Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ved Parkash Sharma vs Ranbir Singh Sahota And Anr. on 5 October, 2007
Equivalent citations: (2008)149PLR33
Author: Hemant Gupta
Bench: Hemant Gupta
JUDGMENT Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The challenge in the present petition is to the order passed by the learned Rent Controller on 9.10.2006 whereby the petitioner's application for leave to contest sought under Section 18-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act") filed by the respondents under Section 13-B of the Act was dismissed.
2. The respondents have sought ejectment on the ground that Ranbir Singh Sahota, respondent No. 1 herein, is a British passport holder, whereas respondent No. 2 is a Canadian passport holder. Respondent No. 2 has executed a power of attorney in favour of respondent No. 1. It is pointed out that the property in question was purchased by respondent No. 1 and Major Randhir Singh, father of respondent No. 2, vide registered sale deed dated 23.07.1968. Major Randhir Singh died in 17.01.1976 leaving behind respondent No. 2 as one of his legal heirs. Daljit Kaur, wife of Major Randhir Singh, also died on 3.3.2002. Another son of Major Randhir Singh, Air Commander N.P.S. Sahota, also died on 1.4.1995, whereas other legal heirs have given their power of attorney in favour of respondent No. 1 herein.
3. The respondents sought eviction of the petitioner on the ground that respondent No. 2 is settled in Canada and now he has retired. He intends to come to India permanently whereas respondent No. 1 has come back from England to India permanently. The intention of the respondents is to do business and to construct Shopping Malls as they are to start business of big consumer stores. The respondents pleaded that they satisfy the requirement to seek eviction of the petitioner herein as Non Resident Indian in a summary manner in terms of Section 13-B of the Act.
4. In an application for leave to contest, the petitioner denied that the respondents are at all owners of the property in question. It was alleged that one Daljit Kaur and Sukhdev Kaur are the landladies from whom the premises were taken on rent in the year 1978. Earlier, the ejectment petitions were filed in the year 1987 and in the year 1995 but the said ejectment petitions were withdrawn. It was pointed out that respondent No. 1 used to collect rent from the petitioner every month but never claimed to be owner of the property in question ever. The other ground taken was that the property is residential in nature and the same cannot be got vacated for constructing a commercial building. It was also pointed out that respondent No. 1 has been living in India much prior to introduction of Section 13-B of the Act, therefore, he cannot claim the benefit of summary eviction of the tenant. In respect of respondent No. 2, it was pleaded that he continues to live abroad and has not come back, therefore, petition is not maintainable. It was also pointed out that after the death of Randhir Singh, his wife Daljit Kaur became the exclusive owner of the property. She died on 3.3.2002 and, therefore, respondent No. 2 cannot be said to be owner of the property in question for a period of five years immediately prior to filing of the petition. It was also pointed out that the respondents have got another commercial plot at Jalandhar and as such the respondents have got alternative vacant accommodation for starting their business and, therefore, petition for eviction under Section 13-B of the Act is not maintainable.
5. The learned Rent Controller considered all the grounds raised by the petitioner but did not agree with any one of them and consequently dismissed the application and passed an order of eviction.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner before this Court has vehemently argued that the respondents have sought eviction not only of the petitioner but from other three tenants of the respondents inducted by them in the same building. Under the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of one tenant and not all the tenants in the building owned by the landlord.
