Delhi District Court
Ms. Asha Rani Gupta vs Sh. Rajender Kanojia on 30 April, 2016
IN THE COURT OF SH. GAURAV RAO, SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE
CUMRENT CONTROLLER, SOUTH EAST DISTRICT, SAKET
COURT COMPLEX, NEW DELHI
E08/13
Unique ID No. 02406C0118402013
Ms. Asha Rani Gupta
w/o Late Sh. S.K. Gupta
R/o 7 Jor Bagh Market,
First Floor, New Delhi110003.
.....Petitioner
Versus
Sh. Rajender Kanojia
S/o Late Sh. Phool Chand
Superwhite Dry cleaners
Shop No. 7, Jor Bagh Market,
New Delhi.
Also at:
B4/7, Safdarjung Enclave,
New Delhi 110029.
...... Respondent
Date of institution : 09.05.2013
Date of arguments : 15.03.2016
Date of order : 30.04.2016
Decision : Eviction petition allowed
E 08/13 1/60
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition for eviction and recovery of possession of One shop and Open space/back courtyard situated on the ground floor of property bearing no. 7, Jor Bagh Market, Block No. 172, New Delhi 110003, shown in red and yellow colours in the site plan filed along with the petition and hereinafter referred as tenanted premises, has been filed u/s 14 (1) (e) r/w section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958.
The entire property no. 7, Jor Bagh Market, Block no. 172, New Delhi110003 comprising of the tenanted premises, one another shop shown in green colour, open space, common verendah and a toilet at the ground floor and as shown in orange colour in the site plan shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the property'.
Petition (Amended petition vide orders dated 05.12.2014)
2. The version of the petitioner is that she is the owner of property bearing no. 7, Jor Bagh Market, New Delhi 110003 by virtue of mutation letter dated 31.05.2001. It is the case of petitioner that earlier Sh. Daulat Ram Gupta (father in law of petitioner) was the owner of the said property by virtue of lease deed dated 09.01.1957 vide registration no. 1559, book No. 1, vol. No. 328 at pages 88 to 95 dated 14.05.1957. Thereafter, after the death E 08/13 2/60 of Sh. Daulat Ram the said property was mutated in the name of the petitioner vide letter dated 31.05.2001.
2.1 It is further the case of petitioner that respondent's father Late Sh. Phool Chand was inducted as tenant by Late Sh. Daulat Ram Gupta in respect of one shop at ground floor of property bearing no. 7, Jor Bagh Market, New Delhi specifically shown in red colour in the site plan on a monthly rent of Rs. 175/ vide rent deed dated 28.02.1957. Later on after 2 and ½ years back courtyard/open space shown in yellow colour in the site plan was also let out to the father of respondent on the monthly rent of Rs. 85/ by the father in law of petitioner.
2.2 It is further the case of petitioner that father in law of petitioner expired in the year 1976 and thereafter father of respondent used to pay rent of the said tenanted premises to Smt. Kalawati i.e. mother in law of petitioner who expired in the year 1984 and thereafter father of respondent used to pay rent to the husband of petitioner. It is further the petitioner's case that in 2001 the property in question was mutated in the name of petitioner and her two sons namely Mohit Gupta and Manish Gupta and therefore petitioner is one of the owners of tenanted premises which is under the tenancy of Late Phool Chand who continued to pay rent to the husband of the petitioner. It is further the petitioner's case that the last rent was paid E 08/13 3/60 by the father of respondent and that respondent never tendered any rent to her despite numerous reminders and requests and the respondent is liable to pay the entire arrears of rent w.e.f. 1992 to the petitioner @ Rs. 295/ per month till date.
2.3 It is further the petitioner's case the respondent broke the backside wall of open space in his occupation and placed heavy dry cleaning machinery in common veranda and water treatment plant in the open space without any permission from any authority and the petitioner. It is further the petitioner's case that she filed numerous complaints with the concerned department regarding illegal acts of respondent and as respondent did not remove the heavy dry cleaning machinery and water treatment plant, the petitioner was constrained to file civil suit CS (OS) no. 288/12 for wrongfully obstructing the petitioner from peaceful use of common veranda and toilet which is pending before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. It is further the petitioner's case that vide orders dated 03.09.2012 the Hon. High Court of Delhi directed the respondent to remove the said heavy dry cleaning machinery and illegal wall however he did not comply with the orders of the court and vide orders dated 06.03.2013 he was held guilty for violation of the orders of the Hon. High Court of Delhi. It is further the petitioner's case that because of misconduct of the respondent a huge fire broke out in the heavy dry cleaning machinery on 13.02.2013 which damaged the first floor E 08/13 4/60 property of the petitioner causing substantial loss to the petitioner and her property. It is further the petitioner's case that because of the illegal acts of the respondent, NDMC disconnected the electricity of the tenanted premises and the respondent moved an application under section 45 of DRC Act which was dismissed by concerned court vide orders dated 30.04.2013. 2.4 It is further the petitioner's case that she retired as Vice Principal from government school and is having more than 34 years of teaching experience and is very fond of children. It is further the petitioner's case that she served in Government Senior Secondary School, Jor Bagh for around 8 years and is a well known educationist in the locality. The petitioner is keen to open a charitable play school for the underprivileged/local children of the locality in the tenanted premises as she loves to teach and look after the children.
2.5 It is further the petitioner's case that one adjoining shop shown in green colour in site plan was let out to M/s Delhi Cloth Mills by Late Sh. Daulat Ram Gupta in the year 1956. However on 30.05.2009 the vacant physical possession of said shop was handed over to the petitioner and sons of the petitioner were carrying on business of real estate in the name of Santasha Real Estate (P) Ltd. It is further the petitioner's case that because of the keen interest of the petitioner her sons vacated the said shop as E 08/13 5/60 shown in green colour on 31.08.2014 and handed over the possesssion to the petitioner for running charitable school and they shifted their entire business to rented accommodation in Noida.
2.6 It is the petitioner's case that she started running a play school in the name and style of Republic of Kids on 10.09.2014 and 5 children have already joined the school and few more are likely to join soon. It is the petitioner's case that the said space is not sufficient to start a play school therefore the petitioner requires the said tenanted premises for her bonafide requirement of running a charitable play school. It is further the petitioner's case that she resides on the first floor of the property in question which comprises of two rooms along with her son and his family. It is further the petitioner's case that since the tenanted premises is on ground floor and has an open back courtyard where an open play ground for the children can be made which is must for a play school therefore it is the best site for opening a play school as the underprivileged children can be provided with best facilities, care and protection and as the petitioner is not having alternative accommodation or any other suitable place to start a charitable school therefore the tenanted premises is required as petitioner wishes to do great charitable work for the society in the form of imparting education to underprivileged children of the society. It is further the petitioner's case that the elder daughter in law of petitioner namely Mrs. Mamta Gupta who is a E 08/13 6/60 teacher by profession, and has served in Junior Branch of Cambridge School, New Rohtak Road, Karol Bagh, Delhi is also willing to assist the petitioner in operating the play school.
2.7 Hence the present petition has been filed on the ground of bonafide requirement.
3. The respondent was duly served with the petition and he consequently filed the application for leave to defend along with an affidavit on 05.06.2013. The petitioner filed the reply to the same along with additional affidavit and after hearing the arguments the application for leave to defend was allowed by the Ld. Predecessor of this court vide orders dated 07.04.2014.
4. Thereafter the respondent filed the detailed written statement denying the contents of the petition.
Written Statement (amended as filed on 10.02.2015)
5. In the WS it was pleaded that the petition for eviction has been filed upon fanciful and frivolous grounds and the same is based upon false and incorrect facts and that the petitioner has no reasonable or genuine need E 08/13 7/60 as claimed by her. It was further pleaded that the petitioner has suppressed material facts and has not approached the court with clean hands. 5.1 It was further pleaded that vide lease deed dated 09.01.1957 the property in question was allotted not just to Late Sh. Daulat Ram but also to Sh. Harjiwan Lal, however in the year 2001 the said property was fraudulently mutated in the name of the petitioner and her sons and the suit challenging the same bearing no. CS (OS) 1531/2012 titled as Ratna Aggarwal Vs. Mohit Gupta and ors for partition, declaration, injunction was filed against the petitioner and her sons which is pending before Hon. High Court of Delhi. It was pleaded that her ownership is disputed. 5.2 It was pleaded that after the death of Daulat Ram the petitioner and her sons have unlawfully occupied the property without the consent of other legal heirs of Sh. Harjiwan Lal. It was pleaded that petitioner occupied the property in question only in the 90s and has never resided in the first floor of the property. It was pleaded that as per voter list petitioner is not residing at the suit premises but residing at B228, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi and petitioner has also one more residential plot at Paharganj i.e. 2914, Chuna Mandi, Paharganj, New Delhi55.
