Allahabad High Court
Pawan Kumar Kothiwal And Others vs State Of U.P. And Others on 22 January, 2025
Author: Ajit Kumar
Bench: Ajit Kumar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?AFR Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:10881 Court No. - 4 Case :- CIVIL REVISION No. - 524 of 2011 Revisionist :- Pawan Kumar Kothiwal And Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Others Counsel for Revisionist :- Archit Mehrotra Counsel for Opposite Party :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Ajit Kumar,J.
1. Heard Shri Archit Mehrotra, learned Advocate appearing for revision-applicants and Shri O.P. Singh Sikarwar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for State of U.P. and Regional Food Controller, Civil Lines, Moradabad, the tenant respondents.
2. The sole issue that arises for consideration before the Court is as to whether an unregistered document presented by the respondent can be read into to draw an inference that there was a tenancy in perpetuity and therefore, could not have been determined by issuance of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
3. In the instant case revision-applicant/ plaintiff has been non-suited in the eviction suit only for the reason that respondent presented an unregistered agreement before the court to demonstrate that there was not fixed term tenancy contrary to the stand taken by plaintiff that there was a fixed term tenancy to expire on 30.06.2009 and, therefore, the respondents were liable to be evicted upon expiry of the term of tenancy and in the event of their failure to vacate the premises, the tenancy was liable to be determined by issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial court while dislodging the stand of the plaintiff to determine the tenancy by issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act held that in view of agreement relied upon by the respondents there appear to be no fixed term tenancy and, hence, it amounted to tenancy in perpetuity and plaintiff/ revision-applicant having continued, the respondents in tenancy by their act and conduct, the benefit under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act of holding over was liable to be extended to the tenant respondent.
4. The submission advanced by learned counsel appearing for revision-applicant for assailing the judgment is that no unregistered agreement in respect of immovable property can create lease rights beyond prescribed period of 12 months as per Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the Registration Act in such circumstances, therefore, an unregistered agreement would only mean to create tenancy right on month to month basis determinable with 30 days notice in advance as it then stood on the statute vide provision 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Thus, it is submitted that the court below was not justified in holding the lease to be a valid agreement creating tenancy rights in perpetuity and then conferring benefit of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act in favour of the tenant respondents for the act and conduct of plaintiff in continuing them in tenancy beyond the period prescribed as per their own document of five years of tenancy which was not acted upon. According to learned counsel appearing for revision applicant, revision applicant would be tenant in sufferance upon issuance of notice under Section 106 and therefore, would not be entitled to benefit under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.
5. Learned counsel appearing for revision-applicant has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Sevoke Properties Limited v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (2020) 11 Supreme Court Cases 782 and placed before the Court paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment that run as under:
"12. The essence of the dispute in the present case is as to whether a notice of termination under Section 106 was necessary. In the judgment of this Court in Satish Chand Makhan, the father of the plaintiff had leased open land to the defendant for a period of five years under a registered deed of lease. After the expiry of the initial term, there was a draft agreement for renewal for a further period of nine years, which, however, was not registered under Section 17 (1) (d) of the Registration Act, 1908. The plaintiff served a notice for the determination of the tenancy on the ground of forfeiture under Section 111 (g) and brought a suit for ejectment. The High Court held that the lease had been determined by efflux of time under Section 111 (a) upon the expiry of the term of nine years and hence, no notice under Section 106 was required for determination of the lease. While determining the correctness of the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that "the defendants have nowhere admitted that the lease was for a specific term of nine years". On the contrary, the defendants had pleaded that they were tenants holding over under Section 116 of the TP Act. This Court held that the unregistered draft lease agreement was inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act except for a collateral purpose of providing the nature and character of the possession of the defendants. the terms of the lease did not constitute a collateral purpose. Consequently, the unregistered draft lease was held to be inadmissible to create a valid lease for a renewed term of nine years. In this background, this Court held that the defendants were tenants holding over under Section 116 in which event it was necessary for the plaintiff to serve a notice under Section 106. In the absence of such a notice, the suit, it was held would not be maintainable.
