Allahabad High Court
Kalicharan vs State Of U.P. on 23 July, 2024
Bench: Ashwani Kumar Mishra, Gautam Chowdhary
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:118531-DB Court No. - 43 Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 6403 of 2019 Appellant :- Kalicharan Respondent :- State of U.P. Counsel for Appellant :- Y,Nitin Sharma,Ramdhan Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.,Brajesh Kumar Solanki Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra,J.
Hon'ble Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra,J.)
1. This criminal appeal is preferred by the accused appellant Kalicharan against the judgment and order dated 30.09.2019, passed by the learned Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Kasganj in Sessions Trial No.300 of 2009, arising out of Case Crime No. 313 of 2009, under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, Police Station-Kasganj, District-Kasganj; whereby the appellant has been convicted under section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment along with fine of Rs.1 lakh and in default of payment of fine to undergo one month additional simple imprisonment; sentenced to two years simple imprisonment under Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently.
2. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that there was a dispute relating to certain land between the accused appellant and the deceased Rajendra Singh son of Nain Sukh. On account of such dispute enmity was maintained by the accused persons. On 26.05.2009, at about 8:00 a.m. in the morning while deceased along with informant reached the house of Sahab Singh Baghel the accused Kalicharan along with Satya Prakash son of Budh Singh as well as Manoj and Vikky son of Kalicharan came from the front. Kalicharan was having a licensed rifle with him, while Satya Prakash had a countrymade pistol, co-accused Manoj had a licenced revolver and Vikky also had a country made pistol. It is alleged that Kalicharan exhorted to kill the deceased and also fired with his licenced rifle which hit on the thigh region of the deceased. Manoj also fired with his licenced revolver but the bullet missed the deceased. It is then alleged that all accused indiscriminately fired on the deceased. The act of the accused persons created an atmosphere of terror in the village and the incident has been seen by brother-in-law of the informant Rakesh as well as Dattar and other villagers. The injured was rushed to the hospital where he was referred to Aligarh but he died on the way. With such allegations written report was made by the informant (wife of the deceased) on the basis of which first information report came to be registered as Case Crime No.313 of 2009. The investigation proceeded and the Investigating Officer collected blood stained earth as well as the mobile kept in the pocket of the deceased vide Exhibit Nos. Ka-3 and Ka-4. Inquest was conducted on 26.05.2009 in the afternoon. Postmortem was also conducted on the same day, wherein the cause of death was stated to be shock and hemorrhage as a result of antimortem firearm injury. In the postmortem report, the deceased was specified as a 35 year old person of average built and following injuries were noticed on the body of the deceased:-
"i). Gun shot wound of entry 1c.m. X 1c.m., 22c.m. below anterior superior iliac spine over anterolateral aspect of right thigh directed posteriorly.
ii). Gun shot wound of exit 17c.m. X 9c.m. communicating injury no.1 femur fractured large vessels of thigh lacerated."
3. The investigation proceeded further and the accused was arrested and his rifle was also recovered vide Exhibit No.Ka-9. In the rifle four live cartridges were found with one used cartridge stuck in the barrel. The rifle has been sent along with other recovered items to the forensic laboratory and the report of the laboratory dated 14th December, 2009 and 22/25th February, 2010 are on record.
4. Before proceeding further, it would be worth noticing that out of the four persons accused in the incident Manoj and Vikky have been declared juvenile. Satya Prakash, who is the other brother of the accused appellant and was alleged to have fired from his country made pistol has been acquitted. There is also no appeal against the acquittal of Satya Prakash. It is thus the main shooter Kalicharan who has been convicted and sentenced in this case.
5. The investigation ultimately resulted in filing of charge sheet against the accused under Section 302 I.P.C. Cognizance was taken of the charge sheet by the Magistrate and the case was committed to the court of Session where it got registered as Sessions Trial No. 300 of 2009.
6. During the course of trial the prosecution has produced following documentary evidence:-
"i. F.I.R., Ex.Ka.6, dt. 26.05.2009.
ii. Written Report, Ex.Ka.1.
iii. Recovery Memo of Torn Pant & Nokia Mobile, Ex.Ka.3, dt. 26.05.2009.
iv. Recovery Memo of Blood Stained & Plain Earth, Ex.Ka.4, dt. 26.05.2009.
v. Recovery Memo of Live, Empty Cartridge & Revolver, Ex.Ka.9, dt. 27.05.2009. vi. P.M. Report, Ex.Ka.5, dt. 26.05.2009.
vii. Report of Vidhi Vigyan Prayogshala, Ex.Ka.18, dt. 11.12.2009.
viii. Report of Vidhi Vigyan Prayogshala, dt. 22.02.2010.
ix. Report of Vidhi Vigyan Prayogshala, dt. 25.02.2010.
x. Report of Vidhi Vigyan Prayogshala, dt. 14.12.2009.
xi. Report of Vidhi Vigyan Prayogshala, Ex.Ka.17, dt. 25.02.2010.
xii. 'Panchayatnama' Ex.Ka.2, dt. 26.05.2009."
