Jharkhand High Court
Rajeev Gupta vs M/S Central Coal Field Ltd on 24 September, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:30127
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1393 of 2018
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Rajeev Gupta, aged about 67 years, Son of Late Saryu Prasad Gupta, Resident of 2D, Rashmi Rathi Apartment, Chandni Chowk, Kanke Road, Ranchi, P.O.- Gonda, P.S. Gonda, Dist-
Ranchi, Jharkhand. .....Petitioner
Versus
1. M/s Central Coal Field Ltd., having its head office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali, District- Ranchi, through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director.
2. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, M/s Central Coal Field Ltd., Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali, District- Ranchi.
3. The General Manager (Vigilance), M/s Central Coal Field Ltd., Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali, District- Ranchi.
4. Sri Prakash Chandra Choudhary, Inquiring Authority, Care of M/s Central Coal Field Ltd., Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali, District- Ranchi.
....Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Jai Prakash, Sr. Adv Mr. Omiya Anusha, Adv For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Adv Ms. Swati Shalini, Adv
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C.A.V. ON: 01.09.2025 PRONOUNCED ON:-24/09/2025 The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for quashing of the memorandum bearing nature of reference no. CCL/VIG/RDA-19/16-16-17 dated 30.08.2016 (Annexure-3), and also the departmental proceeding initiated against the Petitioner being in violation of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules 1978 ("CDA Rules"
for short) & CVC norms.
The Petitioner has also assailed the enquiry report 1 2025:JHHC:30127 dated 12.09.2018 and the order of punishment dated 03.10.2020 as contained in Annexure-17 and Annexure-21 to the writ application.
2. Briefly stated, the Petitioner while officiating as the General Manager (S&M) was found involved in commission of gross irregularity in the matter of implementation of the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Coal relating to supply of coal on tapering basis to various consumers of Power, Cement and Sponge Iron in gross disregard to the directives received from Coal India Limited.
As alleged, the Petitioner was found to have failed to take appropriate action in time to convert the normal linkage of one consumer M/s. Rungta Mines Limited for its plant located at Seraikela-Kharsawan (Jharkhand) to tapering linkage resulting into loss of approximately Rs. 4 Crore to the Company and corresponding gain to the consumer. Similarly, it was found that the Petitioner further committed gross irregularity in not converting the normal linkage of Captive Power Plant of the unit of M/s. Adhunik Alloys and Power Limited to a tapering linkage and continued to supply coal to the said unit as per the normal Fuel Supply Agreement resulting into lifting of coal without tapering and without payment of add-on price as per the policy of the Government 2 2025:JHHC:30127 of India, that too beyond tapering period of three years which has resulted into loss of around Rs.16 Crore.
3. The record further reveals that on receipt of the vigilance report, a memorandum of charge was issued to the Petitioner vide letter dated 30.08.2016 (Annexure 3) for the following charges -
"ARTICLE-I Shri Rajeev Gupta, General Manager (Mining) GM(SD&CSR), CCL, Ranchi while posted and functioning in General Manager (Sales & Marketing), CCL during the year 2010 committed gross irregularity in the matter of implementing the Guidelines/polices issued by Ministry of Coal relating to supply of Coal on tapering basis to various consumers of Power, Cement and Sponge Iron and subsequent directives received from CIL> inasmuch as he failed to take appropriate action in time to convert the normal linkage of M/s. Rungta Mines Limited for its plant located at Seraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand to tapering linkage resulting in loss of approximately Rs. 4 Crores to the company and corresponding gain toi the consumer. Thus, later on to recover the same company had to issue supplementary bills during May 205 to the party.
ARTICLE-II That during the aforesaid period and white functioning in the aforesaid office, said Shri Rajeev Gupta committed further gross irregularity in the matter of implementing the Guidelines/policy issued by Ministry of Coal relating to supply of Coal on tapering basis to various consumers of Power, Cement and Sponge Iron and subsequent directives of CIL, in the matter inasmuch he failed to take appropriate action in time to convert the normal linkage of CPP (Captive Power Plant) unit of M/s Adhunik Alloy & Power to tapering linkage and continued to supply coal to the CPP unit as per normal FSA resulting in lifting of coal without tapering and add on price that too beyond tapering period of three years, which resulted in loss of amount to the tune of 16 Cr. (approx) to the company and corresponding gain to the consumer during the period of supply of coal. Thus, alter on to recover the same company had to issue supplementary bills during May 2015 to the party.
Hence the charge.3
2025:JHHC:30127 The above acts of omissions and commissions on the part of Shri Rajeev Gupta besides being amounting to non- fulfillment of duties and obligations as contained under Rules 4.1 (i), 4.1(ii), 4.2 and 4.3 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 of CIL (amended up to April 2000) also tantamount to misconduct under 5.5(5), 5.0(9), &
5.0(2^) under said Rules."