5.3 It was further pleaded that the petitioner and her sons had earlier also tried to forcefully evict the respondent's father and one suit was filed by Late E 08/13 8/60 Sh. Phool Chand seeking permanent injunction for restraining the petitioner and her brothers in law from forcefully taking possession of the shop. It was also pleaded that petitioner and her sons have filed numerous false complaints against the respondent regularly in order to harass him and force him to close his business and vacate the shop.
5.4 It was pleaded that the respondent has filed writ petition before Hon. High Court for restoration of the electricity in the suit premises as petitioner malafidely refused to restore the electricity connection after the disconnection of electricity due to fire in the shop where the respondent suffered losses of lacs of rupees and NDMC refused to restore the electricity without the consent of petitioner. It was pleaded that electricity has now been restored in the tenanted premises. It was pleaded that petitioner had also filed Writ Petition (C) no. 2861/2013 before Hon. High Court for cancellation of license of respondent which proves that the petitioner is resorting to all possible means with ulterior motives to evict the respondent from the shop/ tenanted property. It was pleaded that petitioner and her sons have made several complaints to many authorities just to evict the respondent from the tenanted premises by all means. 5.5 It was pleaded that the open space in the property is of a very small size of 23x15 and is not suitable to accommodate children. Moreover the E 08/13 9/60 property in question is not suitable to open a charitable play school. 5.6 It was pleaded that petitioner is wrongly using the clause of "bonafide requirement" with a malafide intention to build up an empire of real estate business as the sons of petitioner are running similar business of real estate at different places. It was pleaded that petitioner is actively carrying on the business of real estate with her sons. It was pleaded that petitioner does not have any need to start a charitable play school and is only concealing her real intention. It was pleaded that her need is not genuine but a sham, concocted and frivolous one and her real intention is to evict the respondent and help her sons in expansion of their real estate business. 5.7 It was pleaded that petitioner has no intention to run any charitable play school which can be judged from the fact the business carried on by the sons of petitioner is in the name of Republic of Properties and the name of alleged charitable play school is Republic of Kids, therefore it is a ploy nothing else. It was pleaded that the look of the school is similar to that of the office being run by the sons of the petitioner.
5.8 It was pleaded that the property is situated in a commercial market and therefore it is unreasonable and incongruous to run a charitable play school in the premises. Furthermore there are other government schools near the tenanted premises and there being no slum situated anywhere near the E 08/13 10/60 tenanted premises no question arises of underprivileged coming and studying in the play school.
5.9 It was pleaded that only some posters and pamphlets and a board has been affixed and the list of children and certificate of staff and parents have been forged and fabricated to show that charitable school is being run. 5.10 It was pleaded that petitioner is not keeping good health and is suffering from various ailments such as asthma and skin disease and it is not possible for her to run a charitable school more so in the daylight/under the sun.
5.11 It was pleaded that alleged bonafide need of petitioner for charitable school is neither covered under commercial purpose nor residential purpose and does not fit into the parameters of Delhi Rent Control Act as it is more like a hobby, wish, desire which she wants to pursue for old age happiness and the same is not substantiated by an actual need. It was pleaded that since the petition is misconceived, the same is liable to be dismissed as her need is not bonafide but mere fanciful.
Replication
6. In the replication the petitioner denied and controverted all the allegations as levelled in the WS and reiterated and reaffirmed the facts as stated in the petition.
E 08/13 11/60 Petitioner evidence
7. The petitioner examined herself as PW 1 and filed her evidence by way of affidavit as Ex. PW 1/A and relied upon the following documents:
(a) Ex. PW 1/1 which is mutation letter dated 31.05.2001.
(b) Ex. PW 1/2 is property tax slip dated 09.09.2002.
(c) Mark A to C (Ex. PW 1/3 to Ex. PW1/5 in the affidavit) are electricity bills.
(d) Ex. PW1/6 is typed version of rent deed dated 28.02.1957.
(e) Ex. PW 1/7 is site plan.
(f) PW 1/8 is certified copy of the plaint of CS OS no. 288/12.
(g) Ex. PW 1/9 is the written statement of the defendant/respondent in plaint in CS OS no. 288/12.
(h) Ex. PW1/10 is report of local commissioner in the said suit no. CS OS no. 288/12.
(i) Ex. PW 1/11 is order dated 03.09.2012 in the said suit bearing no. C.S. (OS no.288 of 2012).
(j) Ex. PW1/12 is order dated 06.03.2013 in the said suit bearing no.
C.S. (OS no.288 of 2012).
(k) CFSL report dated 06.03.2013 is marked as Mark D.
(l) Photographs showing damages caused to the structure are Ex.PW1/14 to Ex.PW1/49 along with CD.
(m) Mark E is photocopy of vigilance clearance certificate.
(n) the education qualification certificates are Ex.PW1/51 to Ex.PW1/53.
E 08/13 12/60
(o) Teaching Service agreements of Savita Barua and Kajal are marked as Mark F and G.
(p) Ex.PW1/56 (colly) is the attendance register.
(q) Ex.PW1/57 (colly 8 in numbers) are the admission forms of the students.
(r) Copies of Aadhar Card of parents are Mark H (colly).
(s) Birth Certificates of children is marked as Mark I (colly).
(t) Ex.PW1/60 (colly) are the photographs of school along with CD.
(u) Ex.PW1/61 to Ex.PW1/70 are the educational certificates and the appointment letter of Ms. Mamta Gupta.
(v) Ex.PW1/71 is affidavit of Ms.Mamta Gupta.
(w) Ex.PW1/72 is the certified copy of petition under Section 45
of DRCA.
(x) Ex.PW1/73 (in fact Ex. PW1/72 is mentioned on document) is
the certified copy of orders dated 30.04.2013.
(y) Ex.PW1/74 is the certified copy of orders dated 29.05.2013
passed in WP (C) 3706/13.
(z) Orders dated 12.07.2013, 20.02.2013 and 19.11.2013 are
Ex.PW1/75 to Ex.PW1/77.
(a1) Counter affidavit of the petitioner in Writ Petition is Ex.PW1/78.
(b1) Three rent agreements are Ex.PW1/79 (colly). (c1) Mark J (mentioned as Mark F on document) is property tax details of shop no. 22, Defence Colony.
7.1 PW2 Ms. Kajal tendered her evidence by way of affidavit as Ex. E 08/13 13/60 PW2/A and proved two service agreements dated 01.09.2014 as Ex. PW2/1 and Ex. PW2/2.
7.2 Thereafter PE was closed on 14.07.2015.
8. Respondent led his evidence as under: 8.1 RW1 Dr. Sudhakar Gaikwad, Principal, Sarvodaya Vidayalaya, Jor Bagh proved the summoned record as Ex. RW1/A and Ex. RW1/B in respect of Ms. Kajal while deposing she was guest teacher in their school from 10.07.2013 till 08.05.2014 and was paid Rs. 500/ per day. 8.2 RW2 Shyam Sunder, Deputy Education Officer, NDMC proved the list of 40 schools within the area of NDMC as Ex. RW2/A. He also proved the details of 18 creches vide Ex. RW2/B and 10 balwaris as Ex. RW2/C. 8.3 RW3 Ravindra Kumar, ASEO, Social Education Department, NDMC proved the list of balwaris within the MCD jurisdiction as already Ex. RW2/C. 8.4 RW3 (in fact RW4) Desh Bandhu Gosain, UDC Sub Registrar II proved the copy of license deed executed by Mohit Gupta, GPA holder, Asha Rani Gupta and Sh. Manish Gupta in favour of M/s Sunberry E Services E 08/13 14/60 Private Limited qua premises bearing no. 2/57, WHS, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi as Ex. RW3/1.
