Jharkhand High Court
Om Prakash Pandey vs The State Of Jharkhand on 24 March, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:8244-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1741 of 2026
Om Prakash Pandey, S/o Adya Shanker Pandey, R/o Pandeypur,
Varanasi Cantt, P.O. & P.S.-Varanasi Cantt, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh
..... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Ranchi
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative
Reforms & Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The High Court of Jharkhand, through its Registrar General, Ranchi
4. The Registrar General, High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
5. The Accountant General (A&E), Jharkhand, Ranchi
..... Respondents
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CORAM HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioner: Mr. Alok Anand, Advocate For the Res.-State: Mr. Manish Mishra, G.P.-V For the Res. No. 5: Mr. Arvind Kumar Mehta, Advocate
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02/24.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. Alok Anand, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Manish Mishra, learned G.P.-V appearing on behalf of the Respondent-State.
2. The petitioner by instituting this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeks the following substantive reliefs:
"(i) For issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to revise the pension of the petitioner after granting him the promotion in District Judge super time scale of pay with effect from 6.11.2011, the date his immediate junior was promoted in terms with Notification dated 27.10.2012 issued by the High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi along with arrears, interest and penal interest thereon.
(ii) For issuance of further writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities and in particular the respondent No. 3 for expunging the adverse remark made in 1 2026:JHHC:8244-DB his ACR in the year 2020 for the year 2012 without following the principles of natural justice."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unclear whether the two reliefs are connected. On one hand, he suggested that the adverse remark made in the petitioner's ACR in the year 2020 for the year 2012 was the cause for the denial of the super time scale to him. However, in the same breath, he submitted that, since there were no adverse entries in the petitioner's ACR in 2011, there was no reason to deny him the super time scale, as his junior was granted such super time scale w.e.f. 06.11.2011.
4. Apart from the contradictory submissions, we find that if it was the petitioner's case that there was nothing adverse in his ACR or that he was otherwise eligible for super time scale in the year 2011, nothing prevented him from challenging the denial of super time scale within some reasonable period from the date of denial in the year 2011-12.
5. This writ petition has been filed in December, 2025 i.e., after a delay of almost more than 13 years. There is no explanation for this inordinate delay. In the meantime, it is possible that several officers might have secured a super time scale for which some limited slots were provided. Thus, on the ground of inordinate delay and laches itself, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
6. As regards the adverse remark, we note that the petitioner, who was the Presiding Officer of Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal at Gumla, passed an order dated 19.03.2012 in which he directed that a sum of Rs.2,13,270/- must be deducted from the compensation amount of Rs.10,66,352/- payable to the claimants and be paid to the advocate for the claimants, pursuant to an agreement executed between the claimants and the said advocate. 2
2026:JHHC:8244-DB
7. Being shocked by such an order, the Learned Single Judge of this Court, while hearing Misc. Appeal. No. 104 of 2012, directed the petitioner to submit an explanation under what provision of law the compensation amount awarded in favour of the claimants was distributed among the claimants and their advocate.
8. The petitioner filed his explanation on 27.01.2014. However, upon considering the same, the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 13.01.2015, held that such explanation was not in consonance with the law. After that, an adverse entry was entered into the petitioner's ACR to the effect that his knowledge of law was poor. Before such adverse entry was entered, the petitioner was given a full opportunity to submit his explanation.
9. The petitioner once again represented against the adverse remark and sought for its expungement. In the said representation, the petitioner reiterated the same explanation he had offered to the learned Single Judge, and which had already been rejected by the said Court. This representation for expungement was also rejected, and the petitioner was notified of the rejection.
10. In order to create a base for instituting this writ petition belatedly, the petitioner, after his retirement on 31.12.2021, once again addressed the representation. The petitioner was once again informed that his representation against the adverse remark had already been rejected.
11. Apart from the issue of delay and laches in seeking the expungement of the adverse remark, even on the merits, we do not think this is a fit case to order its expungement. The order apportioning the compensation amount between the claimants and their advocate under a champertous agreement was grossly improper. The explanation offered by the petitioner was already 3 2026:JHHC:8244-DB rejected by the learned Single Judge on judicial review vide order dated 13.01.2015.
12. No steps were taken by the petitioner to challenge the order dated 13.01.2015. In this writ petition, it would not be certainly appropriate for us to pass any order, which would interfere with the portion of the order dated 13.01.2015, passed by the learned Single Judge. A relief that the petitioner now belatedly seeks is virtually to invite us to disagree with the learned Single Judge's order dated 13.01.2015 rejecting the petitioner's explanation.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (UOI) & Ors. vs. Sangram Keshari Nayak reported in (2007) 6 SCC 704 wherein it has been held that in the absence of any material requiring the DPC to take recourse to the sealed cover procedure, promotion could not have been denied to a government officer. This issue has nothing to do with the controversy now raised in this writ petition. In any event, if this decision is pressed in the context of the denial of super time scale to the petitioner in 2011-12, as noted by us earlier, the present writ petition instituted in 2025 is barred by inordinate delay and laches, for which no explanation is offered.
14. For all the above reasons, we see no merit in the present writ petition and dismiss the same without any order for costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (RAJESH SHANKAR, J.) 24.03.2026 Satish/Vikas/ 4