Gujarat High Court
Muljibhai Alias Rakhubhai Sardarsinh ... vs State Of Gujarat And Anr. on 2 February, 1994
Equivalent citations: AIR1994GUJ145, AIR 1994 GUJARAT 145
ORDER A.N. Divecha, J.
1. Should a tenant who has surrendered his tenancy rights after 15th June 1955 but before 1st April 1957 under an illegal surrender be deprived deemed purchase of the tenanted land simply on the ground that he had a misfortune to lose his actual possession thereof under such illegal surrender before 1st April 1957? This is the main question arising in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are not many and not much in dispute. The predecessor-in-title ('the deceased' for convenience) of the present petitioners was the tenant of one parcel of land bearing Survey No. 1294 admeasuring 2 acres 14 gunthas situated at village Anklav, Taluka Borsad, District Kheda ('the disputed land' for convenience). He was siad to have surrendered it to the predecessor-in-title of respondent No. 2 herein ('the landlord' for convenience). It appears that the surrender was accepted by the Additional Aval Karkoon at Borsad by his order passed on 5th July 1955 in Tenancy Case No. 214 of 1955. Its copy is at Annexure D to this petition. The parties are at variance as to when the tenant handed over the actual possession of the disputed land to the landlord. According to Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2, it was done prior to 15th June 1955, that is, the "appointed day" for the purposes of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ('the Act' for brief). Shri Dave for the petitioners submits that it was done after 15th June 1955. The contesting parties are not at variance that its actual possession was handed over by the tenant to the landlord before 1st April 1957, that is, the 'tillers day', for the purposes of the Act. It appears that the tenant breathed his last presumably after the tillers' day leaving behind him his widow and his two sons, named, Muljibhai and Mansinh, as his heirs and legal representatives. They made one application on 17th June 1970 under Section 32G of the Act to the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal No. 1 at Borsad ('the first authority' for convenience) for fixation of the purchase price with respect to the disputed land. It came to be registered as Tenancy Case No. 6 of 1970. Incidentally, a declaration was also sought therein to the effect that the deceased was a tenant of the disputed land. The application was thereupon treated to be also under Section 70(b) of the Act. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his order passed on 13th December 1976 in the aforesaid proceeding, the first authority rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure B to this petition, it appears that in the mean-time one son, named, Muljibhai of the deceased, also breathed his last leaving behind him petitioners Nos. 1/1 to 1/4 as his, heirs and legal representatives. The present petitioners and their widow mother were obviously aggrieved by the aforesaid order at Annaxure B to this petition. They therefore carried the matter in appeal before the Deputy Collector at Kheda by means of their Tenancy Appeal No. 50 of 1977r78 ('the appellate authority' for convenience). By his order passed on 27th December, 1980 in the aforesaid appeal, the appellate authority dismissed it. Its copy is at Annexure C to this petition. It appears that in the meantime the widow of the deceased also breathed her last leaving behind the present petitioners as her heirs and legal representatives. They were obviously aggrieved by the appellate order at Annexure C to this petition. They therefore invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmadabad ('the Tribunal' for convenience) by means of their Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. . 541 of 1981. By its decision rendered on 26th February 1988 in Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 541 of 1981, the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Anenxure A to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon moved this Court by means of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure C to this petition as further affirmed in revision by the impugned decision at Annexure A to this petition.
3. Though this petition is stated to be under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it will have to be treated as the one under Article 227 alone in view of the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Jashubhai Hiralal Gandhi v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Ahmeda-bad reported in 1990 (2) GLH 609.
4. By its decision at Annexure A to this petition, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the surrender of the tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant as accepted by the order at Annexure D to this petition, was illegal and invalid. Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 has tried to convince me to take the contrary view in this case. I think the Tribunal has carefully considered the relevant material on record and the correct position of law in that regard and has come to the aforesadi conclusion. This being a conclusion of fact, it would not be open to me to interfere with it in exercise of my limited powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Even if it is a mixed question of law and fact, I think it would not be open to me to interfere with the aforesaid conclusion by the Tribunal in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim reported in AIR 1984 SC 38. It has clearly been held therein that Article 227 of the Constitution of India has not to be used for correction of errors of fact of even errors of law.
