Delhi District Court
CT CASES/632197/2016 on 23 December, 2022
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad
CC No.632197/2016
IN THE COURT OF MS. TWINKLE CHAWLA: MM, NI ACT-02, SOUTH-
EAST DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS COMPLEX: NEW DELHI
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad
CC No.632197/2016
U/s 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
1. CIS number : DLSE020057932016
2. Name of the Complainant : M/s Karma Contractors & Developers
through AR Mr. Harinder Singh Pannu
3. Name of the Accused, : Sh. Shanti Prasad, Proprietor, Shanti
parentage & residential Traders, R/o 131, Yusuf Sarai Village, New
address Delhi - 110016.
4. Offence complained of or : U/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act,
proved 1881
5. Plea of the Accused : Pleaded not guilty and claimed trial
6. Final Judgment/order : ACQUITTED
7. Date of judgment/order : 23.12.2022
JUDGMENT
1. The Complainant has filed the present complaint under Section 138/142 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI Act") against the Accused on the averments that the Accused and the Complainant were doing joint business pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding dt. 12.09.2014 and thereafter also entered into a rent agreement dt. 16.02.2015, whereby the basement situated at E-166, G.K. II, Page 1 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 New Delhi, was to be leased to the Accused for keeping his exclusive stock and for running his office, for rent of Rs. 50,000/- per month, subject to 10% increase per year.
2. However, as per the Complainant, while the Accused retained the aforesaid premises till February 2016, rent of only two months was paid by the Accused and rent of ten months was pending.
3. As per the Complainant, the Accused in discharge of his liability towards rent, issued a cheque bearing no. 468720, drawn on Andhra Bank, Green Park Branch, New Delhi of Rs. 5,00,000/-, dt. 25.02.2016, in favour of the Complainant ("Cheque in question"). Upon presentment, the cheque in question was returned unpaid on ground of funds insufficient, by way of return memo dt. 26.02.2016.
4. The Complainant sent the legal demand notice dated 21.03.2016 through speed post to the Accused. The Accused replied to the legal demand notice, by way of reply dated 05.04.2016. Hence, despite the service of the legal demand notice, the Accused failed to make the payment within the stipulated period and the Complainant filed the present complaint.
5. After taking pre-summoning evidence, Accused was ordered to be summoned in this case for commission of offence under Section 138 NI Act, vide order dated 03.05.2016.
6. Accused appeared on 06.03.2017 and was released on bail on 21.02.2018. On Page 2 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 finding a prima facie case, notice U/s 251 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ("CrPC") was served upon the Accused on 21.02.2018 to which he pleaded not guilty and opted to contest after disclosing the following defence:
"I am the proprietor of Shanti Traders and the signatory of impugned cheque. The impugned cheque was given as security as per MoU dated 12.09.2014. I received the legal notice and replied the same."
7. Vide order dated 21.02.2018, opportunity was granted to the Accused to cross examine the Complainant. The Complainant firm examined the SPA holder Sh. Harinder Singh Pannu as CW-1, who adopted his pre-summoning evidence affidavit, Ex. CW1/1 and also proved following documents:
Ex. CW1/A(OSR): Copy of Power of Attorney executed
by the Proprietor of Karma
Contractors and Developers, in
favour of the Complainant.
Ex. CW1/B(OSR): MoU dated 12.09.2014, executed
between the Accused and
Complainant firm.
Ex. CW1/C(OSR): Rent Agreement dated 16.02.2015,
executed between Ms. Avneet Kaur
and the Accused.
Ex. CW1/D: Original Cheque bearing no. 468720,
dated 25.02.2016 amounting to Rs.
5,00,000/-.
Ex. CW1/E: Original cheque return memo dt.
26.02.2016.
Ex. CW1/F: Rent account ledger maintained by
the Complainant.
Ex. CW1/G1: Copy of legal demand notice dated
Page 3 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad
CC No.632197/2016
21.03.2016.
Ex. CW1/G2: Speed post receipt as well as return
envelope, in respect of legal demand
notice.
