Allahabad High Court
Shamshad Ali And Another vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 20 May, 2020
Bench: B. Amit Sthalekar, Piyush Agrawal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR RESERVED In Chamber Case :- WRIT - C No. - 27848 of 2018 Petitioner :- Shamshad Ali And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailesh Upadhyay,Manu Khare,Rishi Kant Rai Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Kaushalendra Nath Singh Connected with Case :- WRIT - C No. - 27876 of 2018 Petitioner :- Yunus And 3 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailesh Upadhyay,Rishi Kant Rai Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Kaushalendra Nath Singh And Case :- WRIT - C No. - 20101 of 2018 Petitioner :- Khushi Mohammad And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailesh Upadhyay,Rakesh Pande Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Kaushalendra Nath Singh And Case :- WRIT - C No. - 27873 of 2018 Petitioner :- Imamuddin Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailesh Upadhyay,Rishi Kant Rai Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Kaushalendra Nath Singh And Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1947 of 2020 Petitioner :- Yunus And 3 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Arvind Kumar,Vijay Pratap Singh Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Kaushalendra Nath Singh And Case :- WRIT - C No. - 27846 of 2018 Petitioner :- Ayub And 4 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailesh Upadhyay,Rishi Kant Rai Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ambrish Shukla,Kaushalendra Nath Singh Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar,J.
Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.) Heard Sri Manu Khare, Sri Shailesh Upadhyay as well as Sri Vijay Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Suresh Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh as well as Sri Raghvendra Dwivedi, learned counsel for the respondents.
These bunch of writ petitions are being decided by this common judgment and order as they involve identical question of facts and law, as agreed by the learned counsel for the parties.
We take up the leading case being Writ Petition No. 27848 of 2018 (Shamshad Ali and another Vs. State of U.P. and others). Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the father of the petitioners is said to be the recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 197 area 0-7-0, plot no.198 area 0-9-0, total area 0-16-0 situate in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, district Gautam Budh Nagar. It is stated that by notification dated 22.3.1983 issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1894) the said plots were notified for acquisition alongwith certain other plots in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar. Thereafter a declaration was made on 23.3.1983 under section 6 of the Act, 1894 with respect of these lands. The Award was published on 28.11.1984 fixing compensation payable for the land acquired at Rs.20/- per sq. yard. It is stated that one Fateh Mohammad who was the recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0 situate in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri being not satisfied with the Award preferred a reference under section 18 of Act, 1894 before the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer. This reference was proceeded as LAR No. 06 of 2002 (Fateh Mohd. Vs. State of U.P.). It is also stated that LAR No. 6 of 2002 was thereafter referred to Lok Adalat presided by Addl. District and Sessions Judge/FTC No. 2, Gautam Budh Nagar constituted under the provisions of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1987). Learned Addl. District Judge by his order dated 12.3.2016 allowed the said reference on the basis of a compromise between the parties alongwith other references being LAR No. 7 of 2002, LAR No. 8 of 2002 and LAR No. 9 of 2002 and the compensation was enhanced and fixed at Rs. 297.50/- per sq. yard on the ground that the High Court while deciding the first appeal with respect to the said village had enhanced the compensation to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. When the petitioners came to know about the order of the Lok Adalat, they moved an application under section 28-A of the Act, 1894 before the A.D.M. (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar as heirs of the previous tenure holders Niaz Mohd., Shah Mohd. and Buniyad Ali. It is also stated that the Addl. District Judge (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar delayed consideration of the application of the petitioners, therefore, the petitioners left with no other option approached the High Court by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4368 of 2018 (Shamshad Ali and another Vs. State of UI.P. And others). This writ petition was disposed of by the High Court by its order dated 1.2.2018 with a direction to the competent authority to take a decision on the application of the petitioners in accordance with law and in accordance with the direction contained in the judgement of a Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 38674 of 2017 (Satyapal Singh and 21 others Vs. State of U.P. and others) decided on 21.9.2017. Order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 01.02.2018 reads as under:-
"The petitioners claim to have filed an application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for re-determination of the compensation on the basis of the award made by the Reference Court in regard to the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and the declaration made under Section 6(1) of the Act. The grievance is that till date the application has not been decided.
The application which has been filed under Section 28-A of the Act has to be decided in terms of the conditions set out under Section 28-A of the Act which have also been elaborately dealt by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ C-No.38674 of 2017 (Satyapal Singh & 21 Ors., Vs. State of U.P. & 3 Ors.,) decided on 21 September 2017.
Learned Standing Counsel appears for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh, appears for respondent No.3. Learned counsel for the respondents state that the application shall be decided in accordance with law at an early date.
This petition is, accordingly, disposed of with a direction to the Competent Authority to take a decision on the application filed by the petitioners after hearing the parties concerned in accordance with law and in accordance with the directions contained in Satyapal Singh & 21 Ors,."
It is in pursuance of the order of the High Court dated 1.2.2018 that the respondents have proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 19.5.2018, Annexure-10 to the writ petition.
The contention of the petitioners is that the A.D.M., Land Acquisition/Special Land Acquisition Officer, respondent no. 4 has held that the writ petition no. 4368 of 2018 was filed by Shamshad Ali and another who have not preferred any reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 and since the reference under section 18 was only between the parties therein, therefore, the order passed in that reference would not be applicable in the case of the petitioners.
Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners referring to the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, 1987 submits that section 21 of the Act, 1987 provides that every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. Section 21 of the Act, 1987 reads as under:
"21. Award of Lok Adalat.--(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award."
He next referred to the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, 1894 and submits that where there is an award under Part III, and the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11 of the Act, 1894, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18 of the Act, 1894, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. Section 28-A of the Act, 1894 reads as under:
"28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.--(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made any application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who had not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by writted application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18."
Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel, therefore, submitted that since the reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 filed by the other tenure holders being LAR No. 6 of 2002, LAR. No. 7 of 2002, LAR No. 8 of 2002 and LAR No. 9 of 2002 having been referred to the Lok Adalat and decided therein by the Addl. District Judge/FTC No. 2, Gautambudh Nagar under the Act, 1987 by Award dated 12.3.2016 on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties therein and the compensation having been enhanced to Rs.297.50/- sq. yard, such order of the Lok Adalat would be deemed to be a decree of the civil court under section 21 of the Act, 1987, and the petitioners herein, therefore, would be entitled to the same compensation of Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard for the same village, covered by the same land acquisition notification under section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894 in terms of the provisions of section 28-A of the Act, 1894.
