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[Cites 12, Cited by 0]

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Sri Sukdeb Mandal vs Union Of India & Ors on 6 September, 2022

Author: Aniruddha Roy

Bench: Aniruddha Roy

                         IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                        CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
                                 APPELLATE SIDE


     Present:-
     Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha Roy


                                    W.P.A. 28149 of 2015
                                            With
                                    IA No.CAN 01 of 2019
                                (Old No. CAN 12362 of 2019)

                                      Sri Sukdeb Mandal
                                              Vs.
                                     Union of India & Ors.


     For the petitioner:                        Mr. Achin Kumar Majumder, Advocate.

     For the respondents:                       Mr. Sourav Mondal, Advocate.


     Reserved on:                               05.08.2022

     Judgment on:                               06.09.2022

     ANIRUDDHA ROY, J.:-

     Facts:-

1.   On February 23, 2011 an employment notice was published by the third

     respondent inviting application from the public at large for both male and female

     candidates for filling up the Post of Constables in all the Zonal Railways all over the

     country.

2.   Pursuant to and in terms of the employment notice the petitioner in March 2011

     applied thereunder for the Post of Constable. On May 31, 2011 a charge-sheet was

     submitted by the Chakda Police Station before the Learned Magistrate, Kalyani,

     District- Nadia under Section 341, 323, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code

     against the petitioner and his family members. The petitioner on June 02, 2014

     submitted his Attestation Form. On June 18, 2015 the petitioner was declared to

     be medically fit for the initial course of training at Railway Protection Force (for
                                                2



     short, R.P.F) Training Course, N.F. Railways, Domohani and became selected for

     regular absorption in the Post of Constable, R.P.F, Eastern Railway on June 26,

     2015. On July 14, 2015 the petitioner was directed to appear at the Office of the

     third respondent. He appeared. By an order dated January 20, 2015 passed by

     the Jurisdictional Magistrate the petitioner was acquitted under Section 320 of the

     Criminal Procedure Code and the relevant bail bond stood discharged, Annexure P-

     2 to the writ petition.

3.   On July 13, 2015 the petitioner was served notice of termination of his service,

     wherein it was alleged that the petitioner did not disclose the pending police case in

     the attestation form, which amounted to a false declaration and accordingly on

     such plea of furnishing false declaration and for suppression of material fact his

     service was terminated, Annexure P-1 to the writ petition. The petitioner completed

     his initial training course for a period of nine months, qualified successfully and

     became eligible for regular appointment at the Post of Constable and accordingly

     the petitioner reported the R.P.F Headquarter, Eastern Railway on June 26, 2015

     for receiving the said appointment.

4.   Challenging the said order of termination dated July 13, 2015 the petitioner moved

     a previous writ petition being W.P. No. 23959 (W) of 2015. By an order dated

     September 16, 2015, a Coordinate Bench was pleased to dispose of the said

     previous writ petition by directing the second respondent to decide the case of the

     petitioner in accordance with law within a time framed.

5.   Pursuant to the direction dated September 16, 2015 the second respondent

     disposed of the representation of the petitioner dated July 31, 2015 and rejected

     the contention of the petitioner by its impugned order dated October 14, 2015,

     Annexure P-6 to the writ petition.

6.   Assailing, inter alia, the said decision of the respondent no.2 dated October 14,

     2015 instant writ petition was filed.
                                                 3



7.    The parties had filed and exchanged their respective affidavits.

      Submissions:-

8.    Mr. Achin Kumar Majumder Learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner

      submitted that, out of a bona fide mistake the petitioner did not disclose the

      initiation and pendency of the criminal case in the attestation form which was

      merely an omission. He submitted that, a neighbour, namely, Ranjit Biswas of the

      petitioner, lodged a false complaint against all the family members of the petitioner,

      including the petitioner out of jealously. The jurisdictional police authority did not

      entertain the same and as such the neighbour applied before the Jurisdictional

      Magistrate, at Kalyani and on the basis of a direction made by the Learned

      Jurisdictional Magistrate a criminal case was initiated by the jurisdictional police

      station under Section 341/232/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

