Madras High Court
The Managing Director, Hindustan Photo ... vs H.B. Vinoba And Others on 14 July, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(1)CTC30, AIR 1998 MADRAS 358, (1999) 94 FJR 572, (1999) 2 LAB LN 719, (1998) WRITLR 581, (1999) 83 FACLR 917
Author: P. Sathasivam
Bench: P. Sathasivam
ORDER
1. Aggrieved against the common order passed by this Court in W.Ps.Nos. 5820 of 1994 etc., batch dated 12.9.1997, Managing Director and General Manager of Hindustan Photo Films Company Limited, Ootacamund have filed the above review applications before this Court.
2. Initially persons numbering about 100 all working in Hindustan Photo Films, Indu Nagar, Ootacamund, aggrieved against the action of their management (review petitioners herein) filed W.P.No. 5820 of 1994 and other writ petition on various grounds. By order dated 12.9.97 after considering the claim of the workmen as well as the management, in the light of the various statutory provisions coupled with law laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court, this Court had issued a direction to the management to consider the claim of the workmen for absorption as regular employees of Hindustan Photo Films. Aggrieved by the said decision, the management has filed the above review applications. In the grounds of review petitions, the management mainly contended that most of the workers/trainees after completion of their training period left their services and the particulars regarding the same have not been considered by this Court and according to them, it is an error apparent and the same has to be reviewed under Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C.
3. After notice to the respondents, I have heard Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel for the petitioner-management and Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the respondents/workmen.
4. Even though several contentions have been raised in the review petitions, taking note of the limited scope under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. learned senior counsel for the petitioner confined his argument by pointing out the statistics that some of the trainees after completion left the service and accordingly Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applies. Accordingly, there is no question of complying section 25F of the said Act. In other words, he reiterated that the management has not violated section 25F of the Act; hence termination will not be held invalid. No doubt, he took me through the statistics furnished by the management in the typed book of papers and submitted that the action of the management is fully justified and the common order passed in the Writ Petitions have to be reviewed or modified suitably. By relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education and 2 others, , learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that this Court has ample power under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India to correct the error in the order passed earlier.
5. On the other hand, Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the workmen, after taking me through the various contentions already raised, discussions and the ultimate decision rendered in the Writ Petitions, has submitted that the very same contentions have been raised earlier and after considering the same, this Court has rightly rejected all the said contentions; accordingly the same cannot be argued once again in the review applications. According to him, in the light of the specific provision, namely. Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. coupled with various decisions of the Supreme Court the review jurisdiction of this Court is very limited; accordingly he prayed for dismissal of the present applications for review.
6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.
7. Mr.R. Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel straightaway brought to my notice the particulars regarding the fact that some of the workmen after completion of their training period, left the service, and accordingly the action of the management is justified under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and there is no violation of section 25F of the said Act. As rightly pointed out by Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel, the very same contentions were raised before me at the time of final disposal of the above writ petitions. After taking note of the said contentions and the additional information furnished on the side of the workmen, the very same question has been considered by me in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 (those discussions find place at pages 131 to 138 in the common typed set of papers filed by the management-red book). A perusal of the said discussions shows that this aspect was considered in detail not only with reference to the particulars furnished by the management, but also the various documents/orders produced by the workmen, namely that after the expiry of the training period they were asked to work for several months ranging from one or two months and one or two years in many cases and taking note of the above factual position, coupled with the law laid down by the Apex Court in an identical circumstances, this Court has rejected the argument of the management. If that is so, in the light of the provision contained in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I am afraid whether the same can be agitated or considered once again in the review applications. It is true that in the decision referred to by Mr.R. Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel, namely, Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education and 2 others, . Their Lordships, after referring various earlier decisions of the Apex Court, formulated the following principles:-
"26. The following principles can be culled out from the above rulings:-
(1) If the judgment is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record in the sense that it is evident on a mere looking at the record without any long-drawn process of reasoning, a review application is maintainable.
(2) If there is a serious irregularity in the proceedings, such as violation of the principles of natural justice, a review application can be entertained.
(3) If a mistake is committed by an erroneous assumption of a fact which is allowed to stand, would cause miscarriage of justice, then also an application for review can be entertained. It is not necessary to point out that the above principles are applicable de hors the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
By pointing out clauses 1 and 3 of the above said principles, learned senior counsel for the petitioners emphasized that it is open to this Court to consider the same. In the light of the factual position narrated by me earlier, namely, the very same questions have been raised and considered with reference to the factual position adduced on either side coupled with the statutory provisions and decisions of the Supreme Court, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned senior counsel for re-consideration.
8. It is worthwhile to mention the following 3 decisions cited by Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the respondents with regard to review power of this Court:-
(i) Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, ; (ii) Chhidda Singh, v. Dy, Director of Consolidation, ; (iii) Chandra Kanta v. SK. Habib, .
9. I shall refer the first decision, viz., Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, wherein Their Lordships after referring Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. with regard to scope of review power of High Court have concluded thus:-
"8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and amit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, , speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p.390, para 3) "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power to review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definite limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
10. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasonings on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayanan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, where in K.C. Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record:
An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ."
11. In the case of Chhidda Singh, v. Dy, Director of Consolidation, , the very same grounds which have been raised in the SLP were mentioned in the review application. After nothing the same, Their Lordships have observed thus:-
"We view this with concern and deprecate the casual and irresponsible manner of filing such review petitions which unnecessarily waste the time of the Court. No existence of an error, much less error apparent on the face of the order, while dismissing the SLP has even been alleged, let alone demonstrated in the review petition. The filing of the review petition is an abuse of the process of this Court. The review petition is, therefore, dismissed with Rs.5000/- as costs, which amount shall be recovered under the Rules."
12. In the case of Chandra Kanta v. SK. Habib, similar question was considered and Their Lordships have concluded as follows:-
"Mr. Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave right in the first round but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules or the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge back-log of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.
We dismiss the petition unhesitatingly, but with these observations hopefully."
13. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court with regard to scope of the review power by this Court, I do not find any ground to interfere with the review applications. As a matter of fact, none of the conditions enunciated in the Division Bench judgment Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education and 2 others, has been fulfilled in order to consider the claim of the Management. It is settled that the power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. As observed by the Supreme Court, in the above referred cases, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits, that would be the province of Court of Appeal and the same cannot be a ground for review. I have already demonstrated that the very same objections were raised and considered on the face of information furnished by both sides while disposing of the writ petitions. The review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C.
14. In the light of limitations as referred above and in the absence of any material in terms of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., I am unable to accept the arguments made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners/Management; consequently, all the review applications are dismissed. No costs.