Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Narpat Singh Bhati vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 25 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990(1)WLN673
JUDGMENT
By The Court
1. By this writ petition the petitioner seeks to quash the order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur dated 11th August, 1978 (Ex. 2) whereby the petitioner's services were terminated The petitioner was given appointment temporarily as LDC by the Superintendent of Police, Jaisalmer after his selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission vide order dated 4-12-1975 (Ex. 1) in pursuance of which he joined his duty on 12-12-1975 The petitioner's services were terminated w.e.f. 13-8-1978 as it was found that his work was not satisfactory during the period of probation. The petitioner was served with one month's notice before termination of his services. Notice (Ex. 3) dated 11-7-1978 was received by the petitioner on 13-7-1978. An appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Tribunal but the same was dismissed by the Tribunal and all his contentions were negatived.
2. Mr. M.L. Kala, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of termination is bad in as much as it casts a stigma and when the order casts a stigma, it was essential to hold an enquiry. The order of termination therefore, is bad and to such an order provision of Article 311 would be attracted. We are unable to agree with this submission of the learned for the petitioner. In this connection a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das (1961 SC 177) is relevant wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the order of discharge of a police officer on probation and held that in the case of a probationer observation like 'unsatisfactory work and conduct' would not amount to stigma. The order of termination of the petitioner does not cast any stigna on the petitioner. When the work of the petitioner was not found satisfactory so his services were terminated. Per se such an observation in the order of termination, cannot be said to be an as persion or stigma on the efficiency or otherwise of the petitioner and to such an order in our opinion Article 311 would not be attracted.
3. It is next contended by Shri Kala counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner's Appointing Authority was Superintendent of Police and the petitioner's services were terminated by the Deputy Inspector General of Police Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur who was no his Appointing Authority and it is only the Appointing Authority which can terminate the petitioner's service. Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Sampuran Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1982 SC 1487) It has been held in this case that in view of Article 311(1) of the Constitution the removing authority cannot be subordinate in rank to the Appointing Authority. So this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is without substance as Deputy Inspector General of Police is an authority higher to the Superintendent of Police and higher authority, is competent to pass an order of termination. An Authority lower in rank to the Appointing Authority is in competent to Pali such an order but authority higher to the Appointing Authority does possess all the powers of the Appointing Authority. Thus the second contention of the petitioner also fails It is next urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been confirmed by virtue of the provision contained in Rule 28A of the Rajasthan Subordinate Officer Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 as order of confirmation was not passed whithin six months after expiry of two years period of procation of one year under the old rule. In this connection suffice it to say that conditions of confirmation are required to be fulfilled then only the demmiog piovision of confirmation would came into glay. One of the conditions for confirmation to be fulfilled is that the incumbent should have passed departmental test of prefiectncy in Hindi and permanent vacancy should be there. No such material is place on record to hold that the necessary conditions of confirmation were fulfilled by the petitioner and as such Rule 28 A old as well as new, would not be applicable to the petitioner. That Apart the petitioner was appointed only on temporary basis and when his performance was not found satisfactory, his services were terminated. It is note worthy that from the date of his appointment till the date of his termination, during five spells the petitioner remained away from duty for above 173 days. This period was taken to be a period on leave without pay. Over all performance of the petitioner was judged as would be evident from the consideration made by the Tribunal. Therefore, the authority was justified interminating the petitioner's temporary service. No other point is pressed before us.
4. This writ petition therefore has no force so it is here by dismissed.