Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Susmita Gupta And Another vs Miss Krishna Gupta And Others on 25 March, 2025
Author: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Justice Uday Kumar
F.A.T. No.311 of 2018
With
CAN 1 of 2018 (Old CAN 4472 of 2018)
Susmita Gupta and Another
Vs.
Miss Krishna Gupta and Others
For the appellants : Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya,
Mr. Apurba Kumar Ghosh,
Mr. Rudranil Ghosh
For the respondent no. 1 : Mr. Partha Pratim Roy,
Mr. Apratim Bhattacharya, Mr. Sagar Chowdhury Heard on : 19.03.2025 Hearing concluded on : 20.03.2025 Judgment on : 25.03.2025 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The present first appeal arises out of the last Will and Testament left by Late Kumud Ranjan Gupta. The learned Trial Judge granted probate in favour of the executrix of the Will, the respondent no.1, against which the present challenge has been preferred.2
2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants contends that the probate application was filed in contravention of the specific mandate of Section 276(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1925 Act") inasmuch as it was not stated in the application that the deceased, at the time of his death, had a fixed place of abode or had some property situated within the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Judge.
3. In the present case, the probate application was initially filed before the District Delegate at Alipore, and subsequently, upon turning contentious, was transferred to the learned District Judge at Alipore and thereafter assigned to the learned Additional District Judge, Sixth Court at Alipore for disposal.
4. It is argued that the expression "shall" used in sub-section (2) of Section 276, read with Sections 264 and 265, of the 1925 Act makes it mandatory for such pleading to be made in the probate application. In the absence of the same, the present probate application ought to have been dismissed on such ground alone.
5. Moreover, it is argued that the executrix/propounder (respondent no. 1 in the present appeal) also failed to prove that the testator had any property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Alipore Court, where the probate application was filed, and/or that he lived at the time of his death within such jurisdiction.3
6. Learned counsel relies on a statement made by the P.W.2, that is the propounder, in her cross-examination dated December 4, 2012, where she admitted that the testator, her uncle, was with her during the period 2005 to 2009. In the present case, the Will was executed on February 7, 2005 and the testator expired on March 1, 2011. Thus, it is not established that the testator had his last place of abode within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court at the time of his death in 2011.
7. P.W.3, one of the attesting witnesses, admitted in his cross-
examination dated July 9, 2015 that the testator resided with his nephew (Bhaipo) after coming from Bombay. However, the address of the said Bhaipo was not disclosed.
8. Hence, in the absence of pleading or proof that the testator either had his last place of abode or any part of his property situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, the learned Trial Judge did not have jurisdiction to take up the matter.
9. It is next contended by the appellants that the execution and attestation of the Will was not proved validly as per the parameters of Section 63 of the 1925 Act. The executrix/P.W.2, in her cross- examination dated August 29, 2014, admitted that at the time of execution of the Will, she, along with the handicapped daughter of one Nantu Das Gupta, at whose house the testator was residing, as well as the said Nantu were present. She categorically admits that none others were present at the time of execution of the Will. Such statement, it is 4 argued, demolishes the evidence of the attesting witnesses, both of whom said that the Will was executed in their presence. In view of such contradiction in the evidence adduced in support of the probate application, it is contended that the very execution of the Will in terms of Section 63 is vitiated, having not been proved.
10. The learned Trial Judge, it is submitted, proceeded on the premise that the expression "none others" was meant to indicate the other family members of the testator besides the attesting witnesses and the learned Advocate who drafted the Will. The said major discrepancy in the evidence was brushed aside as a minor contradiction by the learned Trial Judge which, according to the appellant, is erroneous in law.
11. Again, P.W.1, one of the attesting witnesses, in his cross-examination dated March 19, 2014, admitted that he did not know whether the Will was typed (it was actually typewritten), but in the same breath stated that he read the Will at the time of putting his signature on it. Such mutually inconsistent statements, it is argued, vitiates the evidence of the said attesting witness.
