Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Jaipur Development Authority vs Labour Court And Ors. on 28 September, 1988
Equivalent citations: (1991)IILLJ133RAJ
JUDGMENT
Byas. J.
1. Since identical questions of law and facts are involved in these ten inter-connected writ petitions, they were heard together and are disposed of by a single judgment. The petitions are directed against a common order of the Labour Court. Jaipur passed on December 7, 1987 in a proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'). By the impugned order, the learned Judge of the Labour Court allowed the workmen's applications and directed the employer to pay fifty percent wages to them. Both, the workmen and the employer feel aggrieved by the said order. The employer is the Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, who will be hereinafter referred to as the JDA, or the management or the employer.
2. Facts first........... The facts are common in all the writ petitions and may be borrowed or recited from D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3044/88 JDA v. Chand Singh. The five workmen Chand Singh, Mohan Lal, Suresh Nirmal, Sharma B.Joseph and Shiv-Prakash were employed as Munshies in the Enforcement Division of JDA at the relevant time in November, 1984. The management by its order Annexure-1 dated 30th November, 1984 transferred them along with 176 others to the different wings as mentioned therein. The Association of the workmen challenged the transfer order Annexture-1 by instituting a civil suit in the Court of Additional Munsif (2), Jaipur City, Jaipur, on 7th December, 1984 and prayed for pendente-lite injunction. The Munsif issued notice to the JDA and heard both the parties. He, thereafter, by his order dated 12th December, 1984 issued pendente-lite injunction directing the JDA to maintain the status ante existing on the date of the institution of the suit. The workmen were, however, relieved from their posts of Munshies in Enforcement Division on 10th December, 1984 vide Annexure-2. The JDA went in appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge by his judgment dated 23rd February, 1985 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Munsif and vacated the pendente-lite injuntion. The Association came in revision to this Court. The revision was admitted and operation of the order of the District Judge dated 23rd February, 1985 was stayed on 28th February, 1985. The Association prayed for clarification/modification of the order dated 28th February, 1985. Since no ambiguity was there in the stay order granted on 28th February, 1985, the application for clarification/modification was dismissed on 24th May, 1985 by this Court. Somewhere in November 1985, the workmen were promoted to the posts of Junior Assistants. They joined their new posts of promotion. However, the wages to the workmen for the period from 1st November, 1984 to 30th October, 1985 was not paid by the JDA. According to the workmen they reported themselves on duty before the management but the management neither took work from them nor permitted them to mark their presence in the attendence register. The workmen, therefore, submitted applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act in the Court of Labour Court Judge, Jaipur for the computation and payment of the wages for the period from 1st November, 1984 to 31st October, 1985. The applications were opposed by the JDA on the ground that the workmen did not turn up for duty nor they discharged any work. The allegation that they reported themselves on duty but no work was taken from them was entirely false and baseless. Since the workmen did not report themselves on duty and discharged no work, they were not entitled for computation and payment of wages for the period from 1st November, 1984 to 31st October, 1985. Evidence was adduced by both the parties. On the conclusion of enquiry the learned Judge held that the workmen reported themselves for duty but performed no work. The JDA did not take work from them. The workmen were, therefore, entitled to get fifty percent of their wages and not more. He, accordingly, passed the impugned order Annexure-12 on 7th December, 1987. Both the parties feel aggrieved with the said order. The contention of the management is that since no work was performed by the workmen during the disputed period, they were not entitled to get any wages for the period. The grievance of the workmen is that they reported themselves on duty but work was not taken from them by the management. They are, therefore, entitled to get full wages for the disputed period.
3. We have heard Mr. M.R. Calla, learned Counsel for the workmen and Mr.R.S. Mehta, learned Counsel for the JDA. We shall first deal with the contentions raised by Mr. Mehta.
4. In impeaching the impugned order, the first contention raised by Mr. Mehta is that no application for payment of wages is maintainable under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It was argued that the proper forum for recovery of the wages is to file an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 before the Prescribed Authority. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act.
5. We find no force or merit in the contention of Mr. Mehta. Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit in respect of the matter entrusted to the jurisdiction of the Authority constituted under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The Labour Court cannot be regarded as a Court of general jurisdiction. Section 22 speaks about the bar for instituting a suit. It does not bar the institution of an application for recovery of wages under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court is not a Civil Court. As such its jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act for payment of wages to a workman is not barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act. Section 22 in terms does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Labour Court for two reasons (1) the Labour Court is not a Civil Court and (2) the application under Section 33C(2) of the Act cannot be equated with the suit. The contention has no substance and is turned down.