Ex. CW1/G3: Reply to the legal notice dt.
05.04.2016, sent by the Accused to
the Complainant.
8. During cross-examination, the Accused put the following documents to the Complainant:
Ex. CW1/D1: Legal notice dt. 02.02.2017 sent by the
Accused to the Complainant.
Ex. CW1/D2: Reply to the aforesaid legal notice dt.
06.02.2017 sent by the Complainant to
the Accused.
Ex. CW1/D3: Corrigendum dt. 31.01.2017 sent by
the Accused to the Complainant.
Ex. CW1/D4: Reply to the corrigendum dt.
06.02.2017, sent by the Complainant to
the Accused.
Mark DX1 to Mark Copy of invoices issued by the
DX33: Complainant.
9. The Complainant also examined one Sh. Akram Khan as CW-2, who had signed the rent agreement, as a witness. Complainant Evidence was closed by way of separate statement of SPA holder of the Complainant on 10.12.2019.
10.Thereafter, Accused was examined under Section 313 of CrPC on 29.02.2020 for explaining the circumstances appearing against him in the Complainant's evidence. He denied the Complainant's case and pleaded false implication and opted to lead DE in his defence. As part of Defence Evidence, the Accused examined two Page 4 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 witnesses, one Sh. Ved Prakash as DW-1 and another Sh. Deepak Vaidh as DW-2, who supported the case of the Accused. DE was closed vide separate statement of the Accused on 15.09.2022. Thereafter, since certain documents had not been put to the Accused, an additional statement u/s 313 CrPC of the Accused was recorded, on 30.11.2022, in which he denied the Complainant's case and stated that since he has already led DE, he does not want to lead any further DE.
11.I have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and have perused the case file along with the written submissions filed by the parties carefully and meticulously. Submissions of the Complainant and Accused
12.The Ld. Counsel for the Complainant has submitted that all ingredients of Section 138 NI Act are fulfilled in the present case and hence, the presumption under Section 139 NI Act arises in the favour of the Complainant, which has not been successfully rebutted by the Accused.
13.Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the Accused has submitted that the Accused deserves to be acquitted as there was no liability of rent towards the Complainant and that the cheque in question was given as a security cheque under the MOU dt. 12.09.2014. Further, it has been stated that the rent agreement was only executed for the purposes of showing to MCD and no legal liability was to emanate from the above. Hence, as per the Ld. Counsel for the Accused, the Accused has rebutted the presumption by way of preponderance of probabilities.
Page 5 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 Legal Framework Ingredients of Section 138 NI Act:
14.The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd and Ors v. K Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd and Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 745 ("Kusum Ingots Case"), has clearly stipulated that "the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under the provision are:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; 1
(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier;
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the 1 Reduced to three months vide RBI circular dated 4.11.2011. Page 6 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the 2 drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice;
If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence."
15.Therefore, if the aforesaid ingredients are made out, the Accused is deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 NI Act.
Presumption under Section 139 NI Act/Section 118 NI Act:
16.Section 139 NI Act states that:
"Presumption in favour of holder: It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability"
17.Section 139 NI Act is a type of reverse onus clause, which stipulates a presumption in the favour of the Complainant as to fact of a cheque being received in discharge 2 The same is now enhanced to 30 days.
Page 7 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 of a legal debt or liability.
18.Further, Section 118(a) of the NI Act, states as follows:
"Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -- Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:
(a) of consideration --that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;"
19.The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has in a number of judgments dealt with the combined effect of the presumptions raised under Section 139 and Section 118(a) NI Act.