4. As a matter of fact, as per the guidelines, the Coal Companies were required to enter into a tapering linkage agreement with all such consumers with whom they had a 'Fuel Supply Agreement' on allocation of coal block. The said guidelines are contained in letter no. 23011/39/2008-CPD dated 26.02.2010 issued by the Ministry of Coal. Subsequently, guidelines were issued by the Coal India Limited as contained letter dated 24.06.2010.
5. The case of the writ petitioner is that he was posted as General Manager (S&M) only on 20.06.2010 and for the period 26.02.2010 to 19.06.2010, he was not in the Sales & Marketing Department. Thus, he cannot be held responsible for the said irregularity.
6. The further case of the Petitioner to the said departmental proceedings was that he had already superannuated on 30.08.2016 and, therefore, the proceedings cannot commence post his superannuation.
7. It reveals from perusal of records that during the departmental proceedings, full opportunity was given to the Petitioner and the Inquiry Officer after conclusion of the 4 2025:JHHC:30127 enquiry, submitted a detailed report wherein after discussing all the materials on record, the Inquiry Officer found the charges to be proved.
8. At this stage, it is relevant to mention here that in order to maintain transparency and fairness in the enquiry, a retired Judicial Officer was appointed as an Inquiry Officer. On receipt of the enquiry report, a second show-cause notice was issued to the Petitioner on 11.12.2018 (Annexure 17). The Petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the second show- cause notice (Annexure 18), and after considering the entire enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 05.10.2020 imposed punishment of reduction of lower stage in time scale without cumulative effect.
9. Being aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner preferred an appeal which was also dismissed.
10. Mr. Jai Prakash, Ld. Sr. Counsel representing the Petitioner essentially challenged the order of punishment and appeal on the following grounds -
(i) The petitioner was not officiating as General Manager (S&M) for the period 26.02.2010 to 19.06.2010 and, therefore, is not responsible.
(ii) The case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaswan Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, (2007) 1 SCC 663, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 5 2025:JHHC:30127 of CIL had categorically held that after an employee is permitted to retire, no penalty can be imposed subsequent to his retirement.
(iii) The petitioner raised an issue that during the departmental proceedings he was not permitted to take help of an Ex- employee.
(iv) For the self-same charge, an F.I.R. was instituted by CBI which culminated into filing of final form on the ground that ultimately the coal companies did not suffer any loss and in support thereof, the petitioner had brought on record the copy of the final form as Annexure 19.
11. Per Contra, Mr. Amit Kr. Das, Ld. Counsel for the Respondent-CCL contended that the Petitioner joined the post of General Manager (S&M) on 20th of June 2010 and the guidelines of Coal India Limited were communicated on 24th of June 2010. This apart, after the Petitioner joined, it was the responsibility of the Petitioner to ensure that the guidelines of Ministry of Coal as contained in letter dated 26.02.2010; whereby he was required to ensure to enter into a tapering policy with all consumers who have been allotted coal block and with whom Central Coalfields Limited was having Fuel Supply Agreement.
Ld. Counsel contended that the Petitioner duly ignored the said policy and the guidelines of Coal India Limited and did not enter into a tapering linkage with two companies, namely, M/s. Rungta Mines Limited and M/s. Adhunik Alloys and Power Limited, as a result of which, the 6 2025:JHHC:30127 Central Coalfields Limited suffered a loss of Rs.2 crore and Rs.16 crore respectively.
It has also been contended that both these consumers, were allowed to lift coal even beyond the permitted period of three years since allocation of coal block. It has been contended that during the entire period, it was the Petitioner who was officiating on the post of General Manager (S&M) and, therefore, was the main responsible person for such irregularity.
12. Having heard Ld. Counsel for the rival parties, at the outset it is to be indicated that Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Petitioner during course of his argument has relied upon a judgment in the case of Jaswan Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited.1 The reliance of the Petitioner is wholly misplaced, inasmuch as, the said judgment stood overruled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited v. Rabindranath Choubey,2 wherein at paragraph 41 and 42, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :-
"41. We are unable to agree with the decision rendered in Jaswant Singh Gill case [Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat 1 (2007) 1 SCC 663 2 (2020) 18 SCC 71 7 2025:JHHC:30127 Coking Coal Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 663 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 584] inter alia for the following reasons:
41.1. The order of termination was not questioned, nor the authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, had jurisdiction to deal with it.
41.2. The validity or enforceability and vires of Service Rules 34.2 and 34.3 were not questioned.
41.3. The Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, had no jurisdiction to go into the legality of order of the disciplinary authority.
41.4. The scope of the case before this Court was confined to validity of the order of the Controlling Authority and to questions which could have been dealt with by the Controlling Authority.