Shri Suresh Singh, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents no. 1, 2 and 4, on the other hand, submitted that the decision of the Lok Adalat dated 12.3.2016 was based upon a compromise between the parties to the references being LAR No. 6/2002, LAR No. 7/2002, LAR No. 8/2002 and LAR No. 9/2002 and it was on the basis of such compromise that the compensation payable to the applicants therein had been enhanced from Rs.20/- per sq. yard as given in the award dated 28.11.1984 to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. He submitted that since the present petitioners had not preferred any reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 against the award dated 28.11.1984 therefore, they cannot be said to be parties to the compromise Award of 12.3.2016 of the Lok Adalat which was passed in the LARs No. 6/2002, 7/2002, 8/2002 and 9/2002.
Shri Kaushlendra Nath Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3 adopted the submissions of the learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel and further submitted that the Award dated 12.3.2016 was an order passed by the Lok Adalat and not by a civil court. He further submitted that the Award of 12.3.2016 was passed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the parties to the references which was referred to the Lok Adalat by the Civil Court before whom the reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 had been filed and therefore, such an order cannot be said to be a decree of the civil court and, therefore, the provisions of section 28-A of the Act, 1894 would have no application in the present case.
Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners, at the outset submitted that admittedly the petitioners had not filed any reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 but on that basis alone they cannot be denied the benefit of the Award of the Lok Adalat since the Award dated 12.3.2016 was passed by the Lok Adalat on the matter being referred by the civil court to the Lok Adalat in the references LAR No. 6/2002, 7/2002, 8/2002 and 9/2002 filed under section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the civil court. The submission is that section 21 of the Act, 1987 itself ordains that every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under section 20(1) of the Act, 1987, the court fee paid in such cases shall be refunded in the manner provided in the Court Fees Act, 1870.
Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel submitted that the question in the present case is not one of refund of court fees but one where the present petitioners are relying upon an Award of the Lok Adalat on the reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 being transferred to it under the provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act, 1987. Shri Manu Khare further submitted that Section 22 of the Act, 1987 itself provides that Lok Adalat for the purposes of holding any determination under the Act shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure and sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Act, 1987 provides that all proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Section 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Section 195 chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The submission, therefore, is that the Act of 1987 itself deems the Lok Adalat to be a civil court and an award passed by it to be a decree of a civil court and, therefore, even if the petitioners have not preferred any reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894, they, by virtue of mandate of Section 28-A of the Act, 1894 being interested in all other land covered by the same notification under section 4(1) and being aggrieved by the award of the Collector would be entitled to the amount of compensation as determined by the court.
Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel submits that since the Lok Adalat has been vested with the powers of a civil court and its award shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court, such decree/award passed on 12.3.2016 cannot be ignored by the respondent no. 4 as it would amount to ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court. He further submits that the jurisdiction of a civil court can be ousted only by legislation and not by any administrative order. Reliance has been placed upon a judgement of the Supreme Court reported in (2002) 5 SCC 510 (ITI Ltd. Vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd.), the relevant paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the said judgement read as under:
"11. It has been held by this Court in more than one case that the jurisdiction of the civil court to which a right to decide a lis between the parties has been conferred can only be taken by a statute in specific terms and such exclusion of right cannot be easily inferred because there is always a strong presumption that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to decide all questions of civil nature, therefore, if at all there has to be an inference the same should be in favour of the jurisdiction of the court rather than the exclusion of such jurisdiction and there being no such exclusion of the Code in specific terms except to the extent stated in Section 37(2), we cannot draw an inference that merely because the Act has not provided the CPC to be applicable, by inference it should be held that the Code is inapplicable. This general principle apart, this issue is now settled by the judgment of a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and Anr. in C.A. No. 6527/2001 -- decided on 13.3.2002 where in while dealing with a similar argument arising out of the present Act, this Court held :
"While examining a particular provision of a statute to find out whether the jurisdiction of a Court is ousted or not, the principle of universal application is that ordinarily the jurisdiction may not be ousted unless the very statutory provision explicitly indicates or even by inferential conclusion the Court arrives at the same when such a conclusion is the only conclusion."
12. In the said view of the matter, we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by this Court in the case of Nirma Ltd. (supra) and reject the argument of Mr. Parasaran on this question.
13. We also do not find much force in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant based on Section 5 of the Act. It is to be noted that it is under this Part, namely, Part I of the Act that Section 37(1) of the Act is found, which provides for an appeal to a civil court. The term 'Court' referred to in the said provision is defined under Section 2(e) of the Act. From the said definition, it is clear that the appeal is not to any designated person but to a civil court. In such a situation, the proceedings before such court will have to be controlled by the provisions of the Code, therefore, the remedy by way of a revision under Section 115 of the Code will not amount to a judicial intervention not provided for by Part I of the Act. To put it in other words, when the Act under Section 37 provided for an appeal to the civil court and the application of Code not having been expressly barred, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court gets attracted. If that be so, the bar under Section 5 will not be attracted because conferment of appellate power on the civil court in Part I of the Act attracts the provisions of the Code also."
Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that even if an award of the Lok Adalat is not on the basis of a conflict between the parties on merit but is based upon a compromise, nevertheless, it would be equal to and at par with a decree on compromise and will have the same binding effect and it is equivalent to a decree executable to end the litigation among the parties.
We may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of the judgment in the case of P.T. Thomas Vs. Thomes Job, (2002) 6 SCC 478, particularly paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27 of the said judgment wherein the Supreme Court has held that the award of the Lok Adalat is final and permanent which is equivalent to a decree executable bringing and end to the litigation among the parties. Relevant paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment read as under:
"16. In our opinion, the award of the Lok Adalat is fictionally deemed to be decree of court and therefore the courts have all the powers in relation thereto as it has in relation to a decree passed by itself. This, in our opinion, includes the powers to extend time in appropriate cases. In our opinion, the award passed by the Lok Adalat is the decision of the court itself though arrived at by the simpler method of conciliation instead of the process of arguments in court. The effect is the same. In this connection, the High Court has failed to note that by the award what is put an end to is the appeal in the District Court and thereby the litigations between brothers forever. The view taken by the High Court, in our view, will totally defeat the object and purposes of the Legal Services Authorities Act and render the decision of the Lok Adalat meaningless.
17. Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 reads as follows :-
"21. Award of Lok Adalat.- (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as the case may be, an order of any other Court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred on it under sub-section (1) of Sec.20, the court fee paid in such cases shall be refunded; in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award.
