Jharkhand High Court
Nawal Kishore Singh And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 28 February, 2003
Equivalent citations: [2003(2)JCR160(JHR)], 2003 LAB IC (NOC) 152 (JHA), 2003 AIR - JHAR. H. C. R. 1028, (2003) 2 JLJR 204, (2003) 2 JCR 160 (JHA)
Author: Tapen Sen
Bench: Tapen Sen
ORDER Tapen Sen, J.
1. In this Writ Application the petitioners have prayed for quashing the orders dated 24.8.1995 dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioners, thereby confirming the order of punishment. The petitioners have also made a prayerifor a direction upon the respondents to reinstate them in service with all consequential benefits.
2. The short facts which are necessary to be taken note of are that all the 40 (forty) petitioners herein were employed as Security Guards/Hawildars of the Central Industrial Security Force at Bokaro Steel Plant. According to the petitioners the Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, Bokaro Steel Plant in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 37(b) issued en-masse order of dismissal against the petitioners without framing any charge and without making any inquiry. This order was issued on 27.6.1979 and were served on 805 persons including the petitioners. The petitioners have stated that none of them acted in any manner which should have warranted such a drastic action. However, the respondents nonetheless issued orders at random serving them upon all these persons without actually finding out as to whether they were guilty or not.
3. These orders of dismissal were then challenged in a batch of Writ Applica-
tions and they were all allowed and the orders were quashed. The petitioners have further stated that in relation to the alleged incident which led to their dismissal, a criminal case had been registered against all the 805 persons including the petitioners under Section 302 and other Sections of the Indian Penal Code as also under the provisions of the Arms Act. However, out of 805 persons, charge-sheets were submitted only against 222 persons and all the persons against whom charge-sheets were not submitted were taken back in employment. The petitioners and other persons were tried and convicted by the learned Sessions Judge where after all of them preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 4, 5, 25, 27 and 29 of 1987 before the then Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court and on 23.11.1989 a Division Bench acquitted all, the convicted persons including the petitioners.
4. In the meantime another Writ Application bearing CWJC No. 975 of 1986(R) was filed on behalf of Jitendra Singh and others which included some of the petitioners herein who contended that the situation had changed and circumstances were then within control and therefore the order of dismissal be set aside and an inquiry be ordered to held. That Writ Application, however, was dismissed on 23.7.1985.
5. Against the said order of dismissal, the petitioners therein which included some of the petitioners herein moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court and since by that time the judgment of acquittal had been passed, therefore the Supreme Court permitted the petitioners to file an application before the appropriate authority for seeking relief in view of the judgment of acquittal.
6. Accordingly, the petitioners filed an application before the respondent No. 3 (Appellate Authority) wherein they prayed that the orders of dismissal be set aside and they be reinstated in view of the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court. In the meanwhile 6 (six) persons, namely, (i) Yersish Munda, (ii) Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (iii) Anant Raj Singh. (iv) Ranjeet Narayan Singh, (v) Lala Singh and (vi) A.K. Jena also filed Writ Application bearing CWJC No. 1185 of 1991(R), praying for a direction for reinstatement on the ground of acquittal. According to the petitioners, by order dated 11.9.1991 passed in CWJC No. 1185 of 1991(R) the High Court passed a direction for reinstatement on the ground that they had been acquitted. The petitioners state that the order dated 11.9.1991 squarely applied to their case also and they were also entitled to be reinstated because their case stood on identical footing.
7. Inspite thereof and although the case of the petitioners stood squarely covered by the order dated 11.9.1991, the respondents and especially the Appellate Authority (respondent No. 3) dismissed the appeal by reason of an order without taking into consideration the terms of the decision either of the High Court or of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the petitioners and others filed CWJC No. 323 of 1994(R) and by judgment dated 7.3.1995 (Annexure 1) the Writ Application was allowed and a direction was made upon the Appellate Authority for reconsideration in the light of the direction of the Supreme Court.
8. Accordingly, the petitioners submitted an application before the Appellate Authority, (respondent No. 3) for reconsideration of their cases and in order to avoid bulk, the petitioners have annexed one such representation dated 10.4.1995 vide Annexure 2. Thereafter, by reason of the impugned order dated 24.8.1995, the respondent No. 3 dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioners and one such order has been marked Annexure 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, this order was passed in all the appeals.
9. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners firstly drew attention of this Court to Annexure 6 appended to the reply to the Counter affidavit. Annexure 6 is the judgment of the Division Bench passed in Criminal Appeal Nos. 4, 5, 25, 27 and 29 of 1987(R) and submitted that paragraph 13 therein showed that the State had conceded before that Court that there was no direct evidence on record for convicting the appellants therein for the offences charged.
