Jharkhand High Court
Ravishankar Yadav vs Neha Kumari on 25 June, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No. 58 of 2022
Ravishankar Yadav, aged about 33 years, Son of Sri
Motilal Yadav, Resident of Gram, Sakrigali, Post Office
Sahibhanj, Police Station Sahibganj (M), District
Sahibganj, (Jharkhand)
... ... Appellant/Plaintiff
Versus
Neha Kumari, age about 27 years, wife of Ravishankar
Yadav, and daughter of Sri awadh Kishor Yadav, Resident
of Purani Sahibganj, P.O. & P.S. Sahibganj (T), District-
Sahibganj (Jharkhand)
... ... Respondent/Defendant
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Sr. Advocate
Mrs. Rita Kumari, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mrs. Diksha Dwivedi, Advocate
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CAV/Reserved on 16.06.2025 Pronounced on 25/06/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 is directed against the order/judgment dated 18.06.2022 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Sahibganj in Original Suit No. 118 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce by the appellant-husband against the respondent-wife, has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the divorce petition by the appellant-plaintiff, as taken note in the impugned order, needs to be referred herein as under: 1 F.A. No. 58 of 2022
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3. On 7th February, 2016, the marriage between the appellant-
husband and respondent-wife was solemnized, according to Hindu rites and rituals. After the marriage, the respondent- wife went to her matrimonial home where they lived together for some days. After some time of the marriage the respondent-wife went to Gujrat with the appellant-husband where the husband was working. It is alleged that soon thereafter, the respondent-wife started putting pressure on him not to talk to his family members over mobile nor send money to his father and to live separately from his parents at her maike (parental house of the defendant).
4. It is further alleged the respondent-wife used to harass the plaintiff mentally, physically and economically and owing to differences in opinion and temperament they could not live together and as such they could not bear any offspring in their matrimonial relations. After two months since marriage, the respondent started harassing the appellant due to which the appellant felt difficulties in his routine work. The parents and brothers of the respondent had been threatening of lodging the cases of demand of dowry in case he did not obey the direction of the respondent-wife. The respondent-wife wished to go to Sahibganj alone but when the appellant asked her to drop to her parents after taking leave, the respondent-wife, on instigation of her family members, threatened to commit suicide by jumping from the 2 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) roof or by hanging with fan or to set her on fire when he would go to his office and send him to jail along with his parents and brother.
5. It is the specific case of the appellant-husband that respondent-wife had sent messages on his mobile no. 7043170851 and threatened to send him to jail by making a case of dowry and also lodged FIR against him. It is stated that the defendant-wife had treated him with mental cruelty by sending messages on whatsapp and oral as well. She had mounted pressure on the appellant for divorce on instigation of her parents and brother which arose the cause of action for the suit.
6. It is further stated that the respondent-wife had harassed him mentally at his house at Sahibganj before the villagers who tried to pacify the matter but to no avail. On 02.05.2017 the father of the defendant/wife took the defendant/wife with him along with jewelry, clothes and money.
7. It is also stated that since the appellant-husband had taken money from his father, his father has dispossessed him from his house and entire movable and immovable properties when the appellant attained majority and as such he is deprived of right and title in his parental property.
8. The appellant-husband purchased a house and a motor car after taking loan. He had also taken personal loan and PF 3 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) loan and due to repayment of the installments, he is facing hardship in his livelihood.
9. After one month since marriage, the respondent had been taking Rs. 50,000/- to 60,000/- from the appellant on several excuses. The father of the respondent messaged his A/с nо. 34640343254 on mobile and made demand of Rs. 2,00,000/- on 04.05.2017. The respondent also used to threaten him to administer poison in his meal and send money to her parent's without us permission.
10. In the aforesaid backdrop, the suit of divorce under 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by appellant-husband.
11. Written statement has been filed by the respondent-wife stating inter alia that the allegations made in the plaint are false and fabricated. However, the factum of marriage has been admitted by the respondent-wife.
