Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mandeep Singh vs State Of Punjab on 28 January, 1997
Equivalent citations: II(1997)DMC284
Author: R.L. Anand
Bench: R.L. Anand
JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J.
1. Two important questions of law are likely to be decided and discussed by me in the present judgment:
(i) What are the suitable premises on which the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., should be invoked in the matrimonial disputes ? and
(ii) Which Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try the offences allegedly committed under Sections 406 and 498-A read with Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code ?
2. Mandeep Singh son of Surjit Singh, resident of Mohalla Ram Nagar, Mandi (Himachal Pradesh), is the petitioner in the present petition filed under Section 482, Cr. P.C., for the quashment of FIR No. 43 dated 6.5.1996, Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar, under Sections 406, 498-A and 120-B, Indian Penal Code, and the petition has been filed against the State of Punjab and Smt. Mandeep Kaur daughter of Harbans Singh, resident of Jaspal Nagar, Sultanwind Road, Amritsar, who is the wife of Sukhdev Singh, brother of Mandeep Singh-petitioner.
3. It has been averred in the petition by Mandeep Singh that marriage between his brother Sukhdev Singh and Smt. Mandeep Kaur, respondent No. 2, was solemnised at Amritsar on 6.2.1994. This marriage was consummated between the husband and the wife and out of this wedlock a female child was born to respondent No. 2 on 29.4.1995. In the month of December, 1995, respondent No. 2 left for Amritsar and thereafter she did not join the company of her husband at Mandi. It is alleged that at the instance of respondent No. 2 FIR No. 43 under Sections 406, 498-A and 120-B, IPC, was registered in Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar. The petitioner was also granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge, Amritsar, on 1st June, 1996. Quashment of the FIR has been sought by the petitioner - Mandeep Singh on the averments that it does not spell out any criminality. On the other hand, the allegations made in the FIR, lodged at the instance of respondent No. 2 are wild and vague. Further the petitioner hails from Himachal Pradesh and as such the offence under Section 498-A, IPC, cannot be tried by the Criminal Courts at Amritsar. It is further averred by the petitioner that he has nothing to gain with the alleged demand of dowry and the cruelty of his brother Sukhdev Singh. By placing reliance on several authorities in the petition itself, finally the petitioner Mandeep Singh has prayed for the quashment of the FIR and all the subsequent proceedings.
4. Before I incorporate the stand of respondent No. 2 in the present judgment, first of all I would like to incorporate the material averments of the application dated 15.4.1996 on the basis of which FIR No. 43 was registered in the Police Station. Smt. Mandeep Kaur, respondent No. 2, addressed one application to I.G. (Border Range), Amritsar, and in the said application she has prayed for the registration of the case against Sukhdev Singh, Surjit Singh, Smt. Narinder Kaur, Mandeep Singh (present petitioner), Smt. Bela wife of Inderjit Singh. It may be mentioned here that in para No. 9 of the petition it has been averred by the petitioner himself that his sister had already been discharged from the allegations.
5. To continue with the material averments of the application, Smt. Mandeep Kaur has alleged at the first instance about her marriage with Sukhdev Singh on 6.2.1994, which was solemnised at Lawrence Road, Amritsar. She has stated in her application that after performing the Anand Karaj, her parents and brothers gave Istri Dhan to her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law as per list attached with the application. Apart from the above articles, her parents gave to the aforesaid accused suit, ring made of gold and other items at the time of the Milni and at the time of the leaving of the Barat. Funiture, which was not given at the time of the marriage, was sent by her parents from Amritsar on the persistent demand of her husband and her father-in-law and mother- in-law by getting it manufactured from Amritsar in the month of July, 1996. On seeing the furniture, her mother-in-law, husband and brother-in-law remarked that they could get the furniture manufactured from Mandi in a better quality, had but her father and manufactured it at a fair price. Taunt was further given by these persons to the lady that it would have been better if her father had paid the price of the furniture in cash. Respondent No. 2 further alleges in her application that after the marriage when she entered the house of her in-laws, the family of her in-laws started taunting her by stating that she had brought inadequate dowry and she was subjected to harassment. In order to save the dignity of her parents, she continued with the passage of time. After of a span of about one month, these persons again impressed upon her to bring money and a demand was made for a sum of Rs. 5 lacs as the husband of the complainant wanted to instal a factory. She could not accept that demand, as a result of which her