5. Despite the aforesaid conclusion reached by the Tribunal as to illegality and invalidity of the surrender of the tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord, the Tribunal has declared its helplessness in assisting the present petitioners with respect to the consequential relief flowing therefrom mainly on the ground that no application for restoration of its possession was moved under Section 29 of the Act within the prescribed period. This part of the Tribunal's decision at Annexure A to this petition has aggrieved the petitioners and they have therefore voiced their grivance to the effect that the operation performed by the Tribunal was successful but the patient was not given life.
6. It is true that the application of the heirs of the deceased was under Section 70(b) read with Section 32G of the Act. No application could have been made by them under Section 32(1B) thereof as that statutory provision had not seen the light of the day on the date on which the aforesaid application was made by the heirs of the deceased. Inability to make that application under Section 32(1B) of the Act at the relevant time could not be a ground for refusing the desired the relief to the present petitioners once the surrender of the tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord was found to the illegal and invalid.
7. The heirs of the deceased at the relevant time might not have been advised to make any application under Section 32(1B) of Act in view of the pendency of the proceedings culminating into the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition. The petitioners appear to be residing in a remote village in the State of Gujarat. Villagers are by and large illiterate, ignorant and poverty-stricken. They would accept whatever is dished out to them by way of some legal advice and they need not be blamed for any unwitting omission on their part. I am therefore of the opinion that no fault ought to have been found with the. petitioners for their having not made any application under Section 32(1B) of the Act.
8. In fact, for the benefit of such ignorant, illiterate and poverty-stricken tenants or their representatives or successors-in-interest, the benevolent provision for suo motu exercise of powers by the first authority is made in the aforesaid stautory provision. Such tenants or their successors-in-interest as are mentioned in the aforesaid statutory provision can be protected with respect to their statutory rights flowing from the Act by the authority named therein by initiating the suo motu proceeding in that regard. In its ruling in the case of Rasulmiya Rahmanmiya v. Patel Lalbhai Shankerbhai reported in (1973-1) 24 (1) G.L.R. 714 (sic) this Court has taken the view that the authority named in Section 52(1B) of the Act can exercise suo motu powers thereunder even after the prescribed period of limitation for making an application thereunder has expired.
9. It is a settled principle of law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding. The reason therefor is quite simple. An appeal under a statute is provided as a matter of right. Initiation of the appellate proceeding is not dependent on the discretion of the appellate forum. Once an appeal against an order under a statutory provision is preferred, it has to be decided on its own merits according to law unless its cognizance is tarred on account of the Law of Limitation or some such provision. If the law of limitation does not come in the way of the appellant, his appeal has to be decided on its own merits according to law. Whether or not that would apply to a revisional application under Section 6 of the Act is a moot question. It cannot be gainsaid that the Tribunal there-
under is not invested with any suo motu revisional powers. Its revisional jurisdiction has to be invoked by means of an appropriate application. The language of Section 76 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that an application for revision is a matter of right on the part of the party aggrieved by any of the orders mentioned therein. Once an application for revision is made to the Tribunal thereunder, the Tribunal cannot reject it except on merits according to law. The only exception in that regard could be if it is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed in Section 79 thereof and if the delay in preferring it is not condoned. If the revisional applicant makes out a case that the impugned order is not according to law, the Tribunal cannot in its discretion refuse to set it aside for the simple reason that the Tribunal is not invested with any discretionary powers in that regard. Ordinarily, the revisional powers are discretionary in nature if the said powers are exercisable suo motu also. However, the lanugage of Section 76 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that no discretion is given to the Tribunal either for exercise of suo motu powers or for exercise of its discretion not to interfere with an impugned order if it is shown to be illegal and invalid. Once this position of the nature of revisional proceeding is accepted, there is no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the revisional proceeding under Section 76 of the Act is also con-tinuation of the appellate proceeding or the other proceeding named therein. Once the conclusion is reached that the proceeding under Section 76 of the Act is continuation in nature, there is no escape from the conclusion that what the first authority could have done in the matter could have been directed by the Tribunal to be done in the matter after the main issue arising in the revisional applica-
tion is decided in favour of the revisional applicant.
