Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Laxmi Bai And Ors. vs Yashoda Bai And Ors. on 17 January, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997(3)ALT302
ORDER S. Dasaradharama Reddy, J.
1. As all the C.R.Ps. are interconnected and are filed against the common judgment of the Appellate Court and arise out of one eviction petition, they are clubbed and disposed of by a common judgment. These petitions are filed by the landlords who are widow, sons and daughters of late Kishan Rao Patangay who died on 2-11-1979, against six tenants for eviction. The eviction petition which was originally filed against fourteen tenants was allowed by the learned Rent Controller and against the same seven tenants have preferred appeals successfully. The other seven tenants who have not preferred appeals have vacated the premises. Even among the seven tenants who have appealed one tenant has since vacated the premises and that is how the landlords have preferred six C.R.Ps. against six tenants. The parties are referred to in the judgment as arrayed in the eviction petition. The particulars regarding the premises and the grounds of eviction as stated in the eviction petition are given in the tabular form below :
C.R.P.No. Respdt No. in Eviction Petition.
Premises No. & nature of the building.
Grounds for Eviction.
4756/94 4757/94 17 to 21 4 15-1-602 Residential 15-1-595/5, 6, 7 & 8 Partly residential and partly non-residential Bonn fide requirement. Bonn fide requirement and default in rent.
4758/94 15 15-1-595/1 8, 19 and 20
- Non-residential Bonafide requirement.
4759/94 5 15-1-595/9, 10 and 11
-partly residential and partly non-residential Bona fide requirement and default in rent.
4760/94 3 15-1-595/4 -
non-residential Bonafide requirement.
4761/94 8 to 13 15-1-595/15 & 16 -
residential Bonn fide requirement.
2. According to the eviction petition, the petitioners are the owners of the building bearing No. 15-1-595/1 to 15-1-595/21 and 15-1-602, 15-1-602/1 and 15-1-602/2 situated at Siddiamber Bazar, Hyderabad. The building consists of ground floor, first floor, second floor and two rooms in the third floor. Petitioners 1 and 3 are carrying on money lending business in a portion in ground floor bearing No. 15-1-595 and have residential building at Feelkhana. In respect of premises bearing No. 15-1-601, the petitioners have filed eviction case RC 31/77 against the tenant who is running business in the said portion. Petitioners 3, 7 and 8 are qualified doctors in medicine. Petitioner No. 3 is a post graduate in general medicine, while petitioner No. 7 has D.G.O. in addition to M.B.B.S. Similarly petitioner No. 8 is a doctor. Petitioner Nos. 7 and 8 who were in Iran doing service proposed to come back to India on expiry of contract period to run Maternity and Nursing Home along with the 3rd petitioner who is now having a clinic at Badechowdi in Hyderabad city in a rented premises. They do not have any other non-residential building in the city. Hence they filed eviction petition for bona fide requirement under Section 10(3)(iii)(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, hereinafter called 'the Act'. They also sought conversion of the subject premises into non-residential building under Section 18 of the Act. It is also alleged in the petition that respondents 4 and 5 are in default in payment of rent for an amount of Rs. 1500/- for the period June to October, 1983 and Rs. 2500/- for the period November, 1983 to 31st March, 1984 respectively.
3. The 3rd respondent filed counter stating that petitioner No. 3 though a doctor is now doing money lending business, that it is not known whether the contract of the petitioners 7 and 8 will continue in future and it is doubtful whether they will come back to India from Iran and hence the commencement of Maternity Nursing Home is a speculative venture created to seek eviction. It is also stated that though the premises occupied by him are non-residential in nature, the other portions being residential, cannot be used for non-residential purpose of running maternity and nursing home unless they are converted under Section 18 of the Act. The 4th respondent while taking the same plea as 3rd respondent further contended that he was never in default in payment of rent and that the petitioner's rent collector collected the rent without passing receipts in accordance with the usual practice of issuing receipts long after receipt of rents. The 5th respondent filed counter on the same lines as 3rd respondent. Regarding wilful default, he states that the rent was refused by the petitioners when offered by him and as such on the date of the first hearing arrears of rent were deposited in the court. The other respondents against whom the only ground of eviction is bonafide requirement, filed counters on the same lines as 3rd respondent. The respondents 17 to 21 have taken an additional plea that as the premises 15-1-602 is a separate building having separate entrance and having nothing to do with the main building, it is not necessary for running the maternity home.