9.    Referring to Annexure P-2 to the writ petition, which was an order dated January

      20, 2015 passed by the Jurisdictional Magistrate, he submitted that, all the

      accused family members including the petitioner were acquitted at the time of

      examination of the de facto complainant and the alleged injured submitted that,

      they did not want to proceed with the case, as the disputes had been resolved

      amongst them and if all the accused would be acquitted they would have no

      objection. On the basis of an undertaking in writing submitted before the Learned

      Jurisdictional   Magistrate   for   non-prosecution   of   the     criminal   case,   the

      Jurisdictional Criminal Court was of the view that, the offense should be

      compounded and all the accused including the petitioner were acquitted under

      Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The relevant Bail Bond was also

      discharged.

10.   Mr. Majumder submitted that, one Vijendar Singh Goutam a similarly placed

      Constable while undergoing training at RPSF Training Centre, Gorakhpur was

      discharged from the training due to suppression of facts that a criminal case was
                                                4



      pending not being disclosed at the time of filling up the attestation form and for

      suppressing the necessary information. Subsequently after acquittal from the

      criminal case he was allowed to complete the training course. In this regard he

      placed reliance on a document being Annexure P-3 to the writ petition.

11.   Mr. Majumder submitted that, the offenses for which the petitioner was charged

      were trivial in nature. The petitioner had no nexus with the charges. It was due to

      a neighbourhood enmity. The dismissal of service of the petitioner amounted to

      violation of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Such an Act of

      suppression or misrepresentation by the petitioner should be treated as a mere

      omission and nothing more than that. In support Mr. Majumder had relied upon

      the following decisions:-

           (a)   A decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, In the matter of: WPA

                 No. 4683 of 2021, Sri Bibrata Biswas vs. Union of India & Ors;

           (b)   A decision of a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, In the matter of:

                 FMA 888 of 2021 with IA No. CAN 01 of 2021, Union of India &

                 Ors. vs. Bibrata Biswas;

           (c)   A judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, In the matter of: Mohammed

                 Imran vs. State of Maharastra & Ors., reported at AIR 2018

                 Supreme Court 4895;

           (d)   A judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, In the matter of: Civil

                 Appeal Nos. 3574 of 2022, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6009 of

                 2016, Pawan Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors and;

           (e)   A judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, In the matter of: Avtar Singh vs.

                 Union of India & Ors., reported at AIR 2016 Supreme Court 3598.

12.   Learned counsel submitted that, the termination of the petitioner's service should

      be set aside and the impugned decision/order dated October 08, 2015 passed by
                                                 5



      the second respondent be also set aside and the petitioner should be reinstated to

      his service at the Post of Constable where he was appointed, free from any stigma.

13.   Mr. Sourav Mondal appearing for the respondents submitted that, the petitioner

      had applied for and was absorbed in the employment at the Post of Railway

      Constable which is a strict disciplined force. The very suppression of the criminal

      case being pending against the petitioner while filling up the attestation form

      amounted to furnishing false declaration and misrepresentation. The attestation

      form specifically provided for giving a declaration as to the criminal antecedent of

      the candidate. The petitioner deliberately suppressed and misrepresented the

      informations by not declaring that the criminal case was pending against him. This

      relates to a moral turpitude of the petitioner, who was employed in a highly

      disciplined police force. He submitted that, the discharge decision dated July 13,

      2015 clearly mentioned the reasons for dismissal of the petitioner. Since the

      candidate was found to have adverse report on his criminal antecedents and

      character, might not be appointed in RPF including RPSF. False declaration is an

      offense under law and would lead to disqualification of the applicant for

      appointment in a disciplinary force. He submitted that, the necessary instructions

      mentioned in the attestation form clearly specified that furnishing of false

      information or suppression of any factual information in the attestation form would

      be a disqualification and was likely to render the candidate unfit for employment

      under the government. It was also specified that, if the fact that false information

      had been in furnished or there had been in suppression of any factual information

      in the attestation form, comes to the notice of the employer at any time during the

      service of a person, his service would be liable to be terminated.

