Madras High Court
R.S. Hoon vs Mrs. Azaeemunnissa Begum And Ors. on 1 August, 1988
Equivalent citations: (1988)2MLJ477
ORDER Srinivasan, J.
1. Though I am aware that I am beating a dead snake, I am obliged to do it somewhat elaborately on account of the lengthy arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner in the fervent hope that he could persuade me to deviate from the well laid path and pave the way to the constitution of a Full Bench to consider the matter. Unfortunately for him I concur whole heartedly with the decisions rendered already by this Court and there is no question of a reference to a Full Bench. However, I have come out with a long essay on the subject lest I should be accused for not having applied my mind to the points raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
2. The two revision petitions are against the common order passed by the VII Judge, Court Small Causes, Madras while discharging his functions as an Appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973 in R.CA.No. 109 and 110 of 1985 on his file which arose from R.C.O.P.No. 4812 of 1985, XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras filed by the respondents herein for fixation of fair rent for a building occupied by the petitioner herein as tenant. The order of the Appellate Authority was made on 28.2.1986. The revision petitions were presented in this Court on 31.7.86 after delay of 107 days. C.M.P.S.R.No. 56123 of 1986 and 85590 of 1987 are for condonation of the delay of 107 days in preferring C.R.P.S.R.No. 56121 of 1986 and C.R.P.S.R.No. 56119 of 1986 respectively. The two CM.P's are filed under Section 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. C.M.P.S.R.No. 85587 of 1987 is filed under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure for condonation of a delay of 433 days in proper presentation of C.R.P.S.R.No. 56121 of 1986.
3. The Registry naturally raised an objection to the maintainability of the revision petitions and the petitions for condonation of delay as under Section 25(2) of the Act, this Court is empowered to condone delay only upto one month. Of course, the Registry had in its armour several judgments of this Court taking the view that the maximum period which a revision petitioner could have for presenting a revision in 30 + 30 = 60 days excluding the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of the order sought to be revised. Undaunted by the prior judgments, learned Counsel for the petitioner prepared a long note referring to certain authorities and annexed it to a memo. Which reads as follows:
In view of the decisions cited in the annexure hereto, the High Court Office Appellate Side Examiners' section may be directed to post this matter before the Lordship the Chief Justice to refer the same to the Full Bench and pass such further or other orders as His Lordship may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.
On the direction of the Officiating Chief Justice, the matter was posted before me. In the course of his oral arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner refer red to some of the decisions found in the annexure to his memo, and cited some more decisions in addition thereto.
4. Before considering the points urged and authorities relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner, I would briefly set out the relevant provision of law and the earlier decisions of this Court. Before the amendment of the Act in 1973, the Act did not prescribe any period of limitation for filing a revision in this Court. In fact, the section expressly upheld the authorities mentioned therein to exercise the power of revision" at any time". Though the section did not prescribe any period of limitation, the Appellate Side Rules framed by the High Court contained a provision therefor. Order 4, Rule 20 of Appellate Side Rules, read as follows:
Civil revision petition shall be presented within such time as is prescribed by any enactment. There no period of limitation is prescribed, the Civil Revision Petition shall be presented within ninety days of the order explained of or within such further time as the court may, on an application made for the purposes allow, the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act shall apply in computing the said period of ninety days.
An attempt was made to by pass the rule but it was thwarted by Varadarajan, J., in C.R.P.S.R. Nos. 36982 G. Abdul Kudum Sahib v. A. Rukkamdeel Sahib 1973 T.L.N.J. 329 by holding that revision under the Act should be filed within 90 days in accordance with the Appellate Side Rules.
5. By Act 23 of 1973, Section 25 of the Act was completely replaced by a new section which is in vogue now. the relevant portion of the section is found in Sub-section (2) which reads thus:
(2) Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under Sub-section (1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceedings to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant:
Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient excuse for not preferring the application within time specified in this sub-section.
Though there is no ambiguity in the language of the sub-section which presents no difficulty in understanding the same, the ingenuity of the Bar tried to whittle down the effect thereof on more than one occasion but in vain.
