Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Indrani Datta (Chaudhuri) vs Vidyasagar University & Ors on 2 September, 2014
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
1
02.09.2014 W.P. 22850(W) of 2014
Indrani Datta (Chaudhuri)
vs.
Vidyasagar University & ors.
Mr. Saptangshu Basu
Mr. Kaushik De
Mr. Ayan Banerjee
Mr. Soumyo Choudhury
Ms. Debasree Dhamali
.........for the petitioner.
Mr. Joydeep Kar
Ms. Nandini Mitra
Mr. Sanjoy Saha
.....for the respondents 1, 3 & 4.
Mr. Jahar Lal De
Mr. Shamim Ul Bari
..........for the respondent 2.
1. To nip a disciplinary proceeding initiated against her in
the bud, the petitioner (an Assistant Professor of the
Department of English of Vidyasagar University) has
presented this writ petition praying for an order as
follows:
"b) A writ in the nature of mandamus directing
the respondents to withdraw and/or recall
and/or rescind the Show Cause dated
16.06.2014, the Suspension letter dated
21.07.2014 and the Charge-Sheet dated
23.07.2014 and allow the petitioner to join her
services immediately and pay all consequential
2
benefits including arrears of pay to the
petitioner."
2. The charge-sheet issued to the petitioner has been at
the centre of debate in this litigation.
3. According to Mr. Basu, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, expressions used in the charge-sheet are
such that the same provide sufficient reason for the
petitioner to perceive that her disciplinary authority
has pre-judged her guilt, and the enquiry and the
subsequent steps to follow would be nothing but a
mere ritual before she is punished. He further
contended that the disciplinary authority did not
apply his mind to the point as to whether the acts of
omission/commission, as attributed to the petitioner
and forming part of the charge-sheet, at all amount to
misconduct warranting initiation of disciplinary
proceeding against her in terms of the Vidyasagar
University First Ordinances, 1985. There being a real
danger of bias operating against the petitioner, he
submitted that it would be an idle formality for her to
participate in the proceeding and that imposition of
penalty is a foregone conclusion.
3
In support of his submission that the charge-sheet
ought to be interdicted, Mr. Basu placed reliance on
the following decisions:
1. AIR 1984 SC 1361 (A.L. Kalra vs. Project
Equipment Corporation);
2. AIR 2001 SC 343 (State of Punjab vs. V.K.
Khanna);
3. (2010) 13 SCC 427 [Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India];
4. (2012) 5 SCC 242 (Vijay Singh v. State of U. P.);
5. 1977 CHN 1014 (Sunil Kumar Mukherjee v.
State of West Bengal;
6. 1993 (2) CHN 103 (State Bank of India v. Tapan
Kumar Das); and
7. 2009 (4) CHN 380 [Khaitan (India) Limited v.
Learned Judge, Eighth Industrial Tribunal].
It was further submitted by Mr Basu that the
incident which seems to be the genesis of the charge-
sheet was a deputation that was proposed by
members of a professors' association, to which the
petitioner owes allegiance, before the Vice-Chancellor
of the University. Several members of such
association were present in course of the deputation,
4
but the petitioner was singled out. This, according to
him, is a clear example of hostile discrimination and
relying on the decision reported in (1983) 4 SCC 225
(Sengara Singh vs. State of Punjab), it was submitted
that the disciplinary authority of the University acted
illegally.
Mr. Basu also submitted that the charge-sheet was
preceded by a show-cause notice. The petitioner had
duly replied to the allegations forming part of the
show-cause notice in her attempt to explain the
position and expected that no further step would be
taken. To her utter dismay and disbelief, the charge-
sheet was issued against her levelling charges which
were not even referred to in the show-cause notice.
According to him, it is absolutely clear that the
disciplinary authority is biased and the petitioner does
not expect a fair proceeding. Mr. Basu, thus, prayed
for an order as claimed, noted above.
4. The writ petition was opposed by Mr. Kar, learned
senior counsel for the University.
According to him, the writ petition ought not to be
entertained because the same is premature. It was
next submitted that no malice has been alleged
5
against the disciplinary authority by the petitioner
and in the absence thereof, the Court may be loath to
entertain the challenge to the disciplinary proceeding
at this stage. Relying on the decision reported in
(2012) 11 SCC 565 : Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash
Chandra Mirdha, he submitted that a charge-sheet
does not give rise to any cause of action for moving
the Court and that the writ petition merits dismissal
bearing in mind such principle.