14.   Referring to Rule 52 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (for short, the

      RPF Rules), he submitted that, provision had been made that as soon a recruit is

      selected but before he was formally appointed to the force, his character and
                                                 6



      antecedents should be got verified in accordance with the procedure prescribed by

      the central government from time to time and where after such verification, a

      recruit was found not suitable for the force, he should not be appointed as a part of

      the force.

15.   Referring to Rule 67.2 of the said RPF Rules, the learned counsel for the union

      submitted that, a direct recruit selected for being appointed as enrolled member till

      such time he was not formally appointed to the force, was liable to be discharged at

      any stage, if the Chief Security Commissioner for reasons to be recorded in writing,

      deemed it fit so to do in the interest of the force. He submitted that, the order for

      dismissal of the petitioner clearly recorded the reasons for which he was dismissed.

      The order was passed in compliance with Rule 212.1 of the said RPF Rules and

      there was no provision for appeal against the said order of discharge.

16.   Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that, the offenses for which the

      charge was framed against the petitioner were serious in nature. It was the guiding

      factor for appointment of a constable in a disciplined Railway Police Force, that a

      candidate must have a clean character without any criminal antecedent. The

      petitioner deliberately misrepresented facts and suppressed the material fact and

      pendency of criminal case against him, while filling up the attestation form. The

      petitioner thereby furnished a deliberate false representation to the employer. Such

      an unethical conduct of a recruit in a disciplined Railway Police Force is not to be

      indulged and should be discharged. In support Mr. Mondal Learned Counsel for the

      respondents, had relied upon the following judgments:-

           (a)     A judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of:

                   W.P. No. 185552 (W) of 2004, Dinesh Paswan vs. Union of India &

                   Ors and;
                                                7



           (b)   Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Civil

                 Appeal No. 6110 of 2008, SLP (C) No. 23875 of 2005, Union of India

                 & Ors. vs. Sukhen Chandra Das.

17.   He submitted that the writ petition was misconceived and frivolous and not tenable

      in law. The writ petition should be dismissed.

      Decision:-

18.   After considering the rival contentions of the parties and upon perusal the

      materials on record, it appeared to this Court that, the facts stated above are not

      disputed. The issue raised for consideration in this writ petition was that, whether

      by not disclosing the fact relating to the criminal antecedents and the

      suppression thereof while filling up the attestation form, the petitioner had

      committed an unpardonable wrong for which the employment of the

      petitioner could be taken away by way of dismissal from service or such an

      Act on the part of the petitioner, considering the facts and nature of

      criminal charges, to be considered as a mere omission on the part of the

      petitioner and the employment of the petitioner would be reinstated?

19.   Though the learned counsel for the respondent had placed and relied upon the

      relevant RPF Rules suggested for dismissal of service, more so when the petitioner

      was employed in a disciplined Railways Police Force in view of the suppression and

      misrepresentation caused by him by not disclosing his criminal antecedents while

      filling up the attestation form, but several precedential law had already been

      pronounced on the issue.

20.   The division bench of this Court In the matter of: Bibrata Biswas (supra) had

      observed as under:-

                     "The Counsel for the writ petitioner/ respondent further stated that
                     the Ld.    Court of Judicial Magistrate had acquitted the         writ
                     petitioner/respondent Honorably and as such there is no case in
                     the eye-of- law. The Counsel for the respondent further stated
                     that the case of the writ petitioner is covered in the four corners of
                     the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
                         8



case of Avtar Singh versus Union of India reported in 2016
Vol. 8 SCC 471 in which it was held as follows:-

