Madras High Court
Mr.Veeramani Kannan vs / on 15 April, 2015
C.S.No.412 of 2020
and O.A.No.770 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on:02.09.2021 Pronounced on:07.09.2021
Coram::
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN
Civil Suit (Comm.Div.) No.412 of 2020
and O.A.No.770 of 2020
Mr.Veeramani Kannan,
Represented by its Power of Attorney Agent,
Mr.Sridhar Subbarayan,
No.E 2A, Shanthi Apartments,
Appu Street, Mylapore,
Chennai 600 004. .. Plaintiff
/versus/
M/s Super Audio (Madras) Private Limited,
Represented by its Director Mr.Navin N.Daswani,
Carex Centre, III Floor, 713 Anna Salai,
Chennai 600 006. ..Defendant
Prayer: Civil Suit has been filed under Order IV, Rule (1) of the Original Side
Rules and Order VII, Rule 1 of C.P.C., read with Sections 2,13,14, 51, 55,58 & 62
of the Copyright Act, 1957, praying to grant a judgment and decree on the
following terms:-
(a)pass an order of permanent injunction against the defendant, its directors,
agents, officers, holdings, subsidiaries etc., from using or broadcasting any the
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C.S.No.412 of 2020
and O.A.No.770 of 2020
songs in the Music Album in violation of the plaintiff's performer's rights under
Section 38A of the Copyright Act, 1957.
(b)pass on order directing the defendant to render true and correct accounts
of the profits earned from commercializing the plaintiff's performer's rights in the
Music Album.
(c)pass an order directing the defendant to pay damages of Rs.5,00,000 for
commercializing the performer's rights in the plaintiff's songs.
(d)pass an order directing the defendant to pay the costs of the suit to the
plaintiff.
For Plaintiff :Mr.K.Rathinavel
For Defendant :Mr.U.Vinay Metha
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JUDGMENT
(The case has been heard through video conferencing) Suit filed under the Copyright Act, 1957 for injunction against the defendant from broadcasting the songs in the music album of the plaintiff more fully mentioned in the plaint violating the plaintiff's right as performer and for rendition of accounts of the profit earned from commercialising the plaintiff performer right in the music album and also to pay damages of Rs.5,00,000/-.
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2.According to the plaintiff, he is a Singer by profession. He has sang various devotional songs in all the regional languages including Tamil. The defendant is a Music Company carrying on business of producing music album songs, videos etc., During the year 2015, the defendant engaged the plaintiff to write, compose and sing various devotional songs for the music album named, 'Shiva Murugan Paamalai'. Accordingly, the plaintiff sang four songs namely,
(i)108 Chants of Lord Shiva; (ii)Shivan Aarthi; (iii)108 Chants of Lord Muruga and (iv)Murugan Aarthi. All the right in the music album were sold to the defendant for consideration as per the agreement dated 15.04.2015. The defendant had released the music albums in various platforms such as CDs, VCDs, DVDs, etc. However, since March 2020, the defendant, without taking any permission from the plaintiff or paying any royalties to the plaintiff for his performer's rights had published these songs in YouTube and had commercially exploited the same.
Furnishing the dates of uploading the music album containing four songs, the suit is filed alleging that the defendant has made the songs available for streaming in the online platform, which is illegal and violative of plaintiff's performer's right under Section 38-A of the Copyright Act, 1957. The plaintiff, after coming to 3/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 know about the violation of his right, issued cease and desist notice to the defendant on 29.09.2020 and called upon the defendant to make payments towards the plaintiff's share of royalties collected by the defendant till date and also to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- towards damages. Inspite of cease and desist notice, the defendant continues the streaming the songs without taking any license from the plaintiff or paying the performer's royalties to the plaintiff. Hence, the suit is filed for the aforesaid prayer.
3. The defendant has filed written statement wherein, the claim of the plaintiff as a performer is denied. According to the defendant, the performer's right to seek royalties is available only if the performance is a live performance.
