Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow
Gobind R Bhugra vs Union Of India on 6 December, 2022
CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
LUCKNOW BENCH
Original Application No: 332/00420/2018
Order Reserved on: 23.11.2022
Order Pronounced on :6.12.2022
CORAM
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR OJHA, M-(J)
HON'BLE MR. DEVENDRA CHAUDHRY, M- (A)
Gobind R Bhugra, Aged 71 years s/o Sh. N.D. Bhugra, F-431,
Rajajipuram, Lucknow-226017
....Applicant
By Advocate: Applicant in Person
Versus
1. Union of India, through its Secretary Railway Board, Rail
Bhawan, New Delhi
2. Director General, Research Standard Design and
Organization, Manaknagar, Lucknow
.....Respondents
By Advocate: Shri Ashutosh Pathak
ORDER
HON'BLE SHRI DEVENDRA CHAUDHRY, MEMBER (A) The present original application has challenged the letter dated 18/06/2018 of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, New Delhi which is actually a letter supplying information under RTI to the applicant with regards Page 1 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
to implementation MACP scheme as per recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission [6CPC].
2. In relief, as per relief para, it is sought that as the Hon Apex court vide its order dated 08/2/2017 has struck down the order of the Central Government with regards to date of implementation of the MACP w.e.f. 01/09/2008 hence, the MACP scheme should be implemented as from 01/01/2006 per the order of the Hon Apex court for the Ministry of Railways / Civil employees. The applicant has further contended that the 6th CPC recommended separate scheme for Civilian and Defense personnel. That after the recommendations of the 6th CPC were considered and approved by the Cabinet, the Department of Expenditure had issued Resolution dated 29-08-2008 respect of Civilian employees/ Railway Employees and the Ministry of Defense has issued a separate Resolution date 30-08-2008 regarding extension of 6th CPC benefits to Armed Forces / PBOR personnel implying thereby that the Civilians and the Armed Forces /PBOR personnel are governed different Resolutions/Schemes. But the assertion of the respondents that the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Orders dated 08-02-2017 is in the context of MACP scheme for only MoD / PBOR and not for Civilians/Railways personnel is against the judgment of the Hon Apex court dated 08/2/2017and hence this O.A seeking implementation of the order of Hon Apex court also for Civilian / Railway employees.
3. Per contra the respondents have in their O.A sought Page 2 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
dismissal of the O.A on the following grounds:
(i) that the applicant has not approached the respondents with any representation with regards to relief sought in this O.A and so has come to the Tribunal without exhausting alternative remedy and hence the O.A is prematurely filed;
(ii) the assertion of the applicant that this O.A is for seeking relief for all Civilian / Railway personnel makes this O.A in the nature of a PIL which form of applicant and relief cannot be granted by the Tribunal and so this makes the O.A out of jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
(iii) the O.A is also barred by res judicata because the applicant had earlier filed an O.A No.46/2015 on similar relief which was dismissed vide order 27/10/2016 by the Tribunal and more so, a review petition also filed thereafter was dismissed vide order dated 19/9/2018 and so the instant O.A is barred by res judicata;
(iv) the applicant has also filed a Writ in the Hon High Court Allahabad, Lucknow Bench [Annexure O-3] and this implies multiple litigations by the applicant which is not permissible under law Hence on the basis of the above grounds, the O.A is liable to be dismissed.
4. Heard the applicant in person and the ld counsel for the respondents at length and perused all the pleadings as well as the documents filed carefully.
5. The key issue which falls for consideration of the O.A per the grounds raised by the respondents and the rival contention of Page 3 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
the applicant with regards to implementation of MACP scheme in light of the order of Hon Apex court dated 08/2/2017 ['2017 order' in short hereinafter].
6. As regards the point of res judicata, this Tribunal has vide its order dated 15/12/2020 held that given the fact that in the instant O.A, the applicant has challenged the non-implementation of the Hon Apex court order of 08/12/2017 which relief was not sought in the earlier O.A, hence the instant O.A is not barred by res-judicata.
7. The issue of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy by the respondents is also not maintainable, given that the earlier O.A had within it contained plea with regards to implementation of the MACP scheme for the applicant as from 01/01/2006 instead of 01/09/2008, hence the applicant has exhausted the alternative remedy as far as he is concerned specifically with regards to the relief concerning the scheme implementation date no matter that the Tribunal dismissed his plea in that O.A viz 46/2015. In this context, it is to be noted that this Tribunal has held that the instant O.A is not barred by res judicata.