10. As pointed out hereinabove, in its impugned decision at Annexure A to this petition, the Tribunal has unassailably come to the conclusion that the surrender of tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord was illegal and invalid. That conclusion was in substitution of the conclusion reached by the first authority and the appellate authority in their respective orders at Annexures B and C respectively to this petition. In that case, it would have been desirable on the part of the Tribunal to have placed itself in the position of the first authority and ought to have done keeping in mind what the first authority was required to have done in the matter. It is an admitted position on record that there was no application before the first authority under Section 32(1B) of the Act. If the first authority had reached the conclusion that the surrender of tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord was illegal and there was no application under Section 32(1B) of the Act, a prudent first authority would not have hesitated in initiating the suo motu proceeding thereunder in order to further the benign object of the legislature behind bringing on the statute book the aforesaid benevolent Provision. This was what the Tribunal was required to have visualised after reaching the aforesaid conclusion as reflected in its decision at Annexure A to this petition and ought to have decided the case accordingly. The Tribunal has, with respect, failed to exercise its jurisdiction in that regard. 11. Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 has submitted that Section 32(1B) of the Act is not applicable in the instant case as the landlord has sold away the disputed land on 15th June 1970. A copy of the sale deed in that regard is annexed to the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 in this case. It transpires therefrom that it is a conditional sale within the meaning of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It would then be a mortgage. The aforesaid stautory provision does not take within its sweep any mortgage transaction because the right to seek redemption of he mortgage and to obtain its possession remains in tact with the landlord. Till the time-limit for seeking redemption of the mortgage and obtaining its possession expired, the landlord as the mortgager can be said to be in possession of the mortgaged property in law as his right to obtain its redemption and possession can be said to be subsisting and not lost. The benevolent provision designed to protect the interests of the tenants like the deceased predeeessor-in-title of the petitioners can be protected only if it is interpreted in this manner.
12. It is true that the earlier part of Section 32(1B) of the Act refers to actual possession qua a tenant. It contemplates loss of actual possession by a tenant between the appointed day and the specified date for the purposes of the Act. It is however difficult to acept the submission urged before me by Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 to the effect that the word "possession" occurring subsequently in the same provision qua the landlord need not be construed differently as to indicate possession in law or coupled with right to obtain possession. It is a cardinal principle of law that the same word occurring differently in a statutory provision can be construed differently in different contexts. The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in a different context if occurring differently in the same provision or in different provision in the same statute. The word "evidence" occurring differently in Section 207A(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 has been construed differently as found occurring in different context by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Ramnarayan Mor v. The State of Maharash-tra reported in AIR 1964 SC 949 : (1964 (2) Cri LJ 44). In the same way, the word "term" occurring at two places in Section 7(3) of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 has been construed differently in different contexts by he Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Biswanath Sonar reported in AIR 1967 SC 77. The same was the case with the word "regulating" occurring in Section 3(1) and (2) of the Essential Commodities Act in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Ramnathan v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1985 SC 660.
13. It is true that for the purpose of applicability of the aforesaid beneficial provision of law as brought on the statute book by Gujarat Act No. V of 1973, the tenant should be deprived of his actual possession of the tenanted land or lands after the appointed day but before the specified date. As will be shown hereinafter, the deceased tenant in this case was deprived of his possession of the disputed land only after 15th June, 1955, that is, the appointed day for the purposes of the Act.
14. Shri Dave for the Apetitioners is however on a sounder footing when he submits that the case of the petitioners would fall within the purview of Section 32FF of the Act. Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 contends to the contrary. According to him, the conditions for applicability of the aforesaid statutory provision are not found satisfied in the instant case and the petitioners could not get any relief thereunder.
