Gauhati High Court - Itanagar
Sri Yumlam Tani vs The State Of A.P on 8 May, 2026
Page No.# 1/14
GAHC040008192017 2026:GAU-AP:445
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.Petn./71/2017
SRI YUMLAM TANI
S/O SRI YUMLAM SOLUNG, RESIDENT CHIMPU, PO R.K MISSION, PS
ITANAGAR, PAPUM PARE, AP.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF A.P.
Through its Public Prosecutor
Linked Case : Crl.Petn./73/2017
SRI BIRI JAMES
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:S/OO SRI BIRI HANYA
RESIDENT OF CHIMPU
PO R.K MISSION
PS ITANAGAR
PAPUM PARE
DIST. AP.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF A.P.
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:THROUGH ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
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Page No.# 2/14 Linked Case : Crl.Petn./72/2017 SRI TANIA PUNUNG Age: 0 Occupation :
Address:S/O SRHI TANIA YOI RESIDENT OF CHIMPU PO R.K MISSION PS ITANAGAR PAPUM PARE DIST. AP. MOBILE NO. 8104756604 VERSUS THE STATE OF A.P. Age: 0 Occupation :
Address:THROUGH ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
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BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG
Advocate for the petitioners : Mr. U. Bori, ld. Adv.
Advocate for the Respondents : T. Ete, ld. Addl. P.P.
Date on which Judgment is reserved : 30.03.2026
Date of Hearing : 24.03.2026 & 30.03.2026
Date of Judgment and Order : 08.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative part of the Judgment? :No Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced ? : Yes Page No.# 3/14 JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. U. Bori, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. T. Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent.
2. These criminal petitions filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. [corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023] are directed against the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia [in short 'learned JMFC'] and the order dated 20.09.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia. As all three petitions arise out of the same police station case, being ITA P.S. Case No. 243/2011 under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC, and are directed against a common order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, whereby Miscellaneous Application Nos. 09/2017, 10/2017 and 11/2017 filed by the petitioners under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. was rejected by a common order, and as the said order has been further affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, by separate but analogous orders dated 20.09.2017 in Criminal Revision Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017 (YPA), respectively and also as the issues involved pertain to identical facts and common questions of law, all three petitions are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment to avoid repetition and multiplicity of proceedings.
3. The case of the petitioners is that, based on a written FIR lodged by one Sri Tapi Mra on 22.09.2011, a case, being Itanagar P.S. Case No. 243/2011, was registered under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC. Upon completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed a charge-sheet on dated 09.10.2014 against four accused persons, including the present three petitioners, for Page No.# 4/14 offences punishable under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC. A corresponding G.R. case, then was registered, and on the basis of the charge-sheet so filed; by order dated 04.03.2016, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate [in short 'learned CJM'], Yupia, the case was endorsed to the Court of the learned JMFC, Yupia, for further proceedings and disposal.
4. Accordingly, by an order dated 09.03.2016, the learned JMFC, Yupia, took cognizance of the offences in G.R. Case No. 405/2011 and issued summons to the petitioners and the other accused persons. Thereafter, on 18.01.2017, the present petitioners filed three separate Miscellaneous Applications, being Nos. 09/2017, 10/2017, and 11/2017, under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., praying for discharge from G.R. Case No. 405/2011 on the common ground that, in the instant case, the charge-sheet was filed 17 days (actually 18 days) beyond the period of limitation, i.e., from 22.09.2011 to 21.09.2014, and as such, the Trial Court was barred from taking cognizance of the offences.
5. Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., being relevant, is reproduced below:
"Section 468 - Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be--
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most Page No.# 5/14 severe punishment."
6. A plain reading of the above provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. shows that the law prescribes a time limit for taking cognizance of certain offences, depending on the nature and seriousness of the offence. The object of this provision is to ensure that criminal proceedings are initiated within a reasonable time and to prevent undue delay in prosecution. If the case is not instituted within the prescribed period, the court is ordinarily barred from taking cognizance unless the delay is condoned in accordance with law.
7. However, as projected by the petitioners, by an order dated 18.01.2017, the learned JMFC, Yupia, on an erroneous understanding of law with regard to the application of limitation, rejected the applications filed by the petitioners/appellants therein. The learned JMFC, Yupia held that, as the informant had lodged the FIR on the same day of the incident, there was no delay and it was well within limitation; hence, there was no bar to take cognizance of the offence.
8. The contention of the petitioners is that, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, the petitioners preferred separate criminal revisions before the learned Sessions Court, Yupia, being Criminal Revision Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017 (YPA); however, the Sessions Court, by separate but analogous order dated 20.09.2017, upheld/affirmed the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia.
9. Being highly aggrieved by the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, and the order dated 20.09.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, in Criminal Revision Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017 (YPA), the petitioners has filed the present criminal petitions Page No.# 6/14 separately, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS), seeking quashing of the aforesaid orders.