20.The following proposition can be summarized on a perusal of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sunil Todi & Ors v. State of Gujarat, LL 2021 SC 706, Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75; APS Forex Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers and Ors., AIR 2020 SC 945; Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 1876; Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 ("Kumar Exports Case"); K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan and Anr., (2001) 8 SCC 458; and Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 Cri. LJ 437:
(i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted; Section 139 of the NI Act Page 8 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability;
(ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the Accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities;
(iii) Something which is probable has to be brought on record by the Accused for getting the burden of proof shifted to the Complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the Accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist;
(iv) The words "unless the contrary is proved" which occur in Section 139, make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by Section 139 NI Act cannot be said to be rebutted;
Page 9 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016
(v) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the Accused to rely on evidence led by him or the Accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the Complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely;
(vi) That it is not necessary for the Accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
Analysis
21.In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the cheque in question was drawn by the Accused from the bank account of his proprietorship concern. Further, it is also not in dispute that the Accused is the proprietor of M/s Shanti Traders and is the signatory of the cheque in question, as in the defence disclosed by the Accused U/s 251 CrPC and Section 313 CrPC statement; he has duly admitted the same. Presentation of the cheque in question by the Complainant is also not in dispute and its dishonor on grounds of funds insufficient is also not in dispute, having been admitted by the Accused in statement U/s. 313 CrPC. The receipt of the legal demand notice is also admitted and the Accused had also sent a reply to the legal demand notice, which is already on record.
Page 10 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016
22.Finally, the complaint has been filed within the limitation period. Therefore, essential ingredients (i) to (v) as stipulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots Case (supra), have been duly satisfied.
23.Further, as noted above, once the execution of the cheque by the Accused is proved/admitted, the presumption of the same being drawn for consideration stands attracted in terms of Section 139 NI Act. Now, in the case at hand, so far as the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption U/s 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act is concerned, from the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the Accused has not denied his signatures on the cheque in question that has been drawn in favour of the Complainant on a bank account maintained by the proprietorship concern of the Accused; and hence the said presumption can be drawn. The Ld. Counsel for the Accused has stated that such inference cannot be drawn as the cheque in question was given as a blank signed cheque, for security and the particulars on the same have been filled by or at the instance of the Complainant. At this stage, reliance can be laid on the observations of the Hon'ble SC in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197; wherein it has been held that:
"It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted...
Page 11 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016
38. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the Accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence...
40. Even a blank cheque leaf voluntarily signed and handed over by the Accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption Under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt." (emphasis supplied)
24.The same view has been endorsed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ravi Chopra v. State, CRL.M.C. 5211/2006.
25.Hence, in view of such clear stipulation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble Delhi High Court, it is immaterial whether or not the particulars on the cheque have been filled by the Accused or not, to the extent the Accused has admitted to have appended his signatures on the cheque in question. Accordingly, the applicability of the presumption under Section 139 NI Act is not dependent upon the Accused filling the particulars on the cheque. Accordingly, it is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e., the Complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the Accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such Page 12 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 a presumption.
26.In the segment on legal framework, set out above, the legal proposition with respect to the burden of proof upon the Accused has already been discussed. Hence, it is now to be examined as to whether the Accused brought any material on record or pointed out glaring discrepancies in the material produced by the Complainant for dislodging the presumption which meets the standard of preponderance of probabilities.
27.The Accused in the present case, has taken the following line of defence with a view to rebut the presumption:
(a) Misuse of security cheque:
28.The Accused in the present case has taken the defence that cheque in question was issued as a blank signed security cheque in terms of the MOU, Ex. CW1/B. He has submitted that the said cheque was given after the previous cheques mentioned in paragraph 05 of the MOU had become stale and cheques were to be given as replacement, in terms of the said MOU. He has relied upon legal notice, Ex. CW1/D1 (Colly) sent on 02.02.2017 by the Accused to the Complainant to state that the fact of the replacement of cheques was mentioned by him in the said notice as well, which has been duly received by the Complainant. In the reply, Ex. CW1/D2, sent by the Complainant to the Accused, the aforesaid fact of the cheques including the cheque in question, having been issued as replacement was denied by Page 13 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 the Complainant. Hence, much reliance cannot be placed on the fact of dispatch of the legal demand notice, Ex. CW1/D1, especially because the same has been issued after the issuance of summons in the present case.