12. Submission has been made that indeed the plaintiff- husband did not want to live with her. He refused to take her with him during mediation also. During marriage, parents of the plaintiff and brother had taken dowry of Rs. 15 lacs in cash, jewellaries such as golden chain, golden ring, golden jhumka, golden ear ring, one pair payal of silver along with other domestic articles like T.V., washing machine, steel Almirah, table fan, induction, watch, iron, mixture and Palung etc., from her father after mounting pressure. After the marriage, she went to her matrimonial 4 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) house, where after living sometime, the behaviour of her parents-in-laws, brother-in-law and his wife, husband's sister and father suddenly changed and they started humiliating her for bringing less dowry as his son was a manager and if marriage of appellant- husband performed with another girl, they would have got Rs, 40,00,000/- in dowry. They used to say that they have been cheated by the parents of the defendant. After some days since marriage, the appellant went to Junagarh thereafter, the family members of the appellant started mounting pressure on her to bring Rs. 10,00,000/- in cash and a motor car from her parents. They also threatened to divorce her in case demand of dowry is not fulfilled and when the family members of the defendant expressed their inability to fulfill their demand, they started harassing her physically and mentally and the plaintiff forcibly dropped her at her parental house.
13. It is stated that the family members of the defendant tried to pacify the matter but they have also been abused by the appellant‟s family and insisted on their demands of Rs. 10,00,000/- otherwise marriage of the plaintiff will be performed with another girl. Thereafter, the respondent informed the appellant on 16.09.16 on phone and on the request of the plaintiff, the family members of the defendant took her to Gujrat. After living there for some days, the appellant- husband again started harassing her at Gujrat 5 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) also on instigation of his family members. The family members of the plaintiff used to say the plaintiff to drive the defendant away from Gujrat too. They had also taken the resource of Tantra Vidiya (black magic). The appellant also managed termination of her pregnancy after administering medicines but she could anyhow rescue her pregnancy. On instigation of his family members, the appellant dropped her at Surat Airport on 09.04.2017 from where she somehow came to Patna and since then, she has been residing at her maike. Meanwhile, she gave birth to a female child on 15.11.2017. Having been informed the family members of the appellant but they did not come to see the newly born child.
14. Respondent‟s wife family members requested the family members of the plaintiff to take her back to the matrimonial house but the family members of the appellant insisted upon demand of the aforementioned dowry.
15. She then knocked the door of Police for help by filing a case in Mahila P.S. case no.02/17 U/S 498A/315 I.P.C & U/S 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (D.P. Act) against the plaintiff and his family members. During hearing of bail petition before the District & Sessions Judge, Sahibganj the family members of the appellant were not ready to take her back with them.
6 F.A. No. 58 of 2022
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16. It is stated that the appellant-husband has been neglecting the defendant and her daughter. The plaintiff is posted as Branch Manager in Central Bank in Mumbai.
17. It is further stated that the respondent is always ready to live with the appellant. She never sent money to her parents nor subjected the appellant to mental or physical cruelty rather the appellant and his family members had been harassing her owing to the demand of dowry and started ignoring her on instigation of his family members. She specifically denied intimidation of administering poison to the appellant.
18. On the basis of the pleadings of both the parties, the learned family court framed the issue as to whether the plaintiff, the appellant herein [husband] is entitled for a decree of divorce.
19. The learned principal judge, family court, after appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of parties, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff-husband, the appellant herein, has failed to prove and establish the allegation of cruelty on the part of defendant-wife, the respondent herein for dissolution of marriage, against which, the instant appeal has been preferred.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant:
20. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the factual aspect which was available before the learned family court supported by the evidences adduced on behalf of the 7 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) appellant has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
21. It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty has not been taken into consideration in the right perspective even though the fact about living separately has well been established.
22. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned family court did not consider the vital evidence of the appellant that respondent/wife was indifferent to his parents and insisted not to have any relation with them and thereby subjected him to acute mental torture. Further, from time to time she threatens that she will take her life and thereby put them in jail, but these facts have not been considered by learned family court.
23. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such, is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent:
24. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- wife, while defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned judgment. The learned Principal Judge has considered the issue of cruelty and having come to the conclusion that no evidence has been adduced to establish cruelty has dismissed the suit. 8 F.A. No. 58 of 2022
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25. It has been contended that the allegation so far as alleged of commission of cruelty is considered, the ground has been raised before the learned Principal Judge that the respondent-wife is not taking care of the in-laws, which is totally false and baseless.
26. On instigation of his family members, the appellant dropped her at Surat Airport on 09.04.2017 from where she somehow came to Patna and since then, she has been residing at her maike. Meanwhile, she gave birth to a female child on 15.11.2017 and having been informed the family members of the appellant did not come to see the newly born child.
27. Her family members has requested the family members of the plaintiff to take her back to the matrimonial house but the family members of the appellant insisted upon the demand of aforementioned dowry, for which a case has been lodged also.