10. The contention of the petitioners is that the said orders are illegal and perverse, being contrary to the provisions of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the relevant period of limitation is not to be reckoned from the date of the incident till the filing of the FIR, but from the date of lodging of the FIR/incident, as the case may be, to the date of filing of the charge-sheet or taking cognizance of the offence, as applicable. He further submits that if a charge-sheet is not filed within the period of limitation, the court cannot take cognizance unless the delay is properly condoned under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.
11. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Disease by its Director Dr. K. M. Cherian & Ors., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62, wherein Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure was explained in detail. In the said judgment, the Constitution Bench held that "... for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance ..."
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relies on the decision in Baccarose Perfumes and Beauty Products Private Limited vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., reported in (2025) 1 SCC 384, wherein, while reiterating and strengthening the principle laid down in Sarah Mathew (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if a charge-sheet is filed after the period of limitation, the court cannot take cognizance unless the delay is Page No.# 7/14 properly condoned under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that, in the instant case, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on a charge-sheet that was filed beyond the period of limitation by 17 days (actually 18 days), without proper consideration of condonation of delay under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., and as such, the same is legally unsustainable. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that while rejecting the application filed by the petitioners on the ground of limitation, the learned Magistrate wrongly held that the informant had lodged the FIR on the same day of the incident, i.e., on 22.09.2011, and therefore concluded that it was within the limitation period of three years.
14. Per contra, Mr. Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, dismissing the applications filed under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., as well as the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, in criminal revisions filed by the petitioners upholding the said dismissal. He submitted that the period of limitation runs from the date of the incident up to the date of filing of the FIR/complaint, as the case may be. In the present case, the incident occurred on 22.09.2011 and, on the same date, an FIR was lodged; thus, it was well within the limitation period. Therefore, the question of being barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. does not arise.
15. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor also relied on the decision in Amritlal vs. Shantilal Sony & Ors., reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 266, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint/charge-sheet and not the date of taking cognizance of the offence. The said decision is a reaffirmation Page No.# 8/14 of the principle laid down in Sarah Mathew (supra). In Amritlal (supra), the delay was treated as condonable and not fatal; hence, the proceedings were allowed to continue.
16. In support of his submission, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in Ghanshyam Soni vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1301. However, it appears that the reliance placed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is misplaced. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not hold that limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is to be computed from the date of offence till lodging of FIR. On the contrary, following the Constitution Bench's decision in Sarah Mathew case (supra) it was reiterated that the relevant date for computation of limitation is the date of institution of prosecution, namely the filing of complain or charge-sheet, as the case may be and not the date of taking cognizance by the magistrate.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the issue involved in the present case is whether the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on 09.03.2016 is barred by the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., which prescribes the maximum time limit for taking cognizance of certain offences based on the severity of punishment.
18. As per Section 469 of the Cr.P.C., the period of limitation for taking cognizance commences from the date on which the offence is committed. Section 469 of the Cr.P.C., being relevant, is reproduced herein below:
"Commencement of the period of limitation-
(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence--
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(a) on the date of the offence; or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known, from the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of the police officer or to the person aggrieved by the offence, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where the identity of the offender is not known, from the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the police officer investigating the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded."
19. In the present case, the offence took place on 22.09.2011. The offences alleged against the petitioners are punishable under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC. The maximum punishment for the aforesaid offence under Section 384 IPC is imprisonment for a term which may extend up to three years, thereby attracting a limitation period of three years under Section 468(c) of the Cr.P.C. The incident occurred and the FIR was lodged on the same date, i.e., 22.09.2011. Thus, the prescribed limitation period expired on 21.09.2014.
20. In Sarah Mathew (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering Sections 468 and 469 of the Cr.P.C., emphasized in paragraphs 24 and 25 that the object of limitation is to prevent delay in prosecution. Further, in paragraph 47, it was categorically held that the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint or charge-sheet and not the date of taking cognizance. The said principle was conclusively affirmed in paragraph 51, wherein it was held that limitation must be computed up to the date of institution of prosecution. The relevant paragraphs 24, 25, 47, and 51 of Sarah Mathew (supra), decided by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, being relevant, are reproduced below:
"24. Read in the background of the Law Commission's Report and the Report of the JPC, it is clear that the object of Chapter XXXVI inserted in the Cr.P.C. was to quicken Page No.# 10/14 the prosecutions of complaints and to rid the criminal justice system of inconsequential cases displaying extreme lethargy, inertia or indolence. The effort was to make the criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation for certain offences. In Sarwan Singh, this Court stated the object of Cr.P.C in putting a bar of limitation as follows:
"The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to sub-serve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation."