Endeavouring to impress the Court that the decision
in A. L. Kalra (supra) ought not to be relied on, Mr.
Kar submitted that the ratio of such decision had
been explained in subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court and hence, before applying the law
laid down in the cited decision the facts of the case
required careful examination. He submitted that
according to the Bench, a trivial matter had travelled
to it for its consideration. An order of dismissal was
passed against the appellant and the decision is clear
manifestation that the Bench was offended at the
appellant being dismissed for a trivial offence, which
was ultimately set aside. However, the charges
against the petitioner, prima facie, are serious and
6
not only confined to the subject deputation but also
relate to remissness on her part in discharging the
duties of a professor and that action as authorized by
the relevant Ordinances was initiated. That apart, it
was submitted that the decision in A. L. Kalra (supra)
would reveal the order of dismissal being challenged
before the High Court following a sham enquiry and it
is not that that the decision was rendered at the stage
of the charge-sheet. He, therefore, urged that the
decision in A.L. Kalra (supra) ought not to be
followed.
Mr. Kar next pointed out that the decisions in Sunil
Kumar Mukherjee (supra) and Tapan Kumar Das
(supra) would reveal that the High Court was
approached after culmination of the disciplinary
proceedings resulting in orders of punishment being
passed whereas in Khaitan (India) Limited (supra),
the award of the Industrial Tribunal directing
reinstatement of the workman was under challenge.
He submitted that in none of the said decisions did
the Court grant relief based solely on the ground that
the charge-sheet disclosed a closed mind; on the
contrary, ultimate relief to the perceived delinquent
7
followed on manifold grounds, including the ground
that the charge-sheet expressed pre-judgment of
guilt. He, accordingly, contended that this is not the
proper stage for examining the point raised by the
petitioner.
Referring to the decision in Vijay Singh (supra), the
Court's attention was invited to the fact that
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court which
have been pronounced upon consideration of the
decision in A. L. Kalra (supra) and holding that the
latter decision does not lay down an inflexible rule of
law of universal application, were not placed before
the Bench and it is in such circumstances that the
Bench observed that it cannot be left to the vagaries of
the employer to say ex post facto that some acts of
omission or commission, nowhere found to be
enumerated in the relevant rules as misconduct, is
nonetheless a misconduct.
Reacting to the decision in Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd.
(supra), Mr. Kar submitted that the registration
certificate of the appellant was cancelled by an order
dated March 19, 2008 without giving the appellant
any hearing and without citing any reason. An appeal
8
preferred against such order failed, whereafter the
High Court was approached. Although the High Court
declined to interfere, the Supreme Court interfered
not only on the ground that the show-cause notice
gave an impression that the competent authority had
prejudged the guilt of the appellant at the stage of
show-cause notice itself but also on the ground that
the reply to the show-cause notice was not considered
and a non-speaking order of cancellation was passed.
Attention of the Court was drawn to paragraph 37 of
the decision where it was observed that:
"the bias of the third respondent which was
latent in the show-cause notice became
patent in the order of cancellation of the
registration certificate. The cancellation order
quotes the show-cause notice and is a non-
speaking one and is virtually no order in the
eye of the law."
Mr. Kar urged that having regard to the nature of
high office held by the petitioner, the University
reasonably expects a responsible behaviour that is
commensurate with her status. It was found that in
course of the subject deputation, her demeanour was
not proper. There were other allegations too that she
may have indulged in acts of omission/commission,
which are unbecoming of a professor of the
9
University. That is precisely the reason why charge
has been levelled against her in respect of such
incident as well as the other incidents, prima facie,
giving rise to an impression that she may have
committed acts of indiscipline. The mere fact that the
word 'guilty' has been used in some of the articles of
charge do not vitiate the disciplinary proceeding,
which is at its nascent stage, and if the petitioner is
able to satisfy the disciplinary authority by replying to
the charges that there has been no
misconduct/misdemeanour on her part, the
disciplinary authority may not even proceed to
conduct an enquiry.
The decision in Sengara Singh (supra), it was also
submitted by Mr. Kar, is not at all appropriate for
deciding the present controversy. He referred to the
facts of that case and submitted that reinstatement of
the appellant was directed only upon the Court
arriving at a finding that there was arbitrary picking
and choosing for reinstatement after mass dismissal,
which was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
He accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ
petition.
10
5. In reply, Mr. Basu invited my attention to Prabhash
Chandra Mirdha (supra) and submitted that no law
has been laid down therein that a charge-sheet can
never be questioned. The word "ordinarily" has been
consciously used, which makes the position clear that
in an exceptional case a Court may be justified in
interfering with a charge-sheet. This being an
exceptional case, he urged that the Court's
interference is warranted to set things right.