4. The learned Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirement and negatived the contention regarding wilful default. While permitting conversion into non-residential premises he held that petition under Section 18 of the Act for conversion of residential building into non-residential building can be filed simultaneously along with the eviction petition and it is not necessary that conversion orders are to be obtained before filing of eviction petition. Though some other points were formulated for consideration, it is not necessary to refer to them as they do not arise in these proceedings.
5. On appeal, the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court held that (1) the respondents 4 and 5 have not committed any default, (2) there is no legal embargo for the petitioners to seek eviction against all the six tenants who are using their respective portions for residential purpose or for non-residential or both for residential and non-residential, for bonafide requirement of the petitioners; (3) the requirement of the petitioners for running a maternity and nursing home is bona fide; (4) but, as the petitioners are in occupation of non-residential portion in the building, whether the petitioners are carrying on at the premises business in money lending or not, they are barred from claiming eviction in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in "Smt. Vidyavathi Bai v. Shankerlal 1987 (2) ALT 550 as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Divaji's case 1994 (1) APLJ 5 (SC). Accordingly the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the eviction petition. Aggrieved by this, the landlords filed these CRPs.
6. Sri C. Poornaiah, the learned counsel for the petitioners raised the following contentions:- (1) The petitioners have no non-residential building of their own and hence are entitled to seek eviction of the respondents under Section 10(3)(iii)(b) of the Act for the purpose of running Maternity and Nursing Home in the entire premises which constitutes one single structure. (2) Alternatively, the petitioners are entitled to seek eviction under Section 10(3)(c). (3) The respondents 4 and 5 have committed willful default in payment of rents and hence are liable to be evicted under Section 10(2)(i). (4) The respondents except the 3rd respondent in CRP No. 4760/94 are liable to be evicted under Section 10(2)(v) as they have obtained alternative accommodation.
(1) Bona fide requirement:-
7. It is now settled by the Supreme Court in Dwaji's case (supra) confirming the decision of Full Bench of this Court in Vidyavathi Bai v. Shankarlal (supra) that if the landlord has a non-residential premises available for his own occupation, he cannot seek eviction of tenant from another non-residential premises on the ground that existing premises is not sufficient or convenient. Mr. Poornaiah submits that this decision does not come in the way of the petitioners for two reasons:
Firstly, the premises occupied by the petitioners in the ground floor is residential in nature and secondly, even though some portions have fallen vacant during the pendency of the eviction proceedings, all the portions which are let out to the fourteen tenants constitute one single structure.
8. As far as the portions let out to the tenants are concerned, there is no difficulty in holding that they are non-residential premises in view of the order of the Rent Controller permitting conversion under Section 18 of the Act which has not been challenged by the tenants. Regarding the portion occupied by the petitioners, the contention of the learned counsel is that merely because it is used for money lending business, it does not cease to be residential premises. Mr. Poornaiah developed his argument by saying that this premises like the other portions as existing before conversion, is residential in nature and merely because money lending business is carried on by the owners, it does not cease to be residential premises. He contended that residential building is different from residential purpose and that residential building can be used for non-residential purpose like office and Nursing Home, while non-residential building cannot be used for the residential purpose unless the structure is altered. His contention is that the residential building continues to be so until it is converted into non-residential premises by an order under Section 18. He relied upon the following decisions in support of his contention :
Pendyala Venkatakrishna Rao v. B. Seetharam 1989 (3) ALT 284 = 1989 (2) APLJ 261, Amtual Hafeez v. P. Mohammed Ibrahim and D. Krishna Rao v. K.V. Nayak .