15. In order to appreciate the rival contentions urged before me in that regard, it would be quite proper to look at Section 32FF of the Act itself- It reads :
"(1) Notwithstanding anyting contained in the preceding sections, a person who is a tenant within the meaning of Sub-clause (d) of Clause (18) of Section 2 shall be deemed to have purchased the land in his possession of which he is the tenant, free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon, on the specified date:
(2) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32E (both inclusive) and Sections 32G to 32R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase."
On bare perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision, it becomes clear that the only condition which is required to be fulfilled for applicability thereof is that the person should be the tenant within the meaning of Section 2(18)(d) thereof. It would therefore be quite proper to look at it. That provision reads :
"Tenant" means a person who holds land on lease and includes -
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(d) a person who, after the surrender of his tenancy in respect of any land at any time after the appointed day but before the specified date has continued, or is deemed to have continued, to remain in actual possession, with or without the consent of the landlord, of such land till the specified date." , It may be mentioned at this stage that Section 32FF in its present form and the aforesaid provision in Section 2(18)(d) of the Act have been brought on the statute book by Gujarat Act No. V of 1973.
16. Before adverting to the effect of the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 32FF read in the light of Section 2(18)(d) of the Act, it would be quite proper to resolve one important controversy between the contesting parties arising from the question as to whether or not the tenant was in actual possession of the disputed land on the appointed day for the purposes of the Act. Shri Dave for the petitioners has invited my attention to Para 9 of the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure A to this petition wherein it has been observed :
"Both the lower courts have, as rightly argued by Shri Jadeja, held that the applicant was not in possession either on 15-6-1955, the argument of Shri Dave that as the order of surrender was dated 5-7-1955 the tenant was in possession on 15-6-55 cannot be accepted because the tenant in this particular case has voluntarily surrendered the lands as very clearly seen from the order of surrender and the Kabja Pavti also which means that there was a surrender in favour of the landlord. This Kabja Pavit is not available at this stage and therefore it is very difficult to ascertain as to the date on which the landlord took the possession. However, it can certainly be said that there is no evidence on record to show that the tenant was in possession either on 15-6-1955 or on 1-4-1957. As both the lower courts have concurrently held regarding possession, I do not see any reason to interfere with this finding of fact."
Relying on the aforesaid observations made by the Tribunal in its impugned decision, Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 has submitted that it is concluded as a matter of fact by the tribunal that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land on 15th June, 1955. Shri Dave for the petitioners, on the other hand, has contended that the aforesaid conclusion reached by the Tribunal is nothing but perverse. Acconding to Shri Dave for the petitioners, no finding worth the name in that regard is recorded either by the first authority in its impugned order at Annexure B to this petition or by the appellate authority in its appellate order at Annexure C to this petition.
17. The order at Annexure B to this petition runs into some 24 pages. More than 21 pages are devoted to summary of the evidence on record, both oral and documentary. Not much of appreciation thereof is found to have been done. The findings on the basis of the material on record are found contained from page 22 onwards thereof. About nine conclusions of fact are recorded therein. Nowhere therein it is mentioned that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land on 15th June 1955, that is, the appointed day for the purposes of the Act. In the final part of the order at page 24, it has ipse dixit been mentioned that the applicants were not the tenants with respect to the disputed land either on 1st April, 1957 or 15th June, 1955. The applicants before the first authority could not have been the tenants on either date for obvious reasons. 1 think, the reference was obviously to the tenant. The first authority has just jumped to the conclusion that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land either on 1st April, 1957 or 15th June, 1955. As aforesaid, the contesting parties are not at variance that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land on the tillers day. Then the question arises as to on what basis the first authority came to the aforesaid conclusion that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land even on 15th June, 1955. The evidence on behalf of the landlord is found to have been summarised at internal page 15 of the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition. Nowhere therein is found any mention about handing over of actual possession by the tenant to the landlord prior to 15th June, 1955. It would therefore leave one wondering as to on what basis the first authority jumped to the aforesaid conclusion that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land on 15th June, 1955. That finding is obviously based on no evidence. It has to be branded as nothing but perverse. It needs no telting that a finding based on no evidence is perverse.