However, the learned counsel for the State in those cases had submitted that because many had been found to have received injuries, therefore, their participation in the crime had been held to be proved. The scenario on the basis whereof the cases were initiated was in relation to an incident which occurred on 25.6.1979 when 21 (twenty one) Jawans of Central Industrial Security Force, 1 (one) Home Guard and 3 (three) personnel of the Indian Army lost their lives in firing and a dozen army personnel and about 70-80 (seventy-eighty) Central Industrial Security Force Jawans and Home Guards including the appellants received injuries in that firing. Paragraph 3 of the judgment of the Criminal Appellate Court gives details of what happened on that day. However, at paragraph 15, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the materials brought on record was wholly insufficient to bring home the charge of guilt against the appellants and accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of conviction and sentence. The aforementioned judgment of the Criminal Appellate Court was taken up in appeal by the State before the Supreme Court of India and by order dated 14.7.1994, the Supreme Court of India (vide Annexure 8 appended to the reply to the Counter Affidavit) dismissed all the appeals. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha submits that there has been a hostile discrimination in so far as the petitioners are concerned, inasmuch as those persons who were discharged from the criminal case finally were taken back in service and therefore, the petitioners who were ultimately acquitted by the Appellate Court should also be given the same benefit. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha submits that from a perusal of the impugned order dated 24.8.1995 there is reference of one K.N. Singh and this K.N. Singh was reinstated in service vide Annexure 10 appended to the reply to the Counter Affidavit.
10. Mr. M.M. Prasad. learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioners were dismissed from service under Rule 37(b) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969 read with Ar-
tides 31 l(2)(b) of the Constitution of India in the wake of the agitation in the month of June 1979. According to him, the petitioners had committed gross dereliction of duty indulged in indisciplined activities and had provoked others to join in the agitation and that they alongwith others had taken out arms and ammunitions from the Units by breaking open locks without any order of the competent authority and had then fought with the Indian Army by opening fire. In the firing, as many as 21 (twenty one) Central Industrial Security Force personnel and 1 (one) Home Guard and 3 (three) personnel of the Indian Army had lost their lives and a dozen Army personnel and about 70-80 (seventy to eighty) Central Industrial Security Force officials received injury. On 25.6.1979 when the petitioners surrendered before the Army they were arrested and a criminal case was registered against them. According to Mr. M.M. Prasad, the situation in the unit had turned explosive and in these circumstances the authorities had no alternative but to dismiss them from service. The police had submitted charge-sheet against 222 persons including the petitioners.
11. Mr. M.M. Prasad further submitted, with reference to the Counter Affidavit, that after the judgment of acquittal, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court for reinstatement but by judgment dated 10.1.1991 (Annexure 7 appended to the reply to the Counter Affidavit) the appeal was dismissed and it was observed that in view of acquittal it was open for them to move the appropriate authority for seeking relief. Accordingly, the petitioners filed appeals and the Appellate Authority after due consideration, affirmed the order of dismissal and dismissed the appeal. According to the petitioners, the action taken by the Department had already been confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel's case reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 and therefore the appeals were rejected. According to Mr. M.M. Prasad this was the first round of litigation. The second round of litigation according to Mr. Prasad was when the petitioners and others filed CWJC No. 975 of 1986(R) wherein they only made a prayer for fresh inquiry and reinstatement but that Writ Application was also dismissed in limine by an order dated 23.7.1986, where after a Special Leave Petition No. 10228 of 1986 had been filed but by an order dated 10.1.1991 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the manner stated above. According to Mr. Prasad after the dismissal by the Supreme Court, the petitioners again moved the authorities and by an order dated 4.2.1992 their prayer was rejected and this became the subject matter of CWJC No. 323 of 1994 which was filed on behalf of 85 (eighty five) persons including the petitioners. The aforementioned Writ Application being CWJC No. 323 of 1994 was allowed by judgment dated 7.3.1995 (Annexure 1 appended to the Writ Application) and the order of the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal was quashed and the matter was remanded to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration in the light of the order of the Supreme Court. This therefore, according to Mr. M.M. Prasad, was the third round of litigation. After that the matter, according to Mr. Prasad, came to an end by reason of the order dated 24.8.1995 by which the matter was finally concluded and the order dated 24.8.1995 was passed pursuant to the judgment dated 7.3.1995 rendered in CWJC No. 323 of 1994. Now against that, the petitioners want to initiate the fifth round of litigation which should not be allowed. Mr. M.M. Prasad further drew attention of this Court to the case of Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, which included the case of the petitioners. He refers to Paragraphs 154 to 162 of the said judgment and submits that the matter relates to the Central Industrial security Force Unit at Bokaro Steel Plant and was a subject matter of Civil Appeal No. 3512 of 1982 Union of India and Ors. v. G.P. Kaushal, and also Civil Appeal No. 3484 of 1982 Union of India and Ors. v. Sadanand Jha and Ors. He further submits, with reference to Paragraphs 159, 160 and 161 of the said judgment, that this case should not be allowed to be readjudicated and reopened once again. Paragraphs 159 to 161 of the said judgment reads as follows :--
"159. The facts set out in the Supplementary Return of Shri Mohan Gopal and in the impugned orders show that there was a total breakdown of discipline in the CIS Force. There was a willful and deliberate disobedience of orders of the supervisory officers and 'gherao' of such officers. There was a hunger strike, dharna, shouting of rebellious slogans and threats of violence and bodily harm to supervisory officers and acts tending to intimidate the supervisory officers and loyal members of the staff. There were acts of in-subordination and deliberate neglect and willful violation of their duties by a very large section of the members of the CIS Force stationed at Bokaro. All these acts virtually amounted to a mutiny and how grave the situation was can be judged from the fact that the Army had to be called out and a pitched battle took place between the Army and the members of the Force. No person with any reason or sense of responsibility can say that in such a situation the holding of an inquiry was reasonably practicable.