12. The third limb of challenge to the Will by the appellants is that the execution of the same was shrouded with suspicious circumstances. It is contended that whereas the daughter of Nantu Das Gupta was a beneficiary in the Will, the only two attesting witnesses of the Will, who also adduced oral evidence, were admittedly the business associates of 5 Nantu. Hence, Nantu, despite his daughter being a beneficiary, played an active role in execution of the Will.
13. That apart, no dissatisfaction has been expressed in the Will against the deprived heirs of the testator. The property was bequeathed inter alia among some of the nephews/nieces of the testator, while discriminating against his other nephews and nieces, who were also his surviving heirs at the time of his demise. Such deprivation, without any explanation, tantamounts to a suspicious circumstance by itself.
14. Learned counsel for the appellants next submits that there is a patent contradiction in the Will itself. Whereas the testator admits in the second page of the Will that he had become old and had been suffering from various ailments, at the end of the Will, he states that he was in prefect physical and mental condition. Such contradiction, it is argued, also vitiates the Will.
15. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1/propounder argues that in the very first paragraph of the probate application, it has been pleaded that the testator last resided at 779, Purbachal Main Road, 1st Floor, P.S. - Kasba, Kolkata - 700 078, within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court. In Paragraph No.5, it has been stated that the propounder resided at 779, Purbachal Main Road, 1st Floor, P.S. - Kasba, Kolkata - 700 078, formerly at 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, Kolkata - 700 031. Thus, the identity of the residence of the testator at the time of his demise as 6 depicted in his Death Certificate, that is 779, Purbachal Main Road, with 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, has been categorically pleaded.
16. That apart, the defendant/appellant no.1 herself, in her affidavit-in- chief, admitted that the testator was residing with Nantu Das Gupta at 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road after coming from Bombay. In her cross-examination dated January 17, 2017, she further admitted that she had visited 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road 5-6 times before the death of the testator. Thus, the last abode of the testator within the jurisdiction of the testamentary court has been established.
17. Moreover, the Death Certificate of the testator was marked as Exhibit- 2, which also discloses the address of the testator at the time of his demise (779, Purbachal Main Road, 1st Floor, P.S. - Kasba) to be within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
18. It is argued that the statement of P.W.2 to the effect that the testator was with her during the period 2005 to 2009 is not contradictory to the proposition that the testator resided till his death at the said premises.
19. Thus, it is argued that the requirements of Section 276, read with Sections 264 and 265 of the 1925 Act, are fully satisfied in the present case.
20. Insofar as the valid execution of the Will is concerned, it is argued that the learned Trial Judge rightly proceeded on the premise that the expression "none others" in the evidence of P.W.2 has to be read in the context of the suggestion put to her, which is not before the court. If a 7 question was put to the effect whether any other family member was present, the same would have elicited such answer, without it being proved that the attesting witnesses or the scribe were not present.
21. Moreover, a stray sentence cannot be read to demolish the examination-in-chief of P.W.2 and the rest of her evidence as a whole, as well as the corroborative evidence of both the attesting witnesses, who proved the due attestation and execution of the Will under Section 63 of the 1925 Act.
22. It is further pointed out that no counter suggestion was put to either of the attesting witnesses in their cross-examination about them being absent at the time of execution of the Will. Rather, the suggestion put to P.W.1 in his cross-examination on March 19, 2014 as to whether he read the Will at the time of putting signature on it goes on to show that the presence of the said attesting witness at the time of execution was an admitted position.
23. Most importantly, it is submitted that the Will was marked as Exhibit-1 in the suit without any objection on the part of the appellants/objectors. That apart, the presumption of correctness attached to a registered Will is also attached to the present Will, which is a registered one.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submits there was no suspicious circumstance at all, since the reasons for the bequest to each and every beneficiary was clearly explained in the Will itself. 8
25. Insofar as both the attesting witnesses are concerned, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 places the relevant portions of their evidence to indicate that they were not merely business associates of Nantu Das Gupta but also personally known to the testator.
26. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 then argues that the allegations made in the written statement of the appellants were entirely different from those now sought to be argued. Such allegations, which were the original grounds of challenge to the Will, were never proved. In the written objection, the contesting appellants did not allege that no attesting witness was present at the time of execution of the Will.
27. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the court comes to the following conclusions:
Territorial Jurisdiction
28. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that objections to the place of suing have to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity before the court of first instance. Although in the written statement it was alleged that the suit was barred for territorial jurisdiction, we find that no specific argument was advanced by the appellants on such ground at the time of hearing.
9
29. Even if we give the benefit of doubt to the appellants on such count, the challenge as to territorial jurisdiction is not sustainable on several counts.
30. In the very first paragraph of the probate application/plaint, the appellant states that late Kumud Ranjan Gupta, the testator, lastly resided at 779, Purbachal Main Road, 1st Floor, P.S. - Kasba, Kolkata - 700 078. In Paragraph No.5 of the plaint, the said address has been equated with 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road. In fact, both the said addresses, identical or otherwise, lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
31. That apart, in her own examination-in-chief in answer to Question No.5, which is "Where he was residing after coming from Bombay", the appellant no.1, as D.W.1, stated that he (the testator) was residing with Nantu Das Gupta of 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, Kolkata - 700
031. Notably, there is no qualification to the said statement to the effect that he ever shifted elsewhere from such address thereafter till his demise.
32. In her cross-examination dated January 17, 2017, D.W.1 again admitted that it is a fact that the testator was residing in a house at 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, Kolkata but she could not say whether he was residing at the said address at the time of his death or not, as she was not present at the time of death of Kumud Ranjan Gupta.
10
33. Hence, D.W.1, as per her own admission, was not in a position to have direct knowledge of whether the testator was residing at the said address at the time of his death and could not have disproved the probate application statement that he was actually residing there at the time of his demise.
34. Section 114, Illustration (d) of the Indian Evidence Act (which was still applicable at the relevant juncture before the promulgation of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), provides that the court shall presume that a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such thing or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence. Thus, in view of the admission of D.W.1 that the testator was residing at 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, Kolkata after coming from Bombay and in the absence of anything to show that he ever shifted elsewhere during his lifetime, the court has to presume that the testator continued to reside at the said address, which lies within the territorial jurisdiction of the probate court, till his demise and, thus, it was the last place of abode of the testator as required under Section 276 (2) of the 1925 Act.
35. D.W.1 further admitted in her cross-examination that she had seen the testator 3-4 times before his death and had conversation with him by letter prior to his death. The said statement, read in conjunction with her other admission that she had visited the testator 5/6 times before 11 his death at 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, Kolkata, clearly indicates that the testator had his last abode at the said address.
36. The Death Certificate of the testator was marked as Exhibit-2. The place of death has been mentioned therein to be 779, Purbachal Main Road, 1st Floor, P.S. - Kasba, which in the probate application has been equated with 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, Kolkata. Thus, the said addresses were the same.
37. Even if we proceed on the premise that the said two addresses are different, both the said addresses lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the Alipore Court, that is, the court of first instance.
38. The statement of P.W.2 in her cross-examination to the effect that her uncle, the testator, resided with her after coming from Bombay between 2005 to 2009 is not mutually exclusive with the testator continuing to reside there till his demise in 2011.
39. Thus, it has been conclusively proved that the court of first instance (being the District Delegate and thereafter the learned Additional District Judge at Alipore) had the territorial jurisdiction to take up the probate application. As such, the provisions of Section 276(2) read with Sections 264 and 265 of the 1925 Act were amply complied with.
40. Since the petition was presented to the District Delegate, Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 276 applies and it was the last place of abode at the time of death of the testator which was to be proved. In any 12 event, it is nobody's case that any part of the testator's property lay within the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
41. Hence, the objection as to territorial jurisdiction taken by the appellants fails.
Whether the Will was validly attested and executed
42. The evidence of the two attesting witnesses, being P.W.1 and P.W.2, is clear on the question that the testator signed the Will in presence of the attesting witnesses and both the attesting witnesses signed the Will in presence of the testator.
