Calcutta High Court
Prithwis Kumar Nag vs State Of West Bengal on 8 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)1CALLT472(HC), 1998CRILJ3502
JUDGMENT D.P. Kundu, J.
1. This revisional application is directed against an order dated 6.3.95 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia in G.R. Case No. 1173 of 1993 arising out of Ranghal Police Station Case No. 450 dated 27.12.93 under sections 341. 325, 304. 34. 201 of the indian Penal Code.
2. This revisional application has been preferred by Prithwis Kumar Nag, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of investigation, Special Crime Branch, Salt Lake City, Calcutta. By the aforesaid order dated 6.3.95 passed by the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate. Ranaghat, Nadia in G.R. Case No. 1173 of 1993, the Central Bureau of Investigation was entrusted with the investigation of the aforesaid G.R. Case No. 1173 of 1993.
3. Pursuant to a First information Report lodged by Shri Nanda Dulal Chakraborty. Ranaghat Police Station Case No. 450 dated 27.12.93 under sections 341, 325, 304, 34, 201 of the indian Penal Code was registered for investigation.
4. It was alleged in the aforesaid First information Report that Raj Kumar Chakroborty, son of aforesaid Nanda Dulal Chakraborly, on 25th December, 1993, for the purpose of witnessing Christ-Mas celebration and lighting decoration in a Church at Begopara left home in the evening. Thereafter in that night Raj Kumar Chakroborty did not return to home. The father started searching for his son. But the father could not trace out the son. Later on at the dawn the father came to know from the people that his son, while returning in the night, was detained by accused Santanu Bagchl, Dulal Das, Ranada Prasad Saha the so called night guards. It was alleged that the above named accused persons thereafter tied the son, Raj Kumar Chakraborty, with a light-post and inhumanly and brutally assaulted him. It was further alleged that as a result of such assault the son physically became very much exhausted. It has been alleged that thereafter the above named accused persons handed over aforesaid Raj Kumar Chakraborty to the police. It was further alleged that the father came to learn that his son had another round of beating by the police and thereafter on 26.12.93 at about 10.20. a.m. the police sent his son to Ranaghat Court in critical condition. It has been alleged that the police did not take the minimum step for the treatment of his son even seeing that his son was in critical condition. It has further been alleged that seeing the physical condition of his son the GRO in-charge firstly objected to put his son in the lock-up but later on at the instance of the one officer of the Police Station the GRO in-charge took his son in the lockup under compulsion. It has further been alleged that his son within 15 minutes after reaching the court expired in the lock-up. in the last paragraph of the first information report it has been alleged that the accused persons illegally detained his son Raj Kumar Chakraborty and assaulted him mercilessly and thereafter in a critical condition handed him over to the police at the Police Station and even thereafter no arrangement was made for his treatment this resulted tragic untimely death of his son.
5. It appears from the record that Police of Ranaghat P.S. sent Raj Kumar Chakraborly, the victim, to Ranaghat Sub-divisional Hospital where he was examined by EMO Dr. D. Sengupta at 8.55 hours on 26.12.93 and the doctor found abrasion and swelling on both legs, pulse 80, chest-NAD. As there was no serious ailment the victim was not admitted in the hospital.
6. It further appears from the record that subsequently on the basis of Ranaghat PS GD Entry 1316 dated 26.12.93 under section 41/109 Cr.PC said victim Raj Kumar Chakraborly was forwarded to the court of Executive Magistrate. Ranaghat at about 10.45 hours and he was found dead in the lock-up of GRO office, Ranaghat.
7. It appears that thereafter inquest was held by the Executive Magistrate as well as by one Mr. A.K. Sinha, AS1 of Ranaghat PS who had brought Raj Kumar Chakraborly, the victim from Ranaghat PS to the court. It has been alleged that Raj Kumar Chakraborty, the victim, was not in a position to walk yet he was put in the lock-up insplte of objection of the then in-charge of GRO lock-up Shri Balaram Das.
8. It appears that thereafter the victim was sent to Ranaghat Sub-Divisional Hospital where the attending doctor declared Raj Kumar Chakraborty "brought dead" and thereafter Post-Mortem was held at about 3.30 p.m. on that date. It appears that the doctor holding Post-Mortem found as many as seven injuries including rapture of left lung and plurae and facturc of left patella.