    "3. It cannot be disputed that the whole idea of verification
    of character and antecedents is that the person suitable for
    the post in question is appointed. It is one of the important
    criteria which is necessary to be fulfilled before
    appointment is made. An incumbent should not have
    antecedents of such a nature which may adjudge him
    unsuitable for the post. Mere involvement in some petty
    kind of case would not render a person unsuitable for the
    job. Way back in the year 1983, in State of M.P. v.
    Ramashanker Raghuvanshi [State of M.P. v. Ramashanker
    Raghuvanshi, (1983) 2 SCC 145: 1983 SCC (Cri)
    371: 1983 SCC (L&S) 263], where a teacher was
    employed in a municipal school which was taken over by
    the Government and who was taken over by the
    Government and who was absorbed in government
    service in 1972 subject to verification of        antecedents
    and medical fitness. The termination order was passed
    on the basis of a report made by the Superintendent of
    Police to the effect that the respondent was not a fit person
    to be entertained in government service, as he had taken
    part in "RSS and Jan Sangh activities". There was no
    allegation of involvement in subversive activities. It was
    held that such activities were not likely to affect the
    integrity of individual's service. To hold otherwise would be
    to introduce "McCarthyism" into India which is not healthy
    to the philosophy of our Constitution. It was observed by
    this Court that most students and most young men who
    take part in political activities and if they do get involve in
    some form of agitation or the other, is it to be to their ever
    lasting discredit? Sometimes they feel strongly on injustice
    and resist. They are sometimes pushed into the forefront by
    elderly persons who lead and mislead them. Should all
    these young men be debarred from public employment? It
    government service such a heaven that only angles should
    seek entry into it? This Court has laid down that the
    whole business of seeking police report about the political
    belief and association of the past political activities of a
    candidate for public employment is repugnant to the basic
    rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
    37. The "McCarthyism" is antithesis to constitutional goal,
    chance of reformation has to be afforded to young
    offenders in suitable cases, interplay of reformative theory
    cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but
    is one of the factors to be taken into cancelling candidature
    or discharging an employee from service.
    38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to
    explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of
    the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion
    thus:
    38.1 Information given to the employer by a candidate as to
    conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal
    case, whether before or after entering into service must be
    true and there should be no suppression or false mention of
    required information.
                          9



     38.2 While passing order of termination of services or
     cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the
     employer may take notice of special circumstances of the
     case, if any, while giving such information.
     38.3 The employer shall take into             consideration the
     government orders/ instructions/ rules, applicable to the
     employee, at the time of taking the decision.
     38.4 In case there is suppression or false information of
     involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal
     had already been recorded        before filing of      the
     application/verification form and such fact later comes to
     knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses
     appropriate to the case may be adopted:
     38.4.1 In a case trivial in nature in which conviction
     had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age
     or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have
     rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the
     employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of
     fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
     38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case which is
     not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or
     terminate services of the employee.
     38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a case
     involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious
     nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean
     acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given,
     the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to
     antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the
     continuance of the employee."

The Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent has further
submitted that the writ petitioner was minor at the time of
incident. The maturity level expected of a major cannot be expected
from a minor. People may commit errors while they are minors
and cannot be penalized for a life time.

The Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent has further relied
the judgment passed in the case of Mohammed Imran v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. Reported in AIR 2018 Supreme Court 4895
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-

     "10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court
     had called for a confidential report of the character
     verification as also the antecedents of the appellant as on
     this date. The report received reveals that except for the
     criminal case under reference, in which he has been
     acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no
     adverse material against him to deny him the fruits of his
     academic labour in a competitive selection for the post of a
     judicial officer. In our opinion, no reasonable person on the
     basis of the materials placed before us can come to the
     conclusion that the antecedents and character of the
     appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a
     judicial officer. An alleged single misadventure or
     misdemeanour of the present nature, if it can be considered
     to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny appointment to the
                                                   10



                            appellant when he has on all other aspects and parameters
                            been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well-settled
                            in this regard in Avtar Singh v. Union of India and others,
                            (2016) 8 SCC 471: (AIR 2016 SC 3598). If empanelment
                            creates no right to appointment, equally there can be no
                            arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.
                            11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case,
                            we are of the considered opinion that the consideration of
                            the candidature of the appellant and its rejection are
                            afflicted by a myopic vision, blurred by the spectacle of
                            what has been described as moral turpitude, reflecting
                            inadequate appreciation and application of facts also, as
                            justice may demand."