28. Submission has been made that it is the appellant-husband who is neglecting the respondent and her daughter. The appellant is a Manager in Central Bank.
29. The respondent is always ready to live with the appellant. She never sent money to her parents nor subjected the appellant to mental or physical cruelty rather the appellant and his family members had been harassing her owing to the demand of dowry and started ignoring her on instigation of his family members.
9 F.A. No. 58 of 2022
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30. Furthermore, she specifically denied intimidation of administering poison to the appellant.
31. It has been submitted that the appellant has tried to mislead the Court by filing misleading application on the misleading ground of committing cruelty by the wife upon the husband.
32. Learned senior counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that if on that pretext, the factum of cruelty has not been found to be established, based upon which the decree of divorce has been refused to be granted, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an error. Analysis:
33. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.
34. The admitted fact herein is that the suit for divorce has been filed on the ground of cruelty i.e., by filing an application under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and accordingly, issues have been framed and decided against the plaintiff-appellant.
35. The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties. For ready reference, the evidences led on behalf of the parties are being referred as under:
36. PW-1 Moti Lal Yadav is father of the plaintiff who has supported the case of the plaintiff in his examination in chief. In cross-examination, he also admitted marriage of the 10 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) plaintiff with the defendant but denied to receive any amount in his account by the respondent‟s father at the time of marriage. He further denied that he and Hari Shankar Yadav had received/took cash to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/- from the father of defendant but admitted to hear that Rs. 50,000/- was given to the appellant at the time of "Tilak' ceremony. The Tilak' ceremony was held in the month of January, 2016 and there was no dispute on the occasion of 'Tilak' and marriage ceremony. He has stated that after marriage, the respondent lived in his house and thereafter, she went to Gujrat and the father of the respondent sent her to Gujrat. After the institution of the case, he got information about the pregnancy of the respondent. He further stated that before the institution of the case, he never went to the house of respondent for taking bedai of his daughter-in-law. He denied torture and harassment with the respondent due to non-fulfillment of dowry but admitted institution of cases for demand of dowry against him and his family members. He further stated that the relationship between his son and daughter-in-law was better in beginning.
37. PW-2 Harishankar Yadav is the brother of the appellant who has also supported the case of the appellant in his examination in chief. In cross-examination, he has stated that the plaintiff is two years younger than him and presently he is a manager in Central Bank, Mumbai. The 11 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) marriage of parties was performed with the consent of both the families. The respondent does not want to live at her matrimonial house and her family members have also been supporting her in this regard. He denied any maltreatment with respondent for dowry. He stated that he has no good or bad relation with the appellant. Though in paragraph-32 he denied that father of the respondent gave him money/rupees at the time of marriage but in the same breath in the next paragraph which is mistaken also numbered as 32 admitted to receive Rs.9,50,000/-in different installments through account and entire money still is in his account. Further in para-34 he claimed to withdraw Rs.5,00,000/- from his account for his personal work. He claimed to live with his father jointly. In para-46 he again admitted to receive Rs. 9,50,000/-in his account from the father of the bride (respondent) but no document of such transaction was prepared. Further in para-48 he admitted that after sometimes he withdrew the money from the said account as per his requirements. In para-37 he admitted to do any work with the consent of his father.
38. PW-3 Sitaram Yadav is the cousin of father of the appellant, who has also supported the case of the appellant in his examination-in-chief. In cross-examination, he stated that the appellant is posted in Certain Bank in Mumbai. He further stated that the defendant lived at her matrimonial 12 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) house happily till 1 year and 6 months thereafter, she went to her maike and thereafter, her parents sent her to her husband.
39. PW-4 Niranjan Kumar Yadav has also supported the case of the appellant in his examination-in-chief. In cross- examination, he stated that dispute between the parties caused the institution of divorce.
40. P.W. 5-Ravishankar Yadav, he is the plaintiff-appellant himself.
41. PW-6. Rajeev Kumar is a formal witness, who has formally proved the "Whats-app" messages sent to the plaintiff Ravi Shankar Yadav and medical slips as Ext-1 to 15 and Ext-16 to 23 respectively. In cross-examination, he admitted to extract the messages was written in English. He further stated that messages were neither written in Hindi nor mobile number was mentioned on its photocopies. He could not say as to who had sent those messages to whom. He also could not say as to who had written the messages in Hindi on its photocopies. He also could not say the name of service provider of mobile, of SIM card from which the alleged „whats-app‟ messages were sent. He denied to be an authorized service provider of any mobile company at Sahibganj. He denied to have trade number and GST number of his shop. Hence, his evidence is of no avail to the plaintiff.
