Bombay High Court
Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative ... vs Union Of India, Thr. Secretary, New ... on 6 May, 2026
(1) wp.3678.2026..
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.3678 OF 2026
Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-operative Society Limited, Nagpur (Multi-State)
Through its Chief Executive Officer, Mrs. Nanda Dinesh Bante,
Vs.
Union of India, through its Secretary and others
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Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders
appearances, Court's orders of directions
and Registrar's orders
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Mr. A. A. Naik, Senior Counsel a/b Mr. Y. N. Sambre, counsel for the
petitioner.
Mr. Kartik N. Shukul, DSGI with Ms. Prutha Hardas, counsel for
respondent Nos.1 to 4.
Mr. J. D. Gilda, Senior counsel a/b Mr. Zeeshan Haq, Counsel for the
intervenor.
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE AND
NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.
DATED : 06/05/2026
1. Heard.
2. By this petition, petitioner is seeking quashing and setting aside the impugned notice dated 08.04.2026 issued by respondent No.3 Deputy Commissioner (Cooperation) and to quash and set aside the order sheet dated 24.04.2026.
3. At the outset, it is pertinent to determine the issue about the maintainability of the petition before the Division Bench in view of the objection raised by the learned counsel for the intervenor and learned DSGI Mr. Kartik Shukul.
4. Learned counsel for the intervenor as well as learned DSGI, submitted that being the order passed by the (2) wp.3678.2026..
respondent No.2 Central Registrar of the Cooperative Societies is quasi-judicial and therefore, the petition will go before the Single Bench and not before the Division Bench. Learned Senior counsel Mr. Gilda for the intervenor also raised the similar objection. It is submitted by DSGI that while adjudicating the illegalities committed by the petitioner Society, the respondent No.2 has passed the impugned order, and therefore, it is a quasi-judicial order. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd., vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another reported in 2012 (5) Mh.L.J. 312 and the order of Delhi High Court passed in Writ Petition No.669/2021 [Sahara Credit Cooperative Society Vs. Union of India] and other connected petitions dated 22.03.2022.
5. Per contra, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner Mr. Naik submitted that the order passed by the respondent No.2 is in an administrative capacity, and therefore, it is an administrative order. He submitted that considering the expediency the said order was passed, and therefore, it is an administrative order. He submitted that as such no adjudication was pending before the respondent No.2, and therefore, it is not quasi-judicial order, but it is a purely administrative order. In support of his contention, he placed on Neelima Misra Vs. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others reported in (1990) 2 SCC 746 and Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association vs. Union of India and others reported in (2023) 18 SCC 1.
(3) wp.3678.2026..
6. For deciding the aforesaid issue, it is a condition pre-requisite to find out whether the impugned order is a judicial, quasi-judicial or an administrative order. Therefore, to decide the issue in controversy the interpretation of the word 'quasi-judicial act' needs to be considered.
7. The landmark decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Province of Bombay vs. Kusaldas S. Advani (1950 SCC OnLine SC 26), discusses the distinction between the judicial and administrative acts and has further laid down certain tests for ascertaining whether the act of a statutory body is a quasi-judicial or an administrative act. The following conditions have to be complied with for an act to fit into the definition of quasi-judicial act: (1) The body of persons must have legal authority; (2) the authority should be given to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects; and (3) they should have a duty to act judicially.
8. From the aforesaid definition it is imperative to interpret the word 'duty to act judicially'. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Neelima Misra (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court by referring the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in L.N. Mathur's, case wherein the concept of quasi-judicial function was analyzed with reference to the power of the Chancellor under Section 31(8)(a) and expressed the view that the reference to the Chancellor showed the existence of a disagreement between two University Authorities with respect to the claims of competing candidates. The Chancellor has to decide the issue by (4) wp.3678.2026..
examining the reasons given by the Executive Council and the records of the candidate. The decision of the Chancellor is final and not subject to any appeal/revision and his power is quasi- judicial. The fact that the Chancellor is not required to follow any set procedure or sit in public or take evidence does not make his function administrative. Such are the reasonings for the conclusion of the High Court to hold that the Chancellor must act as a quasi-judicial authority.
9. In the light of the above fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that "we find it difficult to accept the reasoning underlying the aforesaid view. Before we consider the correctness of the proposition laid down by the High Court we must, at the expense of some space, analyse the distinctions between quasi-judicial and administrative functions. An administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called 'purely administrative' and there is no third category."
10. Similarly, in the case of Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association (supra) relied by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner wherein while answering the applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act the Apex Court observed in para 55, which is reproduced as under:
"In Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002) 5 SCC 685, this Court held that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be pressed into service to vary, amend, or review a quasi-judicial order or notification.