21.   The Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Mohammed Imran (supra) had

      observed as under:-

                     "6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our country. Every
                     advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited number of
                     vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief
                     where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious questions
                     regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly, judicial service
                     is very different from other services and the yardstick of suitability that may
                     apply to other services, may not be the same for a judicial service. But there
                     cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude, to
                     deny appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much will depend on the
                     facts of a case. Every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn
                     from the past and move ahead in life by self-improvement. To make past
                     conduct, irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around the neck of
                     the candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much will, however
                     depend on the fact situation of a case.

                     7. That the expression "moral turpitude" is not capable of precise definition
                     was considered in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another,
                     (1996) 4 SCC 17: (AIR 1996 SC 3300), opining:
                          "12. "Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also
                          societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile,
                          depraved or having any connection showing depravity."

                     11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the
                     considered opinion that the consideration of the candidature of the appellant
                     and its rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision, blurred by the spectacle of
                     what has been described as moral turpitude, reflecting inadequate
                     appreciation and application of facts also, as justice may demand".

22.   The Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Pawan Kumar (supra) had

      observed as under:-

                     "13. What emerges from the exposition as laid down by this
                     Court is that by mere suppression of material/false information
                     regardless of the fact whether there is a conviction or acquittal
                     has been recorded, the employee/recruit is not to be
                     discharged/terminated axiomatically from service just by a
                     stroke of pen. At the same time, the effect of suppression of
                                                 11



                    material/false information involving in a criminal case, if any, is
                    left for the employer to consider all the relevant facts and
                    circumstances available as to antecedents and keeping in view
                    the objective criteria and the relevant service rules into
                    consideration, while taking appropriate decision regarding
                    continuance/suitability of the employee into service. What
                    being noticed by this Court is that mere suppression of
                    material/false information in a given case does not mean that
                    the employer can arbitrarily discharge/terminate the employee
                    from service.

                    18. The criminal case indeed was of trivial nature and the nature of
                    post and nature of duties to be discharged by the recruit has never
                    been looked into by the competent authority while examining the
                    overall suitability of the incumbent keeping in view Rule 52 of the
                    Rules 1987 to become a member of the force. Taking into
                    consideration the exposition expressed by this Court in Avtar
                    Singh (supra), in our considered view the order of discharge passed
                    by the competent authority dated 24th April, 2015 is not sustainable
                    and in sequel thereto the judgment passed by the Division Bench of
                    High Court of Delhi does not hold good and deserves to be set
                    aside".



23.   The Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Avtar Singh (supra) had observed

      as under:-

                    "21. The verification of antecedents is necessary to find out fitness of
                    incumbent, in the process if a declarant is found to be of good moral
                    character on due verification of antecedents, merely by suppression of
                    involvement in trivial offence which was not pending on date of filling
                    attestation form, whether he may be deprived of employment? There may be
                    case of involving moral turpitude/serious offence in which employee has
                    been acquitted but due to technical reasons or giving benefit of doubt. There
                    may be situation when person has been convicted of an offence before filling
                    verification form or case is pending and information regarding it has been
                    suppressed, whether employer should wait till outcome of pending criminal
                    case to take a decision or in case when action has been initiated there is
                    already conclusion of criminal case resulting in conviction/acquittal as the
                    case may be. The situation may arise for consideration of various aspects in
                    a case where disclosure has been made truthfully of required information,
                    then also authority is required to consider and verify fitness for
                    appointment. Similarly in case of suppression also, if in the process of
                    verification of information, certain information comes to notice then also
                    employer is required to take a decision considering various aspects before
                    holding incumbent as unfit. If on verification of antecedents a person is
                    found fit at the same time authority has to consider effect of suppression of
                    a fact that he was tried for trivial offence which does not render him unfit,
                    what importance to be attached to such non-disclosure. Can there be single
                    yardstick to deal with all kinds of cases?