Therefore, alternative remedy non-exhaustion point of the respondents cannot be held forth.
8. As regards the power of the Tribunal to deal with a P.I.L., while the respondents have not filed any supportive law laid down by the Hon Apex court or the any High Court, but it is in the knowledge of this Tribunal that the Hon Apex court in the matter of Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 273, dealt with an issue as to whether a Page 4 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
Public Interest Writ Petition, at the instance of a stranger, could be entertained by the Administrative tribunal and held that in service matter PIL should not be entertained. Relevant extracts read as under:
"12. We have heard counsel on both sides at length. Several rulings have been relied on by them though in none of the, the question arose directly for consideration. The question as to maintainability of a public interest litigation before the Tribunal depends for its answer on the provisions of the Act. The Tribunal having been created by the Act, the scope and extent of its jurisdiction have to be determined by interpreting the provisions thereof. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. State of U.P., 1987(1) SCC 124 it was held that the Tribunals constituted under the Act were effective substitutes to the High Courts in the scheme of administration of justice and they were entitled to exercise powers thereof. It was observed that they were real substitutes not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto. On that premise the Court held that the power of judicial review exercised by High Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and 227 was completely excluded. It may be noticed that the order of reference dated 15.2.1996 extracted in the earlier paragraph makes a specific mention of this aspect of the matter. If that view had continued to prevail, the approach to the question might have been different.
13. But the law has now been declared differently in Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997(3) SCC 261 that the Tribunals have to perform only, a `supplemental - as opposed to a substitutional - role' in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. This Court has held that the powers of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 are not taken away by the Act. It is only against such a backdrop the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act to entertain a public interest litigation has to be decided. No doubt, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that even from the inception of the Act public interest litigations could be entertained only by the High Courts in exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction and plenary powers and as such powers were not available to the Tribunals, the latter could never have entertained such litigations. It is not necessary for us to consider that contention. As the status of the Tribunals has now been settled in Chandra Kumar (supra), we will discuss the question in the light of the said pronouncement.
14. Section 14 of the Act provides that the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable by all Courts except the Supreme Court immediately before the appointed day in relation to matters set out in the section. Similarly, Section 15 provides for the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the State Administrative Tribunals in relation to matters set out therein. Sections 19 to 27 of the Act deal with the procedure. Section 19 strikes the key-note. Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 19 are in the following terms :
Section 19(1). "Subject to other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.
Explanation : For the purposes of this sub-section, "order" means an order made :
(a) by the Government or a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Govt. of India or by any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Government; or Page 5 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
(b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation (or society) referred in clause (a) *************** *************** Section 19(4). Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject-matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules."
15. Section 20 provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant rules. Section 21 provides for a period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal. A perusal of the above provisions shows that the Tribunal can be approached only by `person aggrieved' by an order as defined. The crucial expression `person aggrieved' has to be construed in the context of the Act and the facts of the case.
16. In Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy and others, 1980(4) SCC 62 it was held that although the meaning of the expression `person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.
17. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, 1976(1) SCC 671 the Court held that the expression `aggrieved person' denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. The Court observed :
"......... It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact, and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him".
18. The constitution of Administrative Tribunals was necessitated because of large pendency of cases relating to service matters in various courts in the country. It was expected that the setting up of Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the Courts but also provide to the persons covered by the Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances. The basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the Act, is that the Tribunal should quickly redress the grievances in relation to service matters. The definition of `service matters' found in Section 3(q) shows that in relation to a person the expression means all service matters relating to the conditions of his service. The significance of the word `his' cannot be ignored. Section 3(b) defines the word `application' as an application made under Section 19. The latter Section refers to `person aggrieved'. In order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already seen that the word `order' has been defined in the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section 3(q) as service matters could be brought before the Tribunal. If in that context, Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt that a total stranger to the concerned service cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the Tribunal the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated.
