Kerala High Court
Sadasivan vs K.Ramachandran Nair on 29 September, 2009
Author: S.S.Satheesachandran
Bench: S.S.Satheesachandran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 6171 of 2008(I)
1. SADASIVAN, S/O.LATE PADAMANABHAN
... Petitioner
2. SIVAJI, S/O.LATE SATHYAVRATHAN
3. MOHAN, S/O.LATE VASUKUTTAN
4. SUGATHAN, S/O.LATE DAMODARAN
Vs
1. K.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
... Respondent
For Petitioner :SRI.T.KRISHNAN UNNI (SR.)
For Respondent :SRI.K.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR(PARTY-IN-PERSON)
The Hon'ble MR. Justice S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN
Dated :29/09/2009
O R D E R
S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN, J.
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W.P.(C).NO.6171 OF 2008 (I)
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Dated this the 29th day of September, 2009
J U D G M E N T
The writ petition is filed seeking mainly the following relief:
i. to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Exts.P7 and P8.
2. Concurrent finding entered by two courts below in a proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil procedure that the petitioners have wilfully disobeyed the order of injunction passed by the court, and, therefore, liable to undergo detention in civil prison for a period of one month, over and above restoring and reinstalling of the boundary fencing stones of the property of the respondent/plaintiff in the suit, is challenged in the writ petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction vested with this WPC.6171/08 2 Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
3. The short facts giving rise to the writ petition are thus:
The respondent filed the suit O.S.No.110 of 2002 before the Munsiff Court, Pathanamthitta, seeking a decree of perpetual prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendants/petitioners in the writ petition, four in number, from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint item No.1 property and demolishing the boundaries of that property separating the plaint item No.2, a pathway described as having a width of 4 meters. Plaintiff canvassed a case that the defendants, with the purpose of widening the item No.2 pathway, are bent upon annexing portions of his property described as item No.1, destroying the boundaries of that property separating the pathway. With the suit, plaintiff moved an application for interim injunction identical to the reliefs claimed as stated above till disposal of the suit. An ex parte order of injunction was passed by the court. An Advocate Commissioner appointed on the request of the plaintiff to note the features of item No.1 and item No.2 properties, after inspecting the property on 21.3.2002, filed Ext.C1 report. After service of notice of the order of injunction and the WPC.6171/08 3 inspection of the Advocate Commissioner, the defendants, violating the order of injunction, destroyed the boundaries separating item No.1 property on its southern side from item No.2 property, the pathway, and, thereby, all of them deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the order of injunction passed by the court, was the case of the plaintiff for moving an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the CPC to proceed against the defendants for such violation. Plaintiff also moved an application for interim mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to restore the boundary fencing of the plaint item No.1 property as it existed before. The defendants, on appearance, refuted the case of the plaintiff, by filing objections. The Advocate commissioner, who inspected the property earlier was deputed by the court again, and, after second inspection, he filed Ext.C2 report stating that the boundaries had been tampered and the fencing stones were removed. The learned Munsiff recorded evidence on the application of the plaintiff for prosecution of the defendants for violating the order of interim injunction, in which, four witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff as PWs.1 to 4, and, on the side of the defendants, three witnesses were examined as DWs.1 to 3. A copy of the notice WPC.6171/08 4 was also exhibited by the defendants as Ext.B1. The reports and sketches prepared by the Commissioner, after conducting local inspection twice on two different dates, were exhibited as Exts.C1 series and C2 series. The learned Munsiff considered the application for interim injunction applied for by the plaintiff, in which an ex parte order was passed earlier, the application moved under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the CPC, alleging that the ex parte order of injunction was violated by the defendants, in which evidence was recorded and also the application for interim mandatory injunction moved for restoration of statusquo as at the time of issuing ex parte order of injunction, all of them together, and passed a common order. Ext.P7 is the copy of that order. The ex parte order of injunction passed earlier was made absolute allowing the application for injunction of the plaintiff. The defendants, all of them, having been found guilty of wilfuly violating the injunction order passed by the court, the application for prosecution moved by the plaintiff was allowed ordering the detention of the defendants, each of them, in civil prison for a period of one month. The defendants were also directed to restore the boundary fencing on the southern side of the plaint item No.1 property touching item No.2 property, pathway, as WPC.6171/08 5 it existed before as reported by the Commissioner in Ext.C1 report prepared on his first visit, allowing the interim mandatory injunction applied by the plaintiff. In default of the defendants to restore the boundary fencing, the plaintiff was allowed to restore it to the original position through court and realise its costs from them. Ext.P7 common order passed by the learned Munsiff was challenged by the defendants, preferring two appeals, C.M.Appeal.Nos.58 and 59 of 2007 before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. The learned District Judge, after hearing both sides, dismissed both the appeals, by which the orders passed in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC, directing detention of the defendants in civil prison for a period of one month, for violating the order of injunction, was confirmed, but, the order to restore the boundary fencing on the southern side of item No.1 property was modified directing the reinstalling of fencing stones alone, but not of the barbed wire fencing, in the original position as before. Ext.P8 is the common judgment passed by the learned District Judge in the above two appeals. Challenge in the writ petition is against the concurrent finding of the two courts below seeking the quashing of Ext.P7 order passed by the learned Munsiff and Ext.P8 common judgment WPC.6171/08 6 of the learned District Judge.