9. In Pendyala Venkatakrishna Rao case (supra), a residential building was let out for non-residential purpose i.e., for nursing home. The landlord filed eviction petition on the ground that he requires it for residential purpose. The tenant resisted the petition contending that as it is let out for non-residential purpose, the landlord cannot seek eviction for residential purpose. Rejecting the contention of the tenant, it was held by the Division Bench that the building continues to be residential building unless it is converted as non-residential by an order of the Rent Controller under Section 18 of the Act and if in law the building continues to be residential, notwithstanding the fact that it is being let out for non-residential purpose the landlord can claim eviction for residential purpose subject to the condition of fulfillment of other conditions mentioned in the Section. This decision was applied in Amtual Hafeez case (supra), wherein I have held that the words 'own occupation' occurring in Section 10(3)(a)(i) have to be interpreted as including the type of occupation as the structure admits of and cannot be restricted to residential occupation only. In that case, the premises was residential and the eviction was sought on the ground that the landlord requires it for business of sale of carpets. Applying the decision of Division Bench in Pendyala Venkatakrishna Rao (supra), I held that the landlord is entitled to claim eviction for own occupation. In D. Krishna Rao case (supra) also following the decision of the Division Bench (supra) I held that residential building can be used either for residential purpose or for non-residential purpose as the structure admits of, for example nursing home, office etc., while non-residential building can be used for non-residential purpose only. In that case, Ist to 4th floors fell vacant during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and the tenant raised the contention that eviction petition has to be dismissed. That contention of the tenant was rejected on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the premises is non-residential.
10. Thus, merely because the petitioners were using the portion of the ground floor for money lending business, the premises does not cease to be residential premises.
11. But the next question is whether in view of the eight portions out of the fourteen now converted into non-residential premises, having fallen vacant during the pendency of these proceedings, and being available to the petitioners to occupy, the petitioners are entitled to claim eviction in view of the decision in Dwaji's case (supra) and Vidyavathi case (supra). Mr. Poornaiah, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that these cases do not come in the way of the petitioners as all the portions constitute one single structure and are not separate buildings and the petitioners cannot put the premises to the intended purpose effectively unless all the portions are available. Mr. M.P. Ugle, the learned counsel for some of the respondents on the other hand, contends that the various portions are given to different tenants at different points of time, for different rents and for different purposes and hence are separate buildings within the meaning of Section 2(iii) of the Act, which defines building as any house, or part of house let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purpose. Mr. Poornaiah drew my attention to the finding of the learned Rent Controller in para 47 of his judgment and to the finding of the Appellate Authority in para 15 of his judgment to the effect that the building is structurally one consisting of ground floor, first floor, second floor and 2 rooms in the 3rd floor. He submits that though as per Section 2(iii) of the Act every portion is to be treated as separate building, if the context otherwise requires, all portions put together can be treated as one single building. He relied on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Bollabha Arthothyadi and Ors. v. Grandhi Kamaraju 1988 (2) ALT 109 = 1988 (1) APLJ 404, where it was held as follows:-
"A reading of these Sections 10(2), 10(3)(a)(ii) does not in any way lead to an inference that the building which is structurally one and the same ceases to be a building when it is leased out in portions to more than one tenant. If the building is such as can be conveniently divided into three portions by making some arrangements temporarily or otherwise, it may be leased out in portions. But the unit as a whole does not cease to be a building. Every premises let, or to be let is a building within the meaning of the Act. Hence even if each portion of a house let out is a building for purposes of the Act, the entire building as an integrated unit is also a building and if the requirement is for the integrated unit, there is no prohibition in law, subject of course to the restrictions or conditions mentioned in Section 10(3)(a)(i) or Section 10(3)(a)(iii) a landlord can seek for possession of the entire unit even though it is let out in portions provided he proves that he is not in occupation of any other building either in its entirety or a portion thereof or for the possession of which he is entitled to for the purposes mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) viz., for a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application or for a business which he proposes to commence.
The definition of a building contained in Section 2(iii) would only mean that part of a building which has been let out separately can also be construed as a separate and independent building without reference to other portion or portions of the building. In fact Section 2 starts by saying unless the context otherwise requires". The definition is thus subject to contextual position. Therefore, it follows that where the context requires, the entire building being construed as one integral unit, it would not be appropriate to view the building as consisting of several units and not as one single integrated unit or structure. There is nothing in Section 10(3)(a)(i) or Section 10(3)(a)(iii) which precludes a landlord from seeking possession of the entire building let out to different tenants if his requirement is bonafide, whether the requirement is bonafide or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in each case. If the context in a particular provision requires that the word 'building' should not be understood as defined under Section 2(iii) of the Act certainly it is open to the court to give the real, natural and ordinary meaning which it is capable of. We are therefore of the view that the landlord can seek possession of the entire building or anyone or more portions of the building depending upon his requirement and if the competent authority is satisfied that the requirement is bonafide he can put in possession of the integrated unit."
