Jharkhand High Court
Amar Chouhan Alias Amar Singh Chouhan vs The State Of Jharkhand And Anr on 4 March, 2016
Author: Rongon Mukhopadhyay
Bench: Rongon Mukhopadhyay
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 255 of 2016
Amr Chouhan @ Amar Singh Chouhan ... ... ... ... Petitioner.
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Munni Devi ... ... ... ... ... ... Opp. Parties.
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY,
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Saibal Kumar Laik, Advocate.
For the State : A.P.P.
For the Opp. Party No.2 : Mrs. Amita Srivastava, Advocate.
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05 / 04.03.2016: Heard Mr. S.K. Laik, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mrs. Amita Sinha, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2.
In this application the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 05.01.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Dhanbad, in S.T. No. 400 of 2015, whereby and whereunder the bail granted to the petitioner by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, vide order dated 30.06.2015 in connection with Kenduwadih P.S. Case No. 8 of 2015 has been cancelled.
Initially a complaint case was filed by the opposite party no.2 being Complaint Petition No. 2366 of 2014, which was referred to the concerned police station under the provisions of section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure resulting in institution of Kenduwadih P.S. Case No. 8 of 2015 for the offence punishable under sections 498(A), 313, 307 of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The allegation made in the first information report is to the effect that the opposite party no.2 was married with the petitioner on 28.11.2009 and subsequent thereto he was consistently demanding dowry and on account of non-fulfillment of the same she was abused and tortured. The allegation has been leveled that on account of act of the petitioner the pregnancy of the opposite party no.2 was terminated. After the first information report was instituted a joint compromise petition was filed on behalf of both the sides, in view of the fact that the matter had been settled between them and opposite party no.2 did not want to proceed further. In terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the learned Judicial Magistrate has been pleased to grant regular bail to the petitioner. Subsequently on 10.12.2015 an application was preferred by the opposite party no.2 for cancellation of bail of the petitioner on account of the fact that she was brutally assaulted by the petitioner and in support of the said allegation, injury report was also brought on record.
-2-The learned Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Dhanbad, vide order 05.01.2016 had allowed the application preferred by the opposite party no.2 and the bail granted to the petitioner was canceled.
Assailing the impugned order dated 05.01.2016, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that mere violation of the terms and conditions of the compromise the bail granted to the petitioner cannot be cancelled. It has been submitted that the opposite party no.2 had produced a fabricated medical certificate, since on 10.12.2015 when the application for cancellation of bail was filed, the injury report was never brought on record, but subsequently on 18.12.2015 she has submitted a list of documents in which injury report was also brought on record which was, in fact, to substantiate the assertion made by the opposite party no.2. It has also been submitted that the opposite party no.2 was said to have been assaulted in Asansole on 4/5.12.2015, but she was subsequently treated at Dhanbad after a considerable period of delay, which also creates grave suspicion on the story narrated by the opposite party no.2. To substantiate this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a case of Biman Chatterjee V. Sanchita Chatterjee and another, reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1699.
Mrs. Amita Srivastava, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has submitted that on the basis of the compromise, in which the petitioner had given assurance that he shall keep the opposite party no.2 with full dignity and honour, she had stayed with the petitioner, but on account of brutal assault made upon her, she was compelled to get herself treated at Dhanbad and the medical prescription, which has been brought on record substantiates the allegation of assault leveled against the petitioner. It has been submitted that keeping the opposite party no.2 with full dignity and honour, was the pre-condition for granting bail to the petitioner and considering the violation of the pre-condition to grant of bail to the petitioner, the learned Court below has rightly cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner.
From the arguments, which have been advanced by both the learned counsels, it is to be seen as to whether in the background of the allegation made by the opposite party no.2, the bail of the petitioner granted earlier could have been cancelled by the learned Court below or not.
From a perusal of the order dated 05.01.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Dhanbad, in S.T. No. 400 of 2015 and which is impugned in this application, it appears that the learned Court below was swayed by the fact that compromise was entered into between-the parties and pursuant to -3- which the petitioner was granted bail and because of brutal assault meted out to the opposite party no.2 the bail of the petitioner was cancelled.
In this context the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of Biman Chatterjee V. Sanchita Chatterjee and another reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1699 and the relevant part of the judgment is being quoted herein below:
"Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the appellant had violated the terms of the compromise. Though in the original order granting bail there is a reference to an agreement of the parties to have a talk of compromise through the media of well wishers, there is no submission made-to the Court that there will be a compromise or that the appellant would take back his wife. Be that as it may, in our opinion the Courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the Court. Here we hasten to observe first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise. That apart non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. The grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code is governed by the provisions of Chapter XXXII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the Court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code. In our opinion, having granted the bail under the said provision of law, it is not open to the trial Court or the High Court to cancel the same on a ground alien to the grounds mentioned for cancellation of bail in the said provision of law"
It, thus, appears that ratio with respect to cancellation of bail has been clearly laid down, inasmuch as, non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise cannot be a basis for cancelling bail. Moreover, some doubt definitely creeps out, since the opposite party no.2 was purported to be treated at Dhanbad on 10.12.2015 for an assault which had taken place on 04.12.2015 at Asansole in the State of West Bengal. It is an admitted position that the occurrence of purported assault had taken place on 04.12.2012; she was treated on 10.12.2015 at Dhanbad -4- and the application for cancellation of bail was filed on 10.12.2015 by the opposite party no.2, but the injury report was never brought on record along with an application dated 10.12.2015 filed for cancellation of bail. Subsequently, by way of list of documents filed on 18.12.2015 the alleged injury report has been brought on record. In such circumstance, therefore, I find that the learned Additional Sessions Judge XI, Dhanbad, did not consider the aforesaid aspects of the matter while cancelling the bail granted earlier to the petitioner in his order dated 05.01.2016.
Having found merit in this application, the same is allowed and the impugned order dated 05.01.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Dhanbad, in S.T. No. 400 of 2015, is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner shall remain on previous bail in terms of the order dated 30.06.2015 passed in Kenduwadih P.S. Case No. 8 of 2015 (G.R. No. 264 of 2015).
( RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY , J) Sharma/-