6. It was next argued by Mr. Mehta that the scope of Section 33C(2) does not include a case of the arrears of wages withheld by the employer. We again find the contention ineffective and without substance. Section 33C(2) is comprehensive and covers a case for the computation of the arrears of wages not paid to the workmen by the employer for one reason or the other.
7. The legislature has given an individual workman a speedy, inexpensive and expeditious remedy to enforce his individual right under Section 33C(2) of the Act without having to wait for the Union to espouse his case. Sub-section (2) is wide and comprehensive to include arrears of wages which may have been withheld or not paid by the employer. We are fortified in our submission by a decision of this Court given in Municipal Board, Merta v. The Labour Commissioner.(1977)Lab IC.497
8. The next contention of Mr. Mehta is that the stay granted by this Court on 28th February, 1985 staying the operation of the order of District Judge dated 23rd February, 1985 was vacated by this Court on 24th May, 1985. It was, therefore, incumbent on the workmen to join their new places of posting mentioned in Annexure-1 because the order of the District Judge became effective due to the withdrawal of the stay order. We find no life in the contention. The workmen moved for seeking clarification/modification of the stay order dated 28th February, 1985 vide their application Annexure-4. The order passed on this application on 24th May, 1985 is Annexure-5. This order does not show that the stay was withdrawn or vacated. It was stated that as there was no ambiguity in the stay order granted on 28th February, 1985 no clarification or modification was required. We are unable to read anything in Annexure-5 to support Mr. Mehta that the stay granted on 28th February, 1985 was withdrawn or vacated.
9. The last contention of Mr. Mehta is that since the workmen did not turn up on duty and discharged no work, they were not entitled to any wages. The Labour Court acted very liberally in granting fifty per cent of wages to them.
We may also deal with the contention of the workmen at this stage along with above contention of the JDA. The contention of the workmen is that they had reported themselves on duty for the period from 1st November, 1984 to 31st October, 1985. The management did not take work from them on the post of Munshies in the Enforcement Division because the management got annoyed with them as they had obtained pendente-lite injunction staying the operation of the transfer order Annexure-1. The blame for their not working cannot be placed on their shoulder. The Judge of the Labour Court on the one hand held that they reported themselves for duty and yet on the other hand awarded only fifty per cent wages to them. This approach of the Labour Court is erroneous and unsustainable.
Annexure-12 is the impugned order/award of the Labour Court. In paras 4 and 5 of it, the Labour Court has recorded the findings that the workmen appeared in the office of the JDA but work was not taken from them. It was further observed that when the workmen reported themselves on duty, it was expected from the management to take work from them or to allow them to work.
The aforesaid finding of the Labour Court has not been challenged by the management before us. There are more than one reason to infer that the workmen must have reported themselves for duty in the employer's office from November, 1984 to October, 1985. They submitted 177 documents which are their applications in the employer's office. These documents lead to the inference that the workmen reported themselves on duty. In case the workmen had not reported themselves on duty, it amounted to a misconduct on their part. It could also show that they had abandoned the job. It was expected (words missing) services on account of continuous absence. Nothing was done by the management. We, therefore, endorse the finding of the Labour Court that the workmen did report themselves on duty, but the management did not take work from them.
10. It appears that the management got annoyed with the workmen as they instituted a suit challenging the transfer order Annexure-1. This annoyance or displeasure continued more vigorously when the operation of Annexture-1 was stayed by the Civil Court. After all what the workman can do is to report himself on duty. It is with the employer to take work from him or not. The workman cannot snatch the work from the employer. It rests on the sweet will of the employer to take or not take work from the workman. But the workman cannot be denied the wages when he reports himself on duty but the work is not taken from him by the employer.
We find no logic in the approach of the Labour Court in awarding only fifty per cent wages to the workmen. The Labour Court has not recorded a finding that the workmen refused to work. There is, therefore, no logic in awarding only fifty per cent of wages to the workmen. They are entitlted to get full wages for the relevant period.
11. In the result:
(1) The writ petition Nos. 3044/88, 3047/88, 3050/88 filed by the Jaipur Development Authority are dismissed.
(2) The writ petition Nos. 367/87 Mohan Lal v. JDA (2) 371/87 Sharma B. Joseph v. JDA, (3) 372/88 Suresh Nirmal v. JDA, (4) 373/88 Chand Singh v. JDA and (5) 374/88 Shiv Prakash Mathur v. JDA are allowed. The Jaipur Development Authority is directed to pay full wages to these workmen for the period from 1st November, 1984 to 31st October, 1985. The impugned award/order of the Labour Court , Jaipur dated 7th December, 1987 will stand modified and amended accordingly.
12. No order as to costs.