13. Mr. Sundaram has sought to distinguish this decision, since in that case this Court found that the defendant was a tenant holding over within the meaning of Section 116. We find merit in the submission which has been urged by Mr. Sundaram. In the case before this Court noted above, the defendants had not admitted that the term of the lease was for a period of nine years. This was noted by the Court, as we have extracted earlier. On the contrary, we find that in the present case, there is an express admission on the part of the defendants that they were in occupation under the lease agreement for a period of fifteen years with effect from 1981 and that the period of lease expired on 24-5-1996. Such a specific admission on the part of the defendants is contained in Para 22 of the written statement. Under Section 111 (a), a lease of immovable property determines by efflux of time limited thereby. Once this be the position, there can be no manner of doubt that the position of the respondent on the expiration of the lease was of a tenant at sufferance. In the circumstances, there was no necessity of a notice for the termination of the lease under the provisions of Section 106. The respondent having squarely admitted in its written statement that it was in occupation for a term of fifteen year, that term having expired, the lease stood determined by efflux of time. Once the lease stood determined by efflux of time, there was no necessity for a notice of termination under Section 106."
6. He has further relied upon the earlier judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Park Street Properties Private Limited v. Dipak Kumar Singh and another (2016) 9 Supreme Court Cases 268 where exhaustive consideration has been given to provision as contained under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 (1) (d) read with Section 39 of the Registration Act. He has placed before the Court paragraphs- 9,10,17, 19 which run as under:
"9. The learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court in Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder K. Bajaj, the relevant portion of which is extracted as hereunder:
6. Section 107, prescribes the procedure for execution of a lease between the parties. Under the first paragraph of this section a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument and remaining classes of leases are governed by the second paragraph, that is to say all other leases of immovable property can be made either by a registered instrument or by an oral agreement accompanies by delivery of possession.
7. In the case in hand, we are concerned with an oral lease which is hit by the first paragraph of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under Section 107 parties have an option to enter into a lease in respect of an immovable property either for a term less than a year or from year to year, for an term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent. If they decide upon having a lease in respect of any immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, such a lease has to be only by a registered instrument. In absence of a registered instrument, no valid lease from year to year or for a term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be created. If the lease is not a valid lease within the meaning of the opening words of Section 106, the rule of construction embodied therein would not be attracted. the above is the legal position on a harmonious reading of both the section.
8. In Ram Kumar Das Section 106 was considered by a Bench of four Judges of this Court. This Court held that this Section 106 lays down the rule of construction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties and in such cases duration has to be determined by reference to the object for the purposes for which tenancy is created. It was also held that the rule of construction embodied in this section applies not only to express leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rent and other circumstances. It was further held that it is not disputed that a contract to the contrary as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act need not be an express contract; it may be implied but it certainly should be a valid contract. On the fact of that case, the Court held that
13. ... the difficulty in applying this rule to the present case arises from the fact that a tenancy from year to year or reserving an yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument, as lays down in Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.
10. The learned Senior Counsel Mr Sundaram further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in K.B. Saha & Sons (P) Ltd v. Development Consultant ltd. wherein it was held as under:
34. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court and the High Court, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that:
1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered, is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from the transaction to effect which the law required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its term can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of providing an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose.
35. In our view, the particular clause in the lease agreement in question cannot be called a collateral purpose. As noted earlier, it is the case of the appellant that the suit premises were let out only for the particular named officer of the respondent and accordingly, after the same was vacated by the said officer, the respondent was not entitled to allot it to any other employee and was therefore, liable to be evicted, which, in our view, was an important term forming part of the lease agreement. Therefore, such a clause, namely, Clause 9 of the lease agreement in this case, cannot be looked into even for collateral purposes to come to a conclusion that the respondent was liable to be evicted because of violation of Clause 9of the lease agreement, which is admittedly unregistered, can be looked into for the purpose of evicting the respondent from the suit premises only because the respondent was not entitled to induct any other person other than the named officer in the same.
17. A perusal of Section 106 of the Act makes it clear that it creates a deemed monthly tenancy in those cases where there is no express contract to the contrary, which is terminable at the notice period of 15 days. The Section also lays down the requirements of a valid notice to terminate the tenancy, such as that it must be in writing, signed by the person sending it and be duly delivered. Admittedly, the validity of the notice itself is not under challenge. The main contention advanced on behalf of the respondents is that the impugned judgment and order is valid in light of the second part of Section 107 of the Act, which requires that lease for a term exceeding one year can only be made by way of a registered instrument.