25. It is equally clear however that the law makers did not want cause of justice to suffer in genuine cases. Law Commission recommended provisions for exclusion of time and those provisions were made part of Chapter XXXVI. We, therefore, find in Chapter XXXVI provisions for exclusion of time in certain cases (Section 470), for exclusion of date on which the Court is closed (Section 471), for continuing offences (Section 472) and for extension of period of limitation in certain cases (Section 473). Section 473 is crucial. It empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Therefore, Chapter XXXVI is not loaded against the complainant. It is true that the accused has a right to have a speedy trial and this right is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. does not undermine this right of the accused. While it encourages diligence by providing for limitation it does not want all prosecutions to be thrown overboard on the ground of delay. It strikes a balance between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the accused. It must be mentioned here that where the legislature wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation in the section itself, for instance, Section 198(6) and 199(5) of the Cr.P.C. However, it chose to make general provisions for limitation for certain types of offences for the first time and incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.
47. So far 'heading' of the chapter is concerned, it is well settled that 'heading' or 'title' prefixed to sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the Page No.# 11/14 meaning of the sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. In M/s. Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.[42], this Court has observed as under:
"It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words of the provisions; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision."
51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C."
21. Thus, it is a well-settled principle that, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., the relevant and decisive date is the date on which the charge-sheet or police report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is actually filed before the competent court, and not the subsequent date on which the court formally takes cognizance of the offence.
22. The period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. commences from the date of the offence in terms of Section 469 of the Cr.P.C. The limitation continues to run until the institution of prosecution. The expression "institution of prosecution," as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew (supra), refers to the stage when criminal proceedings are formally initiated before the court. In a complaint case, it means the date on which the complaint is filed before the Magistrate, whereas in a police case, it means the date on Page No.# 12/14 which the charge-sheet is filed under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. It does not refer to the date of lodging of the FIR or the date of taking cognizance. Therefore, limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. is to be computed up to the date of filing of the complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may be, and not the date of taking cognizance.
23. In the present case, the incident took place on 22.09.2011. The FIR was lodged on the same day, i.e., 22.09.2011. The period of three years expired on 21.09.2014. However, the charge-sheet was filed thereafter on 09.10.2014, which is patently beyond the expiry of the three-year limitation period by 18 days, rendering the initiation of proceedings time-barred on the face of it. As held in Sarah Mathew (supra), the relevant date is the date of filing of the charge-sheet and not the date of cognizance. This principle has been reiterated in Amritlal (supra), wherein it has been held that delay on the part of the court in taking cognizance does not vitiate the proceedings.
24. In simple terms, the limitation runs from the date of the offence and ends with the institution of prosecution, i.e., filing of the complaint or charge-sheet, irrespective of the date of cognizance.
25. There is absolutely no material on record, including the charge-sheet, court orders, or any accompanying documents, to demonstrate that for the aforesaid delay of 18 days, the prosecution had filed any application seeking condonation, nor was such delay ever condoned by the learned Magistrate by invoking the beneficial provisions of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if Page No.# 13/14 it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice"
26. Thus, Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to extend the period of limitation if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained or if it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice, on account of any exceptional circumstances. However, in the instant case, no such application appears to have been moved, no proper explanation for the delay has been furnished, and more importantly, no reasons whatsoever have been assigned or recorded by the Court for extending the limitation period in the interest of justice.
27. In the complete absence of any condonation of delay under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate was barred by law from taking cognizance of the offences after the lapse of the mandatory limitation period. The impugned order dated 18.01.2017, passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, rejecting the petitioners' plea of limitation without addressing this vital aspect, and the order dated 20.09.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Court, Yupia, affirming the rejection order, thus suffer from a patent legal infirmity and absent of proper application of mind, warranting interference in the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
28. Accordingly, these three criminal petitions, being Nos. 71/2017, 72/2017, and 73/2017 filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., stands allowed.
29. Consequently, the order of cognizance dated 09.03.2016, the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia dismissing the Miscellaneous Applications being Nos. 09/2017, 10/2017, and 11/2017 under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. seeking discharge from G.R. Case No. 405/2011, and the order dated 20.09.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia in Criminal Revision Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017 (YPA) affirming the order Page No.# 14/14 dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia in the said Miscellaneous Applications, along with all consequential proceedings arising out of G.R. Case No. 405/2011 pending before the learned JMFC, Yupia, are hereby quashed and set aside. As a result, the learned Trial Court shall not proceed further with the matter.
30. However, before parting with the record, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that the delay in filing the charge-sheet appears to have occurred during the course of investigation, which has ultimately resulted in vitiating the prosecution on the ground of limitation. Such delay defeats the very object of timely criminal justice. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Police, Capital Complex, Itanagar is directed to examine the matter and take appropriate administrative action in accordance with law against the erring officers, if lapses or negligence are found, and to ensure that such lapses do not occur in future.
31. Let a copy of this judgment also be made available to the Director General of Police (DGP), Arunachal Pradesh, for onward circulation to all Superintendents of Police of the Districts in Arunachal Pradesh.
32. With the above observations, these petitions stand disposed of.
33. The Trial Court Record be sent back.
JUDGE Comparing Assistant