Page 6 of 19CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
19. Our attention has been drawn to a judgment of the Orissa Administration Tribunal in Smt. Amitarani Khuntia v. State of Orissa, 1996(1) OLR (CSR) 2. The Tribunal after considering the provisions of the Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no existing right to any post and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not entitled to approach the Tribunal. The following passage in the judgment is relevant :
"..... A reading of the aforesaid provisions would mean that an application for redressal of grievances could be filed only by a `person aggrieved' within the meaning of the Act.
Tribunals are constituted under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. The above Article empowers the Parliament to enact law providing for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government and such law shall specify the jurisdiction, powers and authority which may be exercised by each of the said Tribunals. Thus, it follows that Administrative Tribunals are constituted for adjudication or trial of the disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts. Its jurisdiction and powers have been well-defined in the Act. It does not enjoy any plenary power."
We agree with the above reasoning.
20. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta and others v. Union of India, 1982(2) SCR 365 and read out several passages from the judgment dealing with the question of `standing'. In that case the Court was not concerned with the Tribunal constituted under a Statute. It was discussing the question of `standing' in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court. That ruling cannot help the respondents in the present case. Our attention is also drawn to a judgment in University of Mysore and another v. C.D. Govinda Rao and another, 1954(4) SCR 575 wherein the scope of a writ of quo warranto has been discussed. That decision will not apply in the present case as there was no application for issue of a writ of quo warranto before the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the proceedings before the Tribunal is in the nature of quo warranto and it could be filed by any member of the public as he is an aggrieved person in the sense public interest is affected. We have already pointed out that the applications in the present case have been filed before the appointment of the petitioner as a Lecturer and the relevant prayers are to quash the creation of the post itself and preventing authorities from appointing the petitioner as Lecturer. Hence, the applications filed by the respondents cannot be considered to be quo warranto.
21. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and hold that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Act cannot entertain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total stranger. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]..."
8.1 Thus on the basis of the above law laid down by the Hon Apex court a Tribunal cannot entertain a P.I.L. at the instance of a total stranger. Similarly, the Hon Apex court in the matter Page 7 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
of Dr D.B. Singh v. Union of India, (2004) 3 SCC 363, Bench decided that the case on the same lines and held that PIL is not maintainable in service matters. Then again in the matter of Neetu v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 614, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"The scope of entertaining a petition styled as public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases. Referring to the decisions in Dr Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. in (2004) 3 SCC 349, cited supra, the Supreme Court held that PIL in service matters has been held as not maintainable."
Relying on the above-referred Supreme decisions, Court deemed it necessary to extract Article 141 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows:
"141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts -- The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India."
Hence, the Court held that when the PIL is not maintainable in service matters and time and again the same has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in series of decisions, the public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in law and the same is dismissed accordingly. [Jagdish Prasad v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1411, decided on 24-08-2020].."
8.2 Referring to several judgments of the Hon Apex court, the Hon High Court Kerala at Ernakulam in a judgment dated 06/10/2021 WP [C] No. 33702 of 2018 R. Vijajayakumar v/s State of Kerala represented by Secretary to Government, Health and Family Welfare department held as under:
"8. On more than one occasion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that public interest writ petition in service matters is not maintainable.
9. Reference can be made to a few decisions:-
"(i) When maintainability of the public interest writ petition, in service matters, was raised by us, Mr.J.Pooventhera Rajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Jaskaran Singh Brar v. State Of Punjab And Ors., [2005 (3) SLJ 354 P & H]. At that juncture, we pointed out to the learned counsel for the petitioner that judgments Page 8 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
of other High Courts, do not have any binding effect, more particularly, when the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, is to the effect that, a public interest writ petition is not maintainable in service matters, he sought for an adjournment.