13 F.A. No. 58 of 2022
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42. The defendant- wife examined herself as DW-1, who reiterated her case as made in the written statement. She has stated that she is the legally married wife of the appellant and her marriage was solemnized with the appellant on 07.02.2016. After marriage, she went to her matrimonial house where the behaviour of the family members was cordial and after sometimes, her in-laws started harassing her. She further deposed that out of the wedlock, a female child Aaradhana was born. She filed a criminal case when the behaviour of husband and his family members became unbearable vide Sahibganj Mahila P.S. Case no. 02/17 u/s 498A and 315 of the IPC and section ¾ of the D.P. Act. She further stated that her husband had not been maintaining her and her daughter and, thereafter, she had filed a maintenance case in which maintenance has been awarded. But still, she is willing to live with her husband but her in-laws are not eager to keep her with him. She has further stated that her husband had brought this case on false and frivolous ground and her father-in-law has also lodged a PCR case 733/19 against her and her parents and brother. In cross-examination, she denied that her husband had given her money through her account. She asserted that her husband and his family members demanded dowry. She admitted that she has been living separate with her husband since 9th April, 2017. She denied 14 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) to have sent message to her husband, as alleged. She further denied that she did not want to live with her husband rather her husband used to irritate her on phone to die.
43. Besides oral evidences, both the parties have produced certain documents, which have been marked as exhibits.
44. On the basis of the pleading of the parties the learned Principal Family Judge had framed issues for proper determination of the lis, for ready reference same is being quoted as under:
(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the Defendant has dealt the plaintiff with cruelty?
(iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of divorce?
45. The learned Family Court after due appreciation of the ocular as well as documentary evidence had negated the claim of the husband/appellant and observed that the plaintiff/husband has totally failed to prove and establish the allegation of cruelty on the part of wife for dissolution of marriage.
46. Herein, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the evidence of cruelty has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
47. While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondent that the judgment is well considered one and the learned family court has rightly 15 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) come to the conclusion that the plaintiff-husband, the appellant herein, deliberately broke up the matrimonial home by not taking care of the wife-defendant rather held that the cruelty came from the side of plaintiff-husband, the appellant herein, and not from the side of defendant-wife, the respondent herein the suit for divorce has been filed and accordingly, dismissed the suit which requires no interference by this Court.
48. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] 16 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) this Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) 17 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.""
49. Herein cruelty has been taken by the appellant as the main ground for dissolution of marriage. It needs to refer herein that he "cruelty" has been interpreted by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.
50. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of „cruelty‟ as has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized that "cruelty" can have no fixed definition.
51. According to the Hon'ble Apex Court, "cruelty" is the "conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations". It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either "mental" or "physical", intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the 18 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more "a question of fact and degree."
52. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, "their economic and social conditions", and the "culture and human values to which they attach importance."
53. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from "mental problems and paranoid disorder". The wife's lawyer also levelled allegations of "lunacy" and "insanity" against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon'ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute "cruelty".
54. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was "unchaste" and had indecent familiarity with a person 19 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute "cruelty" itself.
55. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be "grave" and "weighty" and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
56. It is, thus, evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the recent judgment passed in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar (supra) has been pleased to lay down that the conduct complained of must be "serious" and "substantial" and trivial annoyances and normal wear and tear of marriage would not establish mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
57. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word "cruelty" has considered the evidences of the witnesses as 20 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) has been incorporated by the learned Family Court in the impugned judgment.
58. It is evident therefrom that the main ground of cruelty has been taken of not taking care of the in-laws as also threaten to take life of herself [wife] and by such act pressure is mounted upon the husband which results in cruelty.
59. The learned Family Court, on appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties and argument advanced by the parties, has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff- husband, the appellant herein, deliberately broke up the matrimonial home by not taking care of the wife-defendant rather held that the cruelty came from the side of plaintiff- husband, the appellant herein, and not from the side of defendant-wife, the respondent herein.