husband, her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law started beating her and gave her other harass- ment. It is further mentioned by respondent No. 2 that all her gold jewellery was kept by her mother-in-law and she further threatened that in case the complainant did not bring Rs. 5 lacs she would collect the amount after selling at the jewellery articles and thereafter the factory would be installed. It is the further case of respondent No. 2 in her application that all the accused mentioned in the title of the application sent her to Amritsar to her parent's house three times during the period from August, 1994 to February, 1995 by harassing and beating her for the arranging of the amount. Every time she used to collect Rs. 5,000 /- from her mother in order to satisfy the greed of the accused but the greed of her in-laws did not finish. Inspite of the expectation of a child, all the accused continued to harass her by giving her taunts and physical maltreatment. On 3rd March, 1995 her mother and her brother came to Mandi in order to meet her. On this occasion her mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law did not allow them to enter their house. As a result of that, the mother and brother of the complainant had to stay in a hotel and her husband left her in the hotel at about 9 p.m. He categorically told her mother and brother that he could not keep the complainant and they could take her with them. As a result of that, the complainant alongwith her mother and brother returned to Amritsar. On 29.4.1995, a female child was born to the complainant at Amritsar. Inspite of sending intimation to her in-laws, nobody came to see her and the child, nor any amount was sent to the complainant in order to meet her expenses at the time of the birth of the child. In the month of September, 1995 her mother, father, brother, mediator and one Gurcharan Singh Randhawa went to the house of her in-laws at Mandi in order to persuade her husband and in-laws. They also extended an invitation about the Thaka ceremony of the brother of the complainant. On this occasion, the husband of the com- plainant, her mother-in-law, her father-in-law came to Amritsar on 1st October, 1995 and they took the complainant with them on 3rd October, 1995. At that time also the mother of the complainant gave Rs. 5,000/- to the complainant in addition to Rs. 2,100/ - which were given to her mother-in-law. However, her mother-in-law snatched Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and started demanding more money and gave taunts to the complainant that no gold jewellery had been given to her whereas one gold chain had been given to the new born child. That gold chain had also been snatched by her mother-in-law. In December, 1995 her husband took her to Amritsar and after hiring three-wheeler the complainant was sent to her residence from the Bus Stand. A false representation was made by husband that he would be following the complainant after doing some work. The complainant had been waiting for her husband but he did not come to the house of his in-laws. It is further alleged by the complainant that inspite of the telephonic cal 1, her husband did not come to Amritsar in order to take her with him. Ultimately, the complainant went to Calcutta in order to stay with her father. Her father also came to Amritsar. On 13th January, 1996 her parents and brother went to Mandi. However, her mother-in-law, father-in-law and brother-in-law did not allow them to enter the house and rebuked them that in case they tried to leave the complainant in the house of her husband at Mandi, she would not be left alive. While visiting the house of the accused, her parents took customary goods but those were thrown in the courtyard and taunt was given to the complainant that the accused had not arranged the marriage for those bananas and Laddoos. They had to instal a factory. Again a demand of Rs. 5 lacs was repeated upon the complainant and it was also told to her that in the absence of meeting the demand, the complainant could leave the house. It is further alleged by the complainant that in order to save themselves from the threats of the acused, she alongwith her parents returned to Amritsar without touching a sip of water, subsequently, her husband came to Amritsar to give Lohri gift to his married sister. The complainant met her husband and also her sister-in-law and requested them that they should understand the plight of her parents, but her husband and his sister told the complainant that the latter was the only daughter of her parents and her parents should not hestiate to give everything to their only son-in-law. It was also stated by her husband that he could leave the complainant and his daughter but he could not leave his house as he needed money. It was categorically stated to the complainant by her husband that in case the former was not in a position to arrange the amount as demanded earlier, she should not visit the house of her husband at Mandi. A threat was also given by the husband of the complainant that he would arrange a second marriage. The complainant further alleges in her complaint that her in-laws had rebuked her; gave her beatings and threatened her that in case she tried to enter her matrimonial home at Mandi, she would be killed by the accused.
