Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mandeep Singh (Dead) Through His Lrs And ... vs Capt. M.S. Kahlon on 16 September, 2013
Author: Paramjeet Singh
Bench: Paramjeet Singh
-1-
Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011
Reserved on: 04.09.2013
Date of decision: 16.09.2013
Mandeep Singh (dead) through his LRs and another
....Petitioners
Versus
Capt. M.S. Kahlon
....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH
1) Whether Reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ?
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not ?
3) Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ?
Argued by: -
Mr. Sarwan Singh, Sr. Advocate, with
Mr. S.D. Bansal, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Respondent in person.
*****
PARAMJEET SINGH, J.
Instant revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 115 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the order dated 13.5.2010 (Annexure P-
4) passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mohali, whereby the injunction application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, has been dismissed as well as judgment dated 4.12.2010 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mohali, whereby the appeal, against the order passed by learned trial court, has been dismissed.
Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -2- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 Brief facts relevant for disposal of present revision petition are that petitioner/plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent/defendant from using any portion of the industrial plot No.606, Industrial Extension, Phase IX, Mohali, for the purpose of running any Maritime Education and Training Institute and for further using any part of the said building for residential purpose. The petitioner/plaintiffs alleged that initially plot No.406 was allotted to plaintiff No.1 on lease hold basis vide letter No. PSIEC/EW/EO/Allot/12525-29 dated 25.9.1992 but later on plot No.606 was allotted to him in lieu of plot No.406 on the same terms and conditions vide allotment letter No.PSIEC/EW/EO/1026 dated 8.4.1993. The said plot was allotted for the purpose of carrying out industrial activities therein as is clear from the terms of the allotment letter. In Clause (xiii) of the allotment letter it has been specifically mentioned that allottee shall not carry on or permit to carry on in the plot any other business without the written consent of the Corporation or use or permit the same to be used for any other purpose. In case of breach of terms and conditions of the allotment letter, Corporation can cancel the allotment and resume the same and take possession. Respondent/defendant entered into an agreement with the petitioner/plaintiffs; as such was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiffs in a portion of the said plot. As per the averments in the suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiffs, the respondent herein earlier filed a suit for injunction alleging that plot was rented out to him for running Maritime Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -3- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 Institute. In the present suit, Petitioner/plaintiffs alleged that they did not execute any rent note or lease deed. In case any document is produced by the respondent/defendant same is forged and fictitious. Since the plot is meant for industrial purpose, the same cannot be used for running any Maritime Institute or residential purpose. Plaintiffs could not have given any consent for running any such institute on the plot in question as it was against the terms of the allotment letter. Even if the consent is given the same is illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs as there is no estoppel against the statute as well as the terms of the lease agreement. In pursuance of the notice, defendant appeared and filed written statement as well as reply to the injunction application alleging that plaintiffs have been receiving the rent since 1.6.2006. The defendant had contacted the plaintiffs and expressed his desire to set up an institute of Maritime Education and other related training courses. A portion of the plot was being used for car repair workshop at that time and other portion was used for welding work under the name and style of Satyug Welding Works. Front portion of the premises in question is in possession of the plaintiff No.2. It is the case of the defendant that he had made aware plaintiff No.2 of the various requirements, including that of lease duration, accommodation in the premises for self, staff, students and that entire premises were to be independent, exclusive and complete and there should not be any type of interference or involvement in the enjoyment of tenancy rights. The plaintiff agreed to lease out the plot in question for Rs.15,000/- per month and received the amount by Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -4- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 way of cheque. The defendant got confirmed from the experts that the premises were fulfilling the GOI requirement and was suitable for the purpose of running the institute of the defendant. It is also the case of the defendant that plaintiff No.2 extended letter of intent four times after taking cash of Rs.30,000/- per month at every extension. In September, 2006, defendant confirmed that he had already taken the premises on rent as per letter of intent dated 1.6.2006. The portion where the car repair workshop was running was got vacated by plaintiff No.2 and he also constructed 6 ½ feet high wall separating the portion from other area and provided a separate entrance to Satyug Welding Works. As such the defendant got an exclusive area and entrance for the institute. Thereafter the lease deed dated 25.6.2007 was executed between the parties. The lease term of the premises was initially for three years with an option to the allottee to extend for further period of three years on the same terms and conditions. Defendant also averred that he had spent Rs.7.00 lacs on the fittings, fixtures etc. and has started Maritime Institute in the said premises after getting sanction from concerned departments. Thereafter plaintiffs started interfering in the possession of the defendant and demolished the wall which was got constructed by him for providing exclusive passage to the defendant. Thereafter the defendant had to file a suit for injunction. Defendant has alleged that plaintiffs are not entitled for any injunction. Learned trial court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties came to the conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of ad Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -5- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 interim injunction, balance of convenience also does not lie in their favour and consequently dismissed the injunction application vide order dated 13.5.2010. Feeling aggrieved against the order of the trial court, petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Mohali, which has also been dismissed vide order dated 4.12.2010. Hence this revision petition.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondent in person at length and also perused the material on record as well as the impugned order with the assistance of learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent in person.
Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that as per the allotment letter dated 25.9.1992 issued by the Punjab Small Industries & Export Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the PSIEC') the plot in question cannot be used for any purpose other than the industrial use. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent/defendant is running a Maritime Educational Institute in the said premises as a result of which, it being in violation of the terms and conditions of the allotment letter dated 25.9.1992, plot can be resumed resulting into irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiffs which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that lease if any executed between the petitioners and the respondent permitting the respondent to use the premises for running Maritime Institute is null and void and same does not estop the petitioners from seeking injunction against the Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -6- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 respondent/defendant. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that respondent has not paid the rent for sufficient long time as such he is even denying the relationship of landlord and tenant.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Smt. Shanti Sharma vs. Smt. Ved Prabha, 1987(4) SCC 193 (SC), Faqir Chand vs. Ram Rattan Bhanot, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 921 (SC), Nand Kishore vs. Yashpal, 2010(1) L.A.R. 115 (SC), Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. vs. Manmohan Verma, 1982 PLR 633 (P&H) and B. Benerjee vs. Romesh Mahajan, 1996(63) DLT 930 (Delhi) and further contended that the impugned orders passed by learned courts below are perverse and against the settled principles of law. It is settled principle of law that there can be no estoppel against the statute or the agreement with a public undertaking. Hence the impugned orders are perverse and not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Per contra respondent argued that petitioner/plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts from this Court. They have not disclosed that they had rented out the premises for running the Maritime Institute. It is further argued by the respondent that once the petitioners and the respondent have entered into an agreement whereby the plot in question has been rented out to the respondent for running Maritime Institute, the petitioners cannot ask the respondent to stop the institute. Both the parties are bound by the documentary evidence i.e. letter of intent dated 1.6.2006 and the lease deed dated 25.6.2007. If ad interim injunction is Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -7- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 granted, defendant's business will stop which has been started by spending huge amount and reference to various photographs indicating the renovation etc. has been made. In case the injunction is granted, he will be ruined. It will not be possible for the respondent/defendant to get fresh sanction from the competent authority. In support of his contentions, respondent has relied upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass vs. Satish Kumar, AIR 1986 P&H 52. I have considered the rival contentions raised by the parties. Before I deal with the contentions raised by parties, it would be appropriate to reproduce relevant part from the letter of allotment dated 25.9.1992, vide which allotment on lease hold basis was made by PSIEC, which reads as under: -
"2. Plot No.406 measuring 1000 sq. yds/mtrs. at Industrial Focal Point SAS Nagar Ph-9 Ext is hereby allotted to you for the manufacture of Automatic fire detection on 99 years lease- hold basis (renewable for another 99 years) on the following terms and conditions: -
(ii) The plot has been allotted on lease hold basis for 99 years in the first instance, as such you shall also pay annual lease rent Re.1/- per 1000 sq. yds. in advance for 99 years at the time of execution of lease deed agreement.
(vii) You shall take possession from our SDE V at SAS Nagar on production of receipt for having deposited 30% tentative price and a copy of the letter of allotment within 90 days of the issue of this letter. You shall also arrange to have the lease deed executed and registered, original delivered to the Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -8- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 Corporation with a period of 120 days from the date of allotment. The Stamp and registration charges shall have to be borne by you. A copy of the lease deed proforma is enclosed herewith as Annexure B.
(viii) After taking over possession of plot as indicated above, you shall get the building plan prepared from a registered Architect approved by the Architecture Council of India, Strictly conforming to the Zonal plan and Building Bye-laws of the Corporation. A copy of the plan so prepared, duly signed by you and approved architect will be sent to the Chief Engineer, Punjab Small Industries & Export Corpn. Ltd.
Chandigarh for scrutiny and record before undertaking any Construction. In case any addition/alteration over the construction of building is needed subsequently, drawings for the same conforming to Zonal plan and Building Bye-laws of the Corporation shall also be got prepared from the registered architect referred to above and submitted to the Chief Engineer, PSIEC duly signed by you and the approved architect for scrutiny and record before undertaking the required additions/alterations over the construction of building in the allotted plot.