60. Accordingly, the learned family court hold that the appellant-husband has failed to prove and establish the allegation of cruelty on the part of wife for dissolution of marriage and dismissed the suit. For ready reference, relevant paragraph of the impugned judgment is quoted as under:
"On the whole case it appears to me that the plaintiff- husband deliberately broke up the matrimonial home by not taking care of the wife - defendant, the cruelty came from the plaintiff-husband side not from the defendant. The very beginning of the marital life was, thus, made melancholy because of the hostile approach of the plaintiff-husband generating thereby unhappiness. I have made mots for reconciliation when it became evident that the defendant-wife 21 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) was very much eager and willing to re-start the conjugal life. She was more anxious about the care and future of the female child. A divorce, according to her, would cause a social stigma not only to her but also to the daughter who deserves both paternal and maternal care. But the plaintiff-husband is so stubborn that he is not willing to live with the wife at any cost. Because of his strong reluctance all my attempts for reconciliation proved abortive.
After appreciating the pleadings and aforesaid discussed evidence of parties as also rival contentions of the parties, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff husband being not able to bear with wears and tears of the life, no exaggerated the various acts imputed to the wife-defendant but even introduced such allegations which had no prop to stand. I, therefore, have no hesitation in my mind to hold that the plaintiff has totally failed to prove and establish the allegation of cruelty on the part of wife for dissolution of marriage.
In the result, therefore, these issues are decided against the plaintiff accordingly.
In the facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that the suit for divorce filed by the husband being, sans substratum, stands dismissed on contest with costs."
61. It needs to refer herein that it is the specific case of the appellant-husband before the learned family court that the respondent-wife had sent messages on his mobile no. 7043170851 and threatened to send him to jail by making a case of dowry and as such defendant-wife had treated him with mental cruelty by sending messages on "whatsapp" and in order to fortify the aforesaid allegation the plaintiff husband has submitted photocopy of the "whatsapp" massage which has been marked as Ext-1 to 15 and further 22 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) in order to substantiate this evidence the appellant husband has examined formal witness Rajeev Kumar as P.W.6.
62. At this juncture, it would be apt to refer the settled position of law as settled by the Hon‟ble Apex Court that WhatsApp messages can be presented as evidence in court, but they require proper authentication and compliance of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act (now replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). This means a certificate is usually needed to confirm the message's authenticity and that it hasn't been tampered with, for ready reference the section 63 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA 2023) corresponding to section 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is being quoted as under:
63. Admissibility of electronic records.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely.-- 23 F.A. No. 58 of 2022
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(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer or communication device was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer or communication device in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer or communication device in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether--
(a) in standalone mode; or
(b) on a computer system; or
(c) on a computer network; or
(d) on a computer resource enabling information creation or providing information processing and storage; or 24 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB )
(e) through an intermediary, all the computers or communication devices used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer or communication device; and references in this section to a computer or communication device shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:--
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
(5) For the purposes of this section,--
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or 25 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
(b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).
63. The "whatsapp" message, in the context of the present case, is to be considered as the secondary evidence, as per provision of Section 63 of the Evidence Act and as such the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act is required.
64. However, here it would be relevant to refer Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, wherein it has been provided that Evidence Act, 1872 now the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 will not be applicable in strict sense in the Family Courts Act, rather, it depends upon the Presiding Judge to accept or not to accept the WhatsApp massages depending upon its authenticity and genuineness. Reference in this regard be made to Section 14 of the Family Courts‟ Act, which reads as under:
14. Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.--A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)
65. Thus, from perusal of Section 14 of the Family Courts‟ Act, it is evident that it is not mandatory upon the family court to 26 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) accept any type of electronic evidence rather same is to be accepted by the learned family judge in view of provision of Section 14 of the Family Courts‟ Act and the genuineness of the electronic evidence is to be assessed by the learned family judge in order to come to the conclusion of the lis.
66. The issue of authenticity is sine qua non in the adjudication of the issue and if the authenticity of the chat without verifying the same is to be accepted, then it will lead to miscarriage of justice and it will not come under the purview of fair trial. The evidence like that of Whatsapp chat can be accepted in view of Section 14 but it must be after verifying the authenticity of the chat for ascertainment of the fact that there is no tampering with the aforesaid electronic evidence.
67. Further, the authenticity of the Whatsapp message is required to be assessed in order to avoid any type of confusion or mischief. For example, suppose if any mobile phone/SIM has been purchased by the husband in the name of the wife and he used to make chat with the aforesaid mobile device/SIM to his mobile device purchased in his name, and the transfer of the Whatsapp messages/chat from both the mobile phones are there and after getting the chat from that mobile device if it will be accepted, then it will be acute miscarriage and that is the reason the authenticity of the Whatsapp chat/messages is to be ascertained to avoid any type of confusion before 27 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) accepting the Whatsapp message or any conversation recorded there.