8.5 RW4 (in fact RW5) Meena Tuli, Legal Assistant, Department of Education, GNCTD proved the guidelines for opening new schools, self declaration for grant of recognition of school, list of school of District South East as Ex. RW4/1.
8.6 RW5 (in fact RW6) i.e. respondent Sh. Rajender Kanojia tendered his evidence by way of affidavit as Ex. RW5/A and proved the documents as under:
(a) copy of legal notice dated 04.03.2013 with copy of cheque dated 02.03.2013 as Ex. RW5/3 (colly).
(b) transcription of audio recording along with CD is Ex. RW5/6 (colly)
(c) copy of complaint to SHO P.S. Lodhi Colony dated 01.05.2010 is Ex. RW5/8.
(d) copy of complaint dated 09.03.2011 is Ex. RW5/16.
(e) copy of letter dated 15.04.2011 is Ex. RW5/20.
(f) copy of letter dated 03.08.2011 is Ex. RW5/30.
(g) copy of complaint dated 12.05.2012 to SHO P.S. Lodhi Road is Ex. RW5/37.
(h) copy of complaint dated 08.05.2012 to Chairman, National Commission of Scheduled Caste is Ex RW5/38.
(i) copy of legal notice dated 07.08.2012 is Ex. RW5/39.
(j) Pamphlet of Republic of property is Ex. RW5/45. E 08/13 15/60
(k) Account statement of M/s Santasha Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. is Ex. RW5/46.
(l) copy of reply of RTI dated 28.05.2013 is Ex. RW5/47.
(m) Eight photographs of the abutting road is Ex. RW5/48.
(n) legal notice dated 22.08.2012 is Ex. RW5/50.
(p) copy of public notice pertaining to property no. 7, Jor Bagh is Ex. RW5/51.
(q) letter dated 13.05.2013 is Ex. RW5/52.
(r) copy of legal notice dated 04.03.2013 is Ex. RW5/53.
(s) Copy of letter dated 13.06.2013 written to respondent by Executive Engineer, NDMC is Ex. RW5/55.
(t) (i) Mark A is copy of cheque dated 02.03.2013.
(ii) Mark B is copy of money order of Rs. 885/ for period of 01.02.2013 to 31.05.2013.
(iii) Mark C is crime scene inspection report.
(iv) Mark D is complaint to SHO P.S. Lodhi Colony dated 28.05.2010.
(v) Mark E is complaint to SHO P.S. Lodhi Colony dated 03.06.2010.
(vi) Mark F is complaint to President Jor Bagh Market Association dated 30.11.2010.
(vii) Mark G is copy of complaint dated 01.12.2010 made to NDMC
(viii) Mark H is copy of letter dated 10.02.2011 made to MCD by DPCC.
(ix) Mark I is copy of letter dated 16.02.2011 to NDMC by JBA.
(x) Mark J is copy of complaint dated 25.02.2011 to SHO P.S. Lodhi Colony.
(xi) Mark K is copy of letter dated 17.03.2011 written to DPCC by son of petitioner.
E 08/13 16/60
(xii) Mark L is copy of complaint dated 22.03.2011 to NDMC.
(xiii) Mark M is copy of letter dated 31.03.2011 to NDMC for cancellation of license.
(xiv) Mark N is copy of reply dated 10.05.2011 to RTI dated 18.04.2011.
(xv) Mark O is Copy of letter dated 02.06.2011 from NDMC to PGC for Action Taken Report.
(xvi) Mark P copy of letter dated 03.06.2011 from JBA to PGC. (xvii) Mark Q copy of letter dated 17.06.2011 from NDMC to DPCC. (xviii)Mark R copy of letter dated 05.07.2011 to PGC from NDMC. (xix) Mark S Copy of letter dated 06.07.2011 to PGC.
(xx) Mark T copy of letter dated 22.07.2011 by Director NDMC. (xxi) Mark U copy of complaint dated 27.07.2011 to PGC. (xxii) Mark V copy of letter dated 27.07.2011 by NDMC to PGC. (xxiii)Mark W copy of letter dated 05.09.2011 by NDMC. (xxiv)Mark X copy of letter dated 06.09.2011 made by NDMC to PGC.
(xxv) Mark Y copy of complaint dated 07.09.2011 to PGC. (xxvi)Mark Z copy of letter dated 21.10.2011 from JBA to respondent. (xxvii)Mark A1 Copy of order of PGC dated 24.10.2011. (xxviii) Mark B1 copy of letter dated 24.10.2011 to JBA. (xxix)Mark C1 is copy of writ petition no. 2861/2013 filed by petitioner in High Court of Delhi.
(xxx) Mark D1 is counter affidavit filed by NDMC in writ petition no. 2861/2013 before High Court of Delhi.
(xxxi)Mark E1 is copy of order dated 19.11.2013 passed by Hon. High Court in CS OS no. 288/2012.
(xxxii) Mark F1 is details of other properties of petitioner. E 08/13 17/60
(xxxiii) Mark G1 is Voter list of Jor Bagh.
(xxxiv) Mark H1 is copy of CS (OS) no. 1531/2012 before Hon.
High Court of Delhi.
(xxxv) Mark I1 is conveyance deed dated 08.09.2009 in favour
of respondent.
(xxxvi) Mark J1 is conveyance deed dated 18.02.2010 in favour
of petitioner and her two sons.
8.7 RW6 (in fact RW7) Ramanand Pal, Zonal Meter Inspector, NDMC,
proved the Meter reading for the period January 2012 to upto date pertaining to K No.60106 and K No.62549 as Ex.RW6/1(OSR) and Ex.RW6/2 (OSR) respectively. He further proved the last Bills both dated 30.10.2015 of aforesaid two K numbers as Ex. RW6/3 and Ex. RW6/4 respectively. He also proved the Demand Collection Register for the period January 2012 to October 2015 for the aforesaid two K numbers which are Ex.RW6/5 and Ex.RW6/6 respectively.
8.8 RW7 (in fact RW8) Sh.R. K. Saini, Senior Technical Assistant, O/o Registrar of Companies proved the audited balance sheet of Santasha Real Estate Pvt. Ltd.; Santasha Decor Pvt. Ltd. and Santasha Technosoft Pvt. Ltd. for the periods January 2012 to 2014 and 2015 as Ex. RW7/1 to Ex. RW7/3 (colly) respectively.
8.9 RW8 (in fact RW9) Mohan Lal, AERO proved the record pertaining to electoral rolls of Jain Mandir Compound Raza Bazar, Jain Mandir Road, E 08/13 18/60 New Delhi and Electoral rolls of Jor Bagh Market, New Delhi for the period 2012 till date i.e. 05.12.2015 as Ex.RW8/1 (colly). 8.10 RW9 (in fact RW10) Sh. Malik Singh PRI, Lodhi Road, Head Post Office, New Delhi proved that the inland postal letter Ex. RW9/1 was delivered at the given address and the other letters Ex. RW9/2 to Ex. RW9/4 might have been delivered at the given address in the ordinary post. 8.11 RW9 (in fact RW11) Sh. Mukesh Kumar, Tax Assistant, proved the income tax returns of the petitioner for the Assessment years 201112 till 201415 as Ex.RW9/1 (colly).
8.12 RW10 (in fact RW12) Ms. Harjeet, SJA, Original Branch, Delhi High Court brought the summoned record pertaining to CS OS No. 1531/2012 as Ex.RW10/1 (colly) and WP (C) No.2861/2013 and counter affidavit of respondent no.1 as Ex.RW10/2 (colly). 8.13 RW11 (in fact RW13) Mukul Kanaojia tendered his evidence by way of affidavit i.e. Ex. PW11/A and proved the complaint dated 12.05.2012 already exhibited as Ex. RW5/37. He also proved courier envelop and the tracking report as Ex. RW11/1 and Ex. RW11/2.
8.14 Thereafter RE was closed vide orders dated 12.01.2016.
9. I have heard the learned counsels for the petitioner and the respondent and have carefully gone through the record. E 08/13 19/60
10. In order to succeed in a petition for eviction filed under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the petitioner must establish that:
1. He/She is the owner and landlord/landlady in respect of the tenanted premises.
2. That he/she requires the premises bonafide for himself/herself or for any member of his/her family dependent upon him/her.