The music album, which is the subject matter of the suit is non-live studio recording. Therefore, it does not fall under the definition of Copyright and the plaintiff is not a performer under the said Act. Hence, he is not entitled for royalties as envisaged under Section 38-A of the Copyright Act, 1957. The production of music album involves various steps and the processes, such as conception, scratch recording, vocal rehearsal, sessions track recording, final vocals recordings and mixing and editing, etc. The plaintiff did not give his 4/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 performance in one go. After several re-takes and re-recordings for several days, it was thereafter edited, mixed and put together in the form of a single vocal tracks. Since the performance of the plaintiff in the music album was not continuous and uninterpreted, he does not qualify the meaning of performance, which says it must be made live in one go without any break. The plaintiff has assigned all his rights in the music album by executing agreement dated 15.04.2015. The agreement though carried different nomenclature, it was partly a service agreement and partly an assignment agreement, wherein the plaintiff agreed to assign all his rights to the defendant for an equitable consideration. The plaintiff assigned all his performance right under Section 38-A of the Copyright Act relating to any and all performance in favour for the defendant and agreed to release, relinquish, transfer and assign all its royalty rights under Section 38-A(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957 to the defendant for a lump sum royalty payment as consideration. The plaintiff has also agreed that, he has not granted any conflicting rights to any copyright Society. As per the agreement, the defendant is entitled to all rights, title and ownership in the alleged performance/performer right. The defendant has legally acquired all the components of the songs including the performer's right.
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4. Based on the above pleadings, this Court has framed the following Issues for consideration:-
(i)Whether the plaintiff as the singer of the songs contain the “music album” marketed by the defendant is entitled to enforce the performer's right under Section 38 of the Copyrights Act?
(ii)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to restrain the defendant from using or board casting any of the songs in the music album?
(iii)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any damages as prayed for?
(iv)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for rendition of accounts?
(v)What other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?
5. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff and the defendant filed a joint memo dated 13.08.2021 wherein, they have submitted that there is no disputes between the parties with respect to the facts of the case and as such the documents filed by the plaintiff has not been denied by the defendant. There is no necessity for examination of witness. Waving the right to give oral evidence, the parties are ready to make their submissions on the interpretation of the statute to 6/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 decide, whether the plaintiff is a performer as defined under this Act and if so, whether he is entitled for any relief under Section 38-A of the Copyright Act. The parties have also filed their respective written submissions.
6. The Assignment Agreement dated 15.04.2015 is the plaint document No.2. In this agreement, the plaintiff has agreed to produce a music album containing the following four songs:- (i) 108 Chants of Lord Shiva; (ii)Shivan Aarthi; (iii)108 Chants of Lord Muruga and (iv) Murugan Aarthi. He had engaged the plaintiff to compose, author the original musical works and literary work and also render the performances. To acquire all the intellectual property rights in the songs, work and performances, the valuable consideration paid and the same acknowledged by the plaintiff. Under this Assignment Agreement, the plaintiff as assignor has assigned to the producer (defendant) without any limitation, reservation or condition, the entire copyright including all the rights stated in Section 14 of Copyright Act, 1957 and all other rights of any nature whatsoever stated in Section 38-A of the Copyright Act, 1957. Also, there is a specific class in the Agreement that the assignor releases, relinquishes, transfers and assigns all its rights to royalty under Section 38-A(ii) absolutely to the producer in exchange for 7/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 a lump sum royalty payment as mentioned under this Agreement under Clause 4.
Clause 4 of this Agreement indicates that, the plaintiff as assignor had received a consolidated sum of Rs.19,900/-.
7. The relevant recitals are extracted below for proper appreciation:-
3.1 The Assignor hereby assigns to Producer without any limitation, reservation or condition, the entire copyright (including all rights stated in Section 14 of the Copyright act, 1957) and all other rights, title or interest of whatsoever nature throughout the territory for perpetuity (including but not limited to all rights of production, adaptation, reproduction, transcription, performance, broadcast and exhibition) whether vested, or contingent to the Songs and Assigned Works (including but not limited to all Sound Recordings, Musical Works, Literary Works and any other material contributed by the Assignor) to be exploited on all Modes and Mediums.
3.2 The Assignor further assigns to the Producer any and all right, title, interest in any Performer Rights relating to any and all Performances of the Assignor and all rights of action and all other rights of any nature whatsoever stated in Section 38A of the Copyright Act, 1957 including but not limited to the right to reproduce the performances to feature in any audio video content in any material form including but not limited to the storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means; issues copies of the 8/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 Performances to the public including copies of records of such Performances in any format and parts; communication of the Performances to the public in any format; sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental any copy of a recording of the Performances in any format; broadcast or communicate the Performances to the public by any and all mediums and modes, technology or process in existence or in commercial use anywhere in the universe whether or not in the field of Cinematography Films or Sound Recordings at the time of execution of this Agreement by both Parties in perpetuity or invented in future.
3.4 Further and without prejudice to the above assignment, and in consideration of this Agreement, in regard to any audio visual recording and/or sound recording, of any performance made by Assignor in pursuance of this Agreement, the Assignor releases, relinquishes, transfers and assigns all its rights to royalty under Section 38A(2) absolutely to the Producer in exchange for a lump sum royalty payment as mentioned under this Agreement in Clause 4 below.
