Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Heera Ram vs Assistant Engineer Irrigation And Ors on 8 February, 2023
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2023/RJJD/004065] (1 of 19) [CW-11848/2012]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11848/2012
Heera Ram
----Petitioner
Versus
Assistant Engineer Irrigation And Ors.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr J. Gehlot
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Abhilasha Bora, AGC
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
Judgment Reserved on 06/02/2023 Pronounced on 08/02/2023
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:
"(a) The award dated 17.10.2012 i.e. Ann.1 be set aside.
(b) The claim of the Petitioner be allowed / accepted and Petitioner be reinstated with full back wages.
(c) Any other relief for which the Petitioner is entitle, be granted.
It is, therefore, prayed that the Writ Petition be allowed with cost."
2. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioner, are that on 01.04.1990, the petitioner was appointed as labour (Beldar), on daily wage basis, by the respondent-Department to perform the works at Banas Dam. The petitioner, after his appointment as labour, continuously and without any break, performed his works till 31.10.1996. (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (2 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] However, when he reached at his workplace to perform his duty, on 01.11.1996, the respondents did not permit him to do so, rather retrenched/terminated the petitioner from the engagement, which as per the petitioner, was done on count of his claiming semi permanent status in connection with the employment in question. The petitioner further averred that the retrenchment/termination in question was done even without any prior notice or information and without giving any compensation against such retrenchment, to the petitioner, rather the impugned action was taken by the respondent-Department by verbally terminating the services of the petitioner. 2.1 On 12.05.2006, the dispute was raised before the Conciliation Officer, whereafter the conciliation proceedings failed. Thus, the impugned action of the respondent-Department is violative, amongst others, of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1947').
2.1 For ready reference the said provision of law reads as under:-
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has been expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (3 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
3. Thereafter, the Labour Department of the State of Rajasthan vide notification dated 15.09.2008, referred the dispute to the learned Industrial Disputes Tribunal & Labour Court, Jodhpur, which was registered thereat as Case No.59/2003.
4. Vide the impugned order dated 17.10.2012, though the learned Labour Court held that the retrenchment/termination in question by the respondent-Department was not justified and lawful, but it was observed that since the dispute was raised with an inordinate delay, the petitioner was not entitled for any relief, and further, not entitled to get any sum of money against the impugned action of the respondents. Hence, the present petition has been preferred before this Hon'ble Court, claiming the aforementioned reliefs.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the whole dispute arose, after the petitioner, owing to the period of services rendered by him, claimed for declaring him as semi permanent in connection with the employment in question; as a consequence of seeking such declaration, the petitioner was retrenched/terminated from services, without following the due process laid down under the law, and without paying any compensation to the petitioner, against the termination/retrenchment in question; furthermore, no prior (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (4 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] notice or information was given to the petitioner, in connection with the impugned termination/retrenchment.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the delay in raising the dispute was made on count of the reason that the petitioner used to accompany and help his family members, who were engaged in grazing the cattle, and in connection with the same, he used to go outside the State; apart therefrom, as per learned counsel, the delay in raising the dispute is also attributable to the indifferent attitude and callousness on the part of the Conciliation Officer, as a consequence whereof, coupled with other reasons, the conciliation proceedings failed.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner neither worked under any Contractor, nor had he worked under any Scheme or any Panchayat; the petitioner, in each calendar year, from 1990 to 1996, worked for more than 240 days.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that prior to making retrenchment in question, the respondent- Department has also not complied with the prescription of Rule 77 of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 1958'), which requires maintenance of seniority list of the workmen; before making the retrenchment, as done in the present case.
8.1 The said Rule 77 reads as follows:
"77. Maintenance of seniority list of workmen.-
(1) The employer shall prepare a list of all workmen in the particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (5 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] their service in that category and cause a copy thereof to be pasted on a notice board in a conspicuous place in the premises of the industrial establishment at least seven days before the actual date of retrenchment."
9. As regards the delay in raising the claim or reference of the dispute, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Section 10(1) of the Act of 1947, there is no limitation prescribed for making reference under Section 10(1), and that, if the appropriate Government is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or apprehended, it may, 'at any time', refer the dispute to the appropriate forum.
9.1 The said Section 10(1) reads as under:-
"10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.- (1) Where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing-
(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or
(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or
(d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (6 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c):
Provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding anything that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced:
Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for the Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State Government."
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus submitted that in the aforesaid backdrop, the impugned action taken by the respondent-
Department is a clear and apparent non-compliance, amongst others, of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 and Rule 77 of the Rules of 1958; thus, the learned Labour Court also grossly erred in law in passing the impugned order against the petitioner.
11. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. G.M. Instrument Design Development and Facilities Centre & Anr., 2011 DNJ (SC) 266; relevant portion of which reads as under:
"15. . . . Considering the identical words i.e., "at any time" used in Section 10 (1) of the Act and Section 4 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, considered the main question namely, "Was the industrial dispute in (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (7 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] existence on the date of reference for adjudication?"