6. The parties have been heard at length. The three
issues that arise for decision are:
(i) whether the petitioner is justified in
perceiving, at the stage of issuance of the
charge-sheet, that her disciplinary authority
has pre-judged the guilt and has called upon
her to respond to dispel the conclusions
drawn against her;
(ii) whether the disciplinary authority could
have issued the charge-sheet viewing the
alleged acts of omission/commission of the
petitioner as misconduct, in the absence of
enumerated misconduct in the Ordinances;
and
11
(iii) whether the charge-sheet is defective on the
ground that it calls upon the petitioner to
meet certain allegations, which were not
there in the show-cause notice.
7. I am afraid, none of the issues can be answered in
favour of the petitioner and against the University.
8. The grounds on which a charge-sheet may be
interfered with even before an enquiry has
commenced for unearthing the truth, is no longer res
integra. In the decision reported in (2010) 1 CAL LT
197 (HC) (Purushottam Dubey v. Union of India &
ors.), I had the occasion to observe as follows:
"20. .............That it is within the administrative
domain and exclusive discretion of the
disciplinary authority to commence disciplinary
proceedings and to continue it after issuance of
the charge-sheet cannot be doubted. Such
proceedings, however, can be questioned and
interdicted on grounds of proved mala fide,
patent bias, manifest lack of jurisdiction and
other grounds (not possible to be laid down
exhaustively) which might shock the conscience
of the Court."
9. In a decision of recent origin reported in (2014) 1 CAL
LT 504 (HC) (Soumya Dutta v. State Bank of India and
ors.), a learned Judge of this Court was of the opinion
that a charge-sheet could be challenged on grounds
which are limited, viz. assessment of the authority
12
exercised in issuance of the same, as to whether the
ingredients of any misconduct are made out in the
notice and as to whether the notice is mala fide.
10. Apart from the decision in V. K. Khanna (supra), no
authority has been cited where the Court interfered
with the charge-sheet before the perceived delinquent
responded thereto.
11. The facts of V. K. Khanna (supra) have been adverted to
by me in some details in the decision in Purushottam
Dubey (supra) and, hence are not repeated. Suffice it to
note, the charge-sheet there was not challenged on the
ground that it contained expressions of pre-judgment
of guilt; on the contrary, the charge-sheet was
challenged on the specific grounds of bias and mala
fides. The biased mindset was discerned from the fact
that despite the time given for responding to the
charge-sheet not having expired, the Chief Minister
had announced the appointment of a Judge of the High
Court as the enquiry officer. The Bench took into
consideration the undeniable fact arising out of the
said announcement that the enquiry would proceed,
irrespective of the reply. It is such challenge that
succeeded before the High Court and its decision was
13
upheld by the Supreme Court. The decision in V. K.
Khanna (supra), therefore, is not an authority for the
proposition that a charge-sheet could be interfered
with based on the expressions and terminology used
therein disclosing pre-judgment of guilt. It is rather an
authority for the proposition the following passage
reflects:
"33. While it is true that justifiability of the
charges at the stage of initiating a disciplinary
proceeding cannot possibly be delved into by any
court pending inquiry but it is equally well settled
that in the event there is an element of malice or
mala fide, motive involved in the matter of issue of
a charge-sheet or the authority concerned is so
biased that the inquiry would be a mere farcical
show and the conclusions are well known then
and in that event law courts are otherwise
justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to
avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public
official. It is not a question of shielding any
misdeed that the Court would be anxious to do, it
is the due process of law which should permeate
in the society and in the event of there being any
affectation of such process of law that law courts
ought to rise up to the occasion and the High
Court, in the contextual facts, has delved into the
issue on that score. On the basis of the findings
no exception can be taken and that has been the
precise reason as to why this Court dealt with the
issue in so great a detail so as to examine the
judicial propriety at this stage of the proceedings."
12. While deciding Purushottam Dubey (supra), I also
examined the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1969, which seemed to me to be the applicable
14
rules governing disciplinary proceedings against a
member of the All India Service holding equal rank as
Mr. V. K. Khanna himself. Having regard to the
provisions of Rule 8 thereof, I found that it was not
open to the Chief Minister to announce appointment of
a Judge as the enquiry officer even before receipt of
reply from the charged officer. I have no hesitation in
holding that the facts in the case of V. K. Khanna
(supra) are singularly singular and to attract the ratio
thereof to a particular case, the facts have to bear very
close resemblance or else a Court may decline to follow
the law laid down therein by citing the principle laid
down in AIR 1976 SC 1766 (The Regional Manager v.