(5) wp.3678.2026..
It is important to note that a quasi-judicial order or notification cannot be rescinded by relying upon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The notification dated 2-8-2019 rescinded the notification dated 4-7-1986 by which OAT was established. It is therefore the notification dated 4-7-1986 which established OAT which must be analysed to determine whether it is a quasi-judicial notification, and not the notification dated 2-8-2019, the effect of which was to abolish OAT. If the answer is that the decision to establish OAT was indeed a quasi-judicial decision, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be relied on to reverse this decision. As a consequence, the notification dated 2-8-2019 will be invalid, being improperly issued. If, however, the decision to establish OAT was administrative, there would be no bar to the invocation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to rescind the notification establishing OAT."
11. In para No.56 the Hon'ble Apex Court further discussed the meaning and contours of a quasi-judicial act in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (1959 SCC
551), where SR Das, J. in his concurring opinion held:
Para No.80 and 81 which are reproduced as under:
"80.1.(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and 80.2.(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the (6) wp.3678.2026..
contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.
81. In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie, and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially."
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court further refers the judgment of Indian National Congress (I) (supra) wherein in para No.29 it is held as under:
"29. ... another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-judicial function is, the authority who acts quasi-judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated by the policy and expediency."
13. Thus, after considering the various decisions the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association (supra) held as under:
"The decision of an authority is prima facie, and in the absence of any other factor, a quasi-judicial act when there is a lis before it, with two parties with competing claims;
When the authority has the power to do something which will prejudicially affect the subject, the decision it takes is a quasi-judicial act even in the absence of a lis and two parties with competing claims, when the authority is required by the statute in question to act judicially. The express provisions of the statute, the nature of the right affected, the manner of disposal, the objective criterion (if any) to be adopted while deciding one way or the other, the effect of the decision, and other signs in the statute may be considered when evaluating whether there is a duty (7) wp.3678.2026..
to act judicially; and the decision of an authority is quasi- judicial when it is made in accordance with rules. The decision is administrative when it is dictated by policy and expediency."
14. Here in the present case, in view of the order passed this Court in Criminal Writ Petition Nos.16/2024, 1068/2019 and 811/2025 dated 20.11.2025. After considering the various crimes registered against one Mrs. Nirmala Pramod Manmode and Pramod Nathuji Manmode, who were members of the Managing Committee of the Society as also the Nirmal Urban Co-operative Society. After noticing the various illegalities and misappropriation committed by the members it is observed by this Court that "the Commissioner of Police made a communication to the Central Registrar stating the position as on 31st March, 2022. It further indicates that during the financial year 2022-2023, the Society raised funds to the tune of Rs.1497 crores. Thus, the Society has allegedly raised Rs.425 crores in excess of the amount permitted under Section 67 of Multi State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002. According to the Commissioner of Police, such a grave legal violation would put the investments of the depositors to a risk. He then speaks of the illegalities through NPA, where an amount of Rs.19.05 crores is shown as profit. The communication also indicates that an amount of Rs.317.73 crores has been diverted to other enterprises without the permission of the Central Registrar. There are other financial irregularities as well. According to the Commissioner of Police, deposits worth more than Rs.1400 crores are at a grave stake since the very foundations of the Society are substantially (8) wp.3678.2026..
weak owing to blatant legal violation, financial impropriety, mismanagement and misconduct."
15. This Court further observed in para No.8, "The Commissioner of Police, considering the above illegalities, requested the Central Registrar, to authorise a competent officer to vet and lodge a formal complaint before the police under Sections 3 and 4 of the MPID Act, 1999 read with the relevant provisions of the IPC, MSCS Act, 2002 etc., so as to set the law in motion. The Commissioner of Police also made a request to take steps to dissolve the present body running the Society and to appoint an Administrator to run the affairs of the Society and to take steps for protecting the interest of the depositors."
16. "Thus, the Commissioner of Police was well aware of the grave illegalities committed by the Society. He was also aware that the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the MPID Act will be attracted so also the provisions of IPC and MSCS Act, 2002. The law was to be set in motion. Thus, the Commissioner of Police was wanting a formal complaint to be registered for setting law in motion. However, the Central Registrar responded to the Commissioner of Police, Nagpur vide letter dated 18th September, 2023 stating that as per the provisions of MSCS Act, 2002 and Rules therein, no permission or complaint from the office of Central Registrar is required to initiate legal action in case of criminal misconduct against the Society. Accordingly, the Central Registrar requested the Commissioner of Police to take action as deemed appropriate as per law.
(9) wp.3678.2026.. 17. Nothing has been, however, done by the Commissioner of Police till today.