18. In fact, it transpires from the aforesaid summary of the landlord's evidence that the tenant was in possession of the disputed land for the year 1954-55. When such year is referred to for the purposes of tenancy matters in respect of agricultural lands, the year as defined in Section 3(22) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 has to be kept in mind. It would mean a year from 1st August to 31st July of the succeeding year. In that view of the matter also, it can safely be concluded that, even according to the landlord, the tenant was in actual possession upto 31st July, 1955. This material aspect on record appears to have been lost sight of not only by the first authority but also by the appellate authority and the Tribunal.
19. Nowhere in the appellate order at Annexure C to this petition is found mentioned that the tenant was not in actual possession of the disputed land on 15th June, 1955. Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 has taken me through the entire appellate order at Annexure C to this petition but he has not been able to lay his finger on the aforesaid conclusion of fact found to have been recorded therein. In that view of the matter, the abovequoted observations of the Tribunal in its decision at Annexure A to this petition appear to be a figment of imagination. The learned Member of the Tribunal appears to have been carried away by the submission urged by and on behalf of the landlord before it without carefully examining even the appellate order under challenge. I am told at the Bar that the record of both the authorities would be before the Tribunal when a revi-sional application under Section 76 of the Act is taken up for hearing. It would mean that the orders of both the authorities would be before the Tribunal. It then becomes the duty of the Tribunal to verify the correctness of the argument in the light of the orders before it.
It cannot just accept any argument dished out before it de-hors its mention in either order before it. This approach on the part of the Tribunal has to be condemned and deprecated in the strongest possible terms.
20. Since there is no clear-cut finding in either of the orders at Annexures B and C to the petition and since the aforesaid finding recorded by the Tribunal has to be branded as perverse, the question remains as to whether or not the tenant was in actual possession of the disputed land on 15th June, 1955. That question need not pose any problem for its answer in view of he order at Annexure D to this petition. It as admittedly with respect to a proceeding under Section 29 of the Act. The so-called surrender of tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord was accepted thereunder on 5th July, 1955 and the landlord was permitted to obtain its possession from the tenant. The contents of the order at Annexure D to this petition make it clear that possession of the disputed land was with the tenant on its date that is, 5th July, 1955. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that the tenant was in possession of the disputed land on 15th June 1955.
21. As pointed out hereinabove, the Tribunal in its decision at Annexure A to this petition has rightly come to the conclusion that the surrender of tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord was illegal and invalid. It appears that possession was also taken away by the landlord from the tenant pursuant to the aforesaid order at Annexure D to this petition. At this stage it would be quite proper to look at Section 29(4) of the Act. It reads :
"Any person taking possession of any land or dwelling house except in accordance with the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2) or as the case may be, shall be liable to forfeiture of crops, if any, grown in the land in addition to payment of costs as may be directed by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector and also to the penalty prescribed in Section 31."
At this stege, it would be quite proper to note the fact that Section 29 prescribes the procedure for taking possession of a tenanted land. It is a settled principle of law needing no reiteration that, when a statute requires "a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done only in that manner and in no other manner. Since the surrender of the tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land by the tenant to the landlord was found to be illegal and invalid, taking over of possession by the landlord from the tenant will have also to be branded as illegal and invalid. In that context, the relevant provisions contained in Section 29(4) of the Act assumes importance. It has been provided therein that any person taking possession inter alia of any land contrary to the relevant provisions contained in that section shall be liable to forfeiture of crops, if any, grown in the land in addition to payment of costs as may be directed by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector and also to the penalty prescribed in Section 81, thereof. It becomes clear from the language employed and used in the aforesaid statutory provision that the actual possession taken over by the landlord from the tenant contrary to the procedure prescribed in Section 29 of the Act is to be treated as non est. It is not regarded as actual possession with the landlord in the eyes of law despite the fact that the landlord might be in actual possession thereof. Once, by virtue of the aforesaid statutory provision contained in Section 29(4) of the Act, the landlord is to be treated as not in actual possession of the land despite the reality, the only conclusion flowing therefrom would be that the person from whom such possession was taken would be in actual possession thereof. In that context, the deeming provision contained in Section 2(18)(d) will have to be understood. In this case the tenant, after the surrender of his tenancy rights in respect of the disputed land to the landlord after the appointed day is deemed to have continued in actual possession with or without the consent of the landlord of such land till the specified date. He could be deemed to have remained in such possession in view of the relevant provisions contained in Section 29(4) of the Act. Once that conclusion is reached, the provisions contained in Section 32FF will be applicable and the tenant could be said to have statu-torily purchased the disputed land on the specified date, that is 3rd March, 1973. With respect, this aspect of the tenancy law as prevalent in this State has been lost sight of by the Tribunal.