(ii) Way back in 1998, in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with an issue, as to whether a Public Interest Writ Petition, at the instance of a stranger, could be entertained, by the W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -8- Administrative Tribunal. After considering the decision in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and others (1976) 1.S.C.C. 671, the law declared in Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261, and the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"18....... Section 3 (b) defines the word 'application' as an application made under Section 19. The latter Section refers to 'person aggrieved'. In order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already seen that the work 'order' has been defined in the explanation to subs. (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section 3 (q) as service matters could be brought before the Tribunal. It in that context, Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt that a total stranger to the concerned service cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the Tribunal the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated. 19. Our attention has been drawn to a judgement of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in Smt. Amitarani Khuntia Versus State of Orissa 1996. (1) OLR (CSR)-2. The Tribunal after considering the provisions of the Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no existing right to any post and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not entitled to approach the Tribunal. The following passage in the judgement is relevant: "....A reading of the aforesaid provisions would mean that an application for redressal of grievances could be filed only by a 'person aggrieved' within the meaning of the Act." Tribunals are constituted under Article 323 A of the Constitution of India. The above Article W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -9- empowers the Parliament to enact law providing for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government and such law shall specify the jurisdiction, powers and authority which may be exercised by each of the said Tribunals. Thus, it follows that Administrative Tribunals are constituted for adjudication or trial of the disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts. Its jurisdiction and powers have been well-defined in the Act. It does not enjoy any plenary power.". We agree with the above reasoning. 21. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and hold that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Act cannot entertain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total stranger."
(iii) In Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 349, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 5 to 16, held as follows:-
"5. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of the expression "public interest litigation". In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (4th Edn.), "public interest" is defined thus: "Public interest.--(1) A matter of public or general interest 'does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected'."Page 9 of 19
CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
6. In Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), "public interest" is defined as follows: W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -10- "Public interest.--Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national Government."
7. In Janata Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary and Others [(1992) 4 SCC 305] the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down as follows:
"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
8. In para 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows:
"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasise that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory; because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold."
9. In para 98 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as follows: "While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that courts should not allow its process to W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -11- be abused by a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration."
10. In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:
"It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold."
11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing the gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters -- government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts Page 10 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity, break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to lose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the courts never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, courts must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined "public interest litigation" in its Report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:
"Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts which provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."
14. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
15. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu ((1994) 2 SCC 481 = 1994 SCC (L&S) 676) W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -14- and A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar ReRolling Mills [(1994) 2 SCC 647 = AIR 1994 SC 2151]. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the Page 11 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr) v. K. Parasaran [(1996) 5 SCC 530 = 1996 SCC (Cri) 1038 = JT 1996 (7) SC 265]. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] . Today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. Self-styled saviours who have no face or ground in the midst of public at large, of late, try to use such litigations to keep themselves busy and their names in circulation, despite having really become defunct in actual public life and try to smear and smirch the solemnity of court proceedings. They must really inspire confidence in courts and among the public, failing which such litigation should be axed with a heavy hand and dire consequences. 16. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that courts are flooded with a large number of so- called public interest litigations, whereas only a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, courts at times are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra (1998) 7 SCC 273, this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of the so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. This tendency is being slowly permitted to percolate for setting in motion criminal law jurisdiction, often unjustifiably just for gaining publicity and giving adverse publicity to their opponents. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Apart from the sinister manner, if any, of getting such copies, the real brain or force behind such cases would get exposed to find out whether it was a bona fide venture. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs, as it prima facie gives impression about oblique motives involved, and in most cases shows proxy litigation. Where the petitioner has not even a remote link with the issues involved, it becomes imperative for the court to lift the veil and uncover the real purpose of the petition and the real person behind it. It would be desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the courts."
(iv) In Dr. B.Singh (Dr.) v. Union of India, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided the case on the same lines and held that PIL is not maintainable in service matters. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
(v) In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 136, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that PIL is not maintainable in service matters. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] Relevant portion of the said decision is reproduced:
"13. When a particular person is the object and target of a petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object. Since in service matters public interest litigation cannot be filed there is no scope for taking action for contempt, particularly, when the petition is itself not maintainable. In any event, by order dated 15.4.2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High Court's order."
(vi) In Indian Consumers Welfare Council v. Union of India and another, reported in 2005 (3) L.W. 522, the abovesaid Council, filed a public interest writ petition, challenging a notification, issued by the 2nd respondent therein, by which, applications were invited, from degree holders, with degree in Page 12 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
education, and consequently, prayed for a direction to the respondent therein, to appoint only those teachers, who were trained in teaching primary sections, for handling classes from 1st to 7th standards, to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers. Following the decision in Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in 2005 J.T. [5] SC 389, a Hon'ble Division Bench of Madras High Court held as under:
"This is a public interest litigation in respect of a service matter. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that no public interest litigation lies in service matters, the last decision being Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005 J.T. [5] SC 389). Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
(vii) In N. Veerasamy v. Union of India, reported in (2005) 2 MLJ 564, while considering a public interest litigation filed by a treasurer of a political party, praying to take action again Mrs.Lakshmi Pranesh, IAS, the fifth respondent therein, under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, for allegedly making allegations against a leader of a political party, following the above judgments of the Honourable Apex Court, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court held as follows:-
"It is settled law that no writ in the form of public interest litigation will lie under Article 226 of the W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -17- Constitution in service matters. The petitioner has no locus standi to file the public interest litigation. The extraordinary powers of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution in matters of this kind is required to be used sparingly and only in extraordinary cases."
"The service matters are essentially between the employer and the employee and it would be for the State to take action under the Service Rules and there is no question of any public interest involved in such matters."
"The petition is not only not maintainable either in law of facts but also would amount to abuse of the process of Court." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
(viii) In B.Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees Association and others, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 731, at paragraph 61, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in service matters only the non appointees can assail the legality of the appointment procedure.
(ix) In Neetu v. State of Punjab, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 614, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:-
"The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases."
"Referring to the decisions in Dr.Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others, reported in 1998 (7) SCC 273 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B reported in (2004 (3) SCC
349), cited supra, the Apex Court held that PIL in service matters has been held as not maintainable."
(x) In Seema Dharmdhere, Secretary, Maharashtra Public Service Commission vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 290, the Hon'ble Apex Court restated that PIL is not maintainable in service matters.
(xi) In Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 655, claiming himself as Vidyut Shramik Leader, a writ petition was filed before the High Court, challenging the appointment of Mr.Hari Bansh Lal, who was appointed, as the Chairman of Jharkand State Electricity Board. The High Court declared that his appointment was not only arbitrary, but also, contemptuous, and ultimately, quashed his appointment, which gave rise to an appeal, before the Page 13 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
Apex Court. Addressing the issue, as to whether a public interest writ petition, is maintainable in service matters, following the earlier decisions in Dr.Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B reported in [(2004) 3 SCC 349] and other decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"PIL in service matters: 11) About maintainability of the Public Interest Litigation in service matters except for a writ of quo warranto, there are series of decisions of this Court laying down the principles to be followed. It is not seriously contended that the matter in issue is not a service matter. In fact, such objection was not raised and agitated before the High Court. Even otherwise, in view of the fact that the appellant herein was initially appointed and served in the State Electricity Board as a Member in terms of Section 5(4) and from among the Members of the Board, considering the qualifications specified in sub-section (4), the State Government, after getting a report from the vigilance department, appointed him as Chairman of the Board, it is impermissible to claim that the issue cannot be agitated under service jurisprudence. We have already pointed out that the person who approached the High Court by way of a Public Interest Litigation is not a competitor or eligible to be considered as a Member or Chairman of the Board but according to him, he is a Vidyut Shramik Leader. Either before the High Court or in this Court, he has not placed any material or highlighted on what way he is suitable and eligible for that post. .............. The same principles have been reiterated in the subsequent decisions, namely, Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 363, Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2005) 1 SCC 590 and Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 136. 15) The above principles make it clear that except for a writ of quo warranto, Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matters." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
(xii) In Girjesh Shrivastava and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 707, appointments were challenged in PIL, on the grounds of contravention of rules, regarding reservation of ex-servicemen. The High Court allowed the writ petition and ordered cancellation of appointments, and dismissed the review petitions also. While considering the issue, as to whether the matter ought to have been taken, as service dispute and not PIL, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions, at paragraphs 14 to 19 has held as follows:-
"14. However, the main argument by the appellants against entertaining WP (C) 1520/2001 and WP(C) 63/2002 is on the ground that a PIL in a service matter is not maintainable. This Court is of the opinion that there is considerable merit in that contention.. It is common ground that dispute in this case is over selection and appointment which is a service matter.
16. In the case of Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others (1998) 7 SCC 273, a three judge Bench of this Court held a PIL is not maintainable in service matters. This Court, speaking through Srinivasan, J. explained the purpose of administrative tribunals created under Article 323-A in the backdrop of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227. This Court held "if public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the (Administrative) Tribunal, the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated" (para 18). Same reasoning applies here as a Public Interest Litigation has been filed when the entire dispute relates to selection and appointment.
17. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees' Association and others, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 731 (II), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in service matters only the non-appointees can assail the legality of the appointment procedure (See para 61, page 755 of the report).