Section 22 reads thus :-
"22. Powers of Lok Adalats.- (1) The Lok Adalat shall, for the purposes of holding any determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely :
(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath;
(b) the discovery and production of any document ;
(c) the reception of evidence on affidavits ;
(d) the requisitioning of any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any Court or Office; and
(e) such other matters as may be prescribed.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in sub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powers to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it.
(3) All Proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Secs. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Sec. 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2) of 1974).
18. What is Lok Adalat?
"The 'Lok Adalat' is an old form of adjudicating system prevailed in ancient India and it's validity has not been taken away even in the modern days too. The word 'Lok Adalat' means 'People Court'. This system is based on Gandhian Principles. It is one of the components of ADR system. As the Indian Courts are over burdened with the backlog of cases and the regular Courts are to decide the cases involve a lengthy, expensive and tedious procedure. The Court takes years together to settle even petty cases. Lok Adalat , therefore provides alternative resolution or devise for expedious and inexpensive justice.
In Lok Adalat proceedings there are no victors and vanquished and, thus, no rancour.
Experiment of 'Lok Adalat' as an alternate mode of dispute settlement has come to be accepted in India, as a viable, economic, efficient and informal one.
LOK ADALAT is another alternative to JUDICIAL JUSTICE. This is a recent strategy for delivering informal, cheap and expeditious justice to the common man by way of settling disputes, which are pending in Courts and also those, which have not yet reached Courts by negotiation, conciliation and by adopting persuasive, common sense and human approach to the problems of the disputants, with the assistance of specially trained and experienced Members of a Team of Conciliators."
19. Benefits Under Lok Adalat
1. There is no court fee and if court fee is already paid the amount will be refunded if the dispute is settled at Lok Adalat according to the rules.
2. The basic features of Lok Adalat are the procedural flexibility and speedy trial of the disputes. There is no strict application of procedural laws like Civil Procedure Code and Evidence Act while assessing the claim by Lok Adalat.
3. The parties to the dispute can directly interact with the Judge through their Counsel which is not possible in regular Courts of law.
4. The award by the Lok Adalat is binding on the parties and it has the status of a decree of a Civil Court and it is non- appealable which does not causes the delay in the settlement of disputes finally.
In view of above facilities provided by "the Act" Lok Adalats are boon to the litigating public they can get their disputes settled fast and free of cost amicably.
Award of Lok Adalat
20. The Lok Adalat shall proceed and dispose the cases and arrive at a compromise or settlement by following the legal principles, equity and natural justice. Ultimately the Lok Adalat passes an award, and every such award shall be deemed to be a decree of Civil Court or as the case may be which is final.
Award of Lok Adalat shall be final
21. The Lok Adalat will passes the award with the consent of the parties, therefore there is no need either to reconsider or review the matter again and again, as the award passed by the Lok Adalat shall be final. Even as under Section 96(3) of C.P.C. that "no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties". The award of the Lok Adalat is an order by the Lok Adalat under the consent of the parties, and it shall be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court, therefore an appeal shall not lie from the award of the Lok Adalat as under Section 96(3) C.P.C.
22. In Punjab National Bank vs. Lakshmichand Rai reported in AIR 2000 Madhya Pradesh 301, the High Court held that "The provision of the Act shall prevail in the matter of filing an appeal and an appeal would not lie under the provisions of Section 96 C.P.C. Lok Adalat is conducted under an independent enactment and once the award is made by Lok Adalat the right of appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act when it has been specifically barred under Provisions of Section 21(2), no appeal can be filed against the award under Sec.96 C.P.C."
The Court further stated that:
"14. It may incidentally be further seen that even the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for an appeal under Section 96(3) against a consent decree. The Code of Civil Procedure also intends that once a consent decree is passed by Civil Court finality is attached to it. Such finality cannot be permitted to be destroyed, particularly under the Legal Services Authorities Act, as it would amount to defeat the very aim and object of the Act with which it has been enacted, hence, we hold that the appeal filed is not maintainable.
23. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that, in Board of Trustees of the Port of Visakhapatnam vs. Presiding Officer, Permanent, Lok Adalat-cum-Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Visakhapatnam and another reported in 2000(5) ALT 577, " The award is enforceable as a decree and it is final. In all fours, the endeavour is only to see that the disputes are narrowed down and make the final settlement so that the parties are not again driven to further litigation or any dispute. Though the award of a Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest on merits just as a regular suit by a Court on a regular suit by a Court on a regular trial, however, it is as equal and on par with a decree on compromise and will have the same binding effect and conclusive just as the decree passed on the compromises cannot be challenged in a regular appeal, the award of the Lok Adalat being akin to the same, cannot be challenged by any regular remedies available under law including invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the correctness of the award on any ground. Judicial review cannot be invoked in such awards especially on the grounds as raised in this writ petition.
24. The award of Lok Adalat is final and permanent which is equivalent to a decree executable, and the same is an ending to the litigation among parties.
25. In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs. The State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 346, the Constitution Bench held as follows:
A Judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. (South American and Mexican Co.,ex p Bank of England, (1895) 1 Ch.37 & In re & Kinch v. Walcott, 1929 AC 482) "In South American and Mexican Co., ex p Bank of England, In re (1895) 1 Ch 37 ), it has been held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mind on a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams,J Lord Herschell said (Ch page 50) :-
"The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action."
To the like effect are the following observations of the Judicial Committee in 'Kinch v. Walvott', 1929 AC 482 at p.493:-
"First of all their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent , not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced , is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal."
26. The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions. Reference need only be made to the cases of ' Secy. Of State v. Ateendranath Das', 63 Cal 550 at p. 558 (E) ; - ' Bhaishanker v. Moraji', 36 Bom 283 (F) and ' Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur', v. Thatha Ramasamy Chetty', 35 Mad 75 (G). In the Calcutta case after referring to the English decisions the High Court observed as follows :
"On this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusion arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded. When we say "every step in the reasoning" we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgment or the ultimate conclusion was founded. In other words the finding which it was necessary to arrive at for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in the particular case will operate as estoppel by judgment."
27. The Civil Procedure Code contains the following provisions: Order 23 Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit -- where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, written and signed by the parties. The Court after satisfying itself about the settlement, it can convert the settlement into a judgment decree."
Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel has also placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgement of this court passed in a bunch of first appeals decided on 21.4.2016, the leading case being First Appeal No. 522 of 2009 (Pradeep Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others. The relevant paragraphs 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 read as under:
"32. In the facts of this case the only distinguishing feature pointing out is that the land of the same village Makanpur which was acquired under Notification dated 12.9.1986 was for planned development of Ghaziabad Development Authority while the land of the same village Makanpur acquired under Notification dated 15.3.1988 is for planned Industrial Development Authority for NOIDA, no other special reasons have been disclosed to us for not providing the same compensation as determined by the Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra) to the appellants.
33. Another reason for the same conclusion flows from the intent of Section 28-A of the Land Acquition Act, 1894 which reads as follows:
"28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court:
(1) Where in an award under this Part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section II, the persons interested in all the other land.covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (I) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within Ihree months from the date of the award of the court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court;
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under Ihis sub-seclion, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be ex.cluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (I), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonbble opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18."
34. From a simple reading of the said section, it is apparently clear that a farmer, who had not filed any application against the award of Special Land Acquisition Officer for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act, becomes entitled to grant of compensation at the higher rate, if the Court awards higher compensation in respect of the land covered by the same notification to the other tenure holders. The farmer is only required to make an application to the Collector for re-determination of his compensation in terms of the order of the Court.
35. At the very outset, it may be recorded that we are not holding that Section 28A of Act 1894 is attracted in the facts of the case. What we are recording is that from a reading of Section 28A of Act 1894 what flows is that even in absence of exemplars and other evidence, higher compensation can be allowed to a tenure holder only on the plea that the 'Court' has enhanced the compensation for others whose land was acquired under the same notification.
36. 'Court' as referred under Section 28-A of Act 1894, would necessarily include the first appellate court, namely, the High Court as the appeal under Section 54 of Act 1894 is only a continuation of original proceedings. 'Court' has been defined under Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as follows:-
"3(d) the expression "Court" means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the [appropriate Government] has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform functions of the Court under this Act;"
37. In our opinion, therefore what follows is that the orders passed by the Court including the first appellate court i.e. High Court, in the matter of determination of rate of compensation in respect of land covered by a particular notification, would be a relevant consideration to be taken into account for determining as to what would be the fair and just compensation for similarly situated tenure holders, whose lands has been acquired under the same notifications or notifications issued thereafter qua the same village/area.
38. Strictly speaking Section 28A of Act 1894 is applicable in respect of land covered by same notification but if the land of the same village/area is acquired under a subsequent notifications then the rate of compensation cannot be any less than the rate determined by the Court for the land covered by first notification unless some special reasons exist.
39. The rate to be provided in such cases if not higher, must be the same as determined by the 'Court' in respect of the land covered by the earlier notification provided always that the land covered by subsequent notification is situate in the same village/area and there are no special reasons to provide a lesser compensation."
In that case there were two land acquisition notifications for the same village Makanpur in which land was first acquired under notification dated 12.9.1986 for the development of Gautam Budh Nagar Authority whereas under the second notification dated 15.3.1988 the land of the same village Makanpur was acquired for planned industrial development authority for NOIDA. The division bench of this court observed that no special reasons have been disclosed for not providing the same compensation as determined by the court in the case of the GDA Vs. Kashi Ram First Appeal No. 910 of 2000 and therefore in paragraph 38 (quoted above) the Division Bench of the High Court has held that Section 28-A of the Act, 1894 strictly speaking is applicable in respect of the land covered by the same notification but if the land of the same village/area is acquired under a subsequent notification then the rate of compensation cannot be any less than the rate determined by the court for the land covered by the first notification unless some special reason exists. We may hasten to add that in the present case there is only one land acquisition notification.
The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners in support of their submission have relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in (2018) 2 SCC 660 State of Punjab Vs. Jalauar Singh particularly paragraph 12 thereof which reads as under:-
"12. It is true that where an award is made by Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties, (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and disposed of the appeal on merits."
The Supreme Court has left no doubt that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties which is duly signed by the parties it becomes official and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court and no appeal lies against such award before any court. Such an award based on settlement can be challenged by a party aggrieved by such award only by filing a petition under Article 226 and /or Article 227 of the Constitution and that too on very limited grounds.
In the present bunch of writ petitions, it is not the case of the respondents that the award of the Lok Adalat was not based upon a consensus and settlement arrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat, the respondents being one of the parties to said award nor is it the case of the respondents that, that award of 12.03.2016 was put to challenge by the said respondents before any superior forum. In such circumstances, the award of the Lok Adalat being deemed a decree of a civil court and having become final, the petitioners herein would be entitled to claim the benefit thereof by invoking the provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it is not open to the respondents to raise the plea, at this stage in the present bunch of writ petitions that the award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016 was questionable or that it was not based on consensus and settlement between the parties therein and that the Lok Adalat was not a court of competent jurisdiction particularly, when the award of 12.03.2016 was based on a reference made by a court of competent jurisdiction hearing references LAR nos. 6 of 2002, 7 of 2002, 8 of 2002 and 9 of 2002 to the Lok Adalat.
The petitioners have also placed reliance upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, ILR 2007 KAR 4533 Vasudave and Others Vs. The Commissioner and Secretary Government Revenue Department and Others. Paragraph 11 therein reads as under:-
"11. Insofar as Section 28-A of the LA Act is concerned, the principle underlining the said provision is, if a land owner who has not sought for any reference to a civil court seeking higher compensation, should not be denied the benefit of higher compensation if a reference court or the appellate court were to pay higher compensation to a landlord who is similarly placed. Therefore, the Parliament in its wisdom thought of introducing Section 28-A in order to see that innocent, illiterate and ignorant landlords who are not fully aware of the rights given to them under law are not denied the benefit of the law. This provision is in consonance with equality clause enshrined in our Constitution under Article 14. Therefore, by introducing Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, what was intended was to extend the benefit of payment of higher compensation even to those landlords who had not sought for a reference, provided they filed an application within 30 days from the date of judgment and award of the reference court. When that being the intention of the Parliament, when an award is passed by a Lok Adalat by consent, the said award falls within the order under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act passed by the Court and therefore the landlords are entitled to the benefit of higher compensation as per the award passed by the Lok Adalat. The approach of the trial Court is wholly erroneous, contrary to law and cannot be sustained."