In case any deviation from the Zonal plan/Building Bye-laws of the Corporation is noted in the plan or at site, the offending portion(s) of the building(s) shall be demolished under the orders of Chief Engineer, PSIEC and demolition charges as may be incurred shall be recovered from you. A copy each of the Zonal plan and Building Bye-laws of the Corporation are enclosed as annexures 'C' and 'D' respectively.
(xiii) You shall not carry on without the written consent of the Corporation or permit to be carried on in the plot or use the same or permit the same to be used for any purpose other than that for which it has been allotted to you. You shall also not Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -9- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 do or allow to be done therein anything whatsoever which in the opinion of the Corporation may be nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to the neighbours."
Relevant terms of lease agreement between the petitioners and the respondent read as under: -
"AND WHEREAS the Lessor is the owner of Plot 606, Industrial Phase IX, Mohali and the Lessee is in the process of setting up an Institute for the purpose of Maritime Education and other related Training Courses and Activities. AND the Lessor has agreed to Lease out the said plot, exclusively and with complete Building and covered area thereon, with Electricity Connection, only excluding the walled off area at the rear Right hand side which has a separate entrance for establishment of Maritime Education and Training Institute to the Lessee on the following Terms and Conditions.
7) That the Lessee shall abide by the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952, and the Rules framed there under from time to time for running the Business of Maritime Education and Training.
8) That the Lessee is authorized to use the Premises for all activities required for running his business of Maritime Training and education, including use of part of the building for accommodation purpose of his self, faculty, staff, Students and any others.
9) That the Lessor hereby authorizes the Lessee to make the necessary alterations and additions to the interiors, that Lessee may consider necessary for running his business of Maritime Education and Training. For this the Lessee shall spend at his cost. Whenever the Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -10- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 premises are handed back to the Lessor, the Lessee is entitled to remove the interiors that are fitted by him."
From the arguments raised by the parties, in my opinion, following questions arise for determination: -
"1) Whether petitioner/plaintiffs being lessees of PSIEC come within the definition of landlord?
2) Whether leasing out of the premises by landlord-
plaintiffs for a purpose other than the industrial purpose, when the terms of lease on which the landlord- plaintiffs themselves are holding premises, prohibit non- industrial use of the premises, will operate as estoppel against the landlord-plaintiffs?
3) If the landlord of any industrial plot leases out the plot to a lessee by way of specific mutual agreement, can he subsequently seek injunction against the lessee for not using the same for the said purpose as it is other than the one given in the original lease deed?
4) Relief?"
Re: Question No.1 Admittedly the plaintiffs had taken the plot on long lease for 99 years from the PSIEC, which is a public undertaking, vide allotment letter dated 25.9.1992. It is also not disputed that on land in question structure has been raised by the plaintiffs. Delivery of possession by the PSIEC to the landlord at the time of allotment is also not in dispute. The structure over the property is certainly the ownership of the petitioner/plaintiffs. The "lessee", in modern terms, can be owner so far as the other person is concerned. The "owner" in the modern terms, can Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -11- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 be said to mean a person taking the property for a long term like on 99 years lease whereof he will be treated as owner against whole of the world except against the lessor who has leased the property to him.
Certainly the relationship of the petitioner and the respondent/defendant is of lessor and lessee. The lessee cannot dispute the ownership of the plaintiff-owner. In the modern context ownership does not mean absolute ownership. The petitioners taking plot on lease from the PSIEC on long term basis and constructing a building thereon, are certainly owners of the building constructed on the plot, although plaintiffs viz-a-
viz PSIEC are lessor and lessee, respectively.
Re: Question No.2 From the perusal of the allotment letter, it is clear that the plot in question is an industrial plot and it has been given to the plaintiffs for manufacturing of automatic fire detection equipment, on 99 years lease hold basis renewable for another 99 years. It is also one of the terms that it shall conform to the zonal plan and building bye-laws of the PSIEC.