6. To continue with her allegations, the complainant has alleged in her application that she and her family members tried to convince her in-laws and at least on 23.3.1996 her mother-in-law Smt. Narinder Kaur, her father-in-law Surjit Singh, her husband Sukhdev Singh, her brother-in-law Mandeep Singh (Bobby) and her sister-in-law Smt. Bela came with the efforts made by her mediator Jasbir Singh and held a meeting with her parents and brothers. Inspite of the counselling given to them, they did not understand and again demanded Rs. 5 lacs repeatedly. So much so, her mother-in-law, father in low brother-in-law and husband refused to take her with them and they declared that they were ready to rehabilitate the complainant only in case the money is given, otherwise she was at liberty for seeking a divorce, so that a second marriage may be arranged for Sukhdev Singh. It is further stated in the complaint that the complainant told her in-laws that in case they are not interested for her rehabilitation, they should return all her belongings and gold jewellery, which was in their possession. The accused flatly refused to accept this demand of the complainant; rather the complainant was threatened not to visit Mandi, lest she should be liquidated. Further it is alleged by the complainant that her husband, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister- in-law had turned her married life into a curse and she had been kicked out of the matrimonial home by giving her cruel behaviour and she was mentally tortured by making ingenuine demands of money and dowry from the side of the parents of her husband. These persons have also kept all her belongings and gold jewellery and the complainant conceived an apprehension that all her dowry articles would be disposed of by the accused.
7. The above material averments of the application of the complainant had become necessary to be incorporated in order to appreciate the controversy and the questions posed at the outset.
8. Reply to the petition was filed by Smt. Mandeep Kaur (respondent No. 2). A preliminary objection was taken qua the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the police had already filed report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, before the Illaqa Magistrate after the investigation of the case and the said report is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny and in these circumstances, the High Court could not invoke its powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C., for the quashment of the FIR. The case in hand was thoroughly investigated by the police and thereafter the challan was presented and it is for the Court to see whether the accused could be charge-sheeted or not. Om merits respondent No. 2 has denied all the material averments of the petition and has reiterated her material allegations contained in the application made by her and further she had tried to justify that the petitioner, his parents, his brother and his sister had committed the offences under Sections 406 and 498-A, IPC read with Section 120-B, IPC, at Amritsar and the Criminal Courts at Amritsar had the jurisdiction to entertain the challan.
9. I have heard Mr. M.L. Merchea, Advocate, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. Malkeet Singh, Advocate, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2, as well as Mr. K.K. Bheniwala, D.A.G. Punjab, and with their assistance have gone through the record of the case.
10. The present is a petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C., and with the passage of time the law on the subject is being crystallised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and finally a celebrated judgment came to our hands, which is reported as State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., AIR 1992 S.C. 604, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down the following guidelines; which are quite illustrative, and with approval I would like to reproduce the same :
"In following categories of case, the High Court may in exercise of powers under Article 226 or under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., may interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the com- plaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and /or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
Where allegations in the complaint did constitute a cognizable offence justifying registration of a case and investigation thereon and did not fall in any of the categories of cases enumerated above, calling for exercise of extraordinary powers or inherent powers, quashing of FIR was not justified."
Now 1 would like to incorporate the provisions of Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the judgment, which provide as follows :
"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
11. A perusal of the above provisions would show that these powers are the inherent powers of the High Court and such powers should be used sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases and this Court should not shirk its responsibility if the exercise of such powers has become necessary to give effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. At the same time the power under the Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot and should not be invoked by the High Court when the use of this power becomes a handle for the accused party to utilise it as an abuse of the process of law or when the accused party wants to invoke these provisions to scuttle the ends of justice and not for its advancement. While quashing an FIR, the concern of the High Court should always be to go through the allegations on the basis of which a criminal action has flowed against the accused party. If the allegations set out in the complaint or charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, the High Court should exercise those powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for the quashment of the FIR as well as for the quashment of the charge-sheet or for the quashment of the summoning order. But if the allegations made in the FTR or the complaint constitute a prima facie offence vis-a-vis certain persons, then the High Court should not assume the role of the Trial Court, which is the best person to judge after recording the evidence as to what offence had been committed and by whom. The