29.Be that as it may, the further defence of the Accused is that there was no rent liability towards the Complainant as the rent agreement was executed solely for the purposes of showing to the MCD. The execution of the rent agreement, Ex. CW1/C is not disputed. Even CW2 has supported the fact of execution of rent agreement, who was a witness to Ex. CW1/C. However, Ld. Counsel for the Accused has submitted that as per clause 7 of the MOU, Ex. CW1/B, the godown space for the stocking of goods was to be provided by the Complainant, and that as per the Complainant himself, the MOU was in effect till December 2015 since the Complainant had stated in paragraph 7 of the complaint that the MOU was to end from December 2015 onwards, and hence, during the duration of the rent agreement, the obligation to provide the godown space was of the Complainant. Further, as per the cross- examination of the Complainant dt. 24.04.2019, the SPA holder of the Complainant had stated that "As per the MOU, Ex. CW1/B, I have provided the space for goods to the Accused from the date of agreement. The address space provided by me to the Accused is E-166, Part of Basement, Greater Kailash, Part - II, New Delhi. The space as per MOU, Ex. CW1/B was provided to the Accused till period of MOU." Accordingly, in pursuance of clause 7 of the MOU, as per the SPA holder of the Complainant, godown space was given by the Complainant to the Accused, Page 14 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 from 12.09.2014 to December 2015 (i.e., the time till which the MOU was in effect, as per the Complainant). Further, the said godown space provided by the Complainant was part of basement, E-166, G.K. II, New Delhi. The rent agreement, Ex. CW1/C, which has been executed between Ms. Avneet Kaur and the Accused also pertains to the basement, E-166, G.K. II, New Delhi. Hence, Ld. Counsel for the Accused has submitted that since as per the Complainant, the same property was provided as godown space pursuant to the MOU and the same property was the subject of the rent agreement, it is clear that the said rent agreement was only executed for ancillary purposes and did not create a rent liability. Ld. Counsel for the Complainant has submitted in the course of arguments that the basement at E- 166, G.K. II, New Delhi, had two parts, one of which was given pursuant to the MOU and the other one was given pursuant to the rent agreement. However, no such explanation has come in the complaint, cross-examination of the Complainant, or the rent agreement, itself. Perusal of the rent agreement, Ex. CW1/C reflects that as per the recital of the said agreement, the Accused had approached the Complainant to let out the built-up basement floor hall, measuring 250 Sq. Yds. of the abovesaid property. It has not been mentioned that only a portion of the said property was being rented out or that the property described in itself was a part of a larger basement. Hence, the submissions of Ld. Counsel for the Complainant, do not find support from the terms of the agreement, Ex. CW1/C. Ld. Counsel for the Complainant has drawn attention to the below mentioned recitals of the rent agreement, Ex. CW1/C, to state that only a portion was let out: Page 15 of 19
M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 "Whereas the First Party is the Owner and in possession of Property Basement floor of E-166, Greater Kailash-2, New Delhi-110048, Measuring aprox. 1750 SqFt. And whereas the Tenant, has requested and approached the owner who agreed to let out the Built-up Basement Floor (Hall) measuring 250 Sq. Yds. of the above said property."
30. Hence, Ld. Counsel for the Complainant has submitted that while the total size of the basement was 1750 sq ft; only 250 sq yards was let out. However, this understanding does not appear logical, as 250 sq yards equals to 2250 sq ft (and is larger than 1750 sq ft), and hence, accordingly to this, the meaning of the aforesaid recitals would be that out of the property of 1750 sq ft, 2250 sq ft was being leased out to the Accused, which is improbable. Hence, even in these recitals, no distinction of portion of the basement is made out.