Pawan Kumar Dubey).
13. The decision in Tapan Kumar Das (supra) has been
cited on behalf of the petitioner. It would appear from a
reading thereof as well as the decisions referred to
therein that two distinct sets of cases can be culled out
where, upon conclusion of disciplinary proceedings,
this Court viewed the expressions and terminology
used in the relevant charge-sheets as disclosing and
not disclosing any pre-judgment of guilt. Those
decisions where the Court expressed disapproval and
15
held against the expressions and terminology are
reported in 1974 (2) SLR 466 (Meena Janah v. Deputy
Director, Tourism), 79 CWN 39 (State of West Bengal v
Sati Prosad Roy), AIR 1975 CAL 48 (Reserve Bank of
India v. R. N. Dutta & Sons), Sunil Kumar Mukherjee
(supra), 1980 (2) CHN 35 (Bimala Kanta Mukherjee v.
State of West Bengal) and 1984 (2) CHN 185 (Subroto
Bhattacharya v. Bharat Process and Mechanical
Engineers); whereas, in the decisions reported in AIR
1972 CAL 401 (The Collector of Customs, Calcutta v.
Biswanath Mukherjee), 1976 (1) CLJ 483 (Sudhir
Chandra Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal), 80 CWN
998 (Satya Ranjan Dhar v. Life Insurance Corporation
of India) and 86 CWN 232 (Surendra Chandra Das v.
State of West Bengal), the Court did not agree that the
expressions and terminology used in the charge-sheet
itself were sufficient to vitiate the disciplinary
proceedings.
14. I have considered the principles of law laid down in the
aforesaid decisions and my understanding thereof is as
follows. It is settled law that the real purpose of
initiating a disciplinary proceeding is to inquire as to
whether the facts relating to delinquency, prima facie
16
ascertained against a charged officer/staff, are correct
or not. The purpose cannot be to cause a secret inquiry
against him and to form a positive and firm view about
his complicity in the alleged misconduct and thereafter
to give him an opportunity to dispel the conclusion
already drawn against him. Charges framed must be
clear and must not suffer from any ambiguity or
vagueness. If the charge is not expressed in clear and
certain terms, then the officer/staff is likely to be
misled and suffer prejudice for the vagueness in the
charge-sheet, not knowing the case he has to meet. A
charge-sheet has to be read in a common sense way to
see that there is a plain statement of an act complained
as wrong, so that the officer/staff complained against
may raise effective defence. A technically and
legalistically strict view would have to be eschewed.
Whether or not a disciplinary authority has a closed
and pre-judged mind at the inception of disciplinary
proceeding cannot really be comprehended only by
having a look at the expressions used in the charge-
sheet. Expressions used, at times, may be deceptive. A
disciplinary proceeding may be ruled to have been
initiated with closed and pre-judged mind if from the
17
attending circumstances such a conclusion can
reasonably be drawn, even though there is a
proliferation of non-injurious expression in the charge-
sheet like "alleged acts", "prima facie guilty", "tentative
view", etc. and the charge-sheet appears to be perfectly
worded; whereas, a proceeding initiated absolutely
bona fide, may not be interdicted despite definite
expressions in the charge-sheet which might give an
impression in the mind of the charged officer/staff that
nothing remains to be decided and that the same has
been initiated only to complete a formality in law,
unless of course surrounding circumstances are such
that the Court is convinced that there has been
deflection of justice. A charge-sheet has to be
construed in a reasonable manner and too much
legalism cannot be expected of a domestic enquiry. If
apart from the inappropriately worded charge-sheet
there is no other incriminating circumstance having
the effect of vitiating the proceedings culminating in an
order of penalty, it would be prudent exercise of
judicial discretion not to interfere.
15. Bearing the above in mind, the charge-sheet impugned
in the writ petition has to be considered.
18
16. Bare perusal of the charge-sheet would reveal that the
petitioner has been charged with acts of
omission/commission which, according to the
disciplinary authority, amount to
misconduct/misdemeanour. It is no doubt true that
in the concluding paragraph of each article of charge
it is recorded that the petitioner is ".... guilty of
insubordination", ".... guilty of lowering the prestige of
the University", ".... misconducted herself", "....
denigrated and tarnished the reputation of Vidyasagar
University in the eye of the public at large", ".... guilty
of dereliction of duty which is wholly unbecoming of a
member of a teaching faculty....", etc. Question that
would naturally arise at this stage is, whether these
expressions per se are indicative of a pre-judged
mind.