                    22. The employer is given "discretion" to terminate or otherwise to condone
                    the omission. Even otherwise, once employer has the power to take a
                    decision when at the time of filling verification form declarant has already
                    been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the
                    facts and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression or false
                    information are taken into consideration while adjudging suitability of an
                             12



incumbent for services in question. In case the employer comes to the
conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would have been
disclosed it would not have adversely affected fitness of an incumbent, for
reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However, while
doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of
post and duties to be rendered. For higher officials/higher posts, standard
has to be very high and even slightest false information or suppression may
by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However, same standard
cannot be applied to each and every post. In concluded criminal cases, it
has to be seen what has been suppressed is material fact and would have
rendered an incumbent unfit for appointment. An employer would be
justified in not appointing or if appointed, to terminate services of such
incumbent on due consideration of various aspects. Even if disclosure has
been made truthfully, the employer has the right to consider fitness and
while doing so effect of conviction and background facts of case, nature of
offence, etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has been made,
employer may consider nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or
giving benefit of doubt on technical reasons and decline to appoint a person
who is unfit or of dubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion
that conviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the
fitness for employment, incumbent may be appointed or continued in
service.

23. Coming to the question whether an employee on probation can be
discharged/refused appointment though he has been acquitted of the
charge(s), if his case was not pending when form was filled, in such
matters, employer is bound to consider grounds of acquittal and various
other aspects, overall conduct of employee including the accusations which
have been levelled. If on verification, the antecedents are otherwise also not
found good, and in number of cases incumbent is involved then
notwithstanding acquittals in a case/cases, it would be open to the
employer to form opinion as to fitness on the basis of material on record. In
case offence is petty in nature and committed at young age, such as
stealing a bread, shouting of slogans or is such which does not involve
moral turpitude, cheating, misappropriation, etc. or otherwise not a serious
or heinous offence and accused has been acquitted in such a case when
verification form is filled, employer may ignore lapse of suppression or
submitting false information in appropriate cases on due consideration of
various aspects.

24. No doubt about it that once verification form requires certain information
to be furnished, declarant is duty-bound to furnish it correctly and any
suppression of material facts or submitting false information, may by itself
lead to termination of his services or cancellation of candidature in an
appropriate case. However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been
acquitted and case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in not
appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services as conviction
ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and employer is not supposed
to wait till outcome of criminal case. In such a case non-disclosure or
submitting false information would assume significance and that by itself
may be ground for employer to cancel candidature or to terminate services.

25. The fraud and misrepresentation vitiates a transaction and in case
employment has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, as
observed in M. Bhaskaran case [Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995
Supp (4) SCC 100 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 162 : (1996) 32 ATC 94] , it has also
been observed in the reference order that if an appointment was procured
fraudulently, the incumbent may be terminated without holding any inquiry,
however, we add a rider that in case employee is confirmed, holding a civil
                                                13



                  post and has protection of Article 311(2), due inquiry has to be held before
                  terminating the services. The case of obtaining appointment on the basis of
                  forged documents has the effect on very eligibility of incumbent for the job in
                  question, however, verification of antecedents is different aspect as to his
                  fitness otherwise for the post in question. The fraudulently obtained
                  appointment orders are voidable at the option of employer, however,
                  question has to be determined in the light of the discussion made in this
                  order on impact of suppression or submission of false information.

                  26. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one
                  of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to
                  adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based
                  upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.

                  27. Suppression of "material" information presupposes that what is
                  suppressed that "matters" not every technical or trivial matter. The
                  employer has to act on due consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in
                  exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating the
                  services of employee. Though a person who has suppressed the material
                  information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in
                  service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and exercise of
                  power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to
                  facts of cases.

                  28. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post,
                  higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to
                  uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties,
                  impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by authorities
                  concerned considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be
                  exercised on due consideration of various aspects".