4. The respondent, in response to notice, has entered appearance in person. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and also the respondent, party-in-person. Parties are hereinafter referred to as the 'plaintiff' and 'defendants' for the sake of convenience except where reference as to 'petitioners' and 'respondent' as in the writ petition if so found essential and necessary. The learned counsel for the defendants, inviting my attention to Ext.P7 order and Ext.P8 judgment strenuously and vehemently contended that both the courts below have went wrong in appreciating the materials tendered and also the facts and circumstances involved in the case. There was no reference to a barbed wire fencing in Ext.C1 report prepared by the Advocate Commissioner, is highlighted by the learned counsel to contend that the edifice of the case set up by the plaintiff to prosecute the defendants alleging violation of the interim order of injunction, as having caused removal of the barbed wire fencing separating the plaint item No.1 property with that of item No.2 property, lacks credibility and was bereft of any bona fides, and so much so, the imputed violation of the WPC.6171/08 7 order of injunction by the defendants should have been found unworthy of any merit. Reference is also made to the rough sketches prepared by the Commissioner in the first visit showing the difference in the width of the pathway at various spots touching the plaint item No.1 property of the plaintiff to canvass that the pathway had varying width ranging from 3.9 metres to 4.3 metres. So much so, the measurements of the pathway showing different width at various spots as reported by the Commissioner during his second visit, when he was deputed for the purpose of the prosecution petition, according to the learned counsel, would indicate there was no widening of the pathway as was canvassed by the plaintiff. According to the learned counsel, after obtaining an order of injunction, the plaintiff had installed some fencing stones encroaching upon the pathway, and that had been removed by the local public and not by the defendants. Canvassing a case that there existed a barbed wire fencing connecting the fencing stones, which was bereft of truth, and setting forth a false case that the defendants violated the order of injunction, the prosecution petition was filed by the plaintiff, is the submission of the counsel. Since that case of the plaintiff is disproved by the materials collected and the facts and WPC.6171/08 8 circumstances presented, it is the submission of the learned counsel that the courts below were not justified in holding the petitioners condemners of the order of injunction and imposing on them punishment of detention in civil prison. Alternatively, taking note of the limits of the visitorial jurisdiction vested with this Court that, in case, the findings of fact entered by the court below cannot be subjected to further enquiry by reappreciating the materials tendered in the proceedings, the learned counsel for the defendants submitted, in the given facts of the case, the order of detention of the defendants in the civil prison has to be interfered with, subject to such orders as may deem fit and proper to this Court. Reliance is placed on Chand Bai v. Maharaja Gaj Singh (1999 AIHC 3724) that an order passed by the subordinate court for detention in civil prison for violating an order of injunction in a proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the CPC can be modified as one of fine taking note of the circumstances of the case. Though Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC, as such, does not contemplate acceptance of an unconditional apology in lieu of imposing punishment as against the condemner, that does not interdict this Court in passing appropriate orders other than the WPC.6171/08 9 punishment provided under that rule, which would suffice the ends of justice, is the submission of the counsel, relying on Maharani Kamsundari v. Durganand Jha and others (AIR 1982 Calcutta 151). In a case of civil contempt, this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, can modify the punishment of detention to one of fine, is the further submission of the counsel canvassing for such modification in the present case, in case, the concurrent findings entered against the defendants as having violated the order of injunction is found unassailable, placing reliance on P.G.Patra v. Puran Foods and another ((2003) 1 SCC
670). The respondent, who appeared in person, highlighting the highhanded acts of the petitioners not only in violating the order of injunction passed by the civil court, submitted that he had been subjected to assault by the petitioners and their henchmen, and a crime case registered over that incident awaits consideration before the criminal court. Petitioners have no respect of law and they have wilfully and flagrantly violated the order of injunction passed by the court, and it was amply proved by the materials produced in the case, and so, found established with convincing evidence by both the courts below, according to the respondent, and so much so, no WPC.6171/08 10 interference with the findings entered and the punishment imposed against the petitioners is warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, and the majesty of the court, which was trampled upon by the acts of the petitioners violating the order of injunction, warrant their detention in civil prison as ordered by the courts below, is the further submission of the respondent. At any rate, the punishment imposed against the petitioners, in the proved facts of the case, does not warrant any interference, is the submission of the respondent.