Shri Suresh Singh, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel by way of rebuttal submitted that the Lok Adalat itself is not a court and since if on a reference made to a Lok Adalat by a court no award could be made as the parties may not arrive on a compromise or settlement, the Lok Adalat shall advise the parties to seek remedy in a court and where the record of the case is returned to a court, such court shall proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before such reference so made. The learned counsel has referred to the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, 1987, which read as under:
"20. Cognizance of Cases by Lok Adalats-(1) Where in any case referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (5) of Section 19-(i)
(i) (a) The parties thereof agree; or
(b) One of the parties thereof makes an application to the court, for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if such court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances of such settlement or
(ii) The court is satisfied that the matter is an appropriate one to be taken cognizance of by the Lok Adalat, the court shall refer the case to the Lok Adalat:
Provided that no case shall be referred to the Lok Adalat under sub-clause (b) of clause ( i) or clause (ii) by such court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt of an application from any, one of the parties to any matter referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matter needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the Lok Adalat, for determination; Provided that no matter shall be referred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the other party.
(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice equity, fair play and other legal principles.
(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been received under sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law.
(6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to seek remedy in a court.
(7) Where the record of the case is returned under sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal such reference under sub-section (1).
The learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel referring to the provisions of sub section (6) and (7) of Section 20 of the Act, 1987 submits that where no award can be made by the Lok Adalat the matter has to be referred to the court from which the reference was made.
The learned Addl. C.S.C. further referred to the provisions of Section 3(d) of the Act, 1894 which defines 'court' under the Act to mean a principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate court has appointed a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the court under the Act and submits that the 'court' only means the principal court of original jurisdiction or a special judicial officer empowered to perform the functions of the court appointed by the appropriate government. The submission is that since the Lok Adalat is not a 'court' therefore the award of the Lok Adalat based upon a compromise arrived between the parties to such reference cannot be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. The learned Addl. C.S.C has further referred to part III of the Land Acquisition Act and submits that reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 therein means reference to a 'court' as defined under section 3(d) of the Act 1894 but in the present case the references preferred by other persons being reference No. 6/2002, 7/2002, 8/2002 which was pending before the court under section 18 of the Act, 1894 was referred to the Lok Adalat on the request of the parties and it was therein that a compromise had been arrived at between the parties to that reference which was decided by the Lok Adalat through an award dated 12.3.2016 and not by the court under section 18 of the Act, 1894 on a reference made to it and therefore the award made by the Lok Adalat cannot be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. He therefore submits that such award of the Lok Adalat not being a decree of a civil court the petitioners herein cannot claim the benefit of such award by invoking the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, 1894. Learned Addl. C.S.C. further submits that under section 28-A (3) of the Act, 1894 any person who has not accepted the award under sub section (2) may by a written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894.
The submission of Shri Kaushlendra Singh, learned counsel for the respondent is that the petitioners in the present case have not submitted any application to the Collector for referring the matter for determination of the court and therefore they cannot claim the same benefits and enhanced compensation under the award dated 12.3.2016.
If we examine the facts of the case it will be noticed that when the petitioners herein had applied to the Collector-respondent no.4 for granting them the benefits under Section 28A of the Act, 1894 with reference to the award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.3.2016 enhancing the amount of compensation from Rs.20/- per square yard to Rs. 297/- per square yard as stated in paragraph 10 of the writ petition and which has not been disputed by the respondents in their respective counter affidavits. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1, 2 and 4, the averments of paragraph 10 of the writ petition, have been stated to be matter of record and therefore, call for no comments and in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no.3 in paragraph 6 thereof it is stated that the averments of paragraph 10 are matter of record and therefore, need no specific reply. In this view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners have not submitted any application to the Collector for referring the matter for determination of the court is contrary to their own admitted facts is therefore, rejected.
We may also note here that sub section (3) of Section 28A refers to a person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) of Section 28A of the Act, 1894 and therefore, gives such person an option to make an application in writing to the Collector to refer the matter to the court for determination of the court. In the present case, the impugned order dated 19.05.2018, Annexure-10 to the writ petition cannot be said to be an award of the ADM, LAO, Gautam Budh Nagar nor is it an award of the Lok Adalat and therefore, the question of the petitioners herein again applying to the Collector to refer the matter for determination by a court does not arise. Besides in the present bunch of writ petitions, the petitioners were seeking the benefit of the Award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016 under the provisions of Section 28A of the Act, 1894 and had, therefore, submitted their applications dated 12.05.2016.
The learned Chief Standing counsel next submitted that the ''court' as defined in Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate government has appointed a special judicial officer to perform the functions of the court under the Act, 1894, therefore, the Lok Adalat not being a court, the award of the Lok Adalat under Section 21 of the Act, 1987 would not be binding upon the respondents so far as the present petitioners are concerned and would not entitle them to the benefits of the award dated 12.03.2016. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (2008) 6 SCC 741 Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Krishna Travel Agency, particularly paragraph 9 thereof which reads as under:-
"9. There is another facet of the problem. The party will be deprived of the right to file an appeal under section 37(I)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This means that a valuable right of appeal will be lost. Therefore, in the scheme of things, the submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. Taking this argument to a further logical conclusion, when the appointment is made by the High Court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, then in that case, in every appointment made by the High Court in exercise of its power under section 11(6), the High Court will become the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2(1(e) of the 1996 Act. That is certainly not the intention of the legislature. Once an arbitrator is appointed then the appropriate forum for filing the award and for challenging the same, will be the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. Thus, the parties will have the right to move under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and to appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, in the scheme of things, if appointment is made by the High Court or by this Court, the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction remains the same as contemplated under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act."
In our opinion, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a case under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 dealing with an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 and there the Supreme Court had appointed a Senior Advocate as Arbitrator who gave his award which was filed before the District Judge, Dehradun and an application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was filed for setting aside that award and in the meantime, I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 were filed before the Supreme Court on the premise that the Supreme Court alone had the jurisdiction to dispose of the objections since the arbitrator had been appointed by it. The Supreme Court rejected the submissions and held that if the argument is accepted, then in all such cases where an appointment is made by a High Court, of an arbitrator, under exercise of powers under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, the High Court would become the principal civil court of original jurisdiction which was not the intention of the legislature. In our opinion, the said judgment has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case as in the present case, the petitioners are seeking the benefit of an award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.3.2016 on a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 being referred to it by that court and the benefit of that award is being claimed under Section 28A of the Act, 1894 under which an award of the Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of a civil court and Section 28A gives a right to any person who has not accepted the Award to claim same benefit as under the award.
The learned counsel for the respondents have also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in 2013 6 ADJ 104, Northern Coal Fields, Singrauli Vs Aluminium Industries Ltd., Kundara (Kerala). That was also a case under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which has no application to the facts of the present case.