While considering the same, a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court as to the scope of the very same provision, namely, Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was cited before the Bench. In M/s Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs. The Western India Match Co. Workers Union and Ors., (1970) 1 SCC 225 = AIR 1970 SC 1205, the learned Judges made the following observations:-
"Therefore, the expression `at any time', though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the Conciliation Officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can `at any time', i.e., even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression `at any time' thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression `at any time' in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjourned or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence."
Based on the interpretation of the three-Judge Bench, it was concluded:
"15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (8 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case, when the Government has chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach its legal culmination."
After saying so, allowed the appeal of the workman and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
16) Learned counsel appearing for the Management heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 455, particularly, the ultimate conclusion in para 6 which reads thus:
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (9 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent."
17) Though this decision lays down that law does not prescribe any time limit for appropriate Government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the Act, the Court has concluded that the said power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rationale manner. In that case, the Central Government exercised its power after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the workman from service. A perusal of the said decision shows that the workman has not furnished adequate reasons/materials for such a long delay and the only ground advanced by him was that two other similarly placed employees dismissed from service were reinstated.
21) In view of the above, law can be summarized that there is no prescribed time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is more so in view of the language used, namely, if any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate government "at any time" refer the dispute to a Board or Court for enquiry. The reference sought for by the workman cannot be said to be delayed or suffering from a lapse when law does not prescribe any period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is made it is (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (10 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision, hence the Labour Court cannot go behind the reference. It is not open to the Government to go into the merit of the dispute concerned and once it is found that an industrial dispute exists then it is incumbent on the part of the Government to make reference. It cannot itself decide the merit of the dispute and it is for the appropriate Court or Forum to decide the same. The satisfaction of the appropriate authority in the matter of making reference under Section 10(1) of the Act is a subjective satisfaction. Normally, the Government cannot decline to make reference for laches committed by the workman. If adequate reasons are shown, the Government is bound to refer the dispute to the appropriate Court or Forum for adjudication. Even though, there is no limitation prescribed for reference of dispute to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, even so, it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly, when disputes relate to discharge of workman. If sufficient materials are not put forth for the enormous delay, it would certainly be fatal. However, in view of the explanation offered by the workman, in the case on hand, as stated and discussed by us in the earlier paragraphs, we do not think that the delay in the case on hand has been so culpable as to disentitle him any relief. We are also satisfied that in view of the details furnished and the explanation offered, the workman cannot be blamed for the delay and he was all along hoping that one day his grievance would be considered by the Management or by the State Government." 11.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing -cum- (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (11 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] Processing Service Society Ltd. & Anr., 1999 (82) FLR 137; relevant portion of which reads as under:
"9. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent- management on the full bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v. State of Haryana 1999 (1) SCT 141, is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases."
However, it went on further to say that "reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour tribunal will be five years after which the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and laches if there is no explanation to the delay. We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 37- (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (12 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/boards and tribunal under the Act.
10. In the instant case, the respondent-management is not shown to have taken any plea regarding delay as is evident from the issues framed by the labour court. The only plea raised in defence was that the labour court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference and the termination of the services of the workman was justified. Has this plea been raised, the workman would have been in a position to show the circumstances preventing him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or even to satisfy the court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the Government. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, were not justified in holding that the workman had not given any explanation as to why the demand notice had been issued after a long period. The finding of facts returned by the High Court in writ proceedings even without pleadings were, therefore, unjustified. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the courts were bound to render an even handed justice by keeping balance between the two different parties. Such an approach totally ignores the aims and object and the social object sought to be achieved by the Act. Even after noticing that "it is true that a fight between the workman and the (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (13 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] management is not a just between equals," the court was not justified to make them equals while returning the findings, which hit allowed to prevail, would result in frustration of the purpose of the enactment. The workman appears to be justified in complaining that in the absence of any plea on behalf of the management and any evidence, regarding delay, he could not be deprived of the benefits under the Act merely on technicalities of law. The High Court appears to have substituted its opinion for the opinion of the labour court which was not permissible in proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution."
12. On the other hand, learned Additional Government Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Department, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, raised a preliminary objection that an incorrect averment has been made by the petitioner, to the effect that his services were terminated/retrenched by the respondent- Department, rather the petitioner himself voluntarily abandoned the work, after 01.11.1996; as if, had it been done by the respondents, the petitioner would certainly have approached the appropriate court/forum, in the first place; however, in the present case, the petitioner failed to do so within time, and that, after an inordinate and completely explained delay, the petitioner raised his claim, that too, on the false pretexts in the claim application as well as in the present writ petition.
13. Another objection, as taken by the learned Additional Government Counsel is that since the petitioner apparently did not work continuously for a period of 240 days or more in the calender year preceding the date of the alleged retrenchment/termination, (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (14 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] therefore, the provisions of the Act of 1947 are not be applicable in the present case.
14. Learned Additional Government Counsel further submitted that the petitioner was not appointed on regular basis w.e.f. 01.04.1990, as averred by him, rather he was engaged as a labour on daily wage basis, and that, in January 1991, he worked for 26 days; in February 1991, he worked for 21 days and in March 1991, he worked for 23 days, i.e. during the said period, he had performed the work of labour, only for a total period of 70 days. As per learned counsel, apart from the said work for the above period, the petitioner did not work under the respondent- Department.