22. The ruling of this Court in the case of Thakar Bhanuprasad Kripashankar v. Jadav Mahijibhai Desaibhai reported in 1988(2) 29(2) GLR 1141 as relied on by Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 is distinguishable on its own facts. In that case the surrender of tenancy rights in respect of the tenanted land took place on 4th March 1955, that is, prior to the appointed day for the purposes of the Act. In the present case, the surrender took place on 5th July 1955, that is, after the appointed day. This distinction is all the more material for the applicability of Section 32FF read in the light of Section 2(18)(d) thereof. Shri Jadeja for respondent No. 2 has then urged that the petitioners would not be able to get possession of the disputed land as they have not moved the authority under Section 29 of the Act and they cannot resort to the remedy under Section 84 thereof in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Vallabhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi reported in (1069) 10 GLR 829 : (AIR 1969 SC 1190). I think the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court is d istinguishable on its own facts. In order to retrieve the plight or position of people who have missed the bus by not making any timely application under Section 29 of the Act, the legislature has provided beneficial measures by enacting Section 32FF in the present form and adding Clause (d) to Sub-section (18) to Section 2 of the Act by Gujarat Act No. V of 1973. It has also come to the rescue of such people by introducing on the statute book the benevolent provision in Sub-section (IB) of Section 32. By the same statute under Section 32(IB), the authority is empowered to put the concerned person or persons in possession of the land or lands in question. In view of the changed legislative policy as reflected in Gujarat Act No. V of 1973, for the. purposes of Section 32FF in the light of the deeming provision in Section 2(18)(d) of the Act, the resort can be made to Section 84(c) thereof.
The aforessaid ruling of the Supreme Court would be no bar there against in view of the position of law as prevalent today after amendement of the Act by Gujarat Act No. V of 1973.
23. In view of my aforesaid discussion, in either view of the matter, the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure C to this petition as further affirmed in revision by the impugned decision at Annexure A to this petition to the extent it is against the petitioner cannot be sustained in law and has to be quashed and set aside. The matter will have to be remanded to the first authority for fixation of the purchase price in respect of the disputed land and for taking appropriate measures for restoration of its possession to the petitioner.
24. In the result, this petition is accepted, the impugned order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal No. 1 at Borsad on 13th December, 1976 in Tenancy Case No. 6 of 1970 at Annexure B to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeals) at Kheda on 27th December, 1980 in Tenancy Appeal No. 460 of 1977-78 at Annexure C to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenu Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 26th February 1988 in Revision Application No. TEN B. A. 541 of 1981 at Annexure A to this petition to the extent it is against the petitioners is quashed and set aside. The petitioners are deemed to have purchased the disputed land from the specified date, that is, 3rd March, 1973 under Section 32FF of the Act. The matter is remanded to the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribun'al No. 1 at Borsad or his successor in office for determining the purchase price of the disputed land and for taking appropriate steps for putting the petitioners in possession thereof. Since the matter is very old, the authority to whom the matter is remanded shall dispose it of on or before 31st May, 1994. The Registry is directed to send the writ in this case as expeditiously as possible preferably by 24th February, 1994. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.