The next judgement referred is a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Arbitration Application under Section 11, no. 32 of 2012 decided on 31.5.2012 wherein the court had referred to the judgment of Krishna Travel Agency (supra) and therefore, the same has no application to the facts of the present case.
Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in (2012) 4 SCC 307, Kunwar Singh Saini Vs High Court of Delhi, particularly paragraphs 22 and 23 thereof and the submission is that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and if the court passed an order or decree having no jurisdiction over the matter it would amount to a nullity and such a decree/award would be inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. The submission is that when the Act creates a right or obligation and enforces the performance therein in a specified manner that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment read as under:-
"22. There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes order/decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the proceedings including in appeal or execution. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Acquiescence of a party equally should not be permitted to defeat the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute.
23. When a statute gives a right and provides a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act. When an Act creates a right or obligation and enforces the performance thereof in a specified manner, "that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner". Thus for enforcement of a right/obligation under a statute, the only remedy available to the person aggrieved is to get adjudication of rights under the said Act."
In our opinion, this judgment also does not help the respondents and has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason, that the award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016 was based upon a compromise arrived at between the parties before it, the State respondents being one of the parties and it was based on a reference made to the Lok Adalat by the court hearing the references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and by virtue of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 such award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of the civil court and by virtue of Section 28A of the Land Acquistion Act, 1894, the petitioners herein would have a right to claim the benefit of such an award/decree dated 12.03.2016 even if, they had not filed their own references so long as their land was governed by the same notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 and in the same village and area as the persons covered by the decision of the Lok Adalat.
The learned counsel for the respondents next referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (2008) 2 SCC 660, State of Punjab and another Vs Jalaur Singh and others, particularly paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 which read as under:-
"8. It is evident from the said provisions that Lok Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat determines a reference on the basis of a compromise or settlement between the parties at its instance, and put its seal of confirmation by making an award in terms of the compromise or settlement. When the Lok Adalat is not able to arrive at a settlement or compromise, no award is made and the case record is returned to the court from which the reference was received, for disposal in accordance with law. No Lok Adalat has the power to "hear" parties to adjudicate cases as a court does. It discusses the subject matter with the parties and persuades them to arrive at a just settlement. In their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are guided by principles of justice, equity, fair play. When the LSA Act refers to 'determination' by the Lok Adalat and 'award' by the Lok Adalat, the said Act does not contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination based on a compromise or settlement, arrived at by the parties, with guidance and assistance from the Lok Adalat. The 'award' of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision making process. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.
9. But we find that many sitting or retired Judges, while participating in Lok Adalats as members, tend to conduct Lok Adalats like courts, by hearing parties, and imposing their views as to what is just and equitable, on the parties. Sometimes they get carried away and proceed to pass orders on merits, as in this case, even though there is no consensus or settlement. Such acts, instead of fostering alternative dispute resolution through Lok Adalats, will drive the litigants away from Lok Adalats. Lok Adalats should resist their temptation to play the part of Judges and constantly strive to function as conciliators. The endeavour and effort of the Lok Adalats should be to guide and persuade the parties, with reference to principles of justice, equity and fair play to compromise and settle the dispute by explaining the pros and cons, strength and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of their respective claims."
10. The order of the Lok Adalat in this case (extracted above), shows that it assumed a judicial role, heard parties, ignored the absence of consensus, and increased the compensation to an extent it considered just and reasonable, by a reasoned order which is adjudicatory in nature. It arrogated to itself the appellate powers of the High Court and 'allowed' the appeal and 'directed' the respondents in the appeal to pay the enhanced compensation of Rs.62,200/- within two months. The order of the Lok Adalat was not passed by consent of parties or in pursuance of any compromise or settlement between the parties, is evident from its observation that "if the parties object to the proposed order they may move the High Court within two months for disposal of the appeal on merits according to law". Such an order is not an award of the Lok Adalat. Being contrary to law and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat, it is void in the eye of law. Such orders which "impose" the views of the Lok Adalats on the parties, whatever be the good intention behind them, bring a bad name to Lok Adalats and legal services."
The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that when the Legal Services Authority Act refers to determination by the Lok Adalat and award of the Lok Adalat, the said Act does not admittedly require an adjudicatory determination but non-adjudicatory determination passed on a compromise and settlement arrived at by the parties with guidance and assistance from the Lok Adalat.
In paragraph 9, the Supreme Court has observed that sometimes the members of the Lok Adalat get carried away and proceed to pass orders on merits even though there is no consensus or settlement as was the case in the case of Jalour Singh (Supra) as noted by the court in paragraph 10 of the judgment. That is not the factual position in the case of the present petitioners.
The learned Chief Standing Counsel has also referred to a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court dated 24.02.2012 passed in Civil Writ jurisdiction case no. 13375 of 2011 (Surendra Singh and others Vs Deo Muni Singh and others). In that case, the learned Single Judge has held that the Lok Adalat does not fall within the definition of court under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and therefore, has no inherent jurisdiction to decide an issue of fraud. In our opinion, the said judgment has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case since it is nobody's case that any fraud was exercised by any of the parties on the Lok Adalat to obtain the award dated 12.03.2016.
Reliance has been placed by the respondents upon a judgment of this Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition no. 5899 of 2017 (Dheer Singh and others Vs State of U.P. and others). In our opinion the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case as in that case, the application under Section 28A of the Act, 1894 had been filed by the petitioners therein claiming re-determination of compensation on the basis of the judgment rendered by the High Court in first appeal on 3rd, December, 2014 and not on the basis of the award made by the reference court. The Division Bench of the High Court held that an application under Section 28A cannot be filed for re-determination of compensation by treating the award as one made by the High Court in the first appeals or by the Supreme Court and the High Court held that 'court' referred to in Section 3(d) of the Act, 1894 means that principal civil court of original jurisdiction and not the High Court or the Supreme Court. In the present case, the award of the Lok Adalat on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners herein was passed by the Lok Adalat on a reference made to it by the court hearing a bunch of references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and, therefore, the award of the Lok Adalat would be deemed to be a decree of a civil court under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and the petitioners would have right to claim benefit of the said award by invoking the provisions of Section 28A of the Act, 1894.
The next judgment relied on by the respondents is (1997) 4 SCC 473, Bhagti (Smt.) deceased through her legal heirs Jagdish Ram Sharma Vs State of Haryana. That was also a case where the benefit under Section 28A(1) of the Act, 1894 was being claimed with reference to an order made by the High Court, and the Supreme Court held that Section 28A(1) has no application where a right to re-determination of compensation is based upon an order of the High Court. The said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.