6. The earliest judgment published in that or Sethuraman, J, in Rakku and Ors. v. Vasanthalakshmi CR.P.S.R. 826 of 1975 C.M.P. 3128 of 1975, 1975 T.L.N.L 381, who dismissed a petition to condone the delay of 58 days on the ground that the maximum period which is liable to be condoned under the provision is only one month. That decision was followed by Gokulakrishnan, J., in Ambrose v. P.RM.A. Rajapandia Nadar and another in CR.P.S.R.Nos. 62714 and 62738 of 1980 by order dated 22-11-1980. Without referring to either of the above decisions, K.B.N. Singh C.J., took the same view in T.E. Ramanatha Rao v. K. Janardhanan . The facts in that case are worthy of reference. The time for presenting the revision petition expired in that case on 15-5-1980 during the summer vacation. This Court was closed on 1-5-1980 and reopened on 16-6-1980. The revision petition was presented on 9-7-1980. The contention urged on behalf of the revision petitioner was that by virtue of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the revision could have been presented on 16-6-1980 when the Court reopened after summer holidays and the Proviso to Section 25 of the Act enabled this Court in its discretion to allow a period not exceeding 30 days from 16-6-1980 and therefore, the petition to condone the delay in filing the revision on 9-7-1980 was maintainable. Rejecting that contention, the Chief Justice observed as follows:
... If this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the petitioner will have the double advantage of extended period of limitation for filing the revision petition on the day when the court reopened after summer vacation under Section 4 of the Limitation Act when the period of limitation expired during the vacation of the Court and against filing a petition under the Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act seeking the discretionary power of this Court to allow a further time of one month from the date of reopening of the court after vacation. This is not contemplated by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. It is settled law that what is not permitted to be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. If the original period of limitation expires during the vacation and if the revision petition has not been filed on the day when the court reopened under Section 4 of the Limitation Act as in the instant case the discretionary period of one month as provided for in the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act will stay running from the original date of expiration of the period of limitation during the vacation. The power of this Court in the instant case is restricted and not unlimited, as in the case of appeals under the Civil P.C., by the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court can condone any delay for sufficient reasons. In the instant case, the last date of filing the revision was on 15-5-1980 and the revision not having been filed on the date of the reopening of the court, but having been filed only on 9-7-1980, there is no discretion left to the Court, but to reject it on the ground that it is barred by limitation.
7. In M.M. Thimmiah v. M.G. Krishna Reddy and Company 1983 T.N.L.J. 281, Sathiadev, J., discussed the question in detail and held that Section 25(2) of the Act expressly exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Learned Judge relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kangam, and Mohd Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., and Ors. . While the former decision of the Supreme Court was under U.P. Sales Tax Act, the Later was under Motor Vehicles Act. Both the Acts contained provisions similar to Section 25(2) of the Act now in question and the Supreme court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were expressly excluded thereby. As learned Counsel before me made an attempt to distinguish the decisions of the Supreme Court, I will refer to them in detail later when I consider the arguments advanced before me.
8. The aforesaid decisions of this Court were rendered in cases in which the question arose directly under Section 25(2) of the Act. But, even before the judgment of Gokulakrishnan, J., was rendered in Ambrose's case, C.R.P.S.R.Nos. 62714 and 62738 of 1980, dated 22-11-1980, a single Judge of this Court found an occasion to express his opinion on the effect of Section 25(2) of the Act in a case which arose out of an application to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 23 of the Act before the Appellate Authority. While discussing the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 23 of the Act, the learned Judge made a distinction between the language of Section 23 and that of Section 25 of the Act. In Venkai Marban v. Dakshinamoorthy ), V. Balasubrahmanyan, J., observed thus:
...This is illustrated by Rent Control Act, namely, Section 25(2). This Section prescribes a period of one month as the time limit for a revision to the High Court from an order passed by an appellate authority. Under the proviso to Section 25(2), however, the High Court is empowered to admit a revision beyond the time limit. But this power of extention is itself subject to the restriction that the High Court cannot extend the time, in any case, beyond one month of the expiry of the period of limitation. This means that whatever might be the cause and however sufficient it might be, the High Court will be powerless to condone the delay beyond one month. There is no such restriction on the Court's power to extend the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 23 of the Rent Control Act thus present a study in contract. To Section 23, Section 5 of the Limitation Act fully applies, precisely for the reason that provision does not expressly apply Section 5. Section 25 rules out Section 5 precisely for the reason that it expressly legislature on the very subject which is dealt with by Section 5.