9. It appears from the order sheet relating to G.R, Case No. 1173 of 1993 that on 23.3.94 the Police submitted charge-sheet (charge-sheet No. 50 dated 15.3.94) against (1) Ranada Prasad Saha (2) Dulal Das (3) Swapan Ghosh (4) Santanu Bagchi. It further appears from the order sheet that on 23.3.94 the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat took cognizance of the offence in G.R. 1173 of 1993.
10. It appears that Ranaghat P.S. Case No. 449 of 1993 was started at 9.35 a.m. on 26.12.93 on the basis of the written complaint lodged by Santanu Bagchi, one of the accused in the charge-sheet, in G.R. Case No. 1173 of 1993. It appears that on the basis of G.D. entry No. 1316 dated 26.12.93 Raj Kumar Chakraborly, victim was shown arrested under section 41/109 of Cr.PC. In connection with Ranaghat PS Case No. 449 of 1993 dated 26.12.93 Police submitted final report.
11. It appears from the order sheet in connection with G.R. Case No. 1173 of 1993 that on 19.1.95 Shri Nandadulal Chakraborty the father of Raj Kumar Chakraborty, the victim, preferred two applications, one for compensation for custodial death of the victim and the other under section 173(8) of Cr.PC for further investigation by CB1.
12. By an order dated 6.3.95 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia the petition praying for ex gratia compensation for Rs. 2,00,000/- was dismissed on contest.
13. By an order dated 6.3.95 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia, the application under section 173(8) of Cr.PC filed by Nandadulal Chakraborty. the father of the victim was allowed on contest. It was directed that the further investigation of the Ranaghat PS Case No. 450 dated 27.12.93 (G.R. 1173 of 1993 under sections 341, 325, 304, 34, 201 of iPC) and Ranaghat PS. Case No. 449 of 1993 dated 26.12.93 under section 235/24 IPC (GR 1168/93) be taken up by Central Bureau of investigation. It was further ordered that the said order would govern the re-investigation of Ranaghat PS. Case No. 449/93 dated 26.12.93. It was further directed that CBI may be informed accordingly for taking up investigation forthwith. It appears that revistonal applications under section 397 read with section 399 of Code of Criminal Procedure were preferred by the State before the court of Sessions against the common order dated 6.3.95 passed by Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate. Ranaghat Nadia in Ranaghat PS. Case No. 450 dated 27.12.93 being G.R. 1173 of 1993 and 449 dated 26.12.93 being GR Case 1168 of 1993. It appears that the court of Sessions by an order dated 19th August, 1995 in Criminal Motions No. 68 & 69 of 1995 dismissed the aforesaid criminal revlsional applications on contest.
14. Thereafter the Dy. Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of investigation, Special Crime Branch, Salt Lake City, Calcutta preferred an application under section 401 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this High Court. It appears that there was some delay in filing the said application by CBI and, therefore, an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was preferred for condonation of the delay, it appears that on 6.5.96 A.B. Mukherjee, J. condoned the delay and admitted the revislonal application for hearing.
15. On behalf of the petitioner the following points were urged by the learned Advocate :
1. After taking congnizance the learned Magistrate cannot switch back to the stage of section 173;
2. When charge sheet was submitted and Final Report was submitted the learned Magistrate had three options;
(a) He could straight way accept the report under section 173(2) of Cr.PC.
(b) He might not accept the report and direct further investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.PC.
(c) He could take cognizance himself.
3. The learned Magistrate can act within his local Jurisdiction by directing the higher police officer but cannot direct any police beyond his Jurisdiction.
4. A private individual cannot make any application under section 173(8) Cr.PC.
16. It has already been noted hereinabove that in connection with Ranaghat PS. Case No. 449/93 the police submitted final report and in connection with Ranaghal PS. Case No. 450 dated 27.12.93 (G.R. 1173/ 93) police filed charge-sheet against the four accused persons and by order dated 23.3.94 the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia took cognizance of the offence in connection with Ranaghat PS. Case No. 450 dated 27.12.93.
17. The question whether a Judicial Magistrate, after taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report and after appearance of the accused in pursuance of the process issued, can order of his own, further investigation in the case came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Ranadhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) .
18. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) the Supreme Court laid down that despite a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence upon a police report, the right of police to further investigate even under the old 1898 Code was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right often as necessary when fresh information came to light. This position is now beyond pale of controversy because of sub-section 8 of section 173 of 1973 Code. However, in Ram Lal Narang's case (supra) it was added that after cognizance has been taken, then with a view to maintain independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, interests of the purity of administration of criminal justice and interests of the comity of various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts came to light, it was argued on behalf of the respondent that when Supreme Court observed that it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts came to light, it means that the Magistrate, after taking cognizance, even without an application by the police can make an order for re-investigation on the basis of an application made by the father of the victim. The point involved in the present appeal, however, is relatable not to the power of the police to make further investigation but of the Magistrate to order for such investigation. In Randhir Singh Rana's case (supra) Supreme Court held that a Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence, of his own cannot order for further investigation. Therefore, the question which falls for determination in the instant case is whether the Magistrate on an application purported to have been made under section 173(8) of the Cr.PC by the father of the victim can order for further investigation and that too by CBI.
19. The learned Advocate for the respondent relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papalah & Ors. . in that case UPSC sent to the Joint Secretary. CBI a complaint alleging the use of unfair means at the examination by the respondent, in that case the CBI filed a Final Report under section 173 Cr.PC in the court of 5th Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, before whom the FIR had been lodged, seeking closure of the case. The CBI inspite of the request to it by the UPSC did not inform it about the filing of the final report seeking closure of the case. The 5th Metropolitan Magistrate returned the final report because copy of the notice required to be issued to the complainant by the CBI had not been filed along with it, though on behalf of the CBI it was asserted that it had informed the UPSC regarding the filing of the closure report. Thereafter the final report was re submitted by the CBI to the court of 5th Metropolitan Magistrate along with a copy of the notice sent by the CBI to the appellant-complainant. Once again, the 5lh Metropolitan Magistrate returned the final report to the CBI. seeking proof of service of notice on the de-facto complainant. In his order the learned Metropolitan Magistrate further directed the CBI that in the notice to be served upon the UPSC it should be clearly indicated that the UPSC may file its objections to the final report. The CBI, for reasons best known to it did not comply with the order of the 5th Metropolitan Magistrate to resubmit the final report. The final report was once again returned by the 5th Metropolitan Magistrate to the CBI on January 12, 1995 as the statements of the witnesses, copies of the documents including the reports of the hand writing experts etc. had not been filed by the CBI alone with the closure report. While matters rested thus, the UPSC addressed a letter to CBI pointing out that CBI had informed it that CBI had decided to close the case under section 173 Cr.PC and that the closure report had been filed in the court. The UPSC pointed out that investigation had not been carried out properly and filing of the closure report was, therefore, not Justified. The UPSC asserted that there was need for re investigation because some of the vital points raised in its complaint had not been touched at all by the investigating officer during the investigation. While the UPSC was awaiting further communication from the CBI in that behalf the CBI, it appears, resubmltted the closure report and the learned 5th Metropolitan Magistrate accepted the final reported submitted by the CBI and closed the file without any opportunity being provided to the UPSC to have its say. The UPSC filed a Criminal Misc. petition in the court of 5th Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad. In the petition, after detailing the facts it was submitted that the investigation carried out by the CBI has been sketchy and that many vital points mention in the complaint and highlighted in its letter dated January 23, 1995 addressed to the Director had not been investigated property. The UPSC submitted that no notice had been issued by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to the UPSC before accepting the final report and, therefore, the order of acceptance of the final report was vitiated. Supreme Court referring to its earlier decision of a three Judges Bench in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr. held that as per law laid down in Bhagwant's case (supra), the issuance of a notice by the Magistrate to the informant at the time of consideration of the final report is a "must". This binding precedent which is the law of the land, has not been followed by the 5th Metropolitan Magistrate and was wrongly ignored by the revlslonal court also. Supreme Court further held that withholding of vital information from the learned Metropolitan Magistrate while resubmlttlng the final report along with various documents for reasons best known to the investigating officer, has created a doubt about the fairness on the part of the investigating officer while undertaking the investigations. Supreme Court also observed that the Magistrate could in exercise of power under section 173(8) Cr.PC direct the CBI to further investigate the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the UPSC to the investigation. It appears from this case that police submitted a final report seeking closure of the case withholding vital information from ihe learned Metropolitan Magistrate for reasons best known to the investigating officer and the learned Magistrate accepted the final report submitted by CBI and closed the file without any opportunity being provided to the UPSC to have its say. As per the law laid down in Bhagwant's case (supra) the issuance of a notice by the Magistrate to the informant at the time of consideration of the final report is a "must". Under these circumstance Supreme Court observed that the Magistrate could exercise the power under section 173(8) Cr.PC and direct the CBi to further investigate the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objection raised by the UPSC to the investigation. CBI was all through investigating the matter. In the instant case the police did not submit a final report seeking closure of the case. The Police submitted charge-sheet against four accused persons and on the basis of such charge-sheet the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. It is not the case that police while submitting charge-sheet against the accused persons withheld vital informations from the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia have all the records before him and applied his mind in the matter and took cognizance of the offence. Under these circumstances the Magistrate cannot take recourse to the provisions of section 173(8) of Cr.PC and direct CBI who had never investigated the matter for further investigation.