4.Consideration: Assignor has requested and the producer has agreed, to keep Assignor protected from all commercial risk under this Assignment. Accordingly, the Producer shall, in consideration of the assignment of rights herein and services of Assignor under this Agreement pay to Assignor a consolidated sum of Rs.19,900/- (Rupees Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred only) inclusive of all taxes the receipt of which the Assignor hereby acknowledges.
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8. In the cease and desist notice issued by the plaintiff, it is stated that by virtue of being a singer in the music album, it is well within the ambit of a performer as described under Section 2(qq) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and it conferred with the exclusive performance right under Section 38-A of the Copyright Act, 1957. Consequently, he is entitled for royalties from the defendant for broadcasting his songs to various platforms.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, relying upon the proviso to Section 38-A(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, would submit that notwithstanding anything contained in this Sub-Section (2), the performer shall be entitled for royalties in case of making of the performances for commercial use. In this case, the defendant by uploading the songs of the plaintiff is exploiting it commercially.
More than 65,000 followers are there for the songs. Being a performer as defined under Section 2(qq) of the Copyright Act, 1957, the plaintiff is entitled to receive royalties.
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10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant submits that to specify the definition of Performer, the performance must be a live performance. The work of the plaintiff as a singer was not a live performance and therefore, he will not fall within the definition of Performer. Hence, the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 38-A of the Copyright Act, 1957 is not applicable.
Section 2(qq) of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines “Performer” as below:-
[2(qq) ”Performer” includes an actor, singer, musician, dancer, acrobat, juggler, conjurer, snake charmer, a person delivering a lecture or any other person who marks a performance:]
11. Section 2(q) of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines 'Performance' as below:-
[(q)”performance” in relation to performer's right, means any visual or acoustic presentation may live by one or more performers;] 11/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020
12. The Agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant recognises the plaintiff as a Performer and the work of the plaintiff as Performance. Also, Clause (1) in the Agreement provides definition of certain expression used in the agreement also provided. Wherein, Clause 1.6 defines '”Performances” as it shall mean the performances made by Assignor in pursuance of this Agreement.
Therefore, the plea of the defendant that the plaintiff is not a Performer and his work is not a Performances, therefore, he is not entitled for royalties, is absolutely contrary to the terms of the Agreement. The judgements, which are relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff are on a different context. In the instant case, there is a specific terms of agreement between the parties wherein the defendant has agreed to produce music album and the plaintiff agreed to compose and author the original music work.
13. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the defendant that, the performances of the plaintiff was not 'made live' and it was done in bits and piece inside the studio and therefore, it will not fall within the definition of 'Performances', is not only untenable but also contrary to their own admission in the agreement. Having recognises the plaintiff as a Performer and his work as a 12/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 performances, the defendant is estopped from denying his status as a Performer just to deny the plaintiff's right to get performance royalty under Section 38 which was inserted by Amendment in the year 1994.
14. Section 38 of the Copyright Act, 1957 inserted by way of amendment in the year 1994, came into effect on 10.05.1995. The Section confers certain special right to the Performer. This is independent of the copyright in the musical work.
Section 38 speaks about the special right of the Performer, which reads as below:-
38. Performer's right:-(1)Where any performer appears or engages in any performance, he shall have a special right to be known as the “performer's right” in relation to such performance.
(2)The performer's right shall subsist until [fifty years] from the beginning of the calendar year next following year in which the performance is made.
(3)[*****] (4)[*****] Since this special right under repeal Section 38(3) and 38(4) was not adequate, Sub Sections 38(3) and 38(4) was repealed and Sections 38-A and 38-B were inserted.