19. It is also a well-settled position of law that in the absence of a registered instrument, the court are not precluded from determining the factum of tenancy from the other evidence on record as well as the conduct of the parties. A three judge Bench of this Court in Anothony v. K.C Ittoop & sons held as under:
12.... A lease of immovable property is defined in Section 105 of the TP Act. A transfer of a right to enjoy a property in consideration of a price paid or promised to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions is the basic fabric for a valid lease. the provision says that such a transfer can be made expressly or by implication. Once there is such a transfer of right to enjoy the property, a lease stands creted. What is mentioned in the three paragraphs of the first part of Section 107 of the TP Act are only the different modes of how leases are created. The first paragraph has been extracted above and it deals with the mode of creating the particular kinds of lease mentioned therein. The third paragraph can be read along with the above as it contains a condition to be complied with if the parties choose to create a lease as per a registered instrument mentioned therein. All other leases, if created, necessarily fall within the ambit of the second paragraph. Thus dehors the instrument parties can create a lease as envisaged in the second paragraph of Section 107 which reads thus...
13. When lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property and such transfer can be made expressly or by implication, the mere fact that an unregistered instrument came into existence would not stand in the way of the court to determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise than through such deed.
16. Taking a different view would be a contrary to the reality when parties clearly intended to create a lease though the document which they executed had not gone into the processes of registration. That lacuna had affected the validity of the document, but what had happened between the parties in respect of the property became a reality. Non-registration of the document had caused only two consequences. One is that no leased exceeding one year was created. Second is that the instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is concerned. Nonetheless the presumption that the lease not exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains unrebutted.
Thus, in the absence of registration of a document, what is deemed to be created is a month-to-month tenancy, the termination of which is governed by Section 106 of the Act. "
7. He has also placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Rajeev Kumar v. State of U.P. through Secretary Finance and Revenue Department U.P. at Lucknow and others [2016 (165) AIC 939 (Alld.HC)] where lease created in respect of secured assets for a period of nine years required to be compulsorily registrable but executed upon a notarized document, was held to have no binding effect. He has placed before the Court paragraphs 9 and 10 which run as under:
"9. Having analyzed the legal position, we now proceed to apply the same to the facts of the case in hand. Admittedly, petitioner claims to have a lease of the premises in dispute in his favour on the basis of a notarized document for a period of nine years on payment of rent. The question for consideration is whether the notarized document which is a deed of rental agreement (Annexure-1 to the writ petition ) upon which the petitioner places reliance can be said to be a document to establish that he is bona fide lessee of the secured assets. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act prescribed how the lease is to be made.
"107. Lease how made - A lease of immovable property from year to year, or any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument.
All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee;
Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.
10. A bare reading of the provision goes to show that lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term except one year can be made only by registered agreement and all other leases of immovable property can be made either by registered instrument or oral agreement though by delivery of possession. In the case in case the period mentioned in the document is from 6.1.2012 to 5.1.2012 i.e. 9 years under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act such a instrument has to be necessarily registered. Since the petitioner has failed to produce any registered document executed in his favour by the lessor, he cannot be held to be entitled to remain in possession of the secured assets for any term except one year from the date of execution of the document. Admittedly, the document being relied upon by the petitioner, executed on 6.1.2012, is an unregistered document, his possession is liable to be protected for a period of one year from the said date. Thus, only irresistible conclusion is that petitioner is not entitled to possession of the secured assets for more than one year from the date of instrument/ date of rental agreement dated 6.1.2012"
8. He has also placed relevant paragraphs of Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the Case of Union of India and other v. Sudarshan Lal Talwar 2022 ALL L.J. 1623 in which the Court has held that mere acceptance of rent after period of termination of tenancy does not amount of waiver. He has placed before the Court paragraph-18 of the judgment which runs as under.