7. In addition to the documentary evidence, the prosecution has produced Smt. Kanti Devi wife of late Rajendra Singh (P.W.-1), who happens to be the informant. Rakesh Kumar, who happens to be the brother of the deceased has been produced as P.W.-2. Dr. Arun Kumar, who is the autopsy surgeon has been produced as P.W.-3. Siya Ram (PW-4) is a Police personnel, who has proved the prosecution papers. Ram Khiladi is another villager, who has been produced as P.W.-5. Gulveer Singh is the Sub-Inspector who has proved the recovery of rifle etc and has been produced as P.W.-6. P.W.-7 is Ratendra Singh, who has prepared the site plan and has also conducted the investigation of the present case. P.W.-8 is Rakesh Kumar Sharma, who was the subsequent Investigating Officer in the present case and had arrested the accused. P.W.-9 is the Police Constable, who has proved the recovery of revolver and arrest of the accused. P.W.-10 is Susheel Kumar Singh, who has proved the panchayatnama and other police papers.
8. The appellant has also appeared as a defence witness in support of the plea of minority of the two co-accused Manoj and Vikky. The aforesaid evidence adduced during trial has been confronted to the accused, who has denied his implication in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and has claimed that he has been falsely implicated in the present matter due to enmity. He has further denied the evidence relied upon against him by the prosecution.
9. The defense has also produced Shyam Veer as a witness, who has supported the defense plea of alibi on the pretext that the accused was at his office where he was posted as a Junior Engineer. P.W.-2 Rajendra Singh is also produced as a witness to prove the plea of alibi of the accused.
10. It is on the basis of above evidence that trial court has come to the conclusion that it was the accused appellant who had fired on the deceased causing his death and consequently the accused appellant has been convicted and sentenced as per above.
11. Shri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that accused appellant has been falsely implicated. He further argues:-
i. that the enmity between the parties is not proved;
ii. Presence of P.W.-1 at the place of occurrence is doubtful;
iii. Version of P.W.-1 that the accused fired on the deceased from the front is contradicted by the medical evidence on record according to which the solitary firearm injury was caused from behind as the exit wound was on the front side of the thigh; iv. The presence of P.W.-2 and P.W.-5 is also doubtful inasmuch as P.W.-2 is a related and chance witness and his presence at the place of occurrence is not natural. Similarly, presence of P.W.-5 is also questioned. Testimony of P.W.5 has also been relied upon to submit that he had otherwise admitted in his testimony that he was not present at the place of occurrence.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant alternatively submits that the solitary firearm injury on the thigh region of the deceased clearly demonstrates that there was in fact no intention on part of the accused appellant to commit the murder of the deceased. The doctor (autopsy-surgeon) has also opined that the injury was on non-vital part. Learned counsel also argues that the cause of death was excessive bleeding and with proper medical care the deceased could have been saved. Submission is that seat of injury clearly indicates that the offense at best could travel up to Section 304 part-II of the I.P.C. and the trial court has erred in convicting the accused appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. It is further argued that the widow of the deceased is liable to be compensated by the accused.
13. Shri Brajesh Kumar Solanki, learned counsel appearing for the informant, however submits that the testimony of witnesses are reliable and the evidence has been correctly appreciated by the court of Sessions in order to convict the accused appellant. It is submitted that minor contradictions in the version of the witnesses cannot be to the advantage of the appellant. It is further argued that the widow of the deceased is liable to be compensated by the accused.
14. Learned A.G.A. has substantially adopted the argument of Shri Brajesh Kumar Solanki, learned counsel for the informant, and submits that the appellant was a Junior Engineer in the Electricity Department and his act of firing on the deceased since is duly proved, which has occasioned the death of the deceased, as such the conviction and sentence under Section 302 I.P.C. merits no influence.
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. The prosecution case as well as the evidence which has been adduced in the matter has already been noticed above. The specific case of the prosecution is that the deceased was shot at by the accused appellant on account of previous enmity and that the incident has been seen by the eye witnesses.