3. That he/she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.
11. The scope of the section has been enlarged in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as "Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India" reported as AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 3148 so as to include premises let out for commercial purposes also within the scope and ambit of a petition under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. Landlord/owner
12. The foremost requirement for a petitioner to succeed in a petition under section 14 (1) (e) is that he/she has to prove that he/she is the landlord/landlady and that there is a relationship of landlord/landlady and tenant between the parties and that she is the owner of the tenanted property/premises.
12.1 In the case at hand, a careful scrutiny of the pleadings of the E 08/13 20/60 parties would reveal that as far as relationship of landlady and tenant is concerned there is no real dispute regarding the same and the dispute if any has been raised by the respondent for the sake of it. In his WS the respondent vide para 11 of his reply on merits stated as "That it is not denied that rate of rent is Rs. 295/ per month and which has been paid regularly by the respondent to the petitioner but the petitioner has refused to accept the same." This admission is itself proof of the relationship of landlady and tenant between the petitioner and respondent. Reliance may be Badat and Co. vs. East India Trading placed upon the law laid down in In Co ., 1964 (4) SCR 19 .
12.2 Apart from above admission the petitioner relied upon certain documents which further establishes the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. The parties have been at loggerheads before different forums, have been litigating and complaining against each other. The petitioner had filed one civil suit bearing no. 288/2012 seeking a relief of permanent and mandatory injunction against the respondent and his brothers, the certified copy of which is on record as Ex. PW1/8. In the said plaint the respondent filed his WS as defendant no. 1. The certified copy of the said WS is on record as Ex. PW1/9. On comprehensive reading of the WS it unambiguously emerges that there is an admitted relationship of E 08/13 21/60 landlady and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent. The relevant portion of the WS is reproduced hereunder: "............It is submitted that the present suit is an attempt by the plaintiff to get the tenanted premises vacated from the defendant by hook or crook.......In any case the said document further goes on to show that answering defendant was paying rent for the............" 12.3 Prior to present litigation the respondent had filed one petition u/s 45 of Delhi Rent Control Act against the present petitioner (respondent therein) seeking restoration of electricity supply to the tenanted premises. The certified copy of said petition is on record as Ex. PW1/72 which clearly establishes (Paragraphs no. 1 and 2 especially) admission on part of the respondent as to the petitioner being the landlady of the tenanted premises. 12.4 Not only from the petitioner's documents but from the documents relied upon by the respondent no doubt remains whatsoever there is an admitted relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. In paragraph 22 of his affidavit i.e. RW5/A the respondent reaffirmed the contents of para 11 of the WS wherein it was claimed that the respondent has been tendering the rent regularly but the petitioner is refusing to accept the same. There is one legal notice dated 22.08.2012 purportedly written by the advocate of petitioner to the respondent and relied upon by the respondent as Ex. RW5/50 vide which the respondent was instructed to not to pay any rent to the petitioner till further notice. Similarly from Ex. E 08/13 22/60 RW5/53 which is the legal notice dated 04.03.2013 the relationship between the parties as claimed by the petitioner stands further established/proved. Doubts if any are put to rest in view of Mark B relied upon by the respondent which is a money order sent by the respondent to the petitioner tendering the rent @ Rs. 295/ per month w.e.f. 01.03.2013 to 31.05.2013. This money order coupled with Mark A i.e. cheque dated 02.03.2013 and the averments made in the affidavit Ex. RW5/A regarding tendering of rent and the refusal of petitioner to accept the same (para no. 22) put to rest the otherwise feeble agitation raised by the respondent regarding the relationship of landlady and tenant. Furthermore during his cross examination the respondent stated as " the name of my landlord is Smt. Asha Rani Gupta......I do not remember when for the last time I paid the rent to my landlady Smt. Asha Rani Gupta........." During his further cross examination the respondent stated as "I had never offered to pay any rent to any of the family members of Sh. Harjeewan Lal Gupta." 12.5 In fact there is no real dispute as far as relationship of landlady and tenant is concerned between the parties. However, the respondent did raise dispute/doubt regarding the ownership claims made by the petitioner. The respondent claimed that the petitioner is not the owner of the property/tenanted premises and atleast not the sole owner and there are other owners. The respondent argued that the petitioner after the demise of her E 08/13 23/60 father in law got the property wrongly mutated in her name without the consent of other coowners. To establish his above claims the respondent relied upon Ex. RW5/51 i.e. public notice issued/released by Pushpa Aggarwal claiming herself to be the co parcener/coowner of the property including tenanted premises and further claiming that the property has been fraudulently mutated in the name of petitioner and her sons to the exclusion of other co parcener/co owners including her. He also relied upon copy of civil suit filed by one Ratna Aggarwal against the petitioner and her sons i.e. CS (OS) No. 1531/12 seeking partition of the property including the tenanted premises as well as to declare the conveyance deed dated 19.02.2010 in favour of petitioner and her sons as void ab initio. Copy of same is Mark H1 (colly). The respondent claimed that not only she is not the owner of property in question but atleast she is not exclusive owner thereby i.e. in the absence of other coowners the petition is not maintainable.
12.6 However, I differ with the contentions of the Ld. Counsel for respondent. As already discussed above the relationship of landlady and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent stands admitted. As far as the ownership of the petitioner in respect of the property including the tenanted premises is concerned firstly, it is not disputed and in fact admitted that she is the daughter in law of Daulat Ram Gupta who was the erstwhile E 08/13 24/60 owner of the property vide lease deed/ perpetual lease deed dated 09.01.1957. The premises was rented out by the said Sh. Daulat Ram Gupta to the father of respondent vide rent deed dated 28.02.1957. The petitioner claimed that after the death of Daulat Ram Gupta, his wife Smt. Kalawati and the husband of the petitioner the property was mutated in her name on 31.05.2001. The petitioner proved the mutation in her name as Ex. PW1/1. She also proved on record the property tax slip dated 09.02.2002 as Ex. PW1/2 in her name.
12.7 Secondly, the law is well settled that to succeed in a petition under section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act the landlord/landlady is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under the Transfer of Property Act. She/he is required to show that he/she is more than a tenant. 12.8 In Bharat Bhushan Vij Vs. Arti Techchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247, in para 4 and 5 it was held as under:
"the concept of ownership in a landlord tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit . If the premises was let out by a person and after the death , the premises has come in the hands of a beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner, the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises , he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the court to decide as to who shall be the landlord / owner after the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in possession after the death of original owner without demur and without raising any objection against the person , E 08/13 25/60 who claims to have inherited the property under Will, he later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person. It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show there is a testament in his / her favour, he is deemed to have discharged his burden of proving under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord / owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of original owner."
12.9 In Sushil Kanta Chakarvarty Vs. Rajeshwar Kumar, 79 (1999) DLT 210, it has been held as under:
"in case of a petition u/s. 14 (1) (e) of the Act, in order to show the ownership, it is not necessary to show absolute ownership. The legislature used the word "owner", in section 14 (1) (e) not in the sense of absolute owner, but it was used in contra distinction with a landlord as defined in the Act who is not an owner but who owns the property for the benefit of another person and merely collects the rent. If the person collected the rent for himself and for his own benefit and the property is his own even in the loose sense and no one is claiming rights over the property, then he is considered as owner for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of the Act. Even possessory rights over the property of a person have been given recognition as ownership visa vis tenant under Delhi Rent Control Act."
12.10 In Meenakshi Vs. Ramesh Khanna and anr. , 60(1995) DLT 524 it was held as under:
" mere denial of ownership is no denial at all. It has to be something more. The object of the requirement contained in clause (e ) that the petitioner should be the owner of the premises is not to provide an additional ground to the tenant to delay the proceedings by simply denying the ownership of the landlord of the premises and thereby putting him to proof by way of a full fledged trial. The object seems to be to ensure that the provision is not misused by the people having no legal right or interest in the premises. In proceedings under section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, the tenant is never a contender for title E 08/13 26/60 to the property........For this first and foremost thing which has always been considered as a good guide is , does that tenant say who else is the owner of the premises, if not the petitioner? Thus the tenant has to specify about the actual owner, in case he denies the ownership of the petitioner / landlord."