"18. In the light of these decision I therefore, find that mere acceptance of rent after the period of termination of the tenancy does not amount to waiver of notice to quite. There must be some intention of waiver. In the present case, the opposite party actively prosecuted the suit for ejectment filed by him. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the notice has been waived. I, accordingly find that the trial Court has rightly held that the notice to quit has not been waived and, therefore, the revisionist are liable to ejectment"
9. He has also relied upon another judgment of learned Single Judge in the case of Anish Ahmad v. Special/ Additional District Judge, Saharanput and others 1997 SCC Online All 303. Placing before the Court paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 regarding doctrine of waiver in the case of termination of tenancy. Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are reproduced hereunder:
"5. A landlord can waive the notice as provided under Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the notice given under Section 111, Clause (h), is waived, with the express or implied consent of the person to whom it is given, by any act on the part of the person giving it showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. the person claiming that the notice has been waived has to satisfy two essential ingredients (i) the intention of the landlord was to treat the lease as subsisting, and (ii) he had a knowledge of the fact that this conduct amount to waiver.
6. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following observation:
"A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. There can be no waiver unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed had full knowledge of his rights and of facts enabling him to take effectual action for the enforcement of such rights.
7. In Ram Krishna v. Jhaman Das, it was held that if the landlord accepts the rent after the institution of the suit for the period subsequent to the, date of termination of tenancy, it cannot be held that he has waived the notice.
8. In Gulab Singh Rawat v. Disrict, Judge, Uttar Kashi, it was held that if the landlord accepts the rent from the tenant after expiry of the time granted to the tenant for vacating the premises, it would not amount to waiver of termination of tenancy unless it is proved that a fresh contract of tenancy was entered into between the landlord and tenant.
9. If the landlord accepts the rent for the period subsequent to the date of termination of tenancy, that does not amount to waiver of notice, unless there are other compelling circumstances to indicate that there was intention of the landlord to treat the lease as subsisting."
10. Meeting the arguments so advanced above by learned counsel appearing for revision applicant Shri O.P. Singh Sikarwar, learned Standing Counsel has placed before the Court Section 90 of the Registration Act, 1908 and has placed before the Court Sub-Section 1 (d) of Section 90 that runs as under:
"90. Exemption of certain documents executed by or in favour of Government.
..........(d) sanads, inam title-deeds and other documents purporting to be or to evidence grants or assignments by Government of land or of any interest in land; or........."
11. Shri Sikarwar, sought to urge that this was a kind of right created in respect of an immovable property through a document and since it provided for an interest in land may be other than government land, it should be taken to be covering the property in question and, therefore, the law of exemption would stand attracted. Shri Sikarwar, defended the order passed by the court dismissing the suit for the above very reasons. However, Shri Sikarwar, would very fairly concede that in the matter where tenant status is of a tenant-in-sufferance, such a tenant would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Shri Sikarwar also, could not cite any authority laying down law contrary to authorities cited by learned counsel appearing for revision applicant.
12. Having heard learned counsel appearing for respective parties and having perused the records of this revision as well as trial court's records produced before the Court, it comes out an admitted position on the part of the plaintiff-revision applicant that there was no agreement in writing as such creating tenancy rights in favour of the respondents. However, letter issued on behalf of Governor by the Deputy Secretary on 19.05.2006 clearly stipulated that tenancy was till 30.06.2009. Thus, it was a fixed term tenancy starting from 01.07.1995 to end on 30.06.2009 and another is a document on non-judicial stamp filed by respondent and claimed to have been signed by the landlord creating tenancy w.e.f. 01.07.1994. This document refers to lease rights created in favour of respondents. The question arises as to which document is to be read to interpret tenancy rights. Admittedly petitioners before this Court denied to have executed any document creating such rights and only placed reliance upon authorized letter issued on behalf of Governor. This can only be taken to be a collateral document as possessory rights and for a limited purpose to decide jural relationship of landlord and tenant relationship. Therefore, the court even if did not rely upon this document to have created any fixed time tenancy, the findings cannot be held to be erroneous but since the jural relationship of landlord tenant has come to be determined and the parties do agree to this, at the most, it can be referable to only tenancy rights limited to the year 2009. This is a case where one has to acknowledge this fact that parties do agree to jural relationship then such documents can of course, be taken into consideration only for the purposes of determination of such relationship and to that extent its admissibility cannot be doubted.