24. To consider the issue raised in this writ petition, it is necessary to assess

    the charges inflicted upon the petitioner who was an accused in the criminal

    case. The provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, IPC) under

    which the petitioner was accused were available from the order of acquittal

    dated January 20, 2015 passed by the Jurisdictional Magistrate. The

    charges were under Sections 341, 323, 506 and 34 of the IPC. The

    provisions are quoted herein below:-


                  "34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common
                  intention.- When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance
                  of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in
                  the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

                  323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.- whoever, except in the
                  case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished
                  with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
                  year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
                                                 14



                   Classification of Offense.- The offense under this section is non-
                   cognizable, bailable, compoundable and triable by any Magistrate.

                   341.Punishment for wrongful restraint.- Whoever wrongfully restrains
                   any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
                   may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
                   rupees, or with both.

                   Classification of Offense.- The offense under this section is cognizable,
                   bailable, compoundable and traible by any Magistrate.

                   506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.- Whoever commits, the
                   offense of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of
                   either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
                   with both;

                   If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.- and if the threat be to
                   cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by
                   fire, or to cause an offense punishable with death or [imprisonment for life],
                   or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to
                   impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of
                   either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine,
                   or with both.

                   Classification of Offense.- The offense under this section for criminal
                   intimidation is non-cognizable, bailable, compoundable and triable by any
                   Magistrate. If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc., it is triable by
                   Magistrate of the first class".


25. On a meaningful reading of the said provisions under the IPC, it appears

    that the offence and punishment for wrongful restraint, the punishment for

    voluntarily causing hurt are trivial in nature. The resultant effect of the said

    charges ultimately culminate into a punishment for criminal intimidation, at

    best threat be to cause, inter alia, grievous hurt. Since all the family

    members along with the petitioner were inflicted with these charges, the

    charge was also leveled for acts done by several persons in furtherance of

    common intention. On a meaningful reading and harmonious construction

    of the relevant provisions referred to above of the IPC, this Court is of the

    considered opinion that the principle charges were under Sections 341 and

    323 of IPC which were of trivial in nature without having any effect on the

    moral turpitude. By the said order dated January 20, 2015 passed by the

    Jurisdictional Magistrate, the petitioner along with other family members
                                                15


    was acquitted under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The

    relevant   observations    from     the   order     of   acquittal    passed     by    the

    Jurisdictional Magistrate are quoted below:-

                   "Id. A.P.P is present.
                   De-facto complainant is present and file a compromise petition praying for
                   compounding of offences u/S320 against all accused persons.
                         Learned advocate for the de-facto complainants is present
                         Learned advocate for the accused persons are also present
                         De-facto complainant and the injured are examined on dock
                         Perused the materials on record and petitions
                         Heard both sides
                         Considered
                         On perusal of the materials on record it transpires that charge has
                         been framed submitted u/s 341/323/506/34 of INDIAN PENAL
                         CODE and all the section is compoundable u/s 320 of Cr.p.c. At the
                         time of examination the de-facto complainant and the injured said that
                         they do not want to proceed with the case as all the alleged matters
                         have been resolve between them and if all the accused are acquitted
                         they have no objection.
                         So this court is of the view that, the offense should be compounded on
                         the above mentioned grounds.
                         HENCE, it is
                                                           ORDER

That all the accused persons NAROTTAM MONDAL, KALIPADA MONDAL, SUJIT BISWAS, SISIR BISWAS, NEMAI MON DEAL, SUKDEB MONDAL, BISWAJIT MONDAL are acquitted u/s 320 of Cr.P.C. and then are also discharge from their respective bail bonds. The case is disposed of on withdrawal Note in this register".