12.11 From the above decisions, it is evident that the landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership. Therefore it is no more resintegra that in a suit between landlord and tenant, it is only the title as landlord/landlady which is relevant and not the title as "owner". He is only to prove that he is something more than tenant and is /was collecting rent not for someone else but for himself. In the present case, respondent has admitted the relationship of landlady and tenant and therefore it is not open for the respondent to challenge the ownership right of the landlady. In fact the law estops him from doing so.
12.12 In Capt. Praveen Davar (Retd.) & Another Vs. Harvansh Kumari and Ors; 2010 (119) DRJ 560, High Court of Delhi, it was held as under :
"15. From the aforesaid, in my opinion, there is no manner of doubt that the learned trial court rightly decided issue No. 1 in favour of the respondents and against the appellants. Reliance placed in this regard by the learned trial court on the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act and the following observations of the Supreme Court in Anar Devi v. Nathu Ram, 1994 (2) RCJ 103, conclusively clinches the issues: "Section 116 of the Evidence Act applies and estops even a person already in possession as tenant under the landlord from denying the title of his subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as E 08/13 27/60 his landlord by attornment of conduct. Therefore, a tenant B. K. Nagpal & Anr. Vs. Mohan Gupta E.No. 28/12 of immovable property under landlord who becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting him to be the owner who had derived title from the former landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter's title, even when he is sought to be evicted by the latter on a permitted ground."
12.13 In the judgment tiled as Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held:
"....It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly....."
12.14 In Sheela and ors Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Parkash, (2002) 3 SCC 375, it has been held:
"In rent matters the burden of proving ownership on a landlord is not that heavy as it is in a title suit and even a lessor quantum of proof may suffice for holding that the landlord is the owner of the premises in question."E 08/13 28/60
12.15 In judgment tiled as Rajender Kumar Sharma vs Smt. Leela Wati reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held:
".......It is settled law that for the purpose of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. In this case, the landlady had placed on record the documents by which she became owner. The attornment given by the erstwhile landlord in her favour as well as an admission made by the tenant by filing petition under Section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act acknowledging the landlordship of landlady. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the ARC regarding ownership and relationship of landlord and tenant were based on sound legal position and the cogent material before it......"
12.16 The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Shanti Sharma and Ors. Vs. Ved Prabha and Ors 33 (1987) DLT 80 had the occasion to consider the import of word owner in context of section 14(1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act and observed as under:
"..................................................... this Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bonafide requirement is one of such ground on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase "owner" thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use , he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction , the only thing necessary for him to prove is bonafide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context what appears to be the meaning of the term "owner" is vis a vis with the tenant ie the owner should be something more than the tenant"..... It is not the concern of the tenant as to how the landlord acquired the property .E 08/13 29/60
12.17 In T C Rekhi Vs. Usha Gujral, 1971 RCJ 322, at page 326 it was observed that :
"the word "owner" as used in this clause has to be considered in the background of the purpose and object of enacting it. Use of the word "owner" in this clause seems to have been inspired by the definition of word "landlord" as contained in section 2 (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person."
12.18 Hence the petitioner definitely has ownership rights in respect of the tenanted premises for the purposes of section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act.
Coowner not filing the petition
13. As far as arguments regarding the coowner not filing the petition, firstly the respondent could not lead any evidence that there are other co owners of the property apart from the petitioner and her sons. As per Ex. PW1/1 the property including the tenanted premises stands mutated in the name of petitioner and her sons. The petitioner categorically stated in para 18 of her affidavit that her sons have shifted their business from the shop (shown in green colour in the site plan Ex. PW1/7) adjoining the tenanted premises with a clear understanding and to aid their mother i.e. the petitioner in running he charitable play school. The petitioner was not cross E 08/13 30/60 examined on this part of her testimony. Same having remained unchallenged and unimpeached I have no reasons to believe or assume that the sons are against the eviction petition as brought by their mother. 13.1 As far as the other alleged co owners are concerned as discussed above the respondent could not prove that there are other co owners of the property in question. Ex. RW5/51 i.e. the notice in the newspaper or the civil suit bearing no. 1531/2012 allegedly filed by one Ms. Ratna Aggarwal i.e. Mark H1 as relied upon by the respondent, they do not establish any ownership in the alleged co owners. Moreover the petitioner during her cross examination categorically denied the pendency of the civil suit filed by Ratna Aggarwal or notice/summons in respect of suit being issued to her. The respondent could not prove that she was deposing falsely or that the suit is indeed pending or that she has been summoned or notice has been issued to her in this regard. On the other hand the plaintiff has duly proved the mutation letter in her favour which is on record as Ex. PW1/1 which bestows enough title in her favour qua the respondent as far as/ for the purpose of present eviction petition.
13.2 Moreover, the law is well settled that one of the co owner can maintain a petition for eviction. Reliance may be placed upon the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Dhannalal vs Kalawatibai And Ors E 08/13 31/60 decided on 8 July, 2002 in Appeal (civil) no. 3652 of 2002 wherein it was held as under:
"It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Ors., [1976] 4 SCC 184, Kanta Gael v.
B.P. Pathan and Ors ., [1977] 2 SCC 814 and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs. and Ors., [1989] 1 SCC 444 that one of the co owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of tenant and it is no defence open to tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that other coowners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every coowner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of tenant without joining the other coowners if such other co owners do not object."
13.3 In M/s. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Ors. Vs. Bhagabandel Agarwalla (dead ) by Lrs. And Ors. AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1321, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "one of the coowner can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the Coowners and this principle was based on doctrine of agency. One coowner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so, on his own behalf in his own right and also as an agent of the other coowners. The consent of other coowners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other coowners were not agreeable to eject the tenant".
13.4 Further reliance may placed on the law laid down in Shri Ram Pasreja Vs. Jagan nath and ors. AIR 1976 SC 2335, Laxmi Shankar Hari E 08/13 32/60 Shankar Bhatt Vs. Yashram Vasta (dead) by LRs AIR 1993 SC 1587, Krishan Lal Vs. Rajan Chand Khanna AIR 1993 Delhi 1 and Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Smt. Chand Rani 1993 (1) RCR 492. 13.5 In the case at hand even if it is agreed that there is some dispute between the petitioner and some other alleged coowners (though the respondent has failed to prove the same) that by itself does not prove any hindrance/handicap in the maintenance of the present eviction petition by the petitioner. Moreover nothing stopped the respondent from examining the other co owners to prove the alleged objections to the mutations in favour of the petitioner or claims regarding them being the co owner of the property along with the petitioner or to challenge the maintainability of the present eviction petition. Having not done so and the law being well settled that the intersee arrangements or dispute between the owners is no business of the tenant (reliance may be placed upon the law laid down in Yashpal Vs. Chaman Lal Sachdeva, 129 (2006) DLT 200) I find no merits in the submissions of the Ld. Counsel for respondent that the petition is not maintainable in the absence of the other co owners. Petitioner being one of the legal heir of the erstwhile landlord is one of the co owner of the property and as such is entitled to file the eviction petition. E 08/13 33/60 Bonafide requirement and non availability of reasonably suitable alternate accommodation
14. The prime question to be answered is as to whether the tenanted premises is required bonafide by the petitioner and that the petitioner has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. 14.1 The most essential requirement to be proved by the petitioner to succeed in the eviction petition is that the tenanted premises is required by her for her bonafide needs. In the case at hand the bonafide need/requirement raised by the petitioner is that she requires the tenanted premises for running a Charitable Play School. In fact the petitioner requires the tenanted premises as an additional accommodation for expansion of the play school already run/started by her on 10.09.2014 in the portion of the property under her possession excluding the tenanted premises as it is claimed that the area/property under her possession is insufficient for running a play school.
14.2 The eviction petition was initially filed on 09.05.2013 on the ground of bonafide need and it was averred by the petitioner that she intends to run a Charitable Play School for which she requires the tenanted premises. The respondent's application for leave to defend was allowed by the Ld. Predecessor of this court and while the matter was pending for E 08/13 34/60 petitioner's evidence, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was moved by the petitioner seeking to bring on record amended petition mainly incorporating/to bring on record the factum of having started a Charitable Play School on 10.09.2014 in the area of the property available with her. The said amendment petition was allowed by the Ld. Predecessor of this court vide orders dated 05.12.2014. Hence now the bonafide need of the petitioner is additional accommodation in the form of tenanted premises for the charitable play school already started by her.