13. The question that now arises is, as to how to determine any fixed term tenancy to have ever existed or this was a tenancy in perpetuity as has been held by the court below. Coming to the other document which is on non-judicial stamp filed before the court below and upon which respondents have placed heavy reliance as it is their document, this evidences the factum that the tenancy started from 01.07.1994, however, it referred to payment of rent only till 30.05.2005. This document interestingly contained another clause paragraph 6 which prescribed that even after expiry of the period new lease would be executed with further 25% enhancement of rent. It is not a case between the parties that any such agreement was re-entered. This document has been interpreted by the court below in two ways: firstly the landlord petitioners having continued the respondent beyond the prescribed period w.e.f. 1.7.1994 to 30.05.2005, have by their conduct continued the tenancy and, therefore, tenant respondent would automatically get entitled to the benefit under Section 116 and secondly, in view of clause-6 of the said agreement, it amounted to tenancy in perpetuity and not a fixed term tenancy.
14. Here it becomes important and rather pertinent to refer to relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to define the status of such document. Admittedly the court below has proceeded to hold that the documents created a lease right. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the manner and method in which leases have to be made in respect of immovable property for the purposes of period exceeding one year. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:
"107. Lease how made - A lease of immovable property from year to year, or any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument.
All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee;
Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession".
(Emphasis added)
15. From a bare reading of aforesaid provision as quoted above, the intendment of the legislature appears to be absolutely clear that leases beyond period of twelve months in respect of immovable property have to be through registered instruments. Thus, looking to the relevant clause of the document of lease as filed by the respondent which prescribed for period running from 01.07.1994 till May, 2005 it was necessarily required to be registered as part Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Since this document is admittedly not registered one, it cannot create lease rights beyond a period of twelve months. It is not disputed also between the parties that this lease was not neither for agricultural purposes, nor for manufacturing purposes and, therefore, in such circumstances, lease was to be taken as the one on month to month basis and determinable with issuance of thirty days' advance notice as per the provisions contained under Section 106 of the Transfer of Properties Act as it then stood on the statute. Section 106 is reproduced hereunder:
"106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage.?
(1)In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice.
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub-section (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice.
(3)A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section.
(4)Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property."
16. I have already quoted the relevant paragraphs of the judgment in the cases of Park Street Properties Private Limited (supra) and Rajiv Kumar (supra) in which the Courts have held that such lease rights can only be created in respect of immovable property through registered instrument only in view of Section 17 read with Section 49 of the Registration Act and, therefore, no lease rights can flow in respect of immovable property beyond the period prescribed for under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act from an unregistered instrument/ document.
17. In such above view of the matter, therefore, the findings returned by the court below that there was a lease in perpetuity appears to be absolutely upon misreading of the document as well as interpretation of relevant provisions of law as discussed above and these findings, therefore, cannot be sustained in law.
18. Since I have already held above that the lease in question would have been on month to month basis in view of the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the judgment discussed and cited above, I do not see any justification for the court in extending benefit of Section 116 to the respondent. The provisions as contained under Section 90 (1) (d) of the Registration Act as quoted above clearly stipulates only such certificates and documents which are issued by the Government creating rights in respect of Government land or any other rights in respect of such lands and these provisions cannot be interpreted to mean any agreement entered between the private party and the Government in respect of private land. Any right in respect of immovable property which is not creating or conferring any assignment or right as contemplated under Section 90(1) (d), is required to be compulsorily registered under the Registration Act, reading down the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act with the provisions of the Registration Act as discussed above.
19. In view of the above, therefore, the notice issued by the landlord plaintiff determining lease on 30.07.2009 was a valid notice and since the notice has not been disputed and the Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable, the suit deserves to be decreed. Hence, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Judge in SCC suit No. 16 of 2009 deserves to be set aside and suit deserves to be decreed. Hence, the SCC Suit No. 16 of 2009 is hereby decreed directing the respondents to vacate the premises in question.
20. At this stage, learned Standing Counsel states that the State is running its office from the demise premises, so some reasonable time may be given to vacate the premises.
21. Accordingly, respondents are directed to vacate the premises in question on or before 31.12.2025. Since it is a land ad-measuring 4150 sq. feet is in possession of the respondent and the ground floor of the building is already let out at the rate of Rs. 100 per sq. feet, respondents are directed to pay Rs. 50,000/- per month and in the event they fail to vacate the premises in question on 31.12.2025, they shall be paying damages at the rate of Rs. 50 per sq. feet until they vacate the premises in question.
22. Let decree be drawn accordingly.
23. It is clarified that this judgment will not come in the way of the parties seeking fresh agreement in respect of premises in question, if they so desire.
Order Date :- 22.1.2025 Nadeem