The respondents have next relied upon AIR 1995 SC 2259, Union of India and another Vs Pradeep Kumari and others. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the cause of action for moving the application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28A arises from the award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought and the limitation for moving the application under Section 28A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought. In the present case, we may note that the application under Secftion 28A was filed by the present petitioners being successors of the previous recorded tenure holders on 12.05.2016 seeking benefit of the award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016 i.e. within three months from the date of the award of the court. The court here is with reference to the Lok Adalat whose award by virtue of Section 21 of the Act, 1987 is deemed to be a decree of a civil court and therefore, the same has been filed within the time frame as provided in Section 28A(1) of the Act, 1894. The judgment in the case of Pradeep Kumar(supra), therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case.
We may at this stage also note that the respondents have nowhere taken the plea that applications of the petitioners under section 28A of the Act, 1894 was filed beyond the period of limitation of three months as provided in Section 28A(1) of the Act, 1894, nor have they disputed the date of filing of the applications by the petitioners under Section 28A of the Act.
Reliance has next been placed by the respondents on the judgment of the Supreme Court in (1995) 2 SCC 689 Babua Ram and others vs State of U.P. and another. In our opinion, the said judgment also has no application to the facts of the present case. Respondents have also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ petition (C) no. 611 of 2017 (Smt. Kamla Tomar Vs State of U.P. and others) decided on 23.01.2017 which again is on the question of limitation and has no application to the facts of the present case.
The next case relied upon by the respondents is a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 7218 of 2019 (Tezpal Singh & others Vs. State of U.P. & Others) decided on 08.03.2019, which is also on the question of limitation, and, therefore, has no application to facts of the present case.
We may, at this stage, refer to the provisions of Section 19 of the legal Services Authority Act, 1987 which reads as under:-
"Section 19 - Organization of Lok Adalats.--(1) Every State Authority or District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or every High Court Legal Services Committee or, as the case may be, Taluk Legal Services Committee may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as it thinks fit.
(2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such number of :-
(a) Serving or retired judicial officers and
(b) Other persons,of the area as may be specified by the State Authority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee, or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee, organising such Lok Adalats.
(3) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) for Lok Adalats organised by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.
(4) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) for Lok Adalats other than referred to in sub-section (3) shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court.
(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of :-
(i) Any case pending before; or
(ii) Any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is not brought before, any court for which the Lok Adalat is organised.
Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law.
Section 20 of the Act, 1987 has already been quoted above. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides for reference of any case to the Lok Adalat, if the parties thereof agree or one of the parties thereof, in a case agrees and makes an application to the court for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if the court is satisfied that there are chances of settlement, the court shall refer the case to the Lok Adalat. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 provides that the Lok Adalat in a case referred to it shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. In the present case, it is not the case of the respondents that there was no valid case referred for adjudication by the Lok Adalat for adjudicating LARs No. 6 of 2002, 7 of 2002, 8 of 2002 and 9 of 2002. It is also not the case of the respondents that they were not party to such references to the Lok Adalat and it is also not the case of the respondents that the award dated 12.03.2016 was passed by the Lok Adalat becoming a victim of a fraud. The respondents were party to the Land Acquisition references under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 which were referred to the Lok Adalat and on which award dated 12.03.2016 was passed. Such an award of the Lok Adalat shall by virtue of provision Section 21 of the Act, 1987 be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. It is the admitted case of the petitioners herein that they had not filed their own references under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 against the original Land Acquisition award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 published on 28.11.1984. The petitioners, therefore, as soon as, the award was made by the Lok Adalat on 12.03.2016, moved an application under Section 28A of the Act, 1984 on 12.05.2016 seeking the benefits of enhanced compensation under the award of 12.03.2016. The application of the petitioners was therefore, within time.
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 provides for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court to persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4 sub-section (1) of the Act, 1894 and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 and claim re-determination on the basis of the amount of the compensation awarded by the court. It is not disputed by the respondents that the lands of the petitioners are situated in village Aliwardipur/Alahbadripur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, then District Ghaziabad now District Gautam Budh Nagar, which was notified under Section 4 sub section (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 23/03.1983. The averments of paragraph 3 of the writ petition have not been denied in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1,2 and 4 and in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no.3. The averments of paragraph 3 of the writ petition are stated to be matter of record. Likewise, the averments of paragraph 4, 5 and 6 of the writ petition have been replied in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit of the respondents no.1, 2 and 4 as well, calling for no comments being matter of record. Likewise, in the counter affidavit of respondent no.3 the averments of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the writ petition have been stated in paragraph 4 of the affidavit to be matter of record.
Thus, there is absolutely no dispute that the land of the present petitioners was covered by the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquistion Act, 1894 relating to Village Aliwardipur/Alahbadripur, Pargana and Tensil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar in respect of which an award under Section 11 of the Act was published on 28.11.1984 fixing Rs. 20/- per square yard as compensation for the land acquired and which on a reference made under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, by the affected persons other than the petitioners herein culminated in an award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016 based upon a compromise and settlement between the parties, the respondents being one of the parties, in such view of the matter in our considered opinion, the present petitioners cannot be denied the benefit of provisions of Section 28A of the Act, 1894 and they cannot be denied the benefit of the award dated 12.03.2016.