5. Having regard to the submissions made, I have perused Ext.P7 order of the learned Munsiff and Ext.P8 judgment of the learned District Judge. Ext.P7 order was confirmed in Ext.P8 judgment subject to a minor modification with respect to the barbed wire fencing alone. Both the courts below have concurrently found the petitioners condemners of violating the order of injunction on the materials produced in the case. This Court, in exercise of its visitorial jurisdiction, cannot reappreciate the evidence on the findings so entered by the subordinate court unless it is shown that the findings are so perverse which could not have been formed on the materials produced or it is patently illegal. WPC.6171/08 11 Other than the question whether there was a barbed wire fencing separating item No.1 property of the plaintiff with item No.2 property, the existence of which was found so by the learned Munsiff, but differed by the learned District Judge, after reappreciating the materials, with the result of modifying directions given for putting up the barbed wire fencing in restoring the statusquo order prevailing at the time of passing of the interim injunction, I find both the courts below have concurrently found on the materials produced that the defendants, all of them, have violated the interim order of injunction passed by the court. I am not impressed by the circumstances canvassed by the learned counsel for the defendants with reference to the first and second commission reports as to the width of the pathway at different spots, the absence of the barbed wire fencing in the earlier report etc. to doubt the intrinsic worth of the case canvassed by the plaintiff imputing the violation of order of injunction by them, which have been amply demonstrated and proved by the materials tendered in the proceeding. The concurrent finding entered by the two courts below that the petitioners, all of them, have wilfully violated the order of injunction passed by the court, after notice of such injunction, in the given facts of the case, is WPC.6171/08 12 unassailable.
6. In examining the question whether the punishment imposed against the defendants for violating the order of injunction warrants any interference or modification, some directions issued by this Court during the pendency of the proceeding, deserve to be adverted to. Previously, after the case was heard at length, by one of my learned brothers, the records would show some directions had been given to restore the fencing stones that was demolished and removed in violation of the injunction order. However, directions so issued were set at naught as the plaintiff insisted for substitution of the same fencing stones/pillars, which are stated to have been removed and stolen by the defendants. Replacing of the fencing stones and pillars must only be by the old stones/pillars removed, was the stand taken, which in effect, was beyond the contemplation when directions were issued for restoration of the granite stones, as seen from the order dated 25.2.2009 passed by my learned brother. Since the plaintiff insisted for replacement of the fencing stones by the very same fencing stones, which were removed, bringing back and reinstalling them, it is seen from the above order, WPC.6171/08 13 the case was directed to be placed before the appropriate bench for being heard afresh and disposal on merits.
7. Needless to point out, in a proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC, it is the majesty of the court, the order of which has been violated, that is at stake, and not the vindication of the personal right of a party, whatever be his legal right for the order of injunction obtained from the court, which is imputed to having been violated by the opposite party. Proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC is not intended to satiate the thirst for revenge, or even desire without any malice, to impose punishment of the condemner causing his detention in civil prison or attachment of his property for disobeying the orders of injunction of the court. Power exercised by the court under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC is penal in nature, and more than punishing the condemner by one or the other or both modes covered under the rule, the object and purpose is to vindicate the supremacy of the rule of law, and, not to benefit any party. The rule impose a penalty on a party, who disobeys the order of injunction, but, does not provide any relief to the party in whose favour the injunction has been issued. Purpose of the WPC.6171/08 14 rule is not to punish a person who disobeys injunction order, but, to enforce the order of injunction. So much so, it is needless to point out that the plaintiff could not have insisted for reinstallation of the fencing stones with those stones, which had been removed and the impracticable suggestion so canvassed had no merit, and, it was outside the scope of the proceeding. Be that as it may, the question to be looked into is whether in the given facts of the case the defendants have to be detained in the civil prison for the term imposed against them. Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC empowers the court on satisfaction that the person proceeded under the rule had violated the order of injunction, and, thus, guilty of such disobedience, to order the property of that person attached and also to punish such person in the civil prison not exceeding three months, unless the court, in the meantime, directs his release. If an attachment of the property of the condemner is ordered, sub rule (2) of Rule 2-A of CPC stipulates that it shall not continue in force for more than one year, and at the end of that period, if the disobedience continues, the property attached may be sold from the proceeding thereof. The court, on such sale, may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured property, and the WPC.6171/08 15 balance, if any, to the party entitled therein. So much so, awarding of compensation in lieu of imposing the punishment of detention or passing an order of attachment for violating the order of injunction is not contemplated under the proceeding. That course is open only if the disobedience continues for the period of one year after an attachment of property ordered remain in force, and the court finds that the property attached has to be sold for such continued disobedience. Plaintiff has a grievance that he had suffered physical assault at the hands of the defendants and their henchmen. To canvass that case, what is produced was