17. It is axiomatic that should the petitioner wish to deny
the charges and her disciplinary authority is not
satisfied with such response, he may in his discretion
decide for or against an enquiry. If an enquiry is held,
it cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner has to be
afforded reasonable opportunity of defence. If at all
the enquiry culminates in a report submitted by the
19
enquiry officer concluding that all or any of the
charge(s) stand(s) established, the petitioner would
obviously have to be extended opportunity to submit
her comments in regard to the enquiry officer's
report; and before a final call is taken by the
disciplinary authority, he has to apply his mind not
only to the evidence collected during the enquiry but
also the petitioner's comments against the report of
enquiry. In the event the petitioner is punished upon
acceptance of the report of enquiry (the enquiry
supposedly being conducted in compliance with
principles of natural justice) and a writ petition is
presented challenging the order of punishment solely
on the ground that the charge-sheet contained
expressions and terminology disclosing pre-judgment
of guilt by the disciplinary authority, would the
challenge succeed only on such ground? The answer,
to my mind, cannot but be in the negative. The
Division Bench in Biswanath Mukherjee (supra), it is
noticed, ordered a remand because in the judgment
under appeal, the learned trial judge only decided the
point that the charge-sheet was defective, based
entirely on interpretation of two expressions "found"
20
and "giving rise to presumption" therein, without
deciding the other points. The decisions cited by Mr.
Basu are authorities for the proposition that if the
enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with
law and the disciplinary authority himself has acted
in a manner demonstrating bias against the charged
officer/staff, the fact that there has been deflection of
justice would relate back to the date on which the
charge-sheet was issued containing expressions and
terminology evincing pre-judgment of guilt followed by
other steps not in accordance with law, and
considering the totality of the circumstances the
Court may declare the proceedings to be vitiated on
the ground that the petitioner had to face a
disciplinary authority who was biased and partisan
from the very beginning and that the proceeding was
merely an eyewash.
18. It is too early for the Court to observe with conviction
that the disciplinary authority in the present case has
pre-judged the petitioner's guilt and is bent upon
penalising her, having made up his mind.
19. The charge-sheet does not deserve to be interfered with
for the reasons as above, at this stage, on the ground
21
of the same containing expressions and terminology
disclosing pre-judgment of guilt. However, I further
hold that the charge-sheet is not be interdicted either
on the ground of lack of authority or proved mala fide
as no such case has been set up. The first issue is
answered accordingly.
20. Insofar as the question as to whether the acts of
omission/commission of the petitioner amount to
misconduct and reliance placed by Mr. Basu on the
decision in A. L. Kalra (supra) are concerned, I can do
no better than refer to the decision reported in (1997)
3 SCC 387 (State of Tamil Nadu v. A. C. J. Britto).
Dealing with the decision in A. L. Kalra (supra), it was
observed as follows:
"7. What was, however, contended on behalf of
the respondent was that in absence of any rule
treating non-compliance with an order of a
superior police officer or non-appearance before
a Medical Board as an act of misconduct no
disciplinary proceedings should have been
initiated against him for the said act of
delinquency. In support of this submission the
learned counsel relied upon the decision of this
Court in A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment
Corpn. of India Ltd. In that case, disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against A.L. Kalra by
the Corporation for committing an act of
misconduct under Service Rule 4(1)(i) and (iii)
which prescribed that every employee of the
Corporation shall at all times maintain absolute
integrity and do nothing which is unbecoming of
22
a public servant. Rule 5 prescribed various
misconducts for which action could be taken
against an employee governed by the rules.
Taking note of the fact that Rule 4 was given the
heading 'General' and Rule 5 was given the
heading 'Misconduct' this Court took the view
that the draftsmen of the Rules made a clear
distinction about what would constitute
misconduct. It was under these circumstances
this Court observed that (SCC p. 330, para 22)
'failure to keep such high standard of
moral, ethical or decorous behaviour
befitting an officer of the company by itself
cannot constitute misconduct unless the
specific conduct falls in any of the
enumerated misconduct in Rule 5.'
Rule 4 was regarded as vague and of general
nature and in that context it was further
observed that where misconduct when proved
entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on
the employer to specify and if necessary define it
with precision and accuracy so that any ex post
facto interpretation of some incident may not be
camouflaged as misconduct. Construing the
rules this Court held that (SCC p. 331, para 23)
'Rule 4 styled as 'General' specifies a
norm of behaviour but does not specify
that its violation will constitute
misconduct.'