16. We have examined the testimony of the two related witnesses, namely, P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, both of whom have specifically stated that while deceased was going along with P.W.-1, the four accused came from the front and it was the accused appellant Kalicharan who fired on the thigh of the deceased, which caused his death. The testimony of P.W.-1 has been carefully examined by us, wherein the incident has been explained in detail by the witness.
17. In the cross-examination, P.W.-1 has stated that she was going to purchase some cosmetic products from Kasganj along with her husband. The mere fact that the purpose of visit was not mentioned in the F.I.R. would not be material. The thrust of the appellant's contention is that the solitary injury has been caused to deceased from the back, which is inconsistent with the version of P.W.-1, according to whom the four accused were coming from the front thereby implying that the fire was shot from the front. Although, the argument of the appellant at the first blush seems attractive but a deeper examination of the testimony persuades us not to accept it inasmuch as the point of entry of gun shot may depend on various factors including the direction and positioning of the deceased. P.W.-1 has stated that she was following her husband and was behind him by few steps. Possibility of the deceased having turned when the fire was shot at him cannot entirely be eliminated. The incident otherwise occurred in the year 2009 and the statement of witness was recorded after more than a year. The presence of wife along with her husband in the village where he resides otherwise cannot be doubted. It has otherwise come in evidence that some land was sold to the wife of the accused by uncle and brother of the deceased. There was some issue with regard to identification of the land which had been sold to the wife of the accused.
18. According to the prosecution, the land was purchased by the accused in the name of his wife from Shivraj but he had actually encroached upon the land of Ganga Singh. The evidence therefore, does indicate that there was some enmity between the parties. The statement of the informant, therefore, cannot be lightly brushed aside. The F.I.R. has also been lodged at about 10:30 a.m. in respect of the incident occurred at 8:00 a.m. and, therefore, the lodging of the F.I.R. is prompt. It is undisputed that the informant was living in the same village with her husband. In such circumstances, the testimony of P.W.-1 cannot be effectively questioned on the ground of her presence at the place of occurrence. Similarly, P.W.-2 is the brother of the deceased and is resident of the same village. The first information report clearly narrates that the incident has been seen by P.W.-2. The version of P.W.-2 with regard to enmity as well as the manner in which the incident has been committed is consistent with the medical evidence on record.
19. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we, therefore, are of the view that the court of Sessions has rightly relied upon the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 to prove the incident, in which the accused appellant fired on the deceased. The argument of Shri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, that presence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 is doubtful and therefore their testimony be ignored/discarded, therefore, cannot be accepted.
20. Coming to the next limb of the appellant's contention, the record clearly shows that the cause of death of the deceased is the solitary gun shot injury. It has come in evidence of P.W.-3 (autopsy surgeon) that there was a solitary gun shot injury with wound of entry from behind and the exit wound being in the front of the deceased's legs. The autopsy surgeon in his cross-examination has categorically stated that the wound of entry is not on the vital part of the body of the deceased. The cause of death is excessive loss of blood. The doctor has also clearly stated that in the event proper medical assistance was rendered the deceased could have been saved. Relevant portion of the doctor's testimony is reproduced:-
"(5) यह कहना सही है कि बून्स ऑफ एन्ट्री सवेदनंशील भाग पर नही है। मृत्यु का तत्कालीन कारण अधिक रक्त श्राव के कारण था। अगर उचित और सही इलाज होता तो इस हेमरेज से बचाया जा सकता था व उसकी जान बचायी जा सकती थी।"
21. We find substance in the contention of the appellant's counsel that in case the intent on part of the accused was to commit the murder of the deceased, he could have very easily fired on the vital part of the body of the deceased, particularly, as he was in a close range and there was no difficulty in inflicting gun shot on the vital part of the body. The fact that deceased has been shot on his leg below 22 cm on the femur bone, lends credence to the appellant's submission that the intent of the appellant was not to commit the murder of the deceased but was only to cause grievous injury. We further find that the accused was carrying his licenced rifle and he could have very well shot the next fire on the deceased if he wanted to kill the deceased, which admittedly is not the case. The weight of evidence, in such circumstances, clearly suggests that the intent of the accused appellant was not to commit the murder of the deceased but was apparently to cause grievous injury on the deceased.
22. Seat of solitary injury caused to the deceased becomes relevant for twin purposes. It may help in determining whether there was any intent on part of the accused to commit murder and/or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or was it just that the accused had knowledge that his act is likely to cause the death.
23. For an accused to be punished under Section 302 I.P.C. the prosecution has to prove that the accused has committed the offence of murder. Section 300 I.P.C. defines culpable homicide to be murder if the act by which death is caused is with the intention of causing death; intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person; if it is done with the intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or; it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability cause death or likely to cause death and that his act does not fall in any of the five exceptions to Section 300 I.P.C.
24. Section 299 I.P.C. broadly places culpable homicide in three distinct categories i.e. (i) causing death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, (ii) causing death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, (iii) causing death by doing an act with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. First two categories require ascertainment of element of intention whereas the last category only requires knowledge on part of the accused.
25. In Anbazhagan Vs. State 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up the true import of the above two sections after referring to the leading judgments on the issue where it is a case of single injury. Relevant principles have been culled out by the Court in para 66 of the judgment which is reproduced hereinafter:-
"66. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:--
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate:'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."
(Emphasis supplied by us)
26. The judgment in Anbazhagan (supra) has been followed in para 19 of the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Ramkumar Vs. The State Rep. by Inspector of Police reported in 2023 INSC 812.
27. When the facts of the present case are analysed in light of the above principles, we find that the prosecution evidence at best makes out the present case to fall in the third category of Section 299 I.P.C. It has been established by the prosecution that the accused appellant by his act of firing on the deceased has caused his death with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. There is no evidence on record to prove that such act was done with an intention to cause death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Prosecution evidence clearly falls short of proving this case to fall in any of the four classes of Section 300 IPC, inasmuch as it is neither shown that the accused had any intention to cause death; of causing such bodily injury as the accused knows to cause death; injury caused is sufficient in ordinary course of things to cause death; or it was so imminently dangerous that in all probability it is likely to cause death. There is no direct evidence of intention to kill on part of the accused nor the accused can be said to have any intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In our considered opinion the prosecution case will also not fall in any of the other two conditions. The seat of injury, the fact that no repeat shot was fired as also the evidence that accused could have fired on the vital part of the body yet he fired on a non-vital part persuades us to hold that none of the ingredients of Section 300 IPC are attracted.
28. In that view of the matter, the guilt of appellant would only fall in the last category of culpable homicide defined under Section 299 I.P.C. which would be punishable under part-II of Section 304 I.P.C.
29. Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code will be attracted in an exigency where either Section 300 IPC is not attracted or even if attracted it falls in any of its exception. Since on facts we find that Section 300 IPC is not attracted on the basis of evidence produced by the prosecution as such we do not approve of the conviction and sentence by the court below awarded to the accused under Section 302 I.P.C. The conviction and sentence of the accused appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. is consequently reversed.
30. Upon evaluation of the evidence on record, we have come to the conclusion that the solitary firearm gun shot injury since has been caused on the thigh region, a non-vital part of the deceased, and there was no repeat fire shot on him despite the fact that accused could have fired on a vital part or repeat shot as such the offence in the present case would clearly fall under part-II of Section 304 I.P.C. The conviction of the accused appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. thus stands substituted to Section 304 (part-II) of the I.P.C.
31. Coming to the sentence awarded to the accused appellant, we are informed that the accused appellant has already undergone incarceration of six years, eight months and 27 days as on 12th March, 2024. The period of incarceration as on date would be nearly seven years. In our view, the sentence awarded to the accused appellant of seven years would adequately serve the purpose of justice in the present case.
32. This takes us to the question of awarding fine and compensating the widow of the deceased. The trial court has imposed fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- upon the accused appellant. Much argument has been advanced from either side with regard to the quantum of fine to be imposed in the present matter. The appellant herein was employed as a Junior Engineer in the Electricity Department. The deceased was employed in a liquor shop and was primarily an agriculturist. The entire family of the deceased including his wife was dependent upon her. We are also informed that a previous Bench had allowed the parties to amicably settle the quantum of fine such that it adequately compensates the widow and family members of the deceased in light of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ankur Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770. The parties tentatively agreed for a sum of Rs.10 lakhs but the informant later demanded a higher amount. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we enhance the quantum of fine to Rs.10 lakhs to be paid to the widow of the deceased.
34. For the reasons and discussions held above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The judgment and order dated 30.09.2019, passed by the learned Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Kasganj in Sessions Trial No. 300 of 2009, arising out of Case Crime No. 313 of 2009, under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, Police Station-Kasganj, District-Kasganj stands modified.
35. The accused-appellant-Kalicharan, who is reported to be in jail, shall be released, forthwith, unless he is wanted in any other case, subject to compliance of Section 437-A Cr.P.C.
Order Date :- 23.7.2024 Anurag/-