only a copy of a FIR, not even the statement on which the crime was registered. I do not want to express any opinion over that matter as the crime registered thereof is stated to be pending consideration before a criminal court; but, reference has been made to that case only to point out that in the present proceedings, violation of the order of injunction passed by the court and the disobedience thereof by the defendants, that alone, is the matter arising for consideration. The law will take its own course in respect of the criminal case, which is stated to be pending, and that is not a matter to be given too much importance or significance as to what should be the WPC.6171/08 16 punishment to be imposed against the condemners/the defendants, who violated and disobeyed the order of injunction. Flouting the order of injunction, it has been established that they have removed the fencing stones installed on the southern side of the plaint item No.1 property separating it from the pathway item No.2 property. The case of the plaintiff that barbed wire fencing connecting the fencing stones had been removed in the light of the absence of any particulars of the fencing in the first report prepared by the Commissioner and also in the affidavit filed by the plaintiff imputing disobedience of the order of injunction, persuaded the learned District Judge in appeal to differ from the view taken by the learned Munsiff to hold that the removal was only of the fencing stones, but, not of the barbed wire fencing as alleged. Subsequent report prepared by the Commissioner (Ext.C2) would only show that other than the removal of the fencing stones at a spot where one of the fencing stones was removed, there were some marks on the southern boundary of the item No.1 property with a spade. Other than the above feature, prima facie, there was nothing more to hold that there was a concerted act by the defendants for widening the pathway annexing portions of the item No.1 property, WPC.6171/08 17 disobeying the order of injunction. I refrain from adverting further to the above aspects, which may have some relevance in the trial of the suit, in adjudicating the controversies arising for consideration. I make it clear that whatever observations/comments made in the present proceeding by me shall not have any bearing or reflection in the adjudication of the disputes involved in the trial. That is to be dealt with and considered on the basis of the materials produced by both sides in the case. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances presented in the case, I find that detention of the defendants in civil prison for the term stipulated, deserve modification as the extreme penalty appears to be not warranted to uphold the supremacy of the court. Other than the punishment of detention in civil prison the directions/orders given under Ext.P8 judgment by the learned District Judge would suffice the ends of justice, in upholding the majesty of the court. I do take note that the plaintiff, who got an order of injunction in his favour, by the wilful disobedience of such order by the defendants had suffered injuries and to vindicate his legal rights over the properties, was constrained to initiate proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC against them, and consequently to defend the WPC.6171/08 18 orders passed in his favour not only before the District Court, but, before this Court as well. Though the order of punishment of detention in civil prison imposed against the defendants is ordered to be modified, I find all of them are liable to compensate the injuries suffered not in respect to the violation of disobedience of injunction, but, the expenses and suffering that have to be undergone by the plaintiff in the proceeding, which continued before three courts. So much so, I order that the defendants, all of them, jointly and severally pay a cost of Rs.20,000/- to the plaintiff to meet the expenses incurred by him for prosecuting the petition on account of their acts in flouting the order of injunction passed by the court. Cost ordered shall be paid by them depositing such sum before the court below within one month from the date of passing of this judgment. In default of such payment, irrespective of the pendency of the suit, it is open to the plaintiff to take appropriate steps for executing the order for costs under this judgment and realising such sum ordered from the defendants. The defendants shall restore the fencing stones removed from the southern boundary of the item No.1 property as ordered in Ext.P8 judgment of the learned District Judge, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of WPC.6171/08 19 a copy of this judgment by the court, and such work shall be done under the supervision of an Advocate Commissioner deputed by the court, preferably by the same Commissioner, who prepared Exts.C1 and C2 reports, if possible, meeting such expenses also by them. The trial court shall depute an Advocate Commissioner to supervise the work of reinstalling the fencing stones at the previous spots from which such stones had been removed, at the expense of the defendants. In case, the defendants fail to take such steps necessary for execution of the work, after the expiry of the period of one month, the plaintiff will be allowed to carry out the work in the presence of an Advocate Commissioner as indicated above and the entire costs thereof shall be realised from the defendants. Ext.P8 judgment passed by the learned District Judge subject to the modification with respect to the punishment of detention of the defendants in civil prison is upheld directing the trial court to dispose the suit as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. I make it clear that none of the observations/findings made in Ext.P7 order of the learned Munsiff or Ext.P8 judgment of the learned District Judge or in the present judgment rendered by this Court, shall have any WPC.6171/08 20 bearing or influence in the disposal of the suit on its merits.
The writ petition is disposed annulling the punishment of civil detention imposed against the defendants and upholding Ext.P8 judgment in all other respects and imposing cost of Rs.20,000/- on the defendants as payable to the plaintiff. Cost ordered by the appellate court in Ext.P8 judgment shall stand modified and vacated in view of the quantified costs awarded in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the expenses incurred by him in all three courts.
S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN JUDGE prp