9. A similar situation arose before the Division Bench consisting of Ramanujam and Fakkir Mohammed, JJ., in Rathinaswami v. Komalavalli and Anr. (1982) 2 M.L.J. 406. This argument was rendered after that of Gokulakrishnan, J., in Amprose's case (C.R.P.Sr.Nos. 62714 and 62738 of 1980 dated 22-11-1980) and before that of K.B. N. Singh, C.J., in Ramanatha Rao's case . The bench while comparing the provisions of Section 23 of the Act with those of Section 25 of the Act observed as follows:
So far as the appellate authority is concerned, Section 23(2)(b) of the Act (XVIII of 1960) prescribes a period of 15 days for filing an appeal against an order passed by the Rent Controller and in computing 15 days period, the time taken to obtain certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. Thus, there is a special period of limitation prescribed in the Rent Control Act, for filing an appeal before the appellate authority. There is no specific exclusion of the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act anywhere in Act (XVIII of 1960). Of course, in the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the said Act, if the revision application is filed beyond one month from the date on which an order of appellate authority was passed, the High Court may in this discretion allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to a revision petition filed in the High Court under Section 25 of the Act (XVIII of 1960), because the said application of Section 5 is impliedly excluded by prescribing a special period of extension of time for limitation.
10. Thus, the decisions of this Court have been unanimous in construing Section 25(2) of the Act. Yet learned Counsel for the petitioner desired that the matter should be placed before a Full Bench for a fresh consideration. In the Annexure to the memo filed by him, learned Counsel has raised the following points mainly:
(1) Under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is made applicable to all cases unless there is express exclusion by the special or local law.
(2) The remedy of revision under Section 25 of the Act is to the High Court as such and not as any statutory Tribunal or persona designata. Hence the High Court is a Court as contemplated by Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that section would be directly applicable to revisions under the Rent Control Act.
(3) Both Section 25(2) of the Act and the Provision thereto prescribe only a period of limitation. While the sub-section prescribes a period of 30 days normally for filing a revision, the proviso extends that period to 60 days in cases where the revision petitioner is able to prove sufficient cause for not filing within 30 days. Hence, any time taken beyond the trial period or 60 days to be treated as delay for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the Court has to consider whether the revision petitioner had sufficient cause for not filing the revision within the period of 60 days. The proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act cannot be said to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act as the entire period of 60 days should be treated as a period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision under the Rent Control Act.
(4) The Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Rent Control Act is ultra vires the legislature for the following grounds:
(a) The Limitation Act is a Central act and the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act is a sort of reenactment of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a modified form. The legislature can only exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act expressly but it has to power to reenact the Section in the modified form.
(b) While Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not prescribe anytime limit for condonation of delay, the proviso to Section 25(2) prescribes such a time limit. The legislature is not entitled to do so.
(5) There is a divergence of judicial opinion on this vital matter affecting the general body of litigants. Under this heading, the Annexure makes a reference to the following decisions
(i) A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 873 Athani v. Presiding Officer;
(ii) Devi v. Ramachandra Prasad;
(iii) A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 17 Ishar Singh v. Financial Commissioner;
(Though the Annexure gives the reference as 1969, 1 Section 873, 1976 Section 177 and (1984)4 Section 17 learned Counsel at the time of his arguments submitted that it is a typographical error and the correct references are as typed herein.)
(iv) Sakuru v. Tenaji;
(v) ( Rathinaswami v. Komalavalli;
(vi) 94 L.W. 568 Ghose Khan v. The Rent Controller;
(vii) 93 L.W. 136 Ramanujam Naidu v. Panchanatha Mudaliar;
(viii) 1985 T.L.N.J. 279 Namasivayam v. Ramakrishnan.
Apart from the decisions referred to in the typed annexure learned Counsel cited in the course of his oral arguments to Mangal Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Kameshwar Singh v. IV Addl. Dist. Judge, Lucknow .
