Karnataka High Court
Municipal Teachers Training ... vs The National Council For Teacher ... on 22 November, 2000
Equivalent citations: ILR2000KAR5004, 2001(1)KARLJ50, 2001 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 438, (2001) 1 KANT LJ 50
Author: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
Bench: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
ORDER
1. In this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 11th of April, 2000, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-H to the writ petition, and also the order dated 5th of September, 2000, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-K to the writ petition; and for a further direction to respondents 1 and 2 to continue the recognition earlier granted to the petitioner.
2. Before proceeding to deal with the facts of the case of the petitioner, it may be useful to refer to the provisions of the law governing the rights of the parties.
3. With a view to achieve planned and co-ordinated development of the teacher education system, the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), came to be passed and it came into force on 1st of July, 1995. Section 3 of the Act provides for establishment of a National Council for Teacher Education-first respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'the Council'). Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Council. As it can be seen from sub-section (4) of Section 3, the membership of the Council consists of various persons of high repute who possess sufficient experience and knowledge in the field of education or teaching. Section 12 of the Act provides for the functions of the Council. Among other things, Section 12 of the Act provides that it is the duty of the Council to take such steps as it may think fit for ensuring planned and co-ordinated development of teacher education and for the determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education in the country. It empowers the Council to lay down the academic standards in teacher's training and periodical review of the same. Section 13 of the Act confers power on the Council to cause inspection of an Institution which imparts teacher's training for the purpose of ascertaining whether such recognised Institution is functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Act and also to communicate to the Institution the result of its inspection and its recommendations to the Institution to comply with the deficiencies found at the time of inspection. Section 14 of the Act mandates that every Institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education on or after the appointed day, should make an application to the Regional Committee concerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations, seeking recognition. It is useful to extract Section 14 of the Act as the said section has bearing on the question that would arise for consideration in these petitions. It reads as hereunder:
"14. (1) Every institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education on or after the appointed day, may, for grant of recognition under this Act, make an application to the Regional Committee concerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations:
Provided that an institution offering a course or training in teacher education immediately before the appointed day, shall be entitled to continue such course or training for a period of six months, if it has made an application for recognition within the said period and until the disposal of the application by the Regional Committee.
(2) The fee to be paid along with the application under sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of an application by the Regional Committee from any institution under sub-section (1), and after obtaining from the institution concerned such other particulars as it may consider necessary, it shall-
(a) if it is satisfied that such institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such other conditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a course or training in teacher education, as may be determined by regulations, pass an order granting recognition to such institution, subject to such conditions as may be determined by regulations; or
(b) if it is of the opinion that such institution does not fulfil the requirements laid down in sub-clause (a), pass an order refusing recognition to such institution for reasons to be recorded in writing:
Provided that before passing an order under sub-clause (b), the Regional Committee shall provide a reasonable opportunity to the concerned institution for making a written representation.
(4) Every order granting or refusing recognition to an institution for a course or training education under sub-section (3) shall be published in the Official Gazette and communicated in writing for appropriate action to such institution and to the concerned examining body, the local authority or the State Government and the Central Government.
(5) Every institution, in respect of which recognition has been refused shall discontinue the course or training in teacher education from the end of the academic session next following the date of receipt of the order refusing recognition passed under clause (b) of sub-section (3).
(6) Every examining body shall, on receipt of the order under sub-section (4).-
(a) grant affiliation to the institution, where recognition has been granted; or
(b) cancel the affiliation of the institution, where recognition has been refused".
Section 17 of the Act confers power on the Regional Committee to with-draw the recognition granted to an Institution in the event of the Regional Committee being satisfied that a recognised Institution has contravened the provisions of the Act, Rules, Regulations or order made or issued thereunder. Section 18 of the Act provides for an appeal to the Council against the order made under Section 14, Section 15 or Section 17 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Regional Committees by the Council. Section 32 of the Act confers power on the Council to make regulations generally to carry out the provisions of the Act. In exercise of the power conferred on the Council under Section 32 read with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, the Council has framed regulations known as "The National Council for Teacher Education Application for recognition the manner for submission determination of conditions for recognition of institutions and permission to start new course or training) Regulations, 1995" (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations"). Regulation 3 of the Regulations provides that every institution offering a course or training in teacher education immediately before the 17th August, 1995 should make an application for recognition under the Act to the Regional Committee in the form given in Appendix I to the Regulations. Regulation 8 of the Regulations provides for the condition for grant of recognition. The said regulation reads as follows:
"8. Condition for recognition.-(a) Regional Committee shall satisfy itself on the basis of scrutiny and verification of facts as contained in the application for recognition and for recognition of the institution where considered necessary of any other manner deemed fit, that the institutions has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and such other conditions required for the proper functioning of the institution for the course or training in teacher education which is being offered or intending to offer.
