Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 24.03.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 10 April, 2025
2025:HHC:10006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 357 of 2022 Reserved on: 24.03.2025 Date of Decision: 10.04.2025.
Sarita Chauhan and another ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. and others ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Vikrant Thakur Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 3 : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General.
For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Malay Kaushal, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 48 of 2021, dated 19 th July 2021, registered at Police Station New Shimla for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 504, 506, and 509 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Poonam, made a complaint to the police asserting that petitioner Sarika and her husband Loveneesh Kumar threatened, abused and manhandled her at about 5:40 PM on 19th July 2021, when she was returning to her home from her office. The petitioner, Sarika Devi, obstructed her path, shouted at her and did not allow her to go to her residence. When the informant tried to move further, the petitioners, Sarika and her husband pushed her to the corner of the corridor in front of Block No. 9. They asked her not to move a single step and kept her confined for 15 minutes in the corner. The informant had requested petitioner Loveneesh Kumar on the evening of 17th July 2021, not to make his pet dog litter in the courtyard as her children play in the Courtyard. The petitioner Loveneesh Kumar shouted and said that his dog would only litter in the courtyard and she could do whatever she wanted. He also threatened to unleash his dog after the informant's children in case they played in the courtyard. He said that many cases were registered against him and nothing would happen to him. The police registered the FIR, conducted the investigation and filed a 3 2025:HHC:10006 chargesheet before the court after the completion of the investigation.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the chargesheet, the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. It has been asserted that the informant is working as Assistant Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner Shimla. She is the neighbour of the petitioners. She made a complaint on 19th July 2021 to Municipal Corporation Shimla alleging that petitioner No. 2 Loveneesh Kumar had threatened and abused her children. She had also complained about obstruction of the courtyard in front of Block no. 8 & 9. Commissioner Shimla issued a show cause notice to petitioner no. 2 on 27th July 2021 stating that petitioner No. 2 Loveneesh Kumar had erected an iron frame structure for flower pots between the area of Block no. 8 & 9 without permission from competent Authority. The petitioners assailed the order before learned Additional District Judge (II) Shimla who set it aside on 31st October 2021. The informant had registered a false FIR against the petitioners. Petitioners had planted a few plants and flowers in front of their house and kept a pet dog. The informant 4 2025:HHC:10006 uprooted the flowers and beat the dog with a stick. The petitioners objected to the informant's action. She called the police and the office of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla to take action against the petitioners. She also registered the FIR No. 48 of 2021, which is an abuse of the process of the Court. The Investigating Officer did not act fairly and transparently. A small altercation between two neighbours was changed into a criminal case to harass petitioners. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence against the petitioners. There are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. The neighbours made statements before the Superintendent of Police Shimla and did not disclose the informant's manhandling. The criminal proceedings are actuated by mala fides. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.
4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply and making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted that an FIR No. 48 of 2021 was registered at the instance of the informant. The statements of the parties' 5 2025:HHC:10006 neighbours were recorded, who disclosed that the petitioners had restrained and abused the informant on 19th July 2021. The parties were abusing each other at the time of arrival of the police on the spot. The police pacified the parties and recorded the statements of the witnesses. The police filed a chargesheet before the competent court of law for the judicial verdict after the completion of the investigation. The offences committed by the petitioners are not only against an individual but against the society having far-reaching consequences. Quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings would cause prejudice to the State and set a wrong precedent. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
5. I have heard Mr. Vikrant Thakur learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prashant Sen learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent number 1 to 3/State and Mr Malay Kaushal learned counsel for respondent No. 4/informant.
6. Mr. Vikrant Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the contents of the petition are false, which is evident from the fact that the informant had made a similar complaint earlier on the same day to the Superintendent of Police and Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla, in 6 2025:HHC:10006 which no allegations of wrongful restraint and abuse were made. The parties have a dispute over the courtyard and the informant misused the criminal machinery to settle the score with the petitioners. Continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
7. Mr Prashant Sen learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents no. 1 to 3/State submitted that the contents of the complaint disclosed the commission of cognizable offences. The police registered the FIR, conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet before the Court. The competent Court is seized of the matter and this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the FIR. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8. Mr Malay Kaushal, learned counsel for respondent number 4/informant adopted the submission of Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General and submitted that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot enter into the factual disputes. The allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence and the court should not quash the FIR. He prayed that the present petition be 7 2025:HHC:10006 dismissed. He relied upon the judgment of Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat AIR 2018 SC 314 in support of his submission.
9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
10. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -
"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad 8 2025:HHC:10006 kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, 9 2025:HHC:10006 providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."
11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound 10 2025:HHC:10006 nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
12. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
13. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioners obstructed the informant and kept her confined in the corner of the corridor. They also abused the informant. She mentioned the abuses hurled by petitioner No. 1 in her complaint. She also mentioned that petitioner no. 2 Loveneesh Kumar had threatened to unleash his dog after her children. These allegations prima facie constitute the commission of cognizable offences.
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14. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false, which is apparent from the fact that no such allegations were made in the complaint made to the Superintendent of Police, District Shimla and the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla on the same day. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -
"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the 12 2025:HHC:10006 petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not."
15. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-
trial. It was observed at page 397:
"17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference 13 2025:HHC:10006 can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. ... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. ...
7. ... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider 'whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not'."
16. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683:
2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 wherein it was observed at page 111:
"29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1- 2018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof.
30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1- 2018.] . At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate 14 2025:HHC:10006 the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.
31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code.
32. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court.
33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined as being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind else it would lead to committing a jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here.
34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the 15 2025:HHC:10006 application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question."
17. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
18. Secondly, it is not permissible to look into the documents annexed to the petition for quashing the FIR. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:
"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."
19. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:
"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri 16 2025:HHC:10006 Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C."
20. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:
"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and 17 2025:HHC:10006 cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".
21. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142:
"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial."
22. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.
23. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:
"63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case 18 2025:HHC:10006 where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied)
24. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioners with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the material brought before the learned Trial Court. The authenticity of the documents filed with the petition has not been established and it is impermissible to rely upon them to quash the FIR.
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25. It was submitted that the parties have a dispute over the courtyard and the FIR was lodged due to the dispute. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed:
"78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint.
79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but 20 2025:HHC:10006 has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot- free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to "criminal misconduct" punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation."
26. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed:
"30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first 21 2025:HHC:10006 informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, "If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal."
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39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C."
27. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of enmity.
28. It was submitted that there is insufficient material to convict the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme 22 2025:HHC:10006 Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:
"21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.
22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.
23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had 23 2025:HHC:10006 informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC."
29. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
30. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:
"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, 24 2025:HHC:10006 the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not."
31. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage.
32. No other point was urged.
33. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
34. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th April, 2025 (Chander)