11. Before considering the other points raised by learned Counsel, it will be convenient to refer to the decisions cited in the Annexure and during the course of oral arguments. The first of the decisions cited is A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 873. According to the Annexure, it is a case under Section 33C(2) of the industrial disputes Act. I could find in the report a case under Section 33C(2) of the industrial Disputes Act only at page 1335. Learned Counsel did not make any attempt to correct the page number given in the Annexure at the time of his arguments as he did not refer to that decision at that time. I find the decision is a case between Town Municipal Council, Athoni v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli. It was held in that case that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that no limitation is prescribed for such applications. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is that the Article is not applicable to a Labour Court which is not governed by any procedural code relating to civil or Criminal Proceeding. It was held that the Limitation Act would not apply to proceedings before the authorities other than Courts. That decision does not help the petitioner in the present case.
12. The next decision is that of the Supreme court in Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad and Ors. . It was held that a Collector to whom an application under Section 3 of Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act vested him with Certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. That decision does not apply to the facts of the present case.
13. The next decision referred to is also that of the Supreme Court in Ishar Singh v. Financial Commissioner and Ors. though the page is wrongly given in the Annexure as 17. In that case, it was held that no period of limitation would apply to the filing of an application under Section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (13 of 1955) since no such period was prescribed by the Act and the Limitation Act had no application to a proceeding under the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. That case has no relevance whatever to the present case.
14. The fourth decision is against that of the Supreme Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji, . It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not made applicable to the proceedings under A.P. (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act by Section 93 thereof before its amendment in 1979 and it could not, therefore, be invoked by the appellate authority under the Special Act. Learned Counsel relied on the following passage in that judgment.
...The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is Section 93 of the Act, which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms:
93. Limitation - Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period.
On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the Provisions of the Limitation Act relating, to computation of the period of limitation. The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period of limitation'. It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Section 5 can arise. We, are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venakiah's case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector.
15. Learned Counsel contends that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will come into play only after the process of computation of the period of limitation is completed. According to him under Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act, the period of limitation prescribed is merely 60 days which is including 30 days provided in the proviso. According to him, the period prescribed in the proviso should also be taken for computing the period of limitation for preferring the revision and after the completion of the process of computation i.e., after a total period of 60 days, s.5 of the Limitation Act will become applicable and any application to condone delay beyond the period of 60 days should be considered under that section I do not agree with learned Counsel. The Supreme Court has not laid down any such proposition in that case. The only question which the Supreme Court had to consider was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the proceedings under the A.P. (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act by virtue of Section 93 of the said Act. The Supreme Court held agreeing with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in another case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering or Section 5 of the Limitation act applicable to the proceeding before the Collector. The judgment of the Supreme Court has no application to the present case.
16. The fifth decision referred to is that of the Division Bench of this Court is Rathinaswami v. Komalavalli to which I have already made a reference in detail. The view taken by the Division Bench as regards the effect of the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act is against the contention put forward by learned Counsel in the present case.
17. The next decision is that of Ratnavel Pandian, J., in A. Ghose Khan and Ors. v. The Rent Controller (District Munsif of Coimbatore, Coimbatore and Ors. 94 L.W. 568, rendered in a writ petition arising out of execution proceedings under the Act. The learned Judge held that the Rent Controller while acting under Section 18 of the Act in executing the orders passed under the Act, exercised his jurisdiction only as persona designata and not as a Court and that the Controller is only a statutory functionary competent to exercise the powers given to him under the statute and, therefore, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings pending before him, though he is clothed with all procedural powers of a Civil Court in executing the orders passed by him. This decision has no relevance to the question which is being considered by me in the present case. Nor does the decision of Ramaswami J., in N. Ramanujam Naidu v. G. Panchanatha Mudaliar, 93 L.W. 136 have any bearing on the facts of this case. That is also a case arising out of an execution proceeding under Section 18 of the Act. The learned Judge held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings for bringing on record the legal representatives in a petition for execution of an order of eviction passed under the Rent Control Act.