41.5. No fetter is caused on the efficacy of the Rules by Sections 4(1) and 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
The Rules need not be statutory to have efficacy as they are not repugnant to the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. This Court did not consider the scope of provisions of the Gratuity Act and provisions of Rule 34.2, providing legal fiction of employee deemed to be in service even after superannuation. 41.6. The Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to deal with Rules 34.2 and 34.3 or to pronounce upon validity thereof or of dismissal. Thus, the observations made, travelling beyond the scope of the proceedings, cannot be said to be binding and cannot constitute the ratio with respect to continuance of departmental enquiry after superannuation and what kind of punishment can be imposed by an employer. The jurisdiction of authority was only to consider payment of gratuity under Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
42. Thus, we overrule the decision in Jaswant Singh Gill [Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 663 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 584] .
13. Further, the plea of the Petitioner that the CBI had submitted a final form on the ground that ultimately the coal companies did not suffer any loss and as such, the departmental proceedings should not have been continued is also misconceived, inasmuch, from bare perusal of the final form submitted by the Petitioner would show that the irregularity was committed and both the companies i.e. M/s. Rungta Mines Limited and M/s. Adhunik Alloys and Power 8 2025:JHHC:30127 Limited had taken advantage of such irregularity by not making payment of add on price and also by continuing to lift coal even after expiry of three years.
However, when the F.I.R. was instituted by CBI, in order to avoid any further complication both the companies allowed recovery of the differential amount. Such subsequent recovery of differential amount cannot absolve the Petitioner of his misconduct.
14. It has also been contended by Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner was posted as General Manager (S&M) only on 20.06.2010 and for the period 26.02.2010 to 19.06.2010, he was not in the Sales & Marketing Department. Thus, he cannot be held responsible for the said irregularity.
Prima facie, such argument on the part of the petitioner cannot be sustained on the face of it, inasmuch as, the letter dated 24.06.2010 was issued by the Coal India Limited after the Petitioner joined as General Manager (S&M) and it was the Petitioner who would be responsible to implement the said policy.
15. The further contention of the Petitioner to the said departmental proceedings was that he had already 9 2025:JHHC:30127 superannuated on 30.08.2016 and, therefore, the proceedings cannot commence post his superannuation.
Such plea also does not has any leg to stand, inasmuch as, Clause 34.2 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 of CIL permits continuance of the proceedings even after superannuation of an employee and, therefore it was not open for the petitioner to challenge the proceedings on that ground.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has recently in the case of Eastern Coalfields Limited v. Rabindra Kumar Bharti,3 held the scope of the departmental proceedings. It has been held that in the criminal trial the charges are required to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts, whereas; in the departmental proceedings, the findings are to be recorded on the basis of the 'Preponderance of Probabilities' The submission of final form in favour of the Petitioner is of no consequence. In a final-form also, there is a mention of the irregularity which was committed in allowing M/s. Rungta Mines Limited and M/s. Adhunik Alloys and Power Limited to continue with the normal policy and with respect to non- application of tapering policy to both the units besides allowing both the units to continue to lift coal without 3 (2022) 12 SCC 390 10 2025:JHHC:30127 payment of add on price as per the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Coal.
17. Even otherwise, the law with regards to judicial review is also well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj,4 by a judgment dated 14th February, 2020 has reiterated that scope of judicial review is confined only to the decision-making process. Power of judicial review conferred on the Constitutional Court or Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority but is of a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that that conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the Court. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment read as under -
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under :
(AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the 4 (2020) 3 SCC 423 11 2025:JHHC:30127 enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13) "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings 12 2025:JHHC:30127 against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
18. So far as the grievance of the Petitioner that he was not permitted to engage an Ex-employee in the departmental proceedings as a co-officer is concerned; same has also been duly replied in the counter affidavit wherein at paragraph 19 it has been specifically mentioned that under Clause 29.8 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 of CIL, an employee can take assistance of "any other employee". Assistance of an Ex-employee cannot be taken under the clause, though the liberty has been given to the Disciplinary Authority to appoint "any person" as an Inquiry Officer as per Clause 29.2. The Disciplinary Authority had appointed an 13 2025:JHHC:30127 independent retired Judicial Officer to maintain independence and transparency in the departmental proceedings.
19. Thus, it is apparent from the aforementioned facts that there has been no procedural irregularity. Full opportunity was given to the Petitioner to present his case and the findings have been recorded by the Inquiry Officer after detailed discussions. There has been no procedural lapse and the findings of the Inquiry Officer is based on evidence cannot be faulted with.
20. Recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Bhupendra Singh,5 has held that the findings in a departmental enquiry cannot be reassessed by the High Court unless they are based on no evidence or perverse.
21. In view of the facts stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is, thus, liable to be, and is hereby, dismissed. Pending I.A. if any also stands disposed of. However, there shall be no order to cost.
(Deepak Roshan, J.) September 24, 2025 Jharkhand High Court Amardeep/ AFR / NAFR 5 2024 SCC Online SC 1908 14