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15. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, relying upon the following passage in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey and others reported in [2012(50)PTC460(Del)], would emphasis that, the plaintiff is not entitled for any royalty under Section 38-A. The passages relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff is extracted as below:
27. Vide impugned order dated 28.07.2011 the learned Single Judge has concluded that once a license is obtained from the owner or someone authorized to give it, in respect of a sound recording, for communicating it to the public, including by broadcasting, a separate authorization or license is not necessary from the copyright owner or author of the musical and/or literary work. However, this does not mean that the musical and/or literary work can be otherwise “performed” in the public, (as opposed to communication of a sound recording to the public) without authorization. In coming to the said conclusion, the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge is as : - (i) in Eastern MPA's case (supra) it was categorically held by the Supreme Court that if the author of any musical work parts with a portion of his copyright, authorizing a film producer to make a cinematography film in respect of his work and have his work incorporated or recorded on the sound track of a cinematography film, the copyright owner of the film acquires 14/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 a copyright which gives him the exclusive right, inter alia, of performing the work in public i.e. to cause the film in so far as it consists of visual images to be seen in public and in so far it consists of the acoustic portion including a lyric or a musical work to be heard in public without securing any further permission from the author (composer) of the lyric or musical work for the performance of the work in public. Since sound recording copyright was carved out of pre-existing cinematographic film copyright in the year 1994 a similar treatment should be afforded to sound recording copyright as afforded to cinematographic film copyright; (ii) in view of considerable difference between Sections 16, 19 and 20 of UK Copyrights, Patents and Designs Act, 1988 and the provisions of Indian Copyright Act the ratio of the judgments of UK courts relied upon by IPRS cannot be applied in the present case; (iii) in view of the fact that sound recording copyright has been carved out of cinematographic film copyrights the acceptance of the arguments of IPRS would lead to 2 different kinds of copyrights. Whereas, the copyright proprietor of a film, who happens to own the sound recording can authorize the broadcast or communication to the public of the film, including the sound recording part, (as a composite work) without license from the author of the lyrics or the composer;
on the other hand if the copyright owner of a sound recording is different from the owner of the copyright in the film, a separate authorization from the lyricist or the composer would 15/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 be necessary. The acceptance of the arguments of IPRS would lead to a further anomaly, inasmuch as the sound recording in a film, the communication of which is authorized by the film copyright owner, would not require separate authorization from the author of the musical or literary work. Whereas in the case of an owner of the copyright in the sound recording, an identical authorization by the sound recording copyright owner (for communicating the sound recording to the public) would be insufficient, and two more authorizations, or licenses from the lyricist and/or the composer would be required. Thus, the acceptance of arguments of IPRS would lead to discrimination in regard to identical content of copyrights of two different “works” which undermines the purposes of the Act and is also illogical. Two different approaches to identically phrased rights, one carved out of a pre-existing right, would render the quality of the license obtained from the sound recording copyright owner inferior;
(iv) when a sound recording is communicated to the public-by whatever means, it is the whole “work” i.e. the lyrics, the score, the collocation of sounds caused by the equipment and the capturing of the entire aural experience which is communicated. The musical or literary work, which is the subject matter of the copyright under Section 14(a) of the Act, per se is not communicated or broadcast; nor is there a method of separating that element, while communicating the entire work, i.e. the sound recording, to the public. The recognition 16/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 afforded by the Parliament to the content of sound recording itself suggests that that the content of a sound recording is perceived in law, as different from that of a musical or literary work, though there may be a coalescence of the two, but not necessarily so, all the time. It is, therefore, unjustified to say that when a sound recording is communicated to the public by way of a broadcast the musical and literary work is also communicated to the public, through the sound recording.
30. In the year 1994 the Copyright Act, 1957 was amended to strengthen the copyright law in India. One of the significant changes made in the old Act was to extend protection to the performers by means of a special right, to be known as the ‘performer's right’, in respect of the making of sound recordings or visual recordings of their live performances, and of certain related acts. Another change made was to replace the term ‘record’ with ‘sound recording’ as the former term had become outdated through association with an obsolescent technology of sound reproduction. Vide Section 2(xx), ‘sound recording’ was defined, to mean a recording of sounds from which such sounds may be produced regardless of the medium on which such recording is the method by which the sounds are produced; obviously to include piano rolls and mechanical instruments from which jingles are produced. The amended Act recognizes three classes of work viz. (a) literary, dramatic, 17/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 musical or artistic work; (b) cinematographic film and (c) sound recording. Whereas musical and literary works are original works, sound recording is a derivative work. It is significant to note that Section 13(4) of the unamended Act was retained in the post amendment, with the only difference being that Section 13(4) of the amended Act provided that the copyright subsisting in a sound recording shall not prejudice the copyright subsisting in literary and musical work i.e. the only amendment incorporated in Section 13(4), on the subject was to replace the word ‘record’ with the words ‘sound recording’.