14.3 To establish her bonafide need the petitioner relied upon her educational certificates i.e. Ex. PW1/51 to Ex. PW1/53, teaching service agreements of Savita Barua and Kajal as Mark F and G, the admission forms and the attendance register of the school run in the name and style of Republic of School as Ex. PW1/56 and Ex. PW1/57, birth certificates of the children, aadhar card of the parents as Mark I and H apart from photographs Ex. PW1/60 showing that a school is being run at the property in question. She also relied upon the educational qualification and certificates of her daughter in law and her affidavit as Ex. PW1/61 to Ex. PW1/71. Apart from her testimony the petitioner also examined one Ms. Kajal as PW2 who proved her service agreements as Ex. PW2/1 and Ex. PW2/2 proving her employment at the school run by the petitioner. She also proved that apart from her one Savita Barua was also employed as Assistant Teacher in the E 08/13 35/60 school. Apart from the bare averments that the attendance and the admission registers as above are forged the respondent could not prove that the said documents are indeed forged or that no such student was studying in the school as claimed by the petitioner.
14.4 From the above documents proved on record by the petitioner it stands established that a play school in the name and style of Republic of Kids is being run at property in question of which the tenanted premises is a part. Now what is to be adjudged is whether her claims of bonafide need of the tenanted premises as an additional accommodation for expansion of the play school is a genuine one or a whimsical or malafide one as claimed by the respondent.
14.5 I have perused the site plan Ex. PW1/7. The area of the property at the ground floor under the possession of the petitioner is shown/earmarked in the site plan in green and orange colour. The area earmarked/highlighted/coloured as green is the shop vacated by her children and where the petitioner has started the play school in question. The said area is around 300 sq. feet and is indeed insufficient to run a play school. The portion/area in orange is a common area. The area under the occupation of tenant that is to say the tenanted premises is shown in red and yellow colour in the site plan and it comes somewhere around 640 sq. feet. The said area combined with the area under the use and occupation of the E 08/13 36/60 landlady coupled with common passage/ verandah is a sufficient area for the purpose of running a play school. Running a play school involves numerous activities apart from imparting basic education/academic knowledge. A play school forms a foundation, gives a child a platform for his growth and development till the time he enters into the main stream school. For the overall development of a child he need not be educated only qua the academic subjects/knowledge but also in areas of sports/games, theater, plays and other activities. For this there is no doubt that a large space is required. Taking into account the kind of activities involved in a play school which cannot be penned down in my opinion the area under the possession and occupation of the petitioner is insufficient for running a play school and therefore she has a genuine need for an additional area more so when the number of students/children are bound to increase with the passage of time. The tenanted shop can be used for making classrooms, office etc. and the open space can be used for outdoor activities, play ground etc. 14.6 The Ld. Counsel for respondent attacked the bonafide requirements of the petitioner on numerous grounds. Firstly, it was argued that the running of a play school by her is nothing but an eye wash and the said exercise has been undertaken by her merely to form the basis/ground for filing the eviction petition. It was argued that there are other play school and balwaris in the area which otherwise has no nearby slums and therefore no E 08/13 37/60 question of underprivileged children coming to the play school arises. It was argued that running a Charitable play school shall not be financially viable for the petitioner as the property has significant commercial value and can give profitable returns if rented out. Secondly, it was further argued the petitioner is suffering from various old age ailments including asthma and skin disease and therefore is not in a condition to run a play school. Thirdly, it was argued that the play school run by her being a "charitable" i.e. one for the under privileged children her needs no longer remain bonafide. It was argued that for a need/requirement to qualify as a bonafide one for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act it has to be a genuine need of the landlord and not a frivolous one or one guided by extraneous considerations. It was argued that the need should not be fanciful or a mere desire as is the case in the present petition. It was argued that alleged bonafide need to run a charitable play school is nowhere covered either under/for commercial purpose or residential purpose and is more kind of hobby which the petitioner wants to pursue for her old age happiness. 14.7 As far as the intentions of the petitioner to run the play school and the corresponding need for additional accommodation are concerned I have no reasons to doubt the genuineness of her intentions or the needs expressed by her. The petitioner as was proved by her retired as a Vice E 08/13 38/60 Principal and she served in Government Senior Secondary School, Jor Bagh, New Delhi which is situated almost next to/in the immediate vicinity of the property in question. She had a long career, almost 34 years, as a teacher/ academician. The certificates as discussed above establish her qualifications as well as experience in the field of education. Having served in Government Senior Secondary School Jor Bagh for 8 long years she must be a familiar/known face.
14.8 The petitioner is around 65 years old and a widow. At this juncture of ones life the needs, desires the concept of life changes. There is a change of outlook/ perspective from materialistic/commercial world to more of a spiritual/religious one. That comes with age with almost everyone sooner or later. At this stage/age the individual decides/ desires to do something for the society. More so when the sons and other family members are busy in their business/jobs etc. the petitioner needs to keep herself occupied. The petitioner having spent her entire life in the field of education her intentions at this stage of her life to start a play school and that too a charitable one are not only genuine but one which needs to be appreciated and encouraged. The genuineness of her intentions can also be gathered from the fact that her sons are well settled and she herself is financially independent, well off having retired as a Vice Principal and therefore drawing handsome pension.
E 08/13 39/60 14.9 The genuineness of her need, the bonafides of her requirements as expressed by her can be gathered from the very fact that her sons vacated the shop shown in green colour in the site plan which is adjacent to the tenanted premises and handed over the same to their mother. It is from this shop/area that the petitioner is running a play school. The sons shifted their business to Noida which fact is not disputed. The petitioner proved the rent agreements as Ex PW1/79 (colly) in respect of the property taken on rent by her sons to run their business on account of vacating of the shop for the play school to be run by their mother.
14.10 As far as the medical ailments cited by the respondent are concerned firstly, the respondent could not prove any medical document on record to show that she is indeed suffering from the alleged ailments and to an extent that she cannot run a play school. Otherwise also the ailments as alleged are not the ones which incapacitate a person from performing daily routines or to carry on any activity which does not involve hard physical labour for example the running of a play school. Furthermore it is not necessary that she has to undertake physical exertion. In Raj Kumar Khetan Vs. Bibi Zubaida Khatun, (1997) 11 SCC 411, it was held that "......... Further the age cannot be a limiting factor or detriment in the endeavor of the human beings." She can always play a supervisory role more E 08/13 40/60 so when she has retired as a vice principal and she can always employ other teachers and staff who can work under her instructions. She has already employed two teachers, one of them being PW2. Her daughter in law Smt. Mamta Gupta too has teaching experience having worked in Cambridge School, Karol Bagh, Delhi. Her educational certificate are on record as Ex. PW1/61 to 70. Her affidavit Ex PW1/71 is already on record. She has expressed her willingness to assist the petitioner in the play school. 14.11 Regarding the other play schools and balwaris running in the area is concerned which point the respondent tried to prove through RW1, RW2, RW3 and RW4 it is to be seen that even if indeed some other balwaris and play schools are running in the nearby area of Jor Bagh that by itself does not render the claims of the petitioner bogus or malafide. There might be hundreds of play schools and balwaris but the same cannot curtail the right of the petitioner to run one more/her own charitable play school. Furthermore RW1 Principal of Sarvodaya Vidalaya, Jor Bagh categorically stated that there is no play school within 1 km of their school and the only play school seems to be the one run by the petitioner. RW2 went on to admit that NDMC does not run any charitable play school though there are around 10 balwaris and 18 creches in the area.
14.12 As far as the arguments regarding the school being a charitable play school and therefore the bonafide need being not covered under section E 08/13 41/60 14 (1) (e) DRC Act as need is not for any commercial purpose or residential purpose are concerned, it is to be seen that the law as contained in the above provisions underwent a change after the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India" reported as AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 3148. Prior to passing of said judgment eviction on the ground of bonafide need u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act was not maintainable in respect of property let out for commercial purposes. Section 14 (1) (e) as contained in Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 read as:
"14. Protection of tenant against eviction. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:
(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation."
14.13 The Hon'ble Apex Court in para 39 of the judgment held as under: " 39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14 (1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14 (1) (e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of E 08/13 42/60 Section 14 (1) (e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under : "that the premises are required bone fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation."