12. The Division Bench has followed the decision of the Supreme Court in 'Shri Balaganesh Metals v. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty wherein at para 8 it was observed that "the application of the definition of building is subject to the contextual position and if the context warrants the entire building being construed as one integral unit, it can be taken as one integral structure". The Division Bench further explained that the Supreme Court did not hold that for the purpose of Section 10(3)(a)(i) or (iii) each portion must be construed as separate building in all contexts and the integrated unit cannot be considered as a building. Later the Division Bench concluded as follows:-
"For all the above reasons, we hold that under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) a landlord who is not in possession of any non-residential building of his own or to the possession of which he is entitled can simultaneously seek eviction of tenants in more than one non-residential unit of accommodation where all the units are structurally located in the same building. The landlord can seek eviction of the entire building or any one or more than one units of the same building. While portion is a separate building the entire unit consisting of several portions also can be taken as a building depending upon the context"
13. Mr. M.P. Ugle, the learned counsel for some of the respondents relied on Gangaram v. Shankar Reddy and contended that test is not the unity of the ownership of the two buildings but to seek whether the portions can be legally sold independently without affecting the landlord's right to possession and enjoyment of the premises in his occupation. As rightly distinguished by Mr. Poornaiah, this decision is in the context of Section 10(3)(c) which enables the landlord who is residing in part of the building, whether residential of non-residential, to seek eviction of the tenant from the other portions on the ground that they are needed for the purpose of business which he is carrying on. Here, the petitioners are not asking for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c).
14. Apart from the findings of the two courts below that the entire structure is one, decision of Allahabad High Court in Shiv Narain Chaudhari v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Lucknow 108 1TR 104 (All.) supports the contention of Mr. Poornaiah. There the assessee claimed exemption from Wealth Tax under Section 5(l)(iv) of Wealth Tax Act in respect of four residential independent units which are connected with common passage with Municipal Numbers bearing Nos. 92 and 92(A), Darbhanga castle and also another building bearing No. 17/33, Mahathma Gandhi Marg. It was held by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court that buildings bearing Municipal door No. 92 and 92A which are connected by common passage, are contiguous and situated in the same compound within the common boundaries, have unity of structure, and can be regarded as one house and the fact that different portions have different municipal numbers is only relevant but not conclusive. Accordingly it was held that four units are exempt from Wealth Tax while the building bearing municipal door No. 17/33 in Mahathma Gandhi Marg, which was a separate building, is not exempt under Section 5(i)(iv) which grants exemption only for one building.
15. Thus the portions occupied by 14 tenants constitute one structure and though 8 portions have fallen vacant, it cannot be said that the landlords have non-residential premises available for own occupation to disentitle them from claiming eviction. As already seen, the premises now occupied by petitioners are residential premises. Accordingly the decisions in Vidyavathi case (supra) and Dwaji case (supra) do not apply. Even treating the portion now occupied by petitioners as non-residential in view of the entire structure being one and converted into non-residential under Section 18, these decisions do not disentitle them from seeking eviction, as petitioners cannot be said to have independent non-residential building. These decisions apply only to the cases where the premises which is available for occupation by landlord and the premises in respect of which eviction is sought are different buildings. The decision in Anna Kotaiah v. Prabhakar Babu 1993 (2) An.W.R. 304, supports Mr. Poornaiah's submission. In this case the landlord sought eviction of the tenants from all the 6 shops which are in one block on the ground that he wanted to remodel the building for the purpose of clinic. He did not have any non-residential building in Guntur at the time of filing the petition. But subsequent to filing of the petition, 4 shops in the Block i.e., 2 shops at each end were vacated and possession was delivered to the landlord. It was held by Mr. N.D. Patnaik, J that these shops will not be useful for the purpose of clinic of the landlord because the shops in which eviction is sought for are interspersed and unless the landlord get these shops also vacated he cannot remodel the building for his clinic and the learned Judge applied the decision of Division Bench in (supra) and distinguished the decision in Gangaram v. Shankar Reddy (supra), though the learned Judge did not specifically distinguish decision in Vidyavathi Bai case (supra) which was noticed, (Dwaji's case (supra) was rendered subsequently and hence could not be noticed). I respectfully agree with his conclusion for the reasons already stated distinguishing those decisions.