Clause (xiii) of lease agreement specifically states that an allottee shall not carry on, without the written consent of the Corporation, or permit to carry on in the plot or use the same or permit the same to be used for any purpose other than that for which it has been allotted to him. It is further provided that the allottee shall also not do or allow to be done therein anything, whatsoever, which in the opinion of the Corporation may be nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to the neighbours. From the perusal of terms of agreement it is clear that petitioners cannot use the plot Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -12- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 except for the purpose of manufacture of automatic fire detection equipment i.e. the industrial purpose except with the written permission of the PSIEC. Admittedly, the petitioners had given the same premises to the defendant on lease for running Maritime Institute. The terms of the lease between the plaintiffs and the defendant are also specifically detailed in the lease deed dated 25.6.2007; clause 8 of the lease deed states that defendant-lessee is authorized to use the premises for all activities required for running his business of Maritime Education and Training, including use of part of the building for accommodation purposes of self, faculty, staff, students and any others; meaning thereby the premises are being used by the defendant for the purposes of educational training and a part of the building is being used for residential purpose i.e. for the residence of the defendant, staff, faculty, students and others with the consent of the plaintiffs, which is certainly contrary to the terms of the agreement entered between the plaintiff-
landlord and the PSIEC. It is in the light of these facts that question No.2 is to be answered.
It is settled principle of law that there is no estoppel against the statute. Identical issue has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Faqir Chand (supra), which is explicit and bears a striking similarity to the facts of the case at hand. In that case two leases of the plot whereon the premises was built, was made in favour of the landlord by the Delhi Improvement Trust successor of Delhi Development Authority. One of the terms of the lease prohibited the use of the land Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -13- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 and buildings that may be erected thereon for any purpose other than the residential purpose without the consent in writing of the lessor. As the tenant was using the premises for the purpose other than the residential, landlord instituted eviction petition under Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"8. It has been argued on behalf of the tenants that this clause will apply only where the tenant has used the land after previous notice from the landlord, i.e., if the landlord had told him at the 'beginning of the tenancy that the building was not to be, used for commercial purpose and notwithstanding that the tenant used it for a commercial purpose. They, therefore, contend that as in this case both the landlord and the tenant were aware of the use to which the' building was to be put there is no question of any notice from the landlord asking the tenant not to use the building for commercial purpose and by merely issuing such notice the landlord cannot take advantage of clause (k). This is really another way of putting the argument that the landlord having granted the lease for a commercial purpose is estopped from contending that the tenant should not use it for commercial purpose. While the argument appears to be plausible we are of opinion that there is no substance in this argument. If it is a case where the tenant has contrary to the terms of his tenancy used the building for a commercial purpose the landlord could take action under clause (c). He need not depend upon clause (k) at all. These two clauses are intended to meet different situations. There was no need for an additional provision in clause (k) to enable a landlord to get possession where the tenant has used the building for a commercial purpose contrary to the terms of (the tenancy. An intention to put in an Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -14- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 useless provision in a statute cannot be imputed to the Legislature. Some meaning would have to be given to that provision. The only situation in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. That clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose.
9. The legislature has clearly taken note of the fact that enormous extents of land have been leased by the three authorities mentioned in that clause, and has expressed by means of this clause its anxiety to see that these lands are used for the purpose for which they were leased. The policy of the legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorised use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section 11 of section 14., The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the leased land is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given an opportunity to comply with the conditions imposed on the landlord by any of the authorities referred to in clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1). As long as the condition imposed is complied with there is no forfeiture. It even enables the Controller to direct compensation to be paid to the authority for a breach of the conditions. Of course, the Controller cannot award the payment of compensation to the authority except in the presence of the authority. The authority may not be prepared to accept compensation but might insist upon cessation of the unauthorized use. The sub-section does not also say who is to pay the compensation, whether it is the landlord or the tenant.Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -15-
Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 Apparently in awarding compensation the Controller will have to apportion the responsibility for the breach between the lessor and the tenant."
Thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the same issue in Nand Kishore (supra) wherein one of the issues framed was as under: -
"(ii) If the residential premises is let out for commercial purposes, by a mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant, can the landlord still seek eviction of the tenant on the ground that using of such residential premises for commercial purposes entails the tenant to be evicted from the demised premises?"
Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the settled law came to the conclusion in Nand Kishore (supra) as under: -
"30. Section 13 speaks about the ground on the basis of which a tenant can be evicted. In our view, the scope of Sections 11 and 13 are quite different. From a reading of Section 19 of the Act, it is clear that Section 19 gives an additional right to the authorities to impose penalty if a person has contravened the provisions of Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, it would not be difficult to hold that Section 13 gives only a right to a landlord to bring action against a tenant who has used the demised premises for a purpose other than for which it was leased out, whereas for conversion of residential premises into a commercial premises would also entail a tenant to be punished with fine under Section 19 of the Act. That apart, from a bare reading of the Act and object for which the Act was introduced and also after looking into the scope and on consideration of the entire provisions of the Act, it cannot be Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -16- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 said that for violation of Section 11 of the Act, that is to say, a person uses a particular premises which can only be used for residential purposes but is being used for other purposes which entails imposition of penalty under Section 19 of the Act, would not mean that Section 13(2)(ii)(b) and Section 19 cannot go hand in hand. Therefore, the only question that remains to be seen is whether a person who has converted the purpose for which the premises was let out without the permission of the Rent Controller, can be punished only with fine under Section 19 or can he also be evicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. Looking at the object of the Act and the provisions made therein, and considering the fact that the Act is a beneficial legislation not only for the tenant but also for the tenant, it can safely be inferred that both the sections namely, Section 13 and Section 19 can be applied when there is a violation of Section11. Therefore, in our view, reading of Section 13 and Section 19 together, we can safely come to the conclusion that the tenant or the landlord can be punished with fine under Section 19 of the Act and at the same time the tenant can be evicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act if the conditions laid down in the said sections are satisfied. That apart if violation of Section 11 of the Act results in fine under Section 19 of the Act, in that case the tenants who have violated the provisions of Section 11 of the Act could get away from eviction only by paying fine that may be imposed upon them [tenants]. If this can be accepted, the purpose and object of the Act for which this Act was introduced would be frustrated as the residential area would be converted into commercial-cum-residential area or vice-versa, which was not the intention of the Legislature and therefore, it cannot be said that for violation of Section 11 of the Act, the only remedy available was under Section 19 of the Act i.e. imposition of Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -17- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 fine. In view of our discussions made herein above, we are of the view that the appellant had successfully made out a case for eviction of the respondent on the ground mentioned herein above."
This Court in M/s Aerizzona through its Proprietor S. Surinder Singh vs. Gurdarshan Singh Brar, 2006(4) RCR (Civil) 71 had the occasion to consider the identical situation with regard to the maintainability of civil suit for injunction restraining the defendant from misusing the premises contrary to the terms and rules and held that such a suit is not barred by doctrine of estoppel or acquiescence as there is no acquiescence against law if the misuser is in violation of the provisions of law and conditions of lease or rent deed. In view of above, there is no question of estoppel or acquiescence against the landlord as the violation of terms and conditions of the lease with PSIEC would result into resumption of premises.
In view of the above discussion and the settled law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Faqir Chand (supra) as well as Nand Kishore (supra), there is no estoppel against statute and terms of original allotment lease deed.
Re: Question No.3 Contention of the respondent that suit for injunction was not competent on the ground of acquiescence on the part of the petitioner/plaintiffs, cannot be sustained as lease deed dated 25.9.1992 clearly shows that specific bar was imposed upon the petitioners-lessees by the PSIEC not to use the building in violation of the terms of the Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -18- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 lease. It is also not in dispute that in the lease deed there is a specific stipulation, therefore, mere acceptance of rent by the petitioner/landlords cannot be treated acquiescence or estoppel. It is also specifically mentioned in the lease deed between the petitioners and the respondent that respondent will be bound by the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 and the Rules framed thereunder and certainly it is in violation of the said Rules. It is also well settled that there can be no acquiescence or estoppel against law. In the facts of the case, judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
The contention of the respondent that no injunction can be granted, as well as the findings recorded by both the courts below, are perverse and not sustainable. Interim injunction order can be passed in case the essential ingredients that balance of convenience, irreparable injury as well as irreparable loss would be caused or likely to be caused, are proved on record.
In the present case, petitioners have prima facie case that their right to hold the property is threatened as in case the respondent/defendant continues in possession in violation of the original lease deed between the petitioners and the PSIEC, the property will be resumed by PSIEC. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the petitioners that their rights in property would be extinguished, which cannot be compensated and will result into irreparable loss. Therefore, keeping in view the fact that respondent/defendant is using the property Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh -19- Civil Revision No.3077 of 2011 in violation of the terms and conditions between the petitioners and the PSIEC as well as the bye-laws, I find that impugned orders are perverse; as such not sustainable in the eyes of law.
In view of the above discussion, the present revision petition is allowed. Impugned orders are set aside as they suffer from error of law and as such are perverse.
Relief Since 2007 the respondent has been using the premises for the purpose for which the lease was granted to him, equity and justice demands that reasonable period to rehabilitate be granted to the respondent, accordingly he is granted nine months' time to use the premises. In the meantime, he will make alternate arrangement for shifting his entire establishment from the present premises to any other place on expiry of aforesaid period of nine months. Thereafter this order will operate and the respondent/defendant is restrained from using the premises for the purpose mentioned in the lease deed dated 25.6.2007.
(Paramjeet Singh) Judge September 16, 2013 R.S. Singh Ravinder 2013.09.20 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh