Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Satyanarayana Singh vs Y. Maniamma on 15 December, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(1)ALD305, 1999(1)ALT298
Author: Y.V. Narayana
Bench: Y.V. Narayana
JUDGMENT
1. This revision is preferred against the order dated 24-7-1998 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad dated 24-7-1998. Tenant is the revision petitioner.
2. The respondent-landlady filed petition in RC No.379 of 1990 before the learned III Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, seeking eviction of the revision petitioner. Her case is that she is the owner of the mulgi bearing M.No. 15-5-652 and a room attached thereto situated at Ashok Bazar, Afzalgunj, Hyderabad, having purchased the same under Ex.P2 sale-deed dated 2-8-1974. She rented it out to the revisioner petitioner on monthly rent. The eviction petition was filed on the ground of wilful default in payment of rentals and bona fide personal requirement. The revision petitioner-tenant filed a counter denying the averments made by the landlady. In paragraph 1, of the counter, the revision petitioner averred as follows:
"Allegations in the petition under reply are false, mischievous, misconceived and are denied. It is false to allege that the petitioner is the absolute owner of the suit mulgi. In fact, the suit mulgi bearing M. No. 15-5-652 situated at Ashok Bazar, Hyderabad, was taken on rent by the respondent from the husband of the petitioner and executed a rental deed in his favour on 30-12-1971. Originally, the rent of the suit mulgi was Rs.75/- per month and two months rent was paid as advance. After the death of petitioner's husband this respondent was paying rents to petitioner and her daughter-in-law Smt. Venkalamma, wife of Krishna, petitioner's son. Both jointly were passing receipts. For some time petitioner's son Krishna also collected rents and passed receipts. Thus the petitioner alone has no right to file present eviction petition."
Basing on the above allegations, the learned Rent Controller framed the following points for consideration:
"(1) Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is existing between the petitioner and the respondent?
(2) Whether the respondent is a wilful defauller in payment of rent of Rs.225/ - per month for the months of April and May, 1990?
(3) Whether the requirement of the suit premises by the petitioner is bona fide?"
The learned Rent Controller, on a consideration of the entire material available on record, held point No. 1 against the tenant holding that the denial of jural relationship by the respondent is not bona fide. Insofar as point No.2 is concerned, the landlady had given up her claim on this point. The learned Rent Controller found on point No.3 that the requirement of the suit premises by the landlady is bona fide. Accordingly, he allowed the petition for eviction.
3. Aggrieved by the said order of eviction, the tenant preferred appeal - RA No.163 of 1993 - and the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority by Judgment dated 14-2-1996 dismissed the said appeal. The learned appellate authority while confirming the findings of the Rent Controller on the point of denial of jural relationship by tenant, however, reversed the findings of the rent controller on the other point i.e., personal requirement holding that in the absence of any pleading on the point, the ground of bona fide requirement ceased to exist.
4. Thereupon, the tenant filed CRP No.1218 of 1996 against the Judgment of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. The learned single Judge of this Court in his order dated 17-12-1997 remanded the matter to the appellate authority with the following direction:
"The appellate Tribunal now shall record a finding as to whether the petitioner-tenant had denied the title of the respondent landlady and if so, whether such denial was not a bonafide one."
Thereafter, the appellate authority passed the order under revision. As directed by this Court in the above CRP, the appellate authority framed only the abovementioned point and held that the tenant had denied the title of the respondent-landlady and the same was not bona fide. Accordingly, he dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present revision.
5. The main contention of the revision petitioner-tenant is that the averments in the counter do not amount to denying the title of the landlady. It is contended that since receipts were passed jointly by the landlady, her son and her daughter-in-law, an averment is made in the first paragraph of the counter to the effect that the respondent-landlady alone cannot file Ihe eviction petition. It is contended that such an averment can at best be said to have been made with regard to the maintainability of the eviction petition. Reliance is also placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in, Bela Das v. S.N. Bose, , in support of the contention. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently contends that the averments made in the counter unhesitatingly goes to suggest that they are made with a mala fide intention of denying the title of the respondent. Hence, it is contended that the appellate authority was right in holding the issue against the tenant.
6. It is no doubt true that under subsection 2(vi) of Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant if it is proved that the tenant denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide. In this case, we are concerned with the first limb of the provision, i.e., denial of title. Before passing an order of eviction against a tenant under this provision, the Court must be satisfied on the following points: (1) categoric averment in counter denying the title of the landlord;
(2) averment denying the subsistence of tenancy;
(3) averment disputing the relationship of landlord and tenant; and (4) making a specific averment setting up title in himself by the tenant. If all the above stated averments are there in the counter of the tenant, then, in my view, the landlord is entitled for order of eviction. Therefore, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the above cited case, mere assertion in the counter that apart from the petitioner (landlord), there arc some more co-owners who have got right over the property in question and that the petition without impleading them is not maintainable, does not amount to denying the title of the landlord. In this case, on a reading of the averments made in the counter, which are extracted in this Judgment, I have no hesitation to hold that those averments do not amount to denial of title and they are made with regard to the maintainability of the case. As seen from the counter, the tenant never disputed the tenancy. On the other hand, by saying that rents were being paid by him and receipts were being passed to him jointly by the respondent, her son and her daughter-in-law, he admitted the tenancy. Similarly, the tenant never denied the title of the respondent-landlady to the petition schedule property. He never denied that the property in question does not belong to the landlady. The crux of his contention is that since receipts were being passed jointly by the respondent-landlady, her son and her daughter-in-law as co-owners of the property, he believed that the petition schedule property is owned by those three persons jointly. Therefore, he raised a plea that the respondent-landlady alone has no right to file the present eviction petition. The tenor of the averments made in the counter clearly goes to show that those averments were made with regard to the maintainability of the eviction petition and nothing more than that. One more important aspect which the lower appellate Court had missed to notice is that nowhere in the Counter there is any whisper made by the tenant claiming title over the suit premises or raising any plea that the respondent is not the landlady of the petition schedule premises and that the premises is owned by some other person. In the absence of any such positive pleadings in the counter, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be said that the averments made in the counter by the revision petitioner-tenant would amount to denial of title of the landlady. For the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that the lower appellate authority has grossly erred in holding that the averments made in the counter by the revision petitioner-tenant amount to denial of title. The order under revision is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
7. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. Consequently, in view of the findings recorded by the lower appellate authority on the other point, the petition for eviction stands dismissed. No costs.