26. From the observations made by the Jurisdictional Magistrate while acquitting the petitioner, it was evident that, the de facto complainant withdrew the criminal case and specific submission was made that if the accused were to be acquitted there would be no objection on their part. The petitioner was accordingly acquitted on January 20, 2015 after about six months from submission of his Attestation Form without disclosing his criminal antecedents and/or denial thereof. In the facts of this case, it was true that when the Attestation Form was filled up and submitted by the petitioner on June 02, 2014 the charge sheet was submitted prior thereto on May 31, 2011 and the acquittal of the petitioner took place on January 20, 2015 16 subsequent to the said Attestation Form was filled up by the petitioner. It was also a fact that the de facto complainant withdrew its criminal case and charges against the petitioner as would be evident from the said order of acquittal. Upon assessment of the nature of charges leveled against the petitioner, it appeared to this Court that they were trivial in nature and without any effect on the moral turpitude of the petitioner. The offense alleged to have been committed by the petitioner were petty in nature at a young age and not a serious or heinous one. Moreover, the de facto complainant since had withdrawn the criminal case against the petitioner, the acquittal resulted. The nature of the charges being petty and trivial and after withdrawal of the same by the de facto complainant, the moral turpitude of the petitioner could not be questioned in the facts of this case. Such fact should have been considered by the employer in using its discretion while dismissing the petitioner from his employment.

27. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Md. Imran (supra), that no reasonable person on the basis of materials produced before this Court, in the facts of this case also, can come to a conclusion that antecedents and character of the petitioner was such that he could be declared unfit to be appointed as a Constable in the Railway Police Force.

28. Employment Opportunity is a scarce commodity nowadays being circumscribed within a limited vacancies. It is true that this may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credential of a candidate raises any question regarding its suitability, irrespective of eligibility. But there could not be any mechanically or Rhetorical incantation of morale turpitude, to deny appointment in a government service simplicitor which 17 would depend on the facts of a case. Every individual deserves an opportunity to improve itself, learn from the past and move ahead in life for self improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much will depend on the fact situation of a case.

29. The provisions under Rule 52 and Rule 67.2 of the RPF Rules as were referred to by the Learned Counsel for the respondents, this Court is of the considered opinion that those Rules were brought into existence for fixing a complete guideline of the selection process including the dismissal of a recruit. The judicial precedence by virtue whereof the law on the subject had now been well settled, had also duly considered the said RPF Rules. There cannot be a quarrel with such Rules but upon due consideration, they were interpreted in several judicial precedents and the law had become settled thereupon as discussed above.

30. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Sukhen Chandra Das (supra) was delivered on October 15, 2008. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thereafter in 2016 rendered its judgment In the matter of:

Avtar Singh (supra). The law laid down In the matter of: Avtar Singh (supra) is the law governing the field on the subject. In view of the said subsequent judicial pronouncement In the matter of: Avtar Singh (supra) which was rendered by a bench comprising of three Hon'ble Judges prevails over the judgment rendered In the matter of:Sukhen Chandra Das. In view of the said subsequent larger bench judgment In the matter of: Avtar Singh (supra) the law laid down In the matter of: Sukhen Chandra Das no more governs the field. Similarly the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of 18 this Court In the matter of: Dinesh Paswan shall not govern the field in view of the judgment of the larger bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of Avtar Singh (supra).

31. In view of the fore going reasons and discussions and on an overall assessment of the facts of this case, this Court is of the considered view that, the order of termination/discharge from service dated July 13, 2015 and the consequential order passed by the Respondent No.2 dated October 14, 2015 being Annexure P-1 and P-6 respectively to the writ petition should be and are liable to be set aside and/or quashed and accordingly the said order of termination dated July 13, 2015 being Annexure P-1 to the writ petition and the order dated October 14, 2015 passed by the Respondent No.2 being Annexure P-6 to the writ petition, stand set aside and quashed.

32. The respondents are directed to reinstate the writ petitioner in service on the Post for Constable at the stage from where he was dismissed/discharged from his employment forwithwith and positively within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this judgment and order, strictly in accordance with law.

33. It is further made clear that the petitioner shall be entitled for the arrears of salary and/or the monetary benefit for the period during which he had not served the force due to his impugned discharge/dismissal and he shall be entitled for all benefits, including pay, seniority and all other consequential benefits etc. taking into account, as if the petitioner had not suffered any discharge/dismissal from his employment.

19

34. In view of the above, this writ petition WPA 28149 of 2015 stands allowed.

35. Consequently, CAN 12362 of 2019 stands disposed of.

36. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

(Aniruddha Roy, J.)