43. P.W.1 Shyama Prasad Halder, one of the attesting witnesses, stated in his evidence that he signed on the Will as a witness and thereafter the other attesting witness Samir Banerjee (P.W.3) also signed on the Will, after which the learned Advocate also put his signature on the Will and that all the aforesaid persons signed on the Will before him in his presence on the same date and time. The testator, according to P.W.1, put his signature on every page of the Will in his presence.
44. Again, P.W.3 (Samir Banerjee), the other attesting witness, also stated categorically that the testator put his signatures on every page of the Will in his presence and that he can identify his signatures. He also stated that he himself put the signature, before which the other attesting witness Shyama Prasad Halder and the advocate also put their signatures in his presence and that he can identify their 13 signatures. The said attesting witness further states that all of the signatories put their respective signatures at the same place and during the same time, one by one. Thus, even the chronology of signatures is corroborated by each of the two attesting witnesses.
45. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act requires only one of the attesting witnesses to prove the due attestation and execution of a Will. Here, both the attesting witnesses did so and, in the process, corroborated each other's deposition.
46. Also, both the attesting witnesses stated that at the time of execution of the Will, the testator was in sound mental and physical condition.
47. That apart, the Will itself was marked as Exhibit-1 without any objection. Thus, its evidentiary value cannot be challenged at this stage by the appellants.
48. In view of the corroborative evidence of the two attesting witnesses, the due attestation and execution of the Will in terms of Section 63 of the 1925 Act was sufficiently proved. The law does not require the propounder or the executrix to prove such execution but only that one of the attesting witnesses has to prove such execution and attestation. In the present case, both the attesting witnesses have duly proved attestation and execution, which is sufficient to prove due attestation and execution, and the court need not look further.
49. The stray statement of P.W.2 in her cross-examination to the effect that "none others were present at the time of execution of the Will" has to be 14 read in appropriate context and cannot be construed in isolation. Such statement, if taken to mean that the attesting witnesses were not present, would go against the grain of the rest of P.W.2's evidence as well as the corroborative evidence of both the attesting witnesses, deposed respectively as P.W.1 and P.W.2. Moreover, the exact purport of such statement cannot be interpreted beyond doubt without taking into consideration the exact suggestion put to her to elicit such answer, which is not on record. It might very well have been that the counter suggestion put to P.W.2 was to be effect as to whether any other relative of the testator was present at the time of execution of the Will, which is substantiated by her previous statements in her cross- examination, all of which pertain to the presence of herself, Nantu Das Gupta and his handicapped daughter, all relatives of the testator.
50. It should not also be overlooked that the exact statement of P.W.2, the propounder/executrix was that at the time of execution of the Will she, as well as the handicapped daughter of Nantu Das Gupta, were present "in the house". She further stated that Nantu Das Gupta was also present "in the house". "None others were present at the time of execution of the Will" is the very next sentence. Thus, the P.W.2 might very well have generally referred to the other persons who were "in the house" (as opposed to the exact room or location in the said house where the Will was being attested and executed) at the said point of time apart from the attesting witnesses and the advocate, since she did 15 not mention that she, Nantu Das Gupta and the handicapped daughter were at the specific room/location in the house where the Will was being executed but that they were generally present in the house.
51. In any event, in the absence of any counter suggestion being put to the attesting witnesses about them being absent at the time of execution and attestation of the Will, their corroborative evidence of due attestation and execution in consonance with Section 63 of 1925 Act cannot be disbelieved.
52. Counter suggestions were, in fact, put to P.W.1 (one of the attesting witnesses) in his cross-examination dated March 19, 2014 as to whether it was a fact that he had put his signature on the Will and as to when he reached the house where the Will was signed on the relevant date. The tenor of the questions put to P.W.1, thus, indicate that his presence in the house was not denied.
53. Moreover, nowhere in the written statement or the examination-in-chief of the D.W.1 was any specific objection taken that the attesting witnesses were not present at the time of the signing of the Will by the testator.
54. Apart from anything else, the fact of the Will being marked as exhibit without objection and that, being a registered Will, a presumption of correctness is attached to it, clearly indicate the validity of its due execution and attestation. Hence, the challenge to the Will on such ground also fails.
16Suspicious circumstances
55. One limb of the argument of the appellants is that both the attesting witnesses were business associates of Nantu Das Gupta whose daughter was one of the beneficiaries. However, Nantu Das Gupta's daughter was not the only beneficiary but there were other family members as well who were made beneficiaries in the Will.
56. That apart, in his examination-in-chief, P.W.1, one of the attesting witnesses (Shyama Prasad Halder) stated categorically that he was connected to Nantu Das Gupta in business from 1981 and used to go to the house of Nantu and that he came in contact with the testator in this way. He also provided in his evidence details of the personal life of the testator indicating personal acquaintance with the testator, such as that the testator prepared his food by himself and all the time he used to devote in praying to God and that he mentioned to the said witness in the first week of February, 2005 that he had some properties in Assam which he intended to give by way of Will to the petitioner. The said evidence goes on to show that the attesting witness was not merely a business associate of Nandu but, in the course of his visits to Nantu's house, had become quite well-acquainted with the testator himself.
57. Samir Banerjee, the other attesting witness (P.W.3), also stated in his examination-in-chief that the testator was his family friend and a friend of his father, for which reason they had visiting terms. 17
58. We do not find in the cross-examination of either of the attesting witnesses that such stands of the attesting witnesses were countered with any cross-suggestion. Hence, the suspicious circumstances sought to be projected by the appellants on such count is demolished.
59. Moreover, a plain reading of the Will makes it clear that the testator categorically attributed reasons for his bequest to each and every beneficiary of the Will.
60. In Paragraph No.3 of the Will, he stated that upon the death of his wife he became a helpless person at the age of 80 years, when the propounder, an unmarried daughter of his eldest brother late Kamakhya Charan Gupta, used to visit his place regularly at Mumbai and started looking after him. He further stated that since then the propounder had been serving him selflessly like her father.
61. In Paragraph No.4 of the Will it is stated that the testator had become old and had been suffering from various ailments and left Mumbai in the year 2000 and was residing at that juncture at 48/C, Sarat Ghosh Garden Road, P.S. Kasba, Kolkata - 700 031, West Bengal, a residence provided by Sri Nantu Das Gupta and his wife, the son-in-law and daughter of his eldest brother Late Kamakhya Charan Gupta and that he had been residing at the said address along with the propounder and Smt. Suvashree Das Gupta, the daughter of Nantu.
62. Again, in Paragraph No.6 of the Will, the testator reiterated that since his life had become uncertain at the age of 89, he was desirous of 18 making provisions for the propounder and that he had love and affection to the propounder and he was extremely grateful to her for the care she had been taking for him during those days selflessly. In such context, he stated that after his death, the propounder would get the properties mentioned in the Schedules of the Will absolutely and she would have the right to sell, transfer and mortgage and/or to deal with the properties in any manner that she thought fit and proper.
63. In Paragraph No.10 of the Will, the testator provided that the propounder can extend her helping hand to the persons named thereunder out of any benefit obtained through the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B, which were bequeathed absolutely to the propounder, in whatever manner or way she thought fit and proper at her own judgment and at her full discretion. Further, the testator was meticulous enough to explain thereafter the specific reasons as to why such helping hand ought to be provided to such persons named thereunder.
64. In Clause (a) of Paragraph no. 10 of the Will, Suvashree Das Gupta, the daughter of Nantu Das Gupta, was mentioned to be physically handicapped and also that her parents had provided the testator his place of residence free of cost since after his arrival to Kolkata (then Calcutta).
65. In Clause (b), one Dulal Gupta, son of Late Kamakhya Charan Gupta, elder brother of the testator, was mentioned as a beneficiary of such 19 benevolence by the propounder. He was stated in the said clause to be financially very weak within the family and suffering from various ailments.
66. In Clause (c) of Paragraph No.10 of the Will, one Goutam Gupta was mentioned as the eldest grandson of the testator's generation who had lost his father at the age of 21 years and had to fight for his family's well-being.
67. In Clause (d), one Smt. Gayatree Gupta, who also had lost her father and was still unmarried, was mentioned as a proposed beneficiary at the discretion of the propounder.