7. Though the petitioner has not sought leave to defend the petition for eviction on the said ground but the petitioner has produced a copy of the rent note. The learned Rent Controller has referred to the rent note for the period 1.10.1977 to 30.09.1980 wherein the property of the respondents consisted of two halls, six rooms, one kitchen, latrine and bathroom. Thus, it is apparent that the portion let out to the petitioner is part of one integrated building. This Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Mukhesh Kumar v. Santosh Kumari and Ors. (2007-1) 145 P.L.R. 801 has considered that eviction of the tenant is not restricted in respect of the I premises in possession of one tenant but in respect of more than one tenant inducted in one large building. It was held to the following effect:
As a matter of fact, reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act shows that the right is given to the landlord to seek immediate possession of such building or buildings, as the case may be. The use of word "buildings" suggests that the right of the landlord to seek eviction is not restricted in respect of the premises of one tenant but in respect of more than one tenant inducted in one large integrated building. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court in Sardami Sampuran Kaur and Anr. v. Sant Singh and Anr. (1983) 85 Punjab Law Reporter 449, has held that the building as defined under Section 13-B of the Act will mean large integrated building. It was held to the following effect:
...the definition of word "building" in Section 2 of the Act is not in terms absolute but is subject to contextual limitations. The very opening part of the said section makes it explicit that the definition is to apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or the context. Consequently, the use of word 'building' in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) has to be viewed in its particular textual context and not with any inflexible absoluteness of the literal terms of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act. Therefore, it would be possible to construe the word 'building' as used infection 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to include the integrated large building as a whole rather than the part thereof demised to a particular tenant alone....
8. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the said argument raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner.
9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then argued that respondent No. 1 R.S. Sahota has permanently shifted to India prior to introduction of Section 13-B of the Act on 31.05.2001, therefore, he is not entitled to seek ejection of the petitioner. It is also argued that respondent No. 2 became owner of the property after the death of his mother in the year 2002. Since five years from the date of her death has not elapsed, therefore, eviction petition is not maintainable. It is also argued that respondent No. 2 has not visited India and, therefore, eviction sought by him lacks bona fide as he does not intend to shift to India permanently.
10. However, I do not find any merit in the arguments raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The property in question was purchased by respondent No. 1 and father of respondent No. 2 in the year 1968. Respondent No. 2 has not acquired the property for the first time in the year 2002. In fact, the property has been inherited by respondent No. 2. The bar contained in proviso to Section 13-B(1) of the Act that one should be owner of the property for a period of five years can be said to be applicable in respect of the property purchased for the first time. But if the property has been inherited, it can be said that the proceedings under Section 13-B of the Act are being misused for eviction of a tenant. The purpose of such restrictions seems to be that a Non Resident Indian may not buy the property only to seek ejectment of a tenant and, thus, indulge in malpractice of eviction of tenants.
11. Even otherwise, the matter can be examined from another angle as well. The father of the petitioner who purchased the property died on 17.01.1976. After his death, respondent No. 2 inherited the share of his father along with mother Daljit Kaur, other brothers and sisters. Therefore, he is co-owner in his own right since 17.01.1976 as well.
12. The argument that respondent No. 2 has not shifted to India is again without any basis. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini , has held that word "returned to India" should not be read as returned to India permanently with an intention to settle in India. Since respondent No. 2 has expressed his intention to settle in India by establishing a business in the sale of consumer goods by reconstructing building on the property in dispute, it cannot be said that such intention lacks bona fide.
13. The argument that respondent No. 1 is not Non Resident Indian and as such not entitled to seek eviction is again not tenable. In Para No. 1 of the petition itself, it has been pointed out that respondent No. 1 is a British passport holder. His return to India, in fact, shows his intention to start business in the demised premises. A Non Resident Indian as defined in Section 2(dd) of the Act is a person of India origin who has settled outside India either permanently or temporarily who has the intention to stay outside India for uncertain period. Respondent No. 1 is a person of Indian origin but a British citizen. Though he may be staying in India but being British citizen, he is deemed to be permanently settled outside India and is to reside in his country of citizenship. Therefore, he satisfies the requirement of Section 2(dd) of the Act. Alternatively, respondent No. 2 is residing in Canada and is a Canadian citizen. Therefore, respondent No. 2 as a co-owner is competent to seek eviction of the tenant. Reference may be made to Kewal Krishan v. Mohan Singh and Dharampal Sood v. Sarwan Singh and Ors. , wherein it has been held that one of the co-owners is entitled to seek eviction of a tenant under Section 13-B of the Act even if other co-owners do not satisfy the requirement of Section 13-B of the Act. Such view was based upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and Ors. .
No other point has been urged.
14. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any illegality or material irregularity in the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller which may warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
Dismissed.