18. This view was very strongly expressed by this Court in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 590, by pointing out that despite the decision in Duryodhan Sahu (supra), PILs in service matters 'continue unabated'. This Court opined that High Courts should 'throw out' such petitions in view of the decision in Duryodhan Sahu (supra) (Para 16, page 596).
19. Same principles have been reiterated in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., reported in (2004) Page 14 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
3 SCC 349, at page 358 (Para 16)." (xiii) In Soma Velandi v. Dr.Anthony Elangovan, reported in (2010) 4 CTC 8, following Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in JT 2005 (5) SC 389, a Hon'ble Division Bench held that PIL is not maintainable in service W.P.(C) No. 33702 of 2018 -21- matters. (xiv) In Bholanath Mukherjee and others v. Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Centenary College and others, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 464, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a direction to set aside the appointment of the 3rd respondent therein, as Principal, was sought for, as the 3rd respondent was junior, to them, and did not have the requisite qualification. Reiterating the legal position that PIL is not maintainable in service matters, the Hon'ble Apex Court declined to entertain the challenge to the notices issued to Ramakrishna Mission to reconstitute the committees. (xv) Though the present writ petition has been filed by a practicing advocate, we wish to incorporate the views of the Hon'ble Apex Court, while entertaining Public Interest Writ Petition, in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in [(2013) 4 SCC 465]. At paragraphs 14 and 15, the Hon'ble Apex Court, observed as follows:
"14. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of the court. The right of effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new social rights regime, must be used to serve basic human rights, which purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever any public interest is invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that there is in fact, genuine public interest involved. The court must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of court and that, "ordinarily meddlesome bystanders are not granted a Visa. Many societal pollutants create new problems of non-redressed grievances, and the court should make an earnest endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. (Vide: P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 856; Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 114; State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 402; and Amar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 69).
15. Even as regards the filing of a Public Interest Litigation, this Court has consistently held that such a course of action is not permissible so far as service matters are concerned. (Vide: Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 114; Dattaraj Natthuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 540; and Neetu v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 758)" (xvi) In Vishal Ashok Thorat and Ors. v. Rajesh Shrirambapu Fate and Ors., reported in AIR 2019 SC 3616, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled proposition of law that PIL in service matters is not maintainable." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] 8.3 In light of above citations, we are constrained to hold that the instant O.A is not maintainable on grounds of being a P.I.L. whose jurisdiction does not lie with this Tribunal.
9. The ld respondents counsel has asserted that the applicant has also filed a Writ in the Hon High Court Allhabad, Lucknow Bench, apart from the O.A in this Tribunal and that this is akin to filing of multiplicity of litigations at different courts for the same relief which is impermissible by law. The applicant has no where denied this nor clarified as to how multiple litigations Page 15 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
can be filed on the same matter. It is no longer res integra that, filing of multiple litigations on the same matter is impermissible and so on this count also, the instant O.A is worthy of dismissal. The applicant-in-person does not seem to understand the issues of law and we take a lenient view of that on account of the fact that the applicant is an applicant-in-person and so restrain ourselves on imposing heavy costs on him for frivolous litigations. Needless to say, the O.A is worthy of dismissal on this point of the applicant filing multiple litigations also.
10. In all fairness we need not proceed any further, but given the fact that the applicant is an applicant-in-person, we do not want any grouse left with regards to his quest for justice.
Therefore, we examine the applicability of the ratio of the judgment of Hon Apex court with regards to order of 08/12/2017 and other citations of the applicant as compared to the latest judgment of Hon Apex court in the matter of UoI Vs. Ex HC/GD Virendra Singh, decided on 22/8/2022, Bench: Hon Sanjiv Khanna J., Hon' Ms Trivedi, SLP (Civil) No. 16442 of 2021 and other connected Appeals:
"2. These appeals by way of special leave raise three issues, all of which are connected and relate to the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme1, namely:
(a) Whether the MACP Scheme is applicable and to be implemented with effect from 1st January 2006, the date from which the Central Civil Service (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008 were enforced, or in terms of O.M. dated 19th May 2009 with effect from 1st September 2009?