14.14 The widening of the scope of the above provision by Hon. Apex Court coupled with the law laid down in the other rulings leaves no doubt that the court has to merely consider whether the need expressed by the landlord/landlady is a bonafide and genuine one or whether the same is misconceived or a mere desire which one fancies. Furthermore the law is equally well settled by the Hon. Apex Court as well as our own Hon. High Court that the need need not be measured on commercial scale i.e. whether it shall be beneficial/gainful or viable for the landlord/ landlady that is to say the proposed undertaking or intended use of the property shall be commercially/financially beneficial for the landlord/ landlady or not. Bonafide need should not be equated with or measured on commercial scale. Therefore I find no merits in the contentions of Ld. Counsel that the charitable play school shall not prove to be commercially viable for the petitioner and therefore her need is not bonafide. Reliance may be placed upon the law laid down in Mohd. Ayub and anr Vs. Mukesh Chand (2012) 2 SCC 155 wherein it has been held that "........It is well settled the E 08/13 43/60 landlord's requirement need not be a dire necessity. The court cannot direct the landlord to do a particular business or imagine that he could profitably do a particular business rather than the business he proposes to start..........".
14.15 In Shiv Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta , 1999 AIR (SC) 2507, it was was held by Hon'ble Apex Court that:
12. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bonafide to mean 'in good faith : genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural : not spurious :
real; " pure : sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and whitley define bonafide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bonafide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bonafide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest".
14.16 The Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed in Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. (1999) 8 SCC E 08/13 44/60 that:
"The word "reasonable" connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word "requirement" coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in praesenti or within reasonable proximity in the future."
14.17 In Jaswinder Singh Vs. Surinder Kaur, 204 (2013) DLT 716 , in para no. 14, it has been held as follows:
"14. . As per law, bonafide requirement has to be seen and considered from the perspective of the landlord and tenant cannot be allowed to dictate the terms in which portion the landlord should reside."
14.18 In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 100, it was held that ".....The crux of the ground envisaged in Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an E 08/13 45/60 endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 14.19 In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta , 1999 (6) SCC 222 it has been observed that " ............ The judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself - whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural , real , sincere, honest . If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or , in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord is merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant , would be enough to persuade the court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord.
14.20 In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimlabai Prabhulal & Ors, (2005) 8 SCC 252 , it has been held in para 4 as follows:
" . It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if, he requires the premises in question for his bonafide use for expansion of business, this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not a genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advice him what he should do or what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of business and the place of business. ".
14.21 From the above judgments, it is evident that landlord is the best judge of his premises. It is well settled law that the requirement or need not be fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire and must be E 08/13 46/60 something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. It may be a need in praesenti or within a reasonable proximity in the future.
14.22 In S N Kapoor Vs Basant Lal Khatri, VII (2001) SLT 648=(2002) 1 SCC 329 it was held:
"that to contend that no material has been brought on record and no proof has been made by the tenant by any positive material that the requirement of the landlord is neither genuine nor bonafide or reasonable but a mere excuse to get ride of the tenant. Though the choice or proclaimed need cannot be whimsical or merely fanciful, yet a certain amount of discretion has to be allowed in favour of the landlady too and the courts should not impose their own wisdom forcibly upon the landlady to arrange her own affairs, according to their perception carried away by the interest or hardship of the tenant and the inconvenience that may result to him in passing an order of eviction. So far as a claim under Section 14 (1) (e) is concerned, the very requirement has to be shown not only to be bonafide but the move of the landlord/ landlady to seek eviction of the tenant must be genuine."
14.23 It will also be worthwhile to note down the observations of Hon. Apex court at para 12 of Satyawati's judgment (Supra) which are as under: " In Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal [2002 (5) SCC 3971], the Court after noticing several judicial precedents on the subject observed as under:
"The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the E 08/13 47/60 tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble.
14.24 Further in case the petitioner does not use the tenanted premises for the purpose as claimed by her, the respondents can always take recourse to the provisions of Section 19 of the DRC Act. Reliance may be placed upon the law laid down in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini reported as (2005) 12 SCC 778 wherein it was held that "........ if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession............. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine.."
Alternative accommodation E 08/13 48/60
15. As far as the availability of other/alternate reasonable suitable accommodation is concerned the petitioner categorically stated that she has no other reasonable suitable accommodation except for the tenanted premises to run the charitable play school. Her claims were countered by the Ld. Counsel for respondent on two grounds. Firstly, it was argued that the petitioner falsely claimed to be residing at First floor of the property in question and in fact she is residing at B228, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi110017. Secondly, it was argued that if indeed she wants to run the charitable play school she has other properties i.e. Shop no. 21, 25 and 50, Second Floor, Wave Mall, Sector 18, Noida, Shop no. 615, Sixth Floor, Deluxe Star Sector 16B, Agra, UP, 2/57, WHS, Kirti Nagar, Delhi, D228, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi, 1631/9 and 2941/3 situated at Chuna Mandi Paharganj, New Delhi55, 33, Sector 28, Faridabad, Haryana and 11 Jain Mandir Compound, Raza Bazar Jain Mandir Road, New Delhi. It was argued that since these alternate accommodations are available to her the petition ought to be dismissed on this ground alone. 15.1 However I do not agree with the arguments of Ld. Counsel for respondent. As far as the arguments that the petitioner does not reside at the first floor of the property are concerned they have no merits whatsoever. The petitioner categorically stated that she is residing along with one of her E 08/13 49/60 son at the first floor of the property in question. As already discussed above the property is mutated in her name and she is also paying the property tax vide Ex. PW1/1 and Ex. PW1/2 respectively. She also placed the electricity bills Mark A to C to prove the same. Furthermore during her cross examination she stated that she is a member of Jor Bagh Residence Welfare Association for the last 7 years and that she can produce the document in this regard if required. This part of the testimony was not challenged by the Ld. Counsel for respondent. Furthermore in RW5/P20 which is a directory of Jor Bagh the name of petitioner finds mention.
15.2 In fact I am of the firm opinion that the contentions raised by the respondent that petitioner is not residing at the first floor of the property are not only baseless but to some extent malafide also. Reason is that admittedly in all the earlier litigations between the parties including petition u/s 45 DRC Act filed by him, copy of same is on record as Ex. PW1/72, the respondent himself has shown the address of the petitioner of that being of the property in question i.e. first floor, 7, Jor Bagh Market, New Delhi. Furthermore respondent relied upon a document Mark B i.e. money order which he had sent to the petitioner as rent for the period of 01.02.2013 to 31.05.2013. The address appearing in the money order is of 7, Jor Bagh. Even legal notices e.g. Notice dated 04.03.2013 i.e. Ex. RW5/53 sent on behalf of the respondent by his counsel was addressed to the petitioner at her E 08/13 50/60 7, Jor Bagh residence. Hence these documents categorically proved that the petitioner is indeed residing at first floor of the property in question. For these reasons the contentions regarding the voter I card, passport, bank account of the petitioner bearing the address of 11 Jain Mandir compound losses significance. Furthermore the petitioner categorically stated that these documents were prepared 10 to 30 years back and she never felt any need to change the address in those documents from 11, Jain Mandir to 7, Jor Bagh. This is quite natural. Even otherwise the respondent could not prove that the petitioner is not residing at 7, Jor Bagh or that she is residing at 11, Jain Mandir.
15.3 As far as the arguments regarding alternate accommodation are concerned the respondent in para 9 of his affidavit provided details of the following properties claiming that same belongs to the petitioner and her sons.
(a) Shop no. 21, 25 and 50, Second Floor, Wave Mall, Sector 18, Noida.
(b) Shop no. 615, Sixth Floor, Deluxe Star Sector 16B, Agra, UP.
(c) 2/57, WHS, Kirti Nagar, Delhi.
(d) D228, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi.
(e) 1631/9 and 2941/3 situated at Chuna Mandi Paharganj, New Delhi55 E 08/13 51/60
(f) 33, Sector 28, Faridabad, Haryana.
(g) 11 Jain Mandir Compound, Raza Bazar Jain Mandir Road, New Delhi.