(b) Regional Committee shall ensure that every institution applying for recognition fulfil the conditions given in Appendix III".
4. Now, let me advert to the minimum facts that may be required for disposal of this petition.
5. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner-Institution was established in a rural area for the purpose of imparting education for the rural masses and for their overall advancement in the year 1972 and that was being continued since then; and consequent upon the establishment of the Council, the petitioner having made an application for recognition in terms of Section 14 of the Act to the second respondent-Regional Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee"), the Committee, by means of its order dated 30th of July, 1996, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-B, had accorded recognition for a period of two years to the petitioner subject to the condition that the petitioner should provide suitable building with required infrastructural facilities exclusively for teacher education. In the said order, the petitioner was further notified to ensure that all future developmental activities and appointment of teaching staff should be according to the norms laid down by the Council. By means of notice dated 1st of May, 1998, the Director of the Committee had called for explanation of the petitioner for not providing the necessary accommodation and also not providing equipment for library as prescribed by the norms laid down by the Council. Pursuant to the said notice issued, the petitioner sent its explanation dated 20th of May, 1998, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-D. The said explanation was also followed by another representation dated 17th of June, 1998, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-E, explaining the progress made by the petitioner in the construction of buildings and providing other infrastructural facilities and also for the delay in not constructing the buildings immediately. Therefore, the Committee, by means of its order dated 15th of July, 1998, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-F, accorded provisional recognition to the petitioner for one year i.e., 1998-99 subject to the condition that the petitioner should take up the construction of the building and complete the same expeditiously in terms of the norms laid down by the Council. Thereafter, by means of order dated 11th of June, 1999, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-G, the Committee granted recognition for one more year i.e., for the year 1999-2000 subject to the condition that the petitioner setting right the deficiencies pointed out in the said order within a period of six months. The deficiencies pointed out read as hereunder:
"1. The teacher pupil ratio of 1:12 is not maintained. Hence required number of teaching staff should be appointed so as to ensure that the teacher pupil ratio of 1:12 is maintained as per NCTE norms.
2. The building under construction should be taken up on top priority and completed expeditiously".
However, by means of order dated 11th of April, 2000, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-H, the Committee refused to grant recognition sought for by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not maintained the norms laid down by the Council as set out in the said order.
6. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner had filed an appeal to the Council, as provided under Section 18 of the Act. The Council, by means of its order dated 5th of September, 2000, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-K, rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner.
7. Statement of objections has been filed on behalf of the Council and the Committee supporting their action.
8. I have heard Sri H. Subrahmanya Jois, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in this petition, and also Sri Lobo, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 32228 of 2000, which is heard along with this petition where identical question as raised in this petition, is raised. The learned Counsel, in support of their prayer that the orders impugned in both the writ petitions are liable to be quashed, made three submissions. Firstly, they submitted that since it is not in dispute that the petitioners had complied with the deficiencies pointed out in the notices issued and also in the order passed by the Committee during the pendency of the appeal, the Council has seriously erred in law in refusing to set aside the order passed by the Committee solely on the ground that on the date of the consideration of the application filed by the petitioners for recognition, the petitioners had not fully complied with the deficiencies pointed out in the show-cause notices issued to them by the Committee. They pointed out that the power of the Council as an Appellate Authority being co-extensive with that of the Committee, it was obligatory on the part of the Council to have taken into account the subsequent compliance of the deficiencies pointed out by the Committee and allowed the appeal and directed grant of recognition to each of the petitioner-Institutions. They pointed out that the Council, in a mechanical manner, arbitrarily and in disregard of its appellate jurisdiction, rejected the appeals. Secondly, they submitted that since the petitioners are existing Institutions on the date of the coming into force of the Act, the Committee as well as the Council ought to have held that the petitioners are entitled for a reasonable time to comply with the deficiencies pointed out in the show-cause notices issued. They pointed out that the Committee ought to have taken into account the explanation submitted by each one of the petitioners for not complying with the deficiencies pointed out by the Committee, within the time specified and the explanation given by each of the petitioners being a reasonable and just explanation, the said explanation ought to have been accepted and recognition should have been granted at least for the academic year 2000-2001. They pointed out that the explanation furnished by each one of the petitioners and the materials placed by them, would clearly show that each of the petitioners had taken effective measures to comply with the instructions given by the Committee and to maintain the academic standards as laid down by the Council. Finally, they submitted that the entire scheme of the Act and the object of the legislation should have been kept in mind by the Committee as well as the Council while passing the impugned orders. According to them, the object of the legislation insofar as the existing Institutions are concerned, was to give them an opportunity to update the compliance of the norms laid down by the Council and to maintain academic standards in the Institution. Therefore, they submitted that Council as an Appellate Authority, even if it takes the view that the compliance of deficiencies subsequent to the order made by the Committee, was not a ground to interfere with the order passed by the Committee, ought to have considered the question as to whether there was any justification for each of the petitioners not to comply with the deficiencies pointed out in the orders passed by the Committee within the time prescribed. They pointed out that this aspect of the matter having been completely over-looked by the Council, on this ground alone, the impugned orders passed by the Council are liable to be quashed. In support of their submission, they relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Panna Lal v State of Bombay and Others; Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others v Niranjan Modak; and Al-Karim Educational Trust and Another v State of Bihar and Others; and the decisions of this Court in the cases of Narayanappa Divakarappa v Gopala Rao Srinivasa Bhat; and Rangaswamy v Thimmakka and Others .