20. The application filed by Nandadulal Chakraborty, the father of the victim, under section 173(8) of Cr.PC if it is treated as a complaint to the Magistrate then the Magistrate could have passed an order for investigation under section 202 of Cr.PC. In this connection reference may be made to a Supreme Court decision in D. Loxminarayana v. V. Naroyana Reddy . The relevant paragraph is 17 of the reported decision which is quoted herelnbelow :--
"17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII. Under the caption : "Information to the Police and their powers to investigate"; while section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrate". The power to order police investigation under section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exerclsable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under section 173. On the other hand, section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV. but the some is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." Thus the object of an investigation under section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him."
21. The courts are meant to advance the course of justice cannot be doubted. A Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in State v. Meher Singh, 1974 Cr LJ 970 took the view that even after taking cognizance court can order further invesligalion in exercise of inherent power which was read in section 561-A of the Old Code, whose parallel provision in the new code is section 482. Supreme Court in Randhir Singh Rana's case while dealing with the aforesaid Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court observed as follows :--
"As to this decision, it has to be pointed out that in terms both these sections has saved the inherent power of the High Court only. It is doubtful whether the said power can be said to inhere in subordinate Criminal Courts also."
22. It is also relevant to refer to H.S. Bains v. Stats (U.T. Chandigarh) , The relevant lines from paragraph 6 of the reported decision are quoted below :--
"The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under section 156(3) and received a report under section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under sections 200, 203 and 204. Thus, a Magistrate who on receipt of a complaint order an investigation under section 156(3) and receives a police report under section 173(1), may. thereafter do one of three things: (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; (a) he may take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examination upon oath the complainant and his witnesses' under section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be."
23. It appears from Md. Ants v. Union of india & Ors. reported in 1994 SCC (Criminal) 251 that Division Bench of Supreme Court made an order on March 10. 1989 referring the question whether a court can order the CBI an establishment under the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment Act, to investigate a cognizable offence committed within a State without the consent of that State Government or without any notification or order having been issued in that behalf to a large Bench preferably by a Bench comprising of five Judges of Supreme Court. This issue is awaiting decision by a large Bench of the Supreme Court. While considering this aspect of the matter the Division Bench of Supreme Court in Md. Ants's case (supra) in paragraph 6 of the reported decision observed as follows :--
The reference to the expression 'court' in that order cannot in the context mean the apex court for the reason that the apex court has been conferred extraordinary powers by Article 1 and 2(1) of the Constitution so that it can do complete Justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The question regarding the width and amplitude of this court's power under Article 142(1) came up for consideration before this court in Delhi Judicial Service Assn., Delhi v. State of Gujarat and again before the Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of india. In the first case this court observed that the power conferred by Article 142(1) coupled with the plenary powers under Articles 32 and 136 empowers the court to pass such orders as it deems necessary to do complete Justice to the cause or matter brought before it. This power to do complete justice is entirely of different level and of a different quality which cannot be limited or restricted by provisions contained in statutory law. No enactment made by the Central or State Legislature can limit or restrict the court's power under Article 142(1) though while exercising it the court may have regard to statutory provisions (see paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Judgment). In the second case this court clarified that the expression "cause or matter" must be construed in a wide sense to effectuate the purpose of conferment of power. This power has been conferred on apex court only and the exercise of that power is not dependent or conditioned by any statutory provision. The constitutional plenitude of the powers of the apex court is to ensure due and proper administration of justice and is intended to be coextensive in each case with the needs of justice of a given case and to meeting any exigency. Very wide powers have been conferred on this court for due and proper administration of justice and whenever the court sees that the demand of Justice warrants exercise of such powers. It will reach out to ensure that justice is done by resorting to this extraordinary power conferred to meet precisely such a situation. True it is, that the power must be exercised sparingly for furthering the ends of justice but it cannot be said that its exercise is conditioned by any statutory provision. Any such view would defeat the very purpose and object of conferment of this extraordinary power. In the Union Carbide case this court observed as under: (SCC p. 634, para 83) "It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution ... The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous."
Proceeding further, the court observed : (SCC p. 635, para 83) The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations an provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142."
That is so for the obvious reason that statutory provisions cannot override constitutional provisions and Article 142(1) being a constitutional power cannot be limited or conditioned by any statutory provision. It, therefore, seems clear to us that the power of the apex court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution cannot be diluted merely because the statute, namely the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, stipulates that the State Government's permission will be necessary if the CBI is to investigate any offence committed with the territorial Jurisdiction of a State Government. That may be a statutory obligation governing the relations between the Central Government and the State Government but it cannot control this court's power under Article 142(1). In both the aforesaid cases reference was made to the decision In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and it was distinguished by pointing out that the violation of constitutional rights was tn issue. Here as pointed out earlier no such right is inCringed. Besides the decision in that case turned on its peculiar facts. The statute does not prohibit investigation by CBI but only requires certain formalities to be completed which have no relevance when the apex court makes an order in exercise of its power under Article 142(1). Therefore, we do not think that merely because a question is referred to a larger Bench this court is prohibited from exercising the powers conferred on it by Articles 142(1) of the Construction. In any case so far as the powers of the apex court under Article 142(1) are concerned, the position in law is now well settled by the aforementioned Constitution Bench rulings and hence if the reference includes the apex court it must be taken as implledly answered."
24. The learned Advocate for the respondent referred to certain decisions of Supreme Court where Supreme Court directed CBI to investigate into the matter. It is clear from the case of Md. Ants' (supra) that such powers are exercised by Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of india. Such powers have not been conferred even on High Courts not to speak of subordinate courts.
Under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code power vests in the police authorities of the State Government for conducting investigation into allegations relating to an offence. The procedure in the Code is clear and definite. It may be that in a given case the court on being prima facie satisfied from circumstances appearing from the record that the statutory agency has not worked in an effective way or the circumstances are such that it may reasonably be presumed or inferred that the statutory agency may not be able to discharge its function of investigation fairly and impartially might reasonably consider supplementing the procedure. (State of West Bengal v. Sampath Lal: .) in the instant case the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate after considering all the relevant records exercised his Judicial discretion by taking cognizance of the offence.
There is a clear cut and well-demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the Superintendence over which vests in the State Government. Reference may be made to State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna . The relevant lines of the reported decision read as follows :--
There is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the filed exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to-the court requesting the court to take cognizance of the offence under section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in section 173(8). there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence had been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the filed of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate."
25. In my view the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, after taking cognizance of the offence, cannot pass an order for further investigation under section 173(8) of Cr.PC unless the police makes an application praying for formal sanction of the court for further investigation. I am also of the opinion that the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under the provisions of Cr.PC cannot direct CBI under section 173(8) of Cr.PC to further investigate into the matter bypassing the State police.
In view of the discussions made hereinabove I am of the view that the order dated 6.3.95 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, Nadia, in GR 1173/93 allowing the application under section 173(8) of Cr.PC filed by Nandadulal Chakraborty. the father of the victim and directing further investigation of the Ranaghat PS. Case No. 450/93 dated 27.12.93 and Ranaghat PS. Case No. 449/93 dated 26.12.93 by Central Bureau of investigation, is illegal and I quash and set aside the same said order. The revisional application is thus allowed.
26. Application allowed