18. Considerable reliance is placed in the Annexure on the judgment of K.M. Natarajan, J., in K. Namasivayam v. G.S. Ramakrishna 1985 T.L.N.J. 279. That was a case in which the registry of this Court raised an objection as to the maintainability of an application to excuse the delay in bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondent in a civil revision petition filed under the Rent Control Act. The petition for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased was filed after a delay of 193 days and a petitioner was filed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The question which arose before the learned Judge was whether the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the Rent Control Act would exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering the matter at some length, the learned Judge held that the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was maintainable and directed the office to number the application and post the same for orders. Reliance is placed upon the following passage in that judgment:
...In A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 264, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Gokulakrishnan, J., (as he then was) and Nainar Sundaram, J., had occasion to consider the maintainability of a petition under Order 44 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to file appeal as indigent person in respect of proceedings arising under the Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), wherein it has been observed that "when the statute directs an appeal to an ordinary civil Court,...the Court will have to deal with the appeals with all the trappings and powers as an ordinary civil court of Appeal. This is the fundamental rule that has been uniformly countenanced and applied by Courts....
Rule 25 of the Rent Control Rules which was considered in that case by K.M. Natarajan, J., merely prescribes a period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record. There was no provision in that rule similar to the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act. The judgment rendered with reference to that rule including the passage quoted above cannot have any application to the present case.
19. Turning to the judgments referred to in the course of oral arguments, the first one is that of the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality, . It was held in that case that Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and therefore, in a case where special leave petition to appeal from an order of acquittal was filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 of that Act would be available to the applicant and if he could show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the limit of 60 days prescribed in Sub-section (4) of Section 417, Code of Criminal Procedure, the application would not be barred and the High Court would have the power to entertain it. That decision will not apply to the facts of this case as there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code akin to the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act.
20. The last of the decisions cited by learned Counsel is that of the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Singh v. IV Additional District Judge, Lucknow . That case has nothing to do with the Limitation Act or Section 5 thereof. It is a case under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972). While dealing with the provisions of the Act, the Court observed as follows:
...The Court must strive to so interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The courts must therefore keep the legislative policy. The courts must therefore keep the legislative policy in mind in applying the provision of the Act to the facts of the case.
Learned Counsel' placing reliance on the above passage contended that the policy and scheme of the Act is to protect the tenants and benefit them and by adopting a construction whereby Section 5, Limitation Act is excluded, the tenants are put to great hardship and, therefore, such a construction is not in accord with the policy or the scheme of the Act. The fallacy in this argument is that it overlooks that Section 25 of the Act is common to tenants and landlords and the time limit prescribed therein is applicable to all revisions under the Act whether at the instance of a landlord or preferred by a tenant. The policy of the Act is not only to prevent unreasonable eviction but also enable the landlords to secure their buildings when they are in bona fide need of the same. The Act is not one- sided. The scheme of the Act as could be gathered from the provisions thereof is that the proceedings under the Act should be concluded within a short span of time. The time prescribed for filling an appeal under Section 23 is only 15 days. The time fixed for a revision is 30 days. The maximum time that a Rent Controller could grant to a tenant for vacating the premises while passing an order directing him to put the landlord in possession is three months in the aggregate. Hence, the contention that if Section 25(2) of the Act is construed in such a way as to exclude the applicability of Section 5, Limitation Act, it will not be in consonance with the scheme and policy of the Act cannot be accepted. Thus, the cases relied on by the petitioner do not have any bearing on this case.
21. Now, I shall consider the points urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner which I have set out earlier. There can be no exception to the first point by itself as it is well settled by now that under Section 29(2), Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to all cases unless expressly excluded by the local or special law. In order to appreciate the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner, points 1 and 2 should be taken together. It is his argument that the decisions of this Court referred to in the earlier part of this judgment holding that the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, Limitation Act, are passed on the judgments of the Supreme Court relating to Tribunals which are not courts and, therefore, they require to be reconsidered. I have already referred to the judgment of Sathiadev, J., in M.M. Thimmiah v. M.G. Krishna Reddy and Co. 1983 T.L.N.J. 281 which placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kangam and Mohd., Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P. and Ors. . While the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court was with reference to the appellate authority and the Judge (Revisions) under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, the later judgment related to the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act. The concerned authorities in the two cases are not Courts but merely administrative Tribunals. In fact, the Supreme Court held it expressly in the earlier case under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Learned Counsel's contention is that no reliance can be placed on both the decisions as they did not arise out of cases in Civil Courts. This arguments is clearly fallicious. In the case under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, the Supreme Court has referred to with approval the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Purushottam Dass Hassaram Sabnani v. Impex (India) Ltd. . The question which arose before the Bombay Bench was whether the suit in that case was barred by limitation. The plaintiff in the suit on for the purpose of saving limitation the fact that there were some infructuous arbitration proceedings and he wanted to exclude the time taken up by those arbitration proceedings. He invoked the aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. While rejecting the contention of the plaintiff, Chief Justice Chagla, who spoke for the Bench referred to the provisions of Section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act and observed as follows:
Therefore, we have now a statutory provision for exclusion of time taken up in arbitration proceedings when a suit is filed, and the question arises of computing the period of limitation with regard to that suit, and the time that has got to be excluded is only that time which is taken up as provided in Section 37(5). There must be an order of the court setting aside an award or there must be an order of the court declaring that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect, and the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of this order is the period that has got to be excluded.