16. Mr. M.P. Ugle, learned counsel for some of the respondents relied on the decision in Smt. K.K. Rachamma v. Smt. Bimal Bai and Anr. , wherein it was held that when a landlady is in possession of building which can be used for business purpose, she is debarred from claiming possession of another building on the ground of bona fide requirement and that the vacant Mulgi is kept reserved for starting business by her husband. I fail to see how this helps the respondents. In that case admittedly, there are two non-residential buildings and one building fell vacant and was available to the landlady for occupation. In those circumstances, with respect, it was rightly held by the learned single Judge following the decision of Vidyavathi's case (supra) and Divaji's case (supra) that the landlady is not entitled to seek eviction.
17. The various portions which are respectively now vacant and in the occupation of the tenants are given below with reference to Ex.P-1. In the ground floor, portions marked A and B are vacant in the north, while portions marked 'C to the south and 'L' to the west are in the possession of tenants. The portion now occupied by the petitioners is intervening between the portions 'A' and 'C. In the first floor, portions 'F', 'G', 'M' and 'N' are vacant, while portions marked 'D' and 'E' to the east of T' are now in the possession of tenants. In the 2nd floor, the portions marked 'I' and 'K' are vacant, while 'H' which is to the east of 'I' and to the south of 'K' and ']' which is west of 'I' are in the possession of the tenants. Thus the portions available are interpersed with the portions now in the possession of the tenants. As rightly pointed out by learned Rent Controller it is not possible to run the Maternity Home even as per minimum standards unless the entire premises is put to use. Thus I hold that the petitioners are entitled to seek eviction of the respondents under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act.
(2) Section 10(3)(c):
18. The alternative contention of Mr. Poornaiah is that the petitioners are entitled to seek eviction under Section 10(3)(c) which reads as follows :
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purpose or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be."
xxxx xxxx xxxx Provided that, in the case of an application under (C) the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to landlord."
19. Mr. Ugle, the learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that when the petitioners have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) in the courts below they are not entitled to invoke it now for the first time. He has also submitted that even assuming that Section 10(3)(c) can be invoked, the petitioners are not entitled to the relief as additional accommodation required by them is not for the purpose of business which they are carrying now at the premises, namely money lending. He also submitted that if section 10(3)(c) has to be applied, proviso has to be considered and the advantage to the landlord and the hardship to the tenants has to be seen and as parties have not adduced evidence in this regard, it is not open to the petitioners to invoke Section 10(3)(c). I agree with the contention of Mr. Ugle. As the petitioners have not invoked this provision either in the eviction petition or in the appeal or even in the grounds of Revision in the present case, they are not entitled to raise it now. Further, as rightly contended by Mr. Ugle, if Section 10(3)(c) has to be applied, the proviso is crucial and the Court can reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant outweighs the advantage to the landlord. In view of this it is not necessary to consider the question whether the words for purpose of a business which he is carrying on" in Section 10(3)(c) means the business which is being carried on in the existing premises. Accordingly the alternative contention is rejected.
(3) Wilful Default:- Section 10(2)(i).
20. Both the Courts below have held that the respondents 4 and 5 have not committed default in payment or rent. No material is placed to warrant interference with this finding. Though in C.R.P. No. 4760/94 filed against 3rd respondent, a ground is taken that there is wilful default on the part of the 3rd respondent, the petition does not speak of that. No material is placed before me to show that he has defaulted in payment of rent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. This contention of Mr. Poornaiah is accordingly rejected.