68. It needs to refer herein the ratio of judgment rendered by the the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 wherein it has categorically been held that Safeguards provided under Section 65-B of Act 1872 are to ensure the source and authenticity of electronic records. As electronic records are more susceptible to tampering, alteration, transposition, excision, etc., without such safeguards, whole trial based on proof of electronic records can lead to travesty of justice, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
"16. It is further clarified that the person need only to state in the certificate that the same is to the best of his knowledge and belief. Most importantly, such a certificate must accompany the electronic record like computer printout, compact disc (CD), video compact disc (VCD), pen drive, etc., pertaining to which a statement is sought to be given in evidence, when the same is produced in evidence. All these safeguards are taken to ensure the source and authenticity, which are the two hallmarks pertaining to electronic record sought to be used as evidence. Electronic records being more susceptible to tampering, alteration, transposition, excision, etc. without such safeguards, the whole trial based on proof of electronic records can lead to travesty of justice."
69. However, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801, has observed that the requirement of certificate under Section 65-B(4) being procedural, can be relaxed by Court wherever 28 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) interest of justice so justifies and thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65-B(4) is not always mandatory.
70. The Full Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 while overruling the judgment passed in the case of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P(supra) has settled the controversy surrounding the electronic evidence and has observed that the certificate under Section 65B (4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced and this can be done by the owner of the laptop, mobile phone etc. by stepping into the witness box. In cases where the "computer" happens to be a part of a "computer system" or "computer network" and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
73.1.Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno [Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] , being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, 29 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 :
(2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] and the judgment dated 3-4-2018 reported as Shafhi Mohd. v. State of H.P. [Shafhi Mohd. v. State of H.P., (2018) 5 SCC 311 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 704] , do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled.
73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the "computer" happens to be a part of a "computer system" or "computer network" and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65- B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4). The last sentence in para 24 in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] which reads as "... if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act ..." is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words "under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,...". With this clarification, the law stated in para 24 of Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] does not need to be revisited.
73.3. The general directions issued in para 64 (supra) shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and 30 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) directions under Section 67-C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers.
73.4. Appropriate rules and directions should be framed in exercise of the Information Technology Act, by exercising powers such as in Section 67-C, and also framing suitable rules for the retention of data involved in trial of offences, their segregation, rules of chain of custody, stamping and record maintenance, for the entire duration of trials and appeals, and also in regard to preservation of the metadata to avoid corruption. Likewise, appropriate rules for preservation, retrieval and production of electronic record, should be framed as indicated earlier, after considering the report of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justices' Conference in April 2016.
71. Taking into consideration the aforesaid settled position of law this Court is re-adverting to the impugned order wherefrom it is evident that the learned family court has categorically observed that perusal of text of „whatsapp‟ messages from Ext-1 to 15 which are said to have been sent by the wife reveals that those are photocopies of the alleged original messages and Phone numbers of either party has also not been shown in the original text. It further reveals that all those messages are written in Roman English but on the photo copies of „whatsapp‟ massage some texts in Hindi and mobile numbers have been written. It further appears that some messages were sent after interval of some seconds and some minutes but the response of the plaintiff before or after any messages have not been shown.
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72. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid, the learned family court has observed that the plaintiff knowingly deleted his messages sent to the defendant in reply and, therefore, it is crystal clear that the plaintiff has not come in the court with clean hand. The original text or CD of the messages or its original text certified by the evidence of authorized service provider of telecoms service, network service, Internet services Web hasting service has not been proved. Hence, genuineness of whatsapp messages is doubtful and not acceptable.
73. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the learned family court after due consideration of all the aspects has not satisfied with respect to the authenticity and genuineness of the whats-app message, as would be evidence from paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment which led the learned family Judge to dismiss the suit.
74. It is, thus, evident that even the whatsapp message, which is the sole basis to establish the element of cruelty has not been found to be sufficient evidence to prove the element of cruelty by the appellant wife against the respondent husband.
75. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant/husband has failed to brought any cogent evidence on record in order to establish the alleged cruelty by the respondent/wife as such 32 F.A. No. 58 of 2022 ( 2025:JHHC:16950-DB ) the behaviour of the respondent wife as alleged, does not amount to cruelty justifying dissolution of the marriage.
76. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the appellant/petitioner has also failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, this Court do not find any merit in the appeal.
77. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
78. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Alankar/A.F.R.
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