High Court should not read the mind of the accused nor should judge at the stage of invoking the provisions under Section 482, Cr. P.C., who could possibly be punished for the alleged demand of dowry or for the alleged acts of cruelty. Human psychology and behaviour varies from person to person. To decide the probabilities at the initial stage, would amount to entering into the trial itself, which is the prerogative of the Trial Court itself. While quashing or not to quash the criminal proceedings either in the shape of FIR or private complaint or summoning order of charge-sheet, the High Court should be guided from the allegations and with the other provisions of the Code, which provide for an alternative remedy to the accused. In the present case, if the long history of the matrimonial life of the complainant, as given in her application, is taken on its face value, it would be seen that the acts of cruelty had been committed not only at Mandi but also at Amritsar. Those acts of cruelty and misappropriation of the dowry articles had also been committed at Amritsar when the complainant called upon her husband, brother of the husband, and her sister-in-law to return those articles. In these circumstances, the cause of action arose to the complainant partly at Amritsar and partly at Mandi. While dealing with the cases of cruelty, this Court cannot only confine to the interpretation of physical cruelty but also mental cruelty. If a female spouse has been turned out from the house of her in-laws at a particular place like Mandi and under the forced circumstances she is to live with her parents at Amritsar, such female spouse carries with her mental cruelty also because no lady, much less a Hindu lady, would try to leave the house of her husband with her own consent and free-Will unless she was compelled to do so. If a physical cruelty has been committed at Mandi and its effects in the shape of mental cruelty also travelled to Amritsar, this Court is of the view that both the Courts at Mandi and Amritsar had the jurisdiction to try such offences. In the present case there is a specific allegation that the accused repeated the demand of Rs. 5 lacs at Amritsar and this act itself amounts to cruelty and there should not be any difficulty on the part of this Court to hold that the Amritsar Court had the jurisdiction to try the offences.
12. The debtor must find its creditor is the basic law. Assuming for the sake of argument that this principle of contractual liability is not applicable to the matrimonial cases, still it is the husband who is to account for the dowry articles of his wife which were given in the shape of Istri Dhan. The case of the complainant is that right from the very beginning the family of the accused was not satisfied with the dowry articles. They made a demand of Rs. 5 lacs for the installation of a factory. The husband made false representation to the wife; so much so, threat was given to the wife for her liquidation and finally like a prudent lady, the complainant was left with no option but to say to her in-laws, the petitioner, her husband and her sister-in-law to return the dowry articles and this demand was made at Amritsar and once the demand has been made, it becomes obligatory on the part of the accused to account for those articles, and by not doing so, they prima facie committed an offence giving territorial jurisdiction to the Amritsar Courts and thus the finding of this Court is in consonance with the provisions of Section 181(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which lays down that any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject to the offence was received or retained, or was required or accounted for by the accused person. The accused (sic) Istridhan of the complainant at Amritsar irrespective of the fact that they were residing outside Amritsar.
13. With the above discussion, now there is no difficulty to reply to both the questions formulated by this Court at the very outset that in matrimonial cases, the Matrimonial Courts at the bride's residence have the jurisdiction to try the offences both under Section 406 and 498-A, Indian Penal Code.
14. Mr. M.L. Merchea, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, has relied upon a hand of authorities reported as Kulwant Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Kanta Rani, 1994 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 105, I (1994) DMC 463; Rakesh Kumar and Ors. v. The State of Haryana and Ors., 1994 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 288; Satinder Kumar v. Asha Rani, 1995 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 551; Gurmeet Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr., 1993 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 354; Inderjit Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Sushma Rani, 1988 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 527; and submitted with vehemence that the Criminal Courts at Amritsar had no jurisdiction to inquire into and try the offences committed under Sections 498A and 406, Indian Penal Code, as the alleged cruelty, if any, had been committed at Mandi and that the lodging of the FIR at Amritsar is an abuse of the process of law.
15. This Court is not in agreement with the argument raised by Mr. Merchea. All the authorities relied uponby the learned Counsel for the petitioner, if scanned through, would agree with the opinion formulated by this Court above. It is a settled law that every authority stands on its own facts. Rather on the contrary, in the opinion of this Court, the ratios which can be helpful for the adjudication of the controversies in hand can be cited as follows :
(i) In Tilak Raj Sood v. Smt. Sudesh Sood, 1994 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 407, it was held by repelling the contention that the offences under Sections 406 and 498, IPC are separate offences, independent of each other, and that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try those offences together. In this cited case, the Hon'ble Judge examined and came to the conclusion that in the light of the specific allegations, it is a fallacy on the part of the husband to say that the offence under Section 498-A, IPC, cannot be tried together with Section 406, IPC, or that it should be tried at the place of in-laws of the bride.