160. It was said that the impugned orders did not set out the particular acts done by each of the members of the CIS Force in respect of whom dismissal order was made, and these were merely cyclostyled orders with the names of individual members of the CIS Force filled in. Here was a case very much like a case, under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The acts alleged were not of any particular individual acting by himself. These were acts of a large group acting collectively with the common object of coercing those in charge of the administration of the CIS Force and the Government in order to obtain recognition for their association and to concede their demands. It is not possible in a situation such as this to particularize the acts of each individual member who participated in the commission of these acts. The participation of each individual may be of greater or lesser degree but the acts of each individual contributed to the creation of a situation in which a security force itself became a security risk.
161. It was submitted at the Bar that the real reason for passing the orders impugned in Civil Appeal No. 1484 of 1982 was the encounter with the Army on June 25, 1979, and this real reason was not mentioned in the impugned order because the respondents had been arrested and were being prosecuted and therefore, before passing the impugned orders, the disciplinary authority would have had to wait till the prosecutions were over. Such an allegation has not been made in the writ petition filed in the High Court. In fact, there is no mention in the writ petition of the help of the army being sought or of the encounter with the Army. The impugned orders mentioned the reasons why they were passed. The Supplementary Return bears out these reasons. We have therefore, no hesitation in accepting what is stated in the impugned orders. In our opinion, Clause (b) of Rule 37 of the CISF Rules and Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) were properly applied to the cases of the respondents."
(Underlining by this Court)
12. In reply to the aforementioned submissions of Mr. M.M. Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this is a case of gross discrimination inasmuch as others were reinstated while the petitioners were not. He further submits that there is no question of reagitating this matter again and again because paragraph 162 of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel's case made an observation in relation to the discrimination meted but to the dismissed "members of the Central Industrial Security force. Paragraph 162 of the said judgment reads thus :--
"162. Finally, a grievance was made at the Bar that the dismissed members of the CIS Force had field departmental appeals and the appeals of those who had been discharged by the Magistrate were allowed and these appellants were reinstated. We do not know how far this is correct nor the reasons for allowing such appeals, but if what is stated is true, it is not fair and the remaining appeals should be disposed of as early as possible."
13. This Court does not find any reason to interfere in this case inasmuch as it is clear that the petitioners are, in fact, repeatedly agitating and reagitating the matter over and over again. Additionally the observation of the Supreme Court at paragraph 162 itself is very clear that if what had been stated was true (i.e., the reinstatement of those who had been discharged by the Magistrate) then it was not fair and the remaining appeals should be disposed of as early as possible. The judgment of the Supreme Court did not give liberty to again start litigations. All that the Supreme Court directed was that the appeals should be disposed off as early as possible. The aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered on 11.7.1985 and the subject matter of the instant Writ Application, i.e., the impugned order is dated 24.8.1995 and it was passed 10 (ten) years thereafter and that too upon conclusion of various stages of litigations finally disposing off the Appeals not only in deference to the direction of the Supreme Court, but also in pursuance of the judgment which was delivered on 7.3.1995 in CWJC No. 323 of 1994 and which was really, the third round of litigation by which the matter was remanded/remitted to the Appellate Authority to reconsider the matter once again. Tulsiram Patel's case was also taken into consideration by the High Court while delivering the judgment in CWJC No. 323 of 1994(R) at paragraphs 7 and 8. At paragraph 8, the High Court quoted the contents of paragraph 123 of the judgment passed in Tulsi Ram Patel's case. After taking into consideration all these aspects, the Single Judge remanded the matter to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration. That reconsideration has now finally come by reason of the impugned order of the Appellate Authority dated 24.8.1995 as contained at Annexure-3 holding that there was nothing to interfere with the final order of punishment and he accordingly, rejected the appeals.
14. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the matter should finally rest and the petitioners should not be given opportunities to repeat and reagitate the matter over and over again. Consequently, this Court does not find any merit in the Writ Application. The Writ Application is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.