Rule 4 was thus construed as not specifying
a misconduct. Thus the decision in that case
turned upon the scheme of those rules and the
construction placed upon Rules 4 and 5 of those
rules. This Court in that case has not laid down
as a general principle that if an act is not
specified by rules to be a misconduct then it
cannot be regarded as such and an employee
cannot be punished for committing such an act."
21. In the decision reported in (2006) 3 SCC 143 (Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited v. T. K. Raju), Hon'ble
23
S.B. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed
that on more than one occasion different Courts had
taken pains to explain that the decision in A. L. Kalra
(supra) does not lay down any inflexible rule and
reference was made to the decision in A. C. J. Britto
(supra) and the one reported in 1994 (2) CLJ 456
(Probodh Kumar Bhowmick v. University of Calcutta).
His Lordship in the latter decision held that the
decision in A.L. Kalra (supra) was rendered "in the
peculiar fact of that case" and that:
"33. It is not and cannot be said to be a
precedent on the point that the employer in no
circumstances can proceed against its employee
in absence of rule defining and/or specifying
misconduct.
34. Alleged misconduct of Kalra was trivial. The
report against him was found to be on 'ipse
dixit'. The Supreme Court held that Rule 4(1)(i)
did not specify that its violation will constitute
misconduct.
35. It was stated therein that Rule 4 does not
specify a misconduct. It was held Kalra did not
commit any misconduct by violating 'Advance
Rules'. The Apex Court found 'the transaction
may itself provide for repayment and the
consequence of failure to repay or to abide by
the Rules. This has been done in this case. Any
attempt to go in search of a possible other
consequence of breach of contract itself appears
to be arbitrary and even motivated.
36. The Supreme Court in Kalra observed 'How
did the question of integrity arise passes our
comprehension'. The Supreme Court found that
Rule 4(1)(i) was not only attracted but no attempt
was made to sustain it. It found the first head of
charges to be an eye wash.
24
*****
39. Thus, the Supreme Court in 'Kalra' did not lay down any inflexible rule that before a delinquent can be proceeded with by the employer 'Misconduct' has to be defined with precision; otherwise the disciplinary proceeding shall fail."
22. It would thus appear that what this Court held in 1994 was echoed by the Supreme Court in 1997.
23. At the stage a charge-sheet is drawn up by the disciplinary authority against an officer/staff who is perceived to be a delinquent, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and whatever is stated in the charge-sheet would have to be read and considered as correct, and thereupon if a case of alleged misconduct transpires, the defence of the charge-sheeted officer/staff would not at all be material and relevant and he ought to be left free to respond to the charge-sheet. A complete answer to the submission of Mr. Basu that there has been misconduct must be traceable in the statute and in the absence thereof no proceeding can be drawn up, is provided by the decision in Probodh Kumar Bhowmick (supra) with which I respectfully agree.
24. That apart, it is evident from Ordinance 159 under Part VIII of the Ordinances that the enumerated 25 penalties may be imposed if misconduct of the nature specified in clauses (a) to (h), etc. appear to have been committed. Some of the clauses are attracted here in view of the allegations levelled against the petitioner while the word 'etc' is wide enough to take within its comprehension the other alleged misconduct/misdemeanour of the petitioner. The charges levelled against the petitioner, on facts, do not persuade me to hold that no misconduct/misdemeanour on her part is disclosed. There is, therefore, no reason to uphold Mr. Basu's contention. This answers the second issue.
25. Now the third and final issue is taken up for consideration. The contention that has been urged by Mr. Basu is not at all sound. There is no law that prohibits the disciplinary authority from including additional charges in the charge-sheet, which did not form part of the show-cause notice preceding the charge-sheet. If a show-cause notice precedes a charge-sheet, its purpose is to form an opinion, bearing in mind the response to such notice, as to whether a disciplinary proceeding at all is warranted on facts or not. A disciplinary authority having 26 formed the opinion that a charge-sheet may be issued, it is open to him to include therein such other allegations of misconduct/misdemeanour which would warrant a proper investigation. There is no reason to hold that the charge-sheet suffers from a defect, as contended by Mr. Basu.
26. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, fails and is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
27. The time for the petitioner to respond to the charge- sheet is extended by 14 days from date. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.
(DIPANKAR DATTA, J.) 27