(ii) Puran Singh and Ors. v. Surjit Kaur and Anr., 1995 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 611, is another authority which can throw flood of light on the controversy in hand. In the cited case the marriage between the parties was solemnised at Fatehabad, District Hisar. The dowry articles were also entrusted at Fatehabad. The wife was allegedly harassed and turned out of the matrimonial home in Ferozepur District. It was held that the Court at Hissar had the jurisdiction to try the complaint. Similar was the view of this Court in Vipin Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr., 1995 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 512; and Jangir Singh and Ors. v. Harpal Kaur, 1995 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 428.
16. My attention has also been invited to Rishi Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1995 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 189, wherein this Court while interpreting the meaning of 'cruelty' as mentioned in Section 498-A, IPC, held that physical or mental harassment to wife by her husband or by her in-laws comes within the term' cruelty'. Same view was taken in V.P. Singh v. State of Haryana, 1996 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 261.
17. As I said at the very outset that the case in hand is one under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and the law is not barren on this point also. In Vir M. Khosla and Anr. v. State of Punjab, 1996 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 673, it was held that if the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence, it should be allowed to be probed. Inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C, should be used with restraint and not to stifle legitimate prosecution. It was further observed that while dealing with cases under Sections 406 and 498-A, Indian Penal Code, specific allegations made against the husband and relations should be seen and it cannot be held that such allegations were merely an attempt to implicate the close relatives of the husband of the complainant. This Court is also having the same opinion as the one laid down in Vir M. Khosla's case (supra).
18. There is another angle of vision which decides the present petition. As stated in the preliminary objection of respondent No. 2 that the challan has already been presented against the petitioner and the other accused, in State of Bihar and Anr. etc. v. Shri P.P. Sharma and Anr. etc., AIR 1991 S.C. 1260, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court cannot declare the accused to be innocent and quash the proceedings. The appreciation of evidence is the function of the Criminal Courts. The High Court, under the circumstances, could not have assumed jurisdiction and put an end to the process investigation and trial provided under the law. At the cost of repetition, it is stated that with the submission of the challan and with the framing of the charge, the High Court should be very slow in invoking the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. In Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, 1994 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 123, Hon'ble the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that with the completion of the investigation and putting the challan and on the Court taking cognizance and framing charge-sheet against the accused, the proceedings before the Criminal Court cannot be quashed under Section 482, Cr. P.C., except in rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. With the completion of the investigation and submission of the challan, invariably it should be left to the Magistrate who has the power and competence to discharge the accused, if he finds that the allegations are groundless. To scuttle the investigation and the trial at the very outset will not be a fair exercise on the part of the High Court by resorting to the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
19. Here, I would also like to deal with when in such like cases a private complaint is lodged and after recording the preliminary evidence, the Magistrate prima facie summons the respondents as accused under the provisions of Section 204, Cr. P.C. This Court is of the opinion that such an order is an interim order and is not a judgment. The Code of Criminal Procedure gives an alternative remedy to the accused under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and resorting to Section 482, Cr. P.C., cannot be endorsed in view of the citation reported as K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, 1992 Criminal Law Journal 3779, I (1992) CCR316 (SC), and the latest on this point of our own High Court is Bachan Singh v. Harpreet Kaur, 1996 (1) R.C.R. (Crl). 806.
20. Summing up the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that while dealing with these types of offences, the law should be liberally construed so as to lean within its limits for the aggrieved who is the bride. Of course, the Courts are also duty- bound to see that under the limited scope of Section 482, Cr. P.C., the process of law must not be abused by the bride so as to build her case on totally unsubstantiated allegations. A note of caution is always required on the part of the Courts to judge from their experience as to which are those cases where the abuse of process of law has been resorted to by the brides and which are the cases where the accused must be punished irrespective of the fact that he is a close or remote relation of the bridegroom. The Law Courts are not supposed to be swayed by sentiments as to who could be the ultimate beneficiary of the alleged demand of dowry. Every case differs from person to person and greed has no limits and it can reach to any dimension whether on the part of the rich or on the part of the poor. Once the allegations are specific and those allegations constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 406 read with Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, Law Courts would try those offences at the place of the bride.
21. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the present petition is totally devoid of any merit and it has no legs to stand and the same is hereby dismissed.