It is therefore no longer open to the court to rely on Section 14, Limitation Act as applying by analogy to arbitration proceedings. If the Legislature intended that Section 14 should apply and that all the time taken up in arbitration proceedings should be excluded, then there was no reason to enact Section 37(5). The very fact that Section 37(5) has been enacted clearly shows that the whole period referred to in Section 14, Limitation 'Act is not to be excluded but the limited period indicated in Section 37(5).
22. Quoting the above passage, the Supreme Court observed that what the learned Chief Justice Chagla said about the inapplicability of Section 14, Limitation Act, in the context of Section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act held good with added force with reference to Section 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The case dealt with by the Bench of the Bombay High Court was a civil suit in a civil Court and the question related to the period of limitation for that suit. The law laid down by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court as expressly restricting the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act with reference to a proceeding in a civil court was approved by the Supreme Court and held to apply with added force with reference to an Administrative Tribunal under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court proceeded to elaborate the proposition thus:
Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, and application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.
We have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent. With such expressed intent of the lawgiver; more so if the status is a taxing statute. We will close the discussion by recalling what word Kailasam (at p.11 in Pearlberg v. Varty (1972) 2 All.E.R. 6 has said recently in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute which is a clear and complete Code, by itself:
It is true of course, that the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger decree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him. Still less is it the functioning of the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment....
23. Thus, the differentiation sought to be made by learned Counsel for the petitioner between a statutory Tribunal and a Civil Court vis-a-vis the applicability of Section 5 of the limitation Act is a distinction without any difference and there is no substance whatever in the argument.
24. Taking up the third point put forward by learned Counsel for the petitioner, it has only to be stated to be rejected. The period of limitation prescribed for a revision to the High Court is found in the main part of Section 25(2) of the Act., i.e., one month from the date on which the order is communicated to the applicant. The period of one month prescribed in the proviso which the High Court may in its discretion allow for the filing of the revision if it is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time prescribed by the main part of the sub-section cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered to be period of limitation for filing the revision. There is no substance in the contention/that the entire period of 60 days contemplated in Sub-section (2) and the proviso thereto should be treated as a period of limitation for preferring the revision and after the expiry of the same, it would be open to the petitioner to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and hence it is rejected.
25. The next point urged relates to the vires of the legislature to enact the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act. In the typed Annexure filed by learned Counsel, three grounds were urged under this meaning. The first ground is that there is no express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act under the proviso, and, therefore, the proviso is ultra vires the Act. This ground is wholly unintelligible. The question whether the proviso contains an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or not is a matter of construction of the proviso. That has nothing to do with the vires of the Act. Even the expression used in the Annexure viz., "vires of the Act" has no meaning in the context, while learned Counsel is strenuously contending that the court should construe the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act to the effect that there is no express exclusion of Section 5, Limitation Act, it is very strange that he could advance an argument that the absence of such express exclusion is ultra vires the Act. I do not think it necessary to discuss this ground any further.
