (1996)4 SCC
127. In paragraph 28, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"In this behalf, the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria - meaning no man can take advantage of his own wrong - squarely stands in the way of avoidance by the respondent and he is estopped to plead bar of limitation contained in Section 123(2). In Broom's Legal Maximum [10th Edn.] at page 191 it is stated:
"...it is a maxim of law, recognized and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognized in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure."
The reasonableness of the rule being manifest, we proceed at once to show its application by reference to decided cases. It was noted therein that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain the favourable interpretation of the law. In support thereof, the author has placed reliance on another Page 12 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT maxim frustra legis auxilium invocat quaerit qui in legem committit. He relies on Perry v. Fitzhowe [(1846)8 Q.B. 757]. At page 192, it is stated that if a man be bound to appear on a certain day, and before that day the obligee puts him in prison, the bond is void. At page 193, it is stated that "it is moreover a sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non- performance he has occasioned". At page 195, it is further stated that "a wrong doer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong". At page 199 it is observed that "the rule applies to the extent of undoing the advantage gained where that can be done and not to the extent of taking away a right previously possessed."
19. We may now deal with last and important contention as regards the parties in paridelicto. This term "in pari- delicto" as explained by Blacks Law Dictionary is as under:-
"in pari delicto : [Latin "in equal fault] Equally at fault: the court denied relief because both parties stood in pari delicto. (Cases: Action 4; Equity) "in pari delicto doctrine: [Latin] (1917) The principle that a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the wrong- doing. [Cases: Action 4; Contracts : 139: Equity- 65.]
20. The principle that the Courts will refuse to enforce an illegal agreement at the instance of a person who is himself a party to an illegality or fraud as expressed in the maxim "in pari-delicto potior est conditio defendentis".
24. In one of the recent pronouncements by Full Bench of this High Court, rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1875 of 2007 and analogous appeals, decided on Page 13 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT 21.07.2011, the Full Bench in almost an identical fact situation with the only distinguishing feature that it was a case arising from Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation of Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, has held as under:-
"Article 226 of the Constitution is an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction, it should be exercised to prevent perpetration of legal fraud and to promote good faith and honesty. It cannot be exercised in favour of a defaulting party to frustrate legitimate claim of the other party. [AP State Financial Corporation, (1994) 2 SCC 647]"
Even the void transaction under Section 9(1) if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. Even the void transaction cannot be said to be nonexistent in all cases and in all situations. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed to remain for a considerable period and with the passage of time it brings about several changes, creating valuable rights in favour of considerable section of people, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the Collector would be entitled to exercise power under Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act. When the things have been allowed to remain as such for years together, the purchaser cannot be deprived of his possession so as to render indirect benefit to the seller who was equally responsible for entering into such illegal transaction. When the authority had considerable opportunities to know about the transaction and despite that, has not taken any action thereon for years together, such authority cannot be allowed to exercise powers conferred upon it at a belated stage. The concept of reasonableness of time will equally apply in such cases. Therefore, even powers conferred upon the Page 14 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020 C/SCA/6148/2018 JUDGMENT Collector under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 are required to be exercised within a reasonable time. [Valjibhai Jagjivanbhai vs. State of Gujarat, 2005 (2) GLH 34]."
12. To the contrary, the Tribunal, without examining the aspects of delay of 53 years, has set aside the order of the Deputy Collector on the ground that there was no power vested with Extra Aval clerk to pass such orders and the Mamlatdar cannot direct the Extra Aval Clerk to pass such order.
13. In the considered opinion of this Court, such observation made by the Tribunal are arbitrary and illegal. Since the proceedings reveal that the Mamlatdar had only directed the Extra Aval Clerk to do the needful, after the Mamlatdar had passed the order and he had forwarded his opinion to the concerned authorities.
14. Be that as it may, the GRT has travelled beyond its powers in entertaining the dispute after a passage of more than 50 years, at the behest of the private respondents, who have remained dormant over their rights. The predecessor of the present respondents during his lifetime has never raised any objections before the concerned authorities and hence, the present petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the GRT in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/233 of 2014 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute.
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J) GUPTA* Page 15 of 15 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:23:40 IST 2020