(4) Alternate Accommodation - Section 10(2) (v)
21. The last contention is that the respondents are liable to be evicted under Section 10(2)(v) on the ground of having secured alternative accomodation. In the eviction petition the plea of alternative accommodation is raised only against respondents 6 and 14 and not against any of the respondents herein. However, Mr. Poornaiah submitted that the respondents in all the CRPs except in CRP No. 4760/94 i.e., 3rd respondent, obtained alternative accommodation during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and hence they are liable to be evicted under Section 10(2)(v) of the Act.
22. Mr. Poornaiah submitted that though this plea was raised during the pendency of the appeal, in support of the order of Rent Controller, the appellate authority has not considered this point. He drew my attention to the evidence of R.W.7 at page 127 of the material papers, where he has deposed that one of his brothers, respondent No. 21, who got separated about five years back constructed a house at Dilsukhanagar. In the cross-examination he stated that the house is named as "Ramachander Kuteer" named after their father. He asserted that all of them did not shift from the present premises to Dilsukhnagar house. From this, Mr. Poornaiah wants me to infer that the respondents have secured alternative accommodation in Dilsukhnagar. I am afraid I cannot agree with his contention. Merely because the house is named after their father, it does not become the property of all the sons. In C.R.P. No. 4757/94 (against 4th respondent), the tenant R.W.3 deposed at page 109 and 110 of the material papers that the premises F-405 in Purnima Apartment at Gunfoundry does not belong to him and that his son is staying there as tenant with his family. He has admitted that he is having two telephone connections, one at Siddiamber Bazar and another at Purnima Apartment. He admitted in the cross-examination that he has shifted his phone from the suit premises to the Gunfoundry apartment and that in the telephone directory his address is shown as Purnima Apartment. He denied that the suit premises was kept under lock and that he has shifted to Gunfoundry. From this it is not possible to infer that the tenant has secured alternative accommodation.
23. As regards C.R.P.4758/94, R-15 in his evidence at pages 118-119, stated that his son P.A. Kadareshan is carrying on business under the name Annapurna Trading Company at Kishanganj. He has shifted his telephone standing in his name in the suit premises to Kishanganj to be used by his son. He has also stated that his daughter-in-law purchased residential flat in Durga Complex in the same locality and that his another son is residing in a rented house in Himayatnagar. He also stated that he is staying with his wife and another son with his family in the schedule premises and that he is using the premises both for residential and non-residential purposes. It is not possible to infer that he has secured alternative accommodation, as he says that he is staying with his another son in the premises and is also doing business there. Hence, this contention of Mr. Poornaiah is rejected.
24. As regards C.R.P. No. 4759/94, the 5th respondent states at page 115 that he is carrying on business under the name and style of Roopchand and Co., at the premises. He has four non-residential premises apart from the shop besides a residential double storeyed house bearing No. 5-3-629/1 at Thofkhana where his four undivided sons are residing. He says that he is using the suit premises for residential purpose only, though earlier he stated that he is carrying on business at the premises. Though he has denied in the cross-examination that he kept the suit premises under lock and key, he has clearly admitted that he has got residential and also non-residential premises besides the suit premises. He also stated that he has entered into an agreement of sale to purchase three flats near Rajadhani hotel for his sons and that he might get possession of these flats in six months time. In view of this clear admission, I hold that the respondent No. 5 is liable to be evicted under Section 10(2)(v) also.
25. As regards CRP 4761/94 filed against respondents 8 to 13, R.W.6 who is 12th respondent gave evidence at page 124 of the material papers admitting that the telephone number standing in the name of 11th respondent, one of the brothers, which was in the suit premises was shifted to premises bearing No. 15-5-207/10 at Osman Shahi where he is carrying on business. He denied that he is carrying 3 residential flats and shifted residence there. He has also denied that the suit premises is kept under lock and key. Hence there is no material to hold that the respondents have secured alternative accommodation.
26. Thus, all the respondents are liable to be evicted under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act for requirement of the petitioners to run the maternity and nursing home. Respondent No. 5 is liable for eviction under Section 10(2)(v) of the Act on the ground that he has secured alternative accommodation.
27. In view of the above discussion, the C.R.Ps. are allowed. No costs. FOUR MONTHS time is given for the respondents to vacate the premises subject to payment of rent in time.