25. The other two grounds under this heading are that the Limitation Act is a Central Act while the Rent Control Act is a local Act and the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act is only a reenactment of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a modified form which the legislature is not entitled to do. According to learned Counsel Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act permits the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, by any special or local law, but does not permit the reenactment of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a special or local law in a modified form. The other ground is that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not prescribe any time limit and restrict the power of the Court in any manner, the legislature is not entitled to prescribe time limit in the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act and consequently, the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act is ultra vires the power for the legislature. Here again, one has to strain to a great extent to appropriate the logic in the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The power of the legislature to legislate on the subject is derived from Article 246(2) of the Constitution of India which provides that the Parliament and the Legislature of any State would also have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule in the Constitution referred to as the "concurrent List". Of course, it is subject to Clause (1) of Article 246 of the Constitution of India, which empowers the Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule. There are three entries in List III, which pertain to the present subject. Entry II-A relates to Administration of Justice, constitution and organisation of all courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. Entry 13 pertains to Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution, Limitation and arbitration. Entry 46 of the List is with reference to jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in the Concurrent List. No doubt, the Limitation Act is a Central Act passed earlier, but Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act expressly provides that any special or local law could expressly exclude the applicability of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. The terms of the said sub-section that "the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such social or local law" indicate clearly that the exclusion could be absolute or partial. The involved argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the State Legislature has re-enacted Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a modified form in the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act, to do which it had no power, is wholly untenable. Whether it is to be construed as a reenactment or exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the legislature was certainly well within the limits to enact the same. However, as seen already, the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act has been construed by this Court repeatedly as an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There is also no substance in the argument that the legislature had no power to prescribe a time limit in the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act. Hence, this contention of learned Counsel is rejected.
26. The fifth point raised in the Annexure is that there is a divergance of judicial opinion on this vital matter affecting the general body of litigants. I have already discussed all the decisions referred to by learned Counsel for the petitioner in the Annexure as well as in the oral arguments. I have pointed out that those decisions have no bearing on the present case. There is absolutely no divergence of opinion on the question which arises for consideration in the present case. Hence this argument fails and is rejected.
27. At the fag end of his arguments, learned Counsel advance a plea ad miseri cordium. According to him, the section is causing great hardship to tenants who for bona fide reasons and sufficient causes are net in a position to present their revision petitions in this Court, within a total period of sixty days after the communication of the Order of the appellate forum. It was argued that when the High Court is condoning much longer delay, some times of periods exceeding a year or two on proof of sufficient cause in other matters, the curtailment of the power of the High Court under Section 25(2) of the Act is wholly unreasonable and the Legislature has no power to do so. This arguments is a infallacious. Section 25 of the Act is not intended only for revision petitions by the tenants. It is common to landlords and tenants. Even a landlord who desires to prefer a revision petition in this Court under Section 25 of the Act has to do so within the period specified therein. It cannot be said that the section is causing hardship to tenants as well as landlords, that cannot in any way enable this Court to construe the section in the manner in which learned Counsel wants to be done. So long as there is no ambiguity in the language used by the legislature, any amount of hardhsip which it may cause to the litigants, is not a matter to be taken into account by the Court. The legislature has its wisdom decided to restrict the latitude which the High Court would have under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As the legislature has acted within its powers, this Court is not entitled to ignore the proviso, but on the other hand is bound to act in accordance therewith.
28. It may be that Rent Control cases are now the most important and most prolific line of civil litigation in this country. The volume of litigation in this field has increased beyond the limits which could have been imagined by the legislature at the time when the Act was passed in 1960 or when the amendments were introduced in 1973. But, it is a matter for the legislature to take note of the altered situation and bring about a measure which may reduce the rigor of the law and widen the discretion of the High Court in the matter of extending the time for filing a revision under Section 25 of the Act.
29. Before parting with the case, I should refer to a particular fact in this case which disentitles the petitioner to get any indulgence from this Court. In both the affidavits filed in support of the applications for condonation of delay, the reason given by the petitioner is that his counsel did neither inform him about the result of the appeal nor apply in time for the certified copy of the judgment so as to enable him to prefer further proceedings. This averment found in both the affidavits is proved to be false by the certified copies of the judgment and decretal order of the appellate authority filed in this case. The judgment of the appellate authority was delivered on 28-2-1986. The application for certified copies was made as early as on 11-3-1986 and the copies were taken delivery on 27-3-1986. Thus, even on the merits the petitioner is not entitled to have the delay condoned.
30. In the result, the petitions are not maintainable and they are accordingly dismissed.