15.4 As far as properties as enumerated in clause (a) i.e. one at Wave Mall Noida are concerned it stands proved in view of Ex.PW1/79 (colly) that they are lease hold property taken on rent by M/s Santasha Real Estate (P) Ltd. for running the real estate business. The said company is run by the sons of the petitioner. The property can be used only for the purpose and in terms of the lease agreement. Same is otherwise not suitable for running a charitable play school as the property is situated on the second floor of a Mall. Furthermore the court cannot expect the petitioner to travel all the way to Noida to do the charitable work she is carrying on. 15.5 As far as property bearing no. 615, sixth Floor, Deluxe Star sector 16B, Agra UP is concerned the very fact that the petitioner who is around 65 years old and is residing at Jor Bagh, New Delhi and the property in question being at Agra itself rules out use of the said property for the purpose of running a charitable school. The said property can by no bound of imagination be considered as reasonably suitable alternate accommodation.
15.6 As far as property bearing no.2/57, WHS Kirti Nagar is E 08/13 52/60 concerned same is ware house situated in industrial area, in a timber market and is not suitable for running a play school more so when the petitioner is residing at Jor Bagh and Kirti nagar is almost 20 Kms away/distant. With the age of petitioner coupled with traffic and pollution in Delhi it shall be unreasonable to expect her to travel so far when she has a better choice and the law being well settled that tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord as to how and which property the landlord should occupy and use for the intended purpose. Reliance may be placed upon the law laid down in Anil Bajaj and anr Vs. Vinod Ahuja 2014 (6) Scale 572, Sudesh Kumar Soni and anr Vs. Prabhu Khanna and anr. 153 (2008) DLT 652 and Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimlabai Prabhulal & Ors, (2005) 8 SCC 252. Furthermore while deciding the question of bonafides of requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted.
15.7 In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta , [1999] 6 SCC 222 this Court has held that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction.
15.8 In Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. V. Vimlalabai E 08/13 53/60 Prabhulal and Ors. (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 252, it was observed:
"It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business."
15.9 It is ruled out in M. L. Prabhakar Vs. Rajiv Singhal reported at 1(2001) E No.292/11 SLT 282 (2001) 2 SCC 355 wherein it was held the Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for his purpose, the Court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. 15.10 In 1996 SCC 353 Prativa Devi Vs. T. V. Krishanan it was held that 'landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential stand of their own.
15.11 It is held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rishi Kumar Govil Vs. Maqsoodan, 2007 (1) RCR (Rent) 405 "It is the choice of the landlord to choose the place for the business which is most suitable for him. He has complete freedom in the matter."
15.12 As far as property bearing no. B228, Sarvodaya Enclave is E 08/13 54/60 concerned it is stated that she has nothing to do/no concern with the said property however her son is residing at D228 which is a first floor property situated in a residential colony and occupied by the son of the petitioner namely Mohit Gupta. This property also being on first floor and in a residential colony cannot be used for the purpose of running a charitable play school.
15.13 As far as property at Chuna mandi, Paharganj is concerned it is also situated at a quite a distance from the house of the petitioner. Furthermore the respondent has failed to prove that how the said property which is of a very small area is a reasonable suitable one for the purpose of running a charitable play school. The respondent has merely given the address of the property without giving the details i.e. ownership, who is occupying the property and what is the status of the property. Respondent having failed to prove that the property is a suitable alternate accommodation no burden is cast upon the petitioner to prove otherwise. 15.14 Same is the observations regarding the property at Faridabad, Haryana. The respondent could not place on record any document to show that the same is owned and possessed by the petitioner. 15.15 As far as property at 11, Jain Mandir Compound is concerned respondent has failed to file any document to show that the property is owned by the petitioner or what is the right, title or interest of E 08/13 55/60 the petitioner in the said property. It is the case of the petitioner that the property is rented one which has not been negated by the respondent. Furthermore who all are occupying the said property or whether the same is in the exclusive possession and use of the petitioner as against her claims has not been proved by the respondent. What is the status of the said property i.e. residential or commercial? In the absence of any such proof/evidence being led by the respondent the court is not inclined to believe the bare statement made on the basis of property number that the same is the reasonable suitable accommodation available to the petitioner for running a charitable play school.
15.16 In fact the respondent has raised the argument regarding the petitioner having reasonably suitable accommodation without verifying the facts which is evident from the statement made by him during his cross examination which read as " I had never seen any title document of the property at Kirti Nagar, Chuna Mandi Paharganj, Faridabad and Greater Noida which I say belongs to the petitioner".
15.17 As the above properties are not reasonably suitable alternate accommodation available to the petitioner it was not incumbent to give the details of other properties. Reliance may be placed upon Ram Narain Arora Vs. Asha Rani 1999 (1) SCC 141, M.L. Prabhakar Vs. Rajiv Singhal E 08/13 56/60 (2001) 2 SCC 355 and Surender Singh Vs. Jasbir Singh 172 (2010) DLT
611. HARDSHIP
16. It was also argued by Ld. counsel for respondent that since tenanted premises is the only means of earning and livelihood of respondent and his family, a lot of hardship shall be caused to him, if the eviction is allowed or the suit of the petitioner is decreed. However the law is well settled that the concept of comparative hardship has no application so far as ground of eviction U/s. 14 (1) (e) of the Act is concerned. The tenanted premises was let out to the father of respondent way back in the year 1957 i.e. almost 60 years ago. Nothing has been disclosed/ stated by respondent as to whether the respondent has acquired or any attempt was made by him to get alternate accommodation or that he failed to get such accommodation. I am not inclined to believe that respondent has no other property for carrying on the business or that he did not make any effort all this while to find the alternate accommodation more so when the parties have been litigating for quite a long now and their relationship is not at all cordial. 16.1 In Subhash Jain Vs Ravi Sehgal decided on 04.02.2014, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has observed :
E 08/13 57/60
"we are mindful of the fact that whenever the tenant is asked to move out of the premises some hardship is inherent. But in our opinion, in the facts of this case, that circumstance cannot be the sole determinative factum . That hardship can be mitigated by granting him longer period to move out of the premises in his occupation so that in the meantime he can make alternative arrangement"
16.2 Reliance may also be placed upon the law laid down in Om Parkash Arora Vs. Ratan Mala Jain 2013 (1) AD (Delhi) 253 and Mohd. Ayub Vs. Mukesh Chand (2012) 1 AD (SC) 473. In the case at hand it will be worthwhile to note that the tenanted premises was used by the respondent for running a dry cleaning shop. However the respondent right to carry on the said business was curtailed and the respondent is/can no longer carry on the said business at the tenanted premises in view of the undertaking given by him before Hon. High Court of Delhi as well as orders of Hon. High Court dated 03.09.2012, 20.02.2013 and 12.07.2013 as is evident from Ex. Ex.PW1/11, Ex. PW1/12, PW1/75 and Ex. PW1/77 etc. Admittedly he is no longer carrying on the business/activity of dry cleaning in the tenanted premises.
16.3 Furthermore his son has admittedly started a business in the name and style of M/s Mac Euro Cleaners. The respondent admittedly owned a shop bearing no. 22, Defence Colony DDA market, under flyover which he sold the same in September 2015 vide Ex. RW5/P31. The said E 08/13 58/60 property was admittedly on rent @ Rs. 20,000/ per month. He admittedly owns other properties at Chattarpur and Safdarjung Enclave. Reliance may be placed upon the law laid down in Mangat Ram and Another v. Ram Nath (P & H) CR no. 6184 of 2007; wherein Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana held as under:
"4. The object of Rent Laws was to give some reasonable protection from eviction to the tenants at the hands of the landlords without there being any reasonable cause. But it does not mean that a landlord cannot get back possession of his property from the tenants for all times to come and the tenants can acquire new properties but will not shift his business in those and would like to retain possession of the tenanted premises by paying small rents. This would be totally unreasonable."
16.4 Hence no question of any hardship whatsoever being caused to the respondent arises.
17. In view of above discussion the petitioner is entitled to recover the possession of the tenanted premises i.e. one shop and open space situated in/part of property bearing no. 7, Jor Bagh, New Delhi110003 as shown in red and yellow colour in the site plan i.e. Ex. PW1/7 attached with the petition. The eviction petition is allowed accordingly. The petitioner, however shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of this order. E 08/13 59/60
18. File be consigned to record room.
Announced in the open court (Gaurav Rao)
on 30th April 2016 SCJCumRC(SouthEast)
Distt.Courts, Saket, New Delhi.
E 08/13 60/60