68. Paragraph No.11 of the Will also provided that the propounder was to do some religious social services in memory of the testator's spiritual master as named therein.
69. Thus, each and every component of the bequest has been categorically explained with elaborate reasons by the testator in the Will itself.
70. It is to be kept in mind that the very purpose of execution of a Will is to deviate from the natural line of succession; otherwise, the Will would be meaningless and inefficacious. The dissatisfaction of any deprived heir need not be expressed or proved to show that no suspicious circumstances surrounded the Will. In any event, it is not such negative proof that has to be adduced by the beneficiaries of the Will. Rather, the challenger of a Will is required to show by cogent evidence that there existed any suspicious circumstance.
20The objectors/appellants have miserably failed to prove any such suspicious circumstance in the present case.
Other alleged discrepancies
71. In the written statement of the appellants, the primary premise of challenge to the Will was that it was not a genuine Will and the testator did not have the capacity to execute any Will as he was mentally and physically unfit to understand what he was going to do. It was also alleged that the propounder took "opportunity" (apparently meaning undue advantage) of the deceased who was residing with her at the time of the execution of the Will. It was also alleged that the testator was suffering from various ailments at the relevant point of time.
72. However, none of the said grounds has been proved by the appellants. Rather, the plaintiff's witnesses have consistently corroborated the fact that the testator was mentally and physically in sound condition at the time of execution of the Will.
73. The allegations, regarding none of the attesting witnesses being present at the time of execution and attestation of the Will and/or there being other suspicious circumstances since the rest of the nephews and nieces of the testator were deprived, do not find place as such in the written statement.
74. The last-ditch attempt of the appellants to assail the Will is that the testator, in one place of the Will, says that he had been suffering from 21 ailments and in another place that he is in sound physical and mental condition. However, in Paragraph No.4, the testator has, as a justification for executing the Will, merely stated that he had become old and had been suffering from various ailments. The exact expression used was "have been suffering" which was in the present perfect continuous tense, not necessarily indicating that he was still suffering from the same ailment at the point of time when he was executing the Will.
75. On the other hand, the penultimate paragraph of the Will, states that "I hereby make this WILL voluntarily and in perfectly physical and mental condition ...", which was in the present tense, thereby signifying that the testator, at the time of execution of the Will, was in perfect physical and mental condition. Thus, the statement that the testator had been generally suffering from various ailments from time to time previously has no conflict with his statement that at the very moment when he was executing the Will, he was in sound physical and mental condition and was executing the Will of his own volition.
76. In any event, the appellants have miserably failed to prove in any manner whatsoever that the ailments of the testator, even if any, were of such a nature that he did not have the mental capacity to execute a Will of his own free volition. Rather, the plaintiffs' witnesses have categorically proved by cogent and corroborative evidence that the 22 testator was in fine mental and physical condition and had the capacity to understand what he was signing the Will voluntarily.
77. Learned counsel for the appellants sings a valiant swansong by arguing that there is no mention in the Will that the contents thereof were read over and explained to the testator. However, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the testator, having several properties and having spent time in Bombay and Assam before coming to Calcutta (now Kolkata), was not worldly-wise. Also, it is nobody's case that the testator was illiterate or ill-lettered so as not to understand the contents of the Will, particularly in the teeth of the testator's signature on the Will being in English and the corroborative evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses that he consciously signed it after reading and understanding its contents.
78. In such view of the matter, none of the grounds taken by the appellants succeeds.
79. Accordingly, we do not find any reason whatsoever to interfere with the impugned judgment and deemed decree.
80. Accordingly, F.A.T. No.311 of 2018 is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs against the respondent no.1 and ex parte against the other respondents, thereby affirming the impugned judgment and deemed decree dated March 28, 2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sixth Court at Alipore, District: South 24 Parganas in Original Suit No.6 of 2012, whereby probate was granted in favour of 23 the respondent no.1 in respect of the last Will and Testament of Late Kumud Ranjan Gupta.
81. CAN 1 of 2018 (Old CAN 4472 of 2018) also stands disposed of in view of the above.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree.
(Uday Kumar, J.)