(b) Whether under the MACP Scheme the respondents are entitled to financial upgradation equivalent to the pay 1 For short, the 'MACP Scheme'.
scale/grade pay of the next promotional post in the hierarchy, or the Page 16 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
immediate next grade pay in the hierarchy of the pay bands as stated in Section 1, Part A of the First Schedule to the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008?
3................................
......................................
"10. Learned counsel for the government employees, inspite of being correct that M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) does not refer to Balbir Singh Turn (supra) and does not overrule it specifically, misses the point that the entire ratio and reasoning given in M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra), as rightly observed in R.K. Sharma (supra), cannot be reconciled with the ratio in Balbir Singh Turn (supra). M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) has examined the MACP Scheme in depth and detail to settle the controversy, inter alia holding that supersession of the ACP Scheme by the MACP Scheme is a matter of government policy, and that "after accepting the recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission, the ACP Scheme was withdrawn and the same was superseded by the MACP Scheme with effect from 1.9.2008." The ACP Scheme and MACP Schemes were held to be in the nature of incentive schemes to relieve stagnation and not as a part of pay structure, which had revised the dearness allowance with effect from 1.1.2006....... [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
11.On the third aspect, we should record the concession rightly made by the Additional Solicitor General during the course of the hearing that the personnel working in the Central Armed Forces would be granted financial benefit under the MACP Scheme on completion of prescribed years of regular service by relaxation in cases where, on account of administrative or other reasons, they could not be sent for participation in pre-promotional course. The appellant Union of India has agreed to accept the directions given by the Delhi High Court in the case of Ram Avtar Sharma v. Director General of Border Security Force in this regard. A liberal, pragmatic and ameliorative approach is required to succour genuine grievances of the personnel doing duty for the nation, owing to which they forgo participation in pre-promotional courses.
Accordingly, the third question is answered against the appellant-Union of India.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeals filed by the Union of India are partly allowed and impugned judgments, to the extent they hold that the MACP Scheme applies with effect from 1.1.2006 and that under the MACP Scheme the employees are entitled to financial up gradation equivalent to the next promotional post, are set aside. MACP Scheme is applicable with effect from 1.9.2008 and as per the MACP Scheme, the entitlement is to financial upgradation equivalent to the immediate next grade pay in the hierarchy of the pay bands as stated in Section 1, Part A of the First Schedule to the Central Civil Page 17 of 19 CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008. The third issue, which relates to the fulfillment of pre-promotional norms for grant of financial upgradation, is decided against the appellant-Union of India to the extent that this would not be insisted in the case of the Central Armed Forces personnel where, for administrative or other reasons, they could not be sent or undergo the pre-promotional course.
All pending applications are disposed of.
This is the latest judgment of the Hon Apex court on the matter of MACP. Evidently, it has gone into detail on the issue of MACP relating to its date of implementation. And after an extensive analysis, it has held that the Apex Court had in the matter of M.V. Mohanan Nair [reference to judgment contained in the judgment itself] examined the MACP Scheme in depth and detail to settle the controversy, inter alia holding that supersession of the ACP Scheme by the MACP Scheme is a matter of government policy, and that after accepting the recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission, the ACP Scheme was withdrawn and the same was superseded by the MACP Scheme with effect from 1.9.2008. That, the ACP Scheme and MACP Schemes were held to be in the nature of incentive schemes to relieve stagnation and not as a part of pay structure, which had revised the dearness allowance with effect from 1.1.2006. It has finally held that the appeals filed by the Union of India are partly allowed and impugned judgments, to the extent they hold that the MACP Scheme applies with effect from 1.1.2006 and that under the MACP Scheme the employees are entitled to financial up gradation equivalent to the next promotional post, are set aside. MACP Scheme is applicable with effect from 1.9.2008.
Page 18 of 19CAT, Lucknow OA No. 420 of 2018 Gobind R. Bhugra vs. U.O.I.& Ors.
11. Thus we need no further analysis and the case of the applicant closes here and now. The Hon Apex court has in its judgment held finally that the MACP scheme being implemented as from 01/9/2008 is valid and the controversy rests there. In light of above, the O.A is worthy of being dismissed in light of the above judgment of the Hon Apex court.
Accordingly, in sum, the O.A is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed.
12. No costs.
DEVENDRA CHAUDHRY JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR OJHA
Member (A) Member (J)
vidya
Page 19 of 19