18. The petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No.811/2025, who is a member of the Society, then approached this Court with a prayer to direct investigation at the hands of Central Bureau of Investigation as also by Commissioner of Police, Nagpur. Admittedly, the investigation cannot be carried out by both. The emphasis of the petitioner, however, is to direct investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation.
19. The Counsel for the petitioner submits that prior to filing this petition, the petitioner and his wife had filed yet another petition being Criminal Writ Petition No.1068/2019 seeking direction against the Commissioner of Police, Nagpur, as also the Deputy Director of Enforcement Directorate to take cognizance of representation/report dated 27th July, 2019 submitted by them and to direct them to register FIR under various provisions of law. A prayer was also made against the Central Registrar to take appropriate action against the Society. The grievance is that nothing has been done."
20. In para No.17 this Court further observed that "This modified stand speaks volumes about the law enforcing agency. Firstly, the then Commissioner of Police despite receiving clearance from Central Registrar did not take any action till he was holding office. His successor took a somersault saying that communication was suggestive in nature. Thus, the allegation that Rs.1400 crores invested by the investors is at stake is let go by succeeding Commissioner of Police."
(10) wp.3678.2026..
21. Thus, this observation put the Central Registrar to take an action and in view of that the said action was taken by the respondent No.2 Central Registrar.
22. At this point, it is necessary to consider the observation in Radeshyam Khare & another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (1958 SCC OnLine SC 43), wherein it is held that "wherever the legislature intended an enquiry to be held before taking any action by necessary implication or in express manner, provision is made to allow an aggrieved person be heard. Generally speaking, excepting where an order is to be reversed qua a particular person, there is no provision for a hearing. The nature and extent of regulatory powers of the State Government and Central Government and the mode of their exercise are matters of policy and expediency and indicate the taking of an administrative action by the State Government/Central Government and not the exercise of any judicial power."
23. An order passed by the respondent No.2 not acting judicially but acting in expediency. The administrative order is related to the regulation or supervision of the matters as distinguished from an order which decides the rights of the parties as held in Shankarlal Aggarwal and others Versus Shankarlal Poddar and others (AIR 1965 SCC 507).
24. In the case of Radeshyam Khare & another (supra) in para Nos.50 and 51 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
"50. The very fact that an order under Section 53-A is in the nature of an emergency action to protect the interests (11) wp.3678.2026..
of the rate payer and has a limited duration not exceeding 18 months also negatives the order being founded on an objective determination as to the incompetency of the committee. Such a construction will defeat the very purpose of Section 53-A. Further action under Section 57 is of a permanent nature and has accordingly been expressly made subject to an explanation by the municipal committee. The absence of such a provision from Section 53-A clearly shows that the legislature did not intend that there should be an elaborate hearing but intended that the State should under Section 53-A take a swift administrative decision. The correct position, as indicated above, is that the decision of the State Government as to incompetency and the decision as to the action to be taken were really one decision, one integrated whole -- a subjective decision of the State Government that it considered that by the appointment of an executive officer a general improvement in the hitherto general administration was likely to be secured. Merely because the fact of incompetency is a preliminary step to the exercise of an administrative function by the State Government, under Section 53-A, it is not necessary that the fact is to be determined judicially. Where the exercise of the administrative functions of an executive authority like the State Government are subject to a decision as to the existence of a fact, there is no duty cast on the State Government to act judicially. Both the decision as to the fact and as to the action to be taken are really one and not two decisions, the determination being for the purpose of taking an appropriate administrative decision. As has been said above it is one integrated whole and cannot be separated into parts with different legal qualities. This was the view of Kania, C.J., in the Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas Advani [(1951) AC 66, 78] where it was observed at page 633:
"Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a power (12) wp.3678.2026..
conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the executive power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character".
"51. Fazi Ali, J., in that case said at page 642:
"For prompt action the executive authorities have often to take quick decisions and it will be going too far to say that in doing so they are discharging any judicial or quasi- judicial functions. The word 'decision' in common parlance is more or less a natural expression and it can be used with reference to purely executive as well as judicial orders. The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is : Is there any duty to act judicially?"
25. In view of that, we do not agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for intervenor as well as learned DSGI Mr. Kartik Shakul DSGI.
26. The order passed by the respondent No.2 is in the administrative capacity, hence the preliminary objection raised by the learned DSGI with the learned counsel for the intervenor is rejected. It is held that writ petition challenging the order passed by the respondent No.2 is maintainable before the Division Bench only.
(NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J) (URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J) Sarkate Signed by: Mr. A.R. Sarkate Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 07/05/2026 11:14:33