15. Learned Additional Government Counsel also submitted that as per the directions of the State Government, after the year 1991, the practice of engaging the labour on the muster-roll of the department was discontinued, and thus, there was no question of appointing/engaging the petitioner on the muster-roll of the department.
16. Learned Additional Government Counsel further submitted that after performing work for the said period, the petitioner did not work under the respondent-Department, and thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be believed that the petitioner, since the date of his initial engagement, had worked, continuously and without any break, under the respondent-Department, till 01.11.1996. Furthermore, as per learned counsel, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was retrenched/terminated on count of his claiming the semi (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (15 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] permanent status in the employment in question, is completely incorrect; rather the petitioner voluntarily abandoned his engagement in connection his employment.
17. In support of her submissions, learned Additional Government Counsel placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 161, the relevant portion whereof, as relied by the learned counsel, reads as under:
"4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the Labour Court and the High Court fell into error by placing burden on the employer to prove that the concerned workman has not worked for more than 240 days. The Labour Court failed to notice that even if the period for which the muster roll was not produced is reckoned; then also the requirement of 240 days work during twelve months preceding the alleged date of termination is not established.
6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the concerned year. This claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only on his own statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002) ILLJ 1053 SC. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240 days as claimed.(Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM)
[2023/RJJD/004065] (16 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] Even if that period is taken into account with the period as stated in the affidavit filed by the employer the requirement prima facie does not appear to be fulfilled. The following period of engagement which was accepted was 6 days in July 1991, 15½ days in November 1991, 15½ days in January 1992, 24 days in February 1992, 20½ days in March 1992, 25 days in April 1992, 25 days in May 1992, 7½ days in June 1992 and 5½ days in July 1992. The Labour Court demanded production of muster roll for a period of 17.6.1991 to 12.11.1991. It included this period for which the muster roll was not produced and come to the conclusion that the workman had worked for more than 240 days without indicating as to the period to which period these 240 days were referable."
18. Learned Additional Government Counsel also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Umadevi & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 1, while submitting that in the said judgment, it was held, amongst others, in the categorical terms, that a person engaged or appointed on contractual basis (daily wage basis) cannot be regarded as a regularly appointed person; thus, his such engagement/appointment would not survive after the contract comes to an end; thus, a person engaged in such a manner, cannot claim any right in connection with his contractual engagement.
18.1 As per learned counsel, such observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case, clearly disentitles the petitioner, to any relief, as prayed by him in the present petition.
19. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case, alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar. (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (17 of 19) [CW-11848/2012]
20. This Court is conscious of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.V. Anil Mithra & Anr. Vs. Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 9067 of 2014 decided on 27.10.2021). Relevant portion of which reads as under: -
"42. In the facts and circumstances of the instant cases and looking into the nature of service rendered by the appellants as daily wager for a short period, while upholding the termination of the appellants being in violation of Section 25F of the Act 1947, we consider it just and reasonable to award a lumpsum monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakh fifty thousand) to each of the appellants-workmen in full and final satisfaction of the dispute in lieu of right to claim reinstatement with 50% back wages as awarded by the Tribunal.
43. The respondents shall pay the compensation as awarded by this Court to each of the appellants- workmen within a period of three months.
44. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are partly allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 4th January, 2010 is hereby set aside and the Award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 14th November, 2005 is modified to the extent indicated above.
45. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of."
21. This Court finds from the impugned order, that the learned Labour Court in the said order, though observed that the impugned retrenchment/termination was not justified and lawful, (Downloaded on 08/02/2023 at 11:57:44 PM) [2023/RJJD/004065] (18 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] but rejected the claim of the petitioner only on the ground of delay.
22. This Court is of the opinion that since the learned Labour Court has arrived at a conclusion that in the present case, the provision of Section 25F of the Act of 1947 was violated, therefore, this Court deems it appropriate to award a lumpsum monetary compensation to the petitioner, which will cater for the delay caused in raising the claim by the petitioner as well as some monetary benefit to the petitioner. Such an observation is made in light of the fact that any re-adjudication or re-examination of the matter, would unnecessarily prolong the litigation between the parties and would also result into delay in the final result of the case.
23. This Court however, observes that the judgments cited on behalf of the petitioner do not render any assistance to the petitioner's case, so as to hold him entitled for the complete relief, as prayed for in the present petition.
24. Thus, in view of the above, and keeping into due consideration the judgment rendered in K.V. Anil Mithra & Anr. (supra) as also looking into the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, and the material placed on the record, the present petition is partly allowed, while directing the respondents to pay a lumpsum monetary compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh), towards full and final settlement, to the petitioner within the period of two months from today.
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[2023/RJJD/004065] (19 of 19) [CW-11848/2012] 24.1 It is needless to say that except for the limited intervention, as made herein, the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court is upheld.
24.2 All pending applications stand disposed of.
(DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J SKant/-
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