31.Further in the said rent agreement, at paragraph 09, it was clarified that the said premises would be used for godown use only. As per the complaint, the premises were required by the Accused for office purpose and for keeping his exclusive stock. However, as per the rent agreement, the same was to be used as godown only. It is also to be seen that in the cross-examination of CW2; the said witness, who was a foreman of the Complainant, has stated that "it is correct that E-166, Basement, Greater Kailash, Part II, New Delhi is the place where Mr. Pannu kept the goods purchased by Shanti Prasad." Hence, as per CW2, who was an employee of the Complainant, the aforesaid address was being used by the Complainant to keep the Page 16 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 goods of the Accused, and hence, his testimony strengthens the fact that the said premise was being used for the godown purpose, as set out in paragraph 07 of the MOU, Ex. CW1/B. He has also not volunteered to state that the said basement had two parts, one of which was being used by the Accused exclusively. Hence, a reasonable doubt as to the identicality of the property provided by the Complainant, pursuant to Clause 7 of the MoU, Ex. CW1/B and the subject matter of the rent agreement, Ex. CW1/C, has been raised.
32.Further, the Complainant has in his cross-examination dt. 07.01.2019 also admitted that he has not sent any written notice or letter or even instituted any proceedings in regard to the recovery of rent, prior to the present complaint. It has been noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513, that the circumstantial evidence has to be seen from the point of a reasonable/prudent man. Hence, if the rent was paid for only two months and the Accused was continuously using the said premises for the next ten months, it does not appear reasonable for the Complainant to not issue any notice to the Accused for the recovery of the rent in question. This is especially because, the Complainant had a strictly professional relation with the Accused and did not have any familial terms with him.
33.It is also to be seen that in the present case, the cheque in question has been drawn in the favour of Karma Contractors and Developers, i.e., the Complainant, with whom the MOU dt. 12.09.2014 was executed. However, the rent agreement has Page 17 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 been executed between Ms. Avneet Kaur and the Accused. While, Ms. Avneet Kaur is the proprietor of Karma Contractors and Developers, and a proprietorship concern has no legal personality distinct from that of its proprietor; the rent agreement appears to have been executed by Ms. Avneet Kaur in her personal capacity and not as proprietor of Karma Contractors and Developers, and yet the cheque in question has been drawn in the favour of Karma Contractors and Developers. While the case of the Accused is that he had issued the cheque in question as a blank signed cheque as security for the MOU, the Complainant has submitted that the cheque in question was given by the Accused, fully filled in. However, no explanation as to why the cheque, qua the rent agreement was taken in the name of the proprietorship concern has been given by the Complainant. Even the ledger account statement, which is Ex. CW1/F, which is allegedly qua the rent account, has been counter signed by Sh. Harender Singh Pannu, who is the AR of the firm. Hence, while the rent agreement was executed by Ms. Avneet Kaur in personal capacity, the accounts have been maintained by the firm and accordingly placed on record. This fact also leads some credence to the version of the Accused that the cheque was given to the firm as security for the MOU, which was executed with the firm. It is trite law that the Accused has to rebut the presumption by the standard of preponderance of probabilities and it is the Complainant who has to establish his case beyond any reasonable doubt. In the absence of the Complainant explaining/ bringing on record the distinction between the property provided as godown space pursuant to clause 7 of the MOU, Ex. CW1/B and the property given on rent as godown to the Accused Page 18 of 19 M/s Karma Contractors & Developers v. Shanti Prasad CC No.632197/2016 under the rent agreement, Ex. CW1/C, a probable defence of lack of consideration, qua the cheque in question, has been raised by the Accused. Further, the Accused has also denied that he has not made any payments in cash, towards the rent, as is recorded in Ex. CW1/F, i.e., the rent account ledger. In any case, it is seen that the said ledger has not been counter signed by the Accused and is a self-serving document. Accordingly, the Complainant has failed to prove his case beyond all reasonable doubt.
Conclusion:
34.In these circumstances and in view of the above detailed discussion, this court is of the considered opinion that the Accused has successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and ingredients of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 have not been fully proved. Therefore, Accused is held not guilty and is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881.
ORDER: ACQUITTAL Announced in Open Court (Twinkle Chawla) MM (NI-Act 02), South East Saket Court, New Delhi Note: This judgment contains 19 pages and each page has been signed by me.
(Twinkle Chawla) MM (NI-Act 02), South East Saket Court, New Delhi Page 19 of 19