38. Section 14(a) of the Act authorizes the owner of copyright in literary and musical works to perform the work in public or communicate it to the public. On the other hand Section 14(e) of the Act authorizes the owner of copyright in sound recording only to communicate the work in public. This subtle distinction between the rights of owners of literary and musical works on one hand and sound recording on the other has to be seen in the backdrop of the definition of the expression ‘performance’ as defined under Section 2(q) of the Copyright Act, 1957 as it was originally enacted and definitions of various expressions under the amended Copyright Act viz. ‘broadcast’, ‘communication to the public’, ‘performance’ and ‘performer’ contained in Sections 2(dd), (ff), (q) and (qq) of the Act respectively. Section 2(q) in the 18/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 Copyright Act as originally enacted defined ‘performance’ to mean any mode of visual or acoustic presentation, including any such presentation by the exhibition of a cinematographic film, or by means of radio-diffusion, or by the use of a record, or by any other means and, in relation to a lecture, includes the delivery of such lecture. The expression ‘communication to the public’ was not defined when the Act was promulgated. The amendment in the year 1994, significantly changed the definition of the expression “performance”. The amended Section 2(q) defines “performance” to mean any visual or acoustic presentation made live by one or more speakers. Section 2(dd) defines the expression ‘communication to the public’ to mean : making any work available for being seen or heard or otherwise enjoyed by the public directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing copies of such work regardless of whether any member of the public actually sees, hears or otherwise enjoys the work so made available. The definitions of the words ‘broadcast’ and ‘performer’ were also introduced vide Sections 2(dd) and (qq) in the amended Act. A combined reading of the definition of the said expressions, when seen in the light of difference in the definition of the expression “performance” under the unamended and amended Acts, brings out that the Copyright Act draws a distinction when communication to the public is by way of live performance and when it is by way of diffusion. Thus, whereas the owner of copyright in literary and 19/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 musical works enjoys the right to communicate said works to the public by way of live performance the owner of copyright in sound recording does not enjoy similar right to communicate the sound recording to the public by way of live performance. A necessary corollary to the aforesaid is that the communication of a sound recording to the public by the owner of the recording in no way encroaches upon the right of the owner of the underlying literary and musical works to perform said underlying works in the public, as correctly held by the learned Single Judge and therefore, nothing turns upon the arguments predicated upon the definition of the expressions “performance” and “performer” advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing for IPRS.”
16.It is preposterous to canvass that, unless the performance is made live and the same is commercially exploited, the performer is not entitled for royalty. If the expression 'made live', defined the Performance under Section 2(q) of the Act, has to be understood in the manner in which the plaintiff's counsel submits, then their may not be any necessity for incorporating the other provision such as Sections 38, 38-A, 38-B and proviso to Section 2(qq), which are brought by way of amendment by Act 27 of 2012. Once the performance made live either at one breath or in bits or pieces may available for reproduction or circulation for the 20/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 public, the special right conferred to the performer accrues. Just because, the performance is recorded in a studio or in bits or pieces, the right of the performer cannot be taken away by mis-interpreting, the expression 'made live' employed while defining the performance.
17.As far as the claim of the plaintiff under Section 38-A proviso, it is to be tested, whether under the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff has assigned the said right also. For the said purpose, it is necessary to look at Clause 3.4 of the agreement, which reads, “the assignor releases, relinquishes, transfers and assigns all its rights to royalty under Section 38-A(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, absolutely to the producer in exchange for a lump sum royalty payment as mentioned under this Agreement in Clause 4.” Having relinquished and transferred his right to royalty under Section 38-A(2) specifically on receipt of the lump sum royalty, the plaintiff cannot seek for relief of royalty under this Section.
18.The case of the plaintiff is based on the assignment agreement. In the assignment agreement knowingly the plaintiff has relinquished his right of royalty upon his performance. No doubt, the Act confers some special rights on the 21/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ C.S.No.412 of 2020 and O.A.No.770 of 2020 performer which is exclusive and an independent of copyright over the work, notwithstanding the said special right, when consciously the said right is relinquished or assigned for a lump sum consideration, his entitlement for royalty gets waived. Therefore, Issue No.1 is answered as below:
The plaintiff as a singer is entitled to enforce the performer right under Section 38 of the Copyright Act, 1957. However, in the instant case, the right to enforce the performer's right is relinquished by the plaintiff in Clause 3.4 of the Assignment Agreement. Sections 38 and Section 38-A are the provisions, which confers special right exclusively upon the performer to claim royalty, when the performance is commercially used.
However, by contract, if the performer relinquishes the said right, on receiving a lump sum consideration, thereafter he cannot enforce the right conferred under the proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 38-A of the Copyright Act, 1957. Hence, Issue No.1 is answered in negative.
19. In view of holding Issue No.1 against the plaintiff, the other issues which are consequential, are also answered against the plaintiff.
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20. In the result, this Civil Suit is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Consequently, connected Application is also dismissed.
07.09.2021
Index : Yes
Speaking order/Non-Speaking order
ari
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and O.A.No.770 of 2020
DR.G.JAYACHANDRAN,J.
ari
delivery judgement made in
C.S.No.412 of 2020
and O.A.No.770 of 2020
07.09.2021
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