The claim of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent no. 4 by the impugned order dated 19.05.2018 on the ground that they had not filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 and that the award of 12.03.2016 was only between the parties before the Lok Adalat or before the court under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. The reasoning given by the respondent no. 4 is absolutely illegal and arbitrary and against the statutory mandate of Section 28A of the Act, 1894 and in view of our discussion herein above, the impugned order dated 19.5.2018 deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed and we hold that the petitioners would be entitled for payment of compensation as determined in the Award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016. The respondent no. 4-Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, District Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application of the petitioners dated 12.5.2016 in the light of our observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
The claim of the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 27876 of 2018 (Yunus and others Vs. State of U.P. and others) is that their father was recorded tenure holder of plot nos. 206 area 0-10-0, plot no. 207 area 0-19-0, plot no. 209-M area 0-19-0, plot no. 208 area 2-10-0, plot no. 210 area 0-22-0 total area 6-0-0 situated in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur Pargana and Tehsil Dadri. The said plots have also been notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Act, 1894 on 22.3.1983. The award was published on 28.11.1984 fixing Rs.20/- per sq. yard as compensation for the land acquired. One Fateh Mohd., who was a recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0 situated in the same village being affected by the award dated 28.11.1984, preferred a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer being LAR No. 6 of 2002. Subsequently, the said LAR was produced before the Lok Adalat i.e. Addl. District and Sessions Judge/F.T.C. No. 2 Gautam Budh Nagar and the same was allowed on 12.3.2016 on the basis of a compromise between the parties alongwith other references enhancing the compensation to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. Though the petitioners have not preferred any reference but on coming to know about the said award, they have moved an application on 13.5.2016 under section 28-A of the Act, 1894 before the respondent no. 4 within time. The said application of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent no. 4 by the impugned order dated 19.5.2018. In view of the fact that identical questions of fact and law are involved in this writ petition also, the impugned order dated 19.5.2018 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the light of the discussion and direction given in the leading writ petition no. 27848 of 2018. The respondent no. 4-Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, District Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application of the petitioners dated 13.5.2016 in the light of our observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
The claim of the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 20101 of 2018 (Khushi Mohammad and another vs. State of U.P. and others) is that their father was recorded tenure holder of ½ part of plot Nos. 183M area 0.14-0, plot no. 184M area 0-0-0, plot no. 192 area 0-3-61/3 and plot no. 193 area 4-5-62/3 total area 5-7-62/3 situated in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur Pargana and Tehsil Dadri. The said plots have also been notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Act, 1894 on 22.3.1983. The award was published on 28.11.1984 fixing Rs.20/- per sq. yard as compensation for the land acquired. One Fateh Mohd., who was a recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0 situated in the same village being affected by the award dated 28.11.1984, preferred a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer being LAR No. 6 of 2002. Subsequently, the said LAR was produced before the Lok Adalat i.e. Addl. District and Sessions Judge/F.T.C. No. 2 Gautam Budh Nagar and the same was allowed on 12.3.2016 on the basis of a compromise between the parties alongwith other references enhancing the compensation to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. Though the petitioners have not preferred any reference but on coming to know about the said award, they have moved an application on 17.5.2016 under section 28-A of the Act, 1894 before the respondent no. 4 within time. The said application of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent no. 4 by the impugned order dated 19.5.2018. In view of the fact, that identical questions of fact and law are involved in this writ petition also, the impugned order dated 19.5.2018 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the light of the discussion and direction given in the leading writ petition no. 27848 of 2018. The respondent no. 4-Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, District Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application of the petitioners dated 17.5.2016 in the light of our observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
The claim of the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 27873 of 2018 (Imamuddin Vs. State of U.P and others) is that his father was recorded tenure holder of plot no. 185 area 0-10-0 situated in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur Pargana and Tehsil Dadri. The said plots have also been notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Act, 1894 on 22.3.1983. The award was published on 28.11.1984 fixing Rs.20/- per sq. yard as compensation for the land acquired. One Fateh Mohd., who was a recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0 situated in the same village being affected by the award dated 28.11.1984, preferred a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer being LAR No. 6 of 2002. Subsequently, the said LAR was produced before the Lok Adalat i.e. Addl. District and Sessions Judge/F.T.C. No. 2 Gautam Budh Nagar and the same was allowed on 12.3.2016 on the basis of a compromise between the parties alongwith other references enhancing the compensation to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. Though the petitioners have not preferred any reference but on coming to know about the said award, they have moved an application on 12.5.2016 under section 28-A of the Act, 1894 before the respondent no. 4 within time. The said application of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent no. 4 by the impugned order dated 19.5.2018. In view of the fact that identical questions of fact and law are involved in this writ petition also, the impugned order dated 19.5.2018 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the light of the discussion and direction given in the leading writ petition no. 27848 of 2018. The respondent no. 4-Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, District Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application of the petitioner dated 12.5.2016 in the light of our observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
The claim of the petitioners of W.P. No. 1947 of 2020 (Yunus and others Vs. State of U.P. and others) is that they are the recorded bhumidhar in possession of 1/3 share in Gata No. 190 area 2-18-0 situated in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur Pargana and Tehsil Dadri. The said plots have also been notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Act, 1894 on 22.3.1983. The award was published on 28.11.1984 fixing Rs.20/- per sq. yard as compensation for the land acquired. One Fateh Mohd., who was a recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0 situated in the same village being affected by the award dated 28.11.1984, preferred a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer being LAR No. 6 of 2002. Subsequently, the said LAR was produced before the Lok Adalat i.e. Addl. District and Sessions Judge/F.T.C. No. 2 Gautam Budh Nagar and the same was allowed on 12.3.2016 on the basis of a compromise between the parties alongwith other references enhancing the compensation to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. Though the petitioners have not preferred any reference but on coming to know about the said award, they have moved an application on 2.6.2016 under section 28-A of the Act, 1894 before the respondent no. 4 within time. The said application of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent no. 4 by the impugned order dated 3.9.2019. In view of the fact that identical questions of fact and law are involved in this writ petition also, the impugned order dated 03.09.2019 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the light of the discussion and direction given in the leading writ petition no. 27848 of 2018. The respondent no. 2-Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, District Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application of the petitioners dated 2.6.2016 in the light of our observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
The claim of the petitioners of W.P. No. 27846 of 2018 (Ayub and others Vs. State of U.P. and others) is that their fathers were recorded tenure holders of Plot Nos. 194 area 0-5-, plot no. 195 area 1-12-0, plot no. 196 area 3-8-0 total area 5-5-0 situated in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur Pargana and Tehsil Dadri. The said plots have also been notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Act, 1894 on 22.3.1983. The award was published on 28.11.1984 fixing Rs.20/- per sq. yard as compensation for the land acquired. One Fateh Mohd., who was a recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0 situated in the same village being affected by the award dated 28.11.1984, preferred a reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer being LAR No. 6 of 2002. Subsequently, the said LAR was produced before the Lok Adalat i.e. Addl. District and Sessions Judge/F.T.C. No. 2 Gautam Budh Nagar and the same was allowed on 12.3.2016 on the basis of a compromise between the parties alongwith other references enhancing the compensation to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. Though the petitioners have not preferred any reference but on coming to know about the said award, they have moved an application on 12.5.2016 under section 28-A of the Act, 1894 before the respondent no. 4 within time. The said application of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent no. 4 by the impugned order dated 19.5.2018. In view of the fact that identical questions of fact and law are involved in this writ petition also, the impugned order dated 19.5.2018 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the light of the discussion and direction given in the leading writ petition no. 27848 of 2018. The respondent no. 4-Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, District Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application of the petitioners dated 12.5.2016 in the light of our observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 20.5.2020 o.k./Kirti