9. However, Sri D.V. Shylendra Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2, strongly supported the orders impugned. He pointed out that since the petitioners, on the date of passing of the order impugned in each of the petitions by the Committee, had not complied with the deficiencies pointed out in the show-cause notices issued to them, the Committee cannot be found fault with in passing orders impugned; and in that view of the matter, the Council was fully justified in affirming the said orders without taking into account that the petitioners had complied with the deficiencies pointed out subsequent to the orders passed by the Committee. In other words, it is his submission that the Council, which is the Appellate Authority, was not required to take into account the subsequent compliance made by the petitioners after the order passed by the Committee refusing to grant recognition. It is his further submission that since it is open to the petitioners to file fresh applications and seek for recognition, it is not permissible for this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the orders impugned. He submitted that the Council and the Committee being creatures of the Act, have an obligation to maintain the academic standards in the Institution and in discharge of their statutory functions, if they have passed the impugned orders keeping in mind the maintenance of the academic standard in the Institution; this Court should not sit in over the decisions of the Authorities as an Appellate Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and nullify the orders. He further submitted that even if the orders impugned, for any reason, are to be quashed and the matters are required to be remitted either to the Committee or to the Appellate Authority, the petitioners should be either directed to file an undertaking that they will not make any admission till fresh recognition is given or a direction should be given to them not to admit any student. He pointed out that if such an order is not made, large number of students who may be admitted by the petitioner-Institution are likely to be put to irreparable injury and un-told hardship in the event of the recognition being refused to the petitioners by the Committee; and therefore it is desirable that this Court should protect the interest of the innocent students while disposing of the writ petitions. Sri Shylendra Kumar, in support of his submissions, relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Additional Secretary to the Government of India v Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia; Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa v State of Karnataka; St. John's Teacher Training Institute (for Women), Madurai v State of Tamil Nadu and Others; and Union of India v Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Limited and that of this Court in the case of Dr. B.V. Panduranga v State of Karnataka and Others .
10. Sri K. Vishwanath, learned Additional Government Advocate, also strongly supported the submission of Sri Shylendra Kumar that if the petitioner-Institutions are not prevented from admitting the students pending grant of recognition, the innocent students will be put to irreparable injury and hardship.
11. Now, let me examine the correctness of the submissions made by the learned Counsels appearing for both the parties.
12. As it can be seen from order Annexure-K passed by the Council, the Council has confirmed the order Annexure-H passed by the Commit-tee refusing to grant the recognition only on the ground that the compliance of the deficiencies by the petitioner subsequent to the order Annexure-H passed by the Committee cannot be taken into account. There-fore, the question that would arise for consideration is whether such a reasoning adopted by the Council as an Appellate Authority is valid and legal in law? Further, even if the said reasoning is held to be valid, whether the Council was not required to consider the explanation given by the petitioner pursuant to the show-cause notice issued to it for the delay in complying with the deficiencies pointed out and in the light of the explanation given, whether the Council was not required to direct the Committee to continue the recognition for a further period? In the case of Narayanappa, supra, this Court, after discussing the law at length, has taken the view that the Revisional Court can take into account the subsequent events. It is useful to refer to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment which read as follows:
"6. The only point therefore that arises for my consideration in this revision petition is:
'Whether this Court is competent to take into consideration the subsequent event viz., that the period of lease has run out and the tenant continues as a statutory tenant from 1-9-1977?'
7. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner invited my attention to a decision in the case of Ranvijaya Shahi v Bala Prasad Motani, wherein a Division Bench of the High Court has, after reviewing several decisions on this point has come to the conclusion that the Court is bound to take subsequent event viz., that the lease has run out by efflux of time, into consideration. Paras 18 and 18-A of the judgment deal with this aspect. No possible defence could be raised against the admitted fact that the lease runs out by efflux of the time on 1-9-1977. That is what has happened in the case cited above. It is observed at para 18 in the Patna case thus:
The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent has drawn our attention to some decisions on the point. In the case of Gajadhar v Khas Mahatdih Colliery Company , an imperfect title had been perfected during the pendency of the suit, and it was taken into consideration. The learned Judge has followed an earlier decision in the case of Ram Narain Das v Governor General in Council. The Supreme Court took notice of a probate granted subsequent to the filing of the suit and acted on that basis in the case of Surinder Kumar v Gian Chand . In case of Laxi and Company v Dr. A.R. Deshpande, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have indicated the circumstances in which a Court can take notice of subsequent events. In the case of Tata Iron and Steel Company v Abdul Khan, a Bench decision of this Court it was held that even subsequent rights or new cause of action can be taken into consideration at the time of final adjudication provided that there should be no valid defence. Reliance was placed therein on some of the decisions which have been mentioned earlier. This was a case very near to the facts of the present case, almost on all fours. It was a case of termination of lease with a renewal clause. The learned Judges found that the opinion for renewal had not been exercised and there was thus no possible defence to ejectment on the ground of the termination of the lease by efflux of time. We respectfully agree with the principle of law laid down therein'.
That being so, I have no hesitation to hold that this Court can certainly take into consideration the subsequent event that the lease in the present case has expired by efflux of time on 1-9-1977 and that the tenant continues as a statutory tenant in order to effectively adjudicate the proceedings between the parties and to do substantial justice between them".
13. In the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that the Appellate Court is bound to take into account the change of law. At paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"9. That a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will govern the rights of the parties was laid down by this Court in Ram Sarup v Munshi , which was follows by this Court in Mula v Godhu. We may point out that in Dayawati v Inderjit, at page 1426, this Court observed.-
'if the new law speaks in language, which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance'.
Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Amarjit Kaur v Pritam Singh, where effect was given to a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal, relying on the proposition formulated as long ago as Kristnama Ckariar v Mangammal, by Bhashyam Iyengar, J., that the hearing of an appeal was under the processual law of this country, in the nature of a re-hearing of the suit. In Amarjit Kaur, supra, this Court referred also to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, in which the Federal Court had laid down that once a decree passed by a Court had been appealed against the matter became sub-judice again and thereafter the Appellate Court acquired seisin of the whole case, except that for certain purposes, for example, execution, the decree was regarded as final and the Court below retained jurisdiction".
Therefore, in my view, when Supreme Court has laid down that sub-sequent change of law can be taken into account, the subsequent event though it falls in the realm of facts, is required to be taken into account by the Appellate Authority when the matter in controversy is as to whether an educational Institution like the petitioner, has complied with the deficiencies pointed out, or not.
14. It is also relevant to refer to the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Al-Karim Educational Trust, supra, wherein, at paragraph 11, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has pointed out that while considering the claim of an educational Institution for grant of recognition, it is impractical to insist for a foolproof or absolute adherence to all requirements without regard to the importance or relevance for the purpose of imparting education in a practical way. The said observation reads as hereunder:
"11. In the matter of grant of affiliation, it is ordinarily for the State Government after consulting the Medical Council of India to arrive at a decision. However, if it is found that the affiliation is being withheld unreasonably or the decision is being prolonged for one reason or the other, this Court would, though reluctantly, be constrained to exercise jurisdiction. We must make it clear that we are not diluting the importance of fulfilling the essential prerequisite set by the Medical Council before granting recognition. The fact of this case are very special and exceptional. In the present ease, we take note of the following aspects:
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(g) The appellants claim to be a minority institution and the difficulties/or even the imponderables to start a new institution cannot be gainsaid. To insist on fulfilling all requirements at a stretch in modern conditions is not a practical proposition and ordinarily, only those aspects or requirements, which in the minimal will give a good start for effectively imparting education, with ancillary requisites may be considered sufficient in the extraordinary circumstances of this case.
(h) It is impractical to insist, for a foolproof or absolute adherence to all requirements without regard to their importance or relevance, for the purpose of imparting education, in a practical way, especially because the Institution has begun to function, students admitted to the Institution have taken the examination and the fate of a good many number of students should not hang in the balance in an unending or everlasting manner.
(i) In the final analysis, the question to be posed is whether there exists the minimal and satisfactory requirements to keep the matter going and not whether better arrangements that will render the set-up more efficient and more satisfactory, should be insisted as "a wooden" rule.
(j) It may be that there are some minor deficiencies here and there which call for rectification. Time can certainly set right such matters. What is required is a total, practical, overall view in the light of the latest tabular statement filed along with the affidavit dated 4-9-1995. Material placed before the Court goes to show that there has been 'substantial' though not literal compliance with the deficiencies pointed out in the latest report dated 28-6-1995.
(k) Lapse of time and the turn of events call for urgent action and any delay on that score will entail untold hardship to the students and the Institution".
In the instant case, as noticed by me earlier, the petitioner- Institution has been in existence ever since the year 1972. The Committee, even after coming into force of the Act, has granted recognition from time to time till the year 1999-2000. Further, it is also not disputed by respondents 1 and 2 in the statement of objections filed by them that the petitioner has complied with the deficiencies pointed out in order Annexure-H during the pendency of the appeal. The statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 only proceeds to point out the deficiencies that were existing on the date of the order Annexure-H passed by the Committee. It is useful to refer to paragraph 17 of the statement of objections, which reads as follows:
"The Institution preferred an appeal to NCTE, New Delhi which confirmed the order of SRC-NCTE vide its order dated 5-9-2000, on the ground that the deficiencies were existing at the time of refusal of recognition by SRC and improvements which are reported to have been made are subsequent to the issue of the order by the SRC. It is accordingly submitted that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed".
From the said statement made by respondents 1 and 2, it is clear that the Council and the Committee do not dispute the assertion made by the petitioner that the petitioner has complied with the deficiencies pointed out in the order Annexure-H. When the fact situation of the case is such as pointed out above, in my view, there was no justification for the Council not to examine the claim of the petitioner on merits and pass appropriate orders. I am unable to accept the submission of Sri Shylendra Kumar that since it is open to the petitioner to file fresh application in a matter like this, this Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with the impugned order. It is necessary to point out that the Council and the Committee are conferred with the powers under the Act with a view to maintain academic standards in educational Institutions imparting Teachers Training Course. The Committee is conferred with the power of granting recognition on examination of the question whether the requirements of the norms laid down have been complied with or not, to ensure that the academic standards are maintained in the Institutions and to compel the Institutions for compliance of the norms laid down by such Institutions. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, it is an existing Institution. It is necessary to point out that the proviso given to sub-section (1) to Section 14 of the Act allows the existing Institution on the date of coming into force of the Act to function as existing Institutions till the application filed seeking recognition under the Act is disposed of by the Committee. This indicates that in the case of existing Institutions there being without a further order of recognition granted by the Committee, such existing Institutions are entitled to impart Teachers Training Course until the disposal of the applications filed by them. The proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 14 must be considered as an exception made to the general rule that no Institution imparting Teachers Training Course can start imparting training programme or admit students without there being an order of recognition granted to such an Institution. Therefore, merely because the law permits the petitioner to make fresh application, in my view, is not a ground for this Court to refuse to interfere with the order impugned. The power of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 is required to be exercised to compel the statutory Authorities to carry out their statutory obligations; and if, in the course of discharge of their duties, they commit infraction of law, and orders passed by them suffer from errors which require to be corrected by this Court, in my view, it is the plain duty of this Court to correct such errors in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. While considering the question in a given case, no doubt, this Court has to keep in mind the justice of the case, the conduct of the parties, the magnitude or the nature of the error committed in the orders which are called in question before this Court, the nature of the alternate remedy and the serious consequences that would have on the rights of the parties. Therefore, I am of the view that order Annexure-H is liable to be quashed on the short ground that the Council has seriously erred in law in not considering the subsequent fact that the petitioner has complied with the deficiencies pointed out.
15. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since admittedly the recognition was being extended from time to time by the Committee and the petitioner had given a representation with regard to the deficiencies pointed out in the notice, the Council should have examined in the light of the representation given by the petitioner for non-compliance of the deficiencies pointed out by the Committee within the time prescribed, whether on merits, the petitioner deserves recognition for one more year, especially taking into account that the petitioner has spent nearly Rs. 65 lakhs for the construction of the building and 90 per cent of the construction work has already been carried out. It is necessary to point out that in a matter like this, the approach of the authorities insofar as the Institution existing as on the date of the coming into force of the Act are concerned, should be to see that norms laid down are complied with and the Institutions are not closed down unless the deficiencies pointed out are of very serious in nature. No doubt, an Institution must have its own building. But, if an Institution like the petitioner has been imparting Teachers Training Course ever since the year 1972 in a building not of its own and even after the coming into force of the Act, the recognition is being continued upto 1999-2000 and when it is the case of the petitioner that 90 per cent of the construction work of the building is over and in the absence of material on record to show that the existing building in which the training programme carried out by the petitioner seriously impairs the academic standards, I do not find any justification for the authorities not to give some more time to the petitioner to complete the construction of the building. Therefore, in my view, order Annexure-K is also liable to be quashed on the ground that the Council has failed to consider the cause shown by the petitioner in its representation for not complying with the deficiencies pointed out in the show-cause notice issued. The Council being an Appellate Authority, is required to consider every aspect of the matter. In the memorandum of appeal filed, the petitioner has set out in detail the circumstances under which the deficiencies pointed out could not be complied with. Non-consideration of the explanation given by the petitioner both in the representation given and in the memorandum of appeal filed, in my view, vitiates the order Annexure-H passed by the Council. In my view, the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Al-Karim Educational Trust, supra, extracted in paragraph 14 of this order, would be apposite. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the facts of this case indicate that the petitioner has, as a matter of fact, constructed the building and made the building available for the Institution immediately after the passing of the order. Further, one H.K. Ananthasubba Rao, Superintendent of the petitioner-Institution has filed an affidavit to the effect that all the deficiencies pointed out by the Committee have been complied with. The relevant portion of the said affidavit reads as follows:
"2. In reiteration of the contents of Annexures-D and E, dated 20-5-1998 and 17-6-1998 respectively, as also the contents of paragraphs 4 and 10 of the memorandum of writ petition and also the contents of Annexure-J, the memorandum of appeal filed by the petitioner before the 1st respondent-Council, I hereby state that all the deficiencies that the 2nd respondent had pointed out have been duly cured and rectified, providing the required infrastructural facilities, as well. Hence, there remains no deficiency for justifying refusal of the permanent recognition sought by the petitioner".
Therefore, in a matter like this, I am of the view that if this petition is to be rejected accepting the contention of Sri Shylendra Kumar that merely because the petitioner has subsequently complied with the deficiencies pointed out, is not a ground for this Court to interfere with the impugned orders, it would result in great injustice not only to the petitioner-Institution, but also to large sections of candidates who are intending to pursue Teachers Training Course in a rural area where the Institution like the petitioner is located. The petitioner is not one of the Institutions which has come into existence recently and, therefore, the criticism that some of the Institutions have come up recently with the commercial motive, in my view, cannot be lightly made against the petitioner-Institution. It is necessary to point out that education, whether it is Teachers Training or in some other area of learning, has not yet reached the large sections of the society. While there cannot be any compromise or two views that academic excellence should be maintained, the Authorities, who are in charge of maintaining academic standard, must have a fair, reasonable, just and balanced approach. While the erring Institutions must be dealt with seriously, the Institutions which try to improve the quality of education and make a serious attempt to comply with the norms or the additional norms laid down, should not be allowed to be closed down on the sole ground that the deficiencies which are not of serious consequence affecting academic curriculum in the Institutions, are not complied with. Therefore, in the light of the discussion made above, the order Annexure-K is liable to be quashed.
16. In the light of the conclusion reached above, I am of the view that it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners.
17. Now, the other question that would arise for consideration is whether, in the light of the conclusion reached by me that the order passed by the Council impugned in this petition is liable to be quashed, the matter is required to be remitted to the Council or the Committee for consideration? In my considered view, it would be in the interest of justice to remit the matter for fresh consideration to the Committee as the Committee is in a better position to appreciate the case set out by the petitioner in this petition that if it has complied with the deficiencies pointed out, and pass appropriate orders on examination of the materials, if necessary after inspecting the petitioner-Institution. If this course is adopted, no injustice or prejudice is caused to either of the parties, Further, in the light of the said conclusion, I also find it inappropriate for me to direct the Committee to grant recognition as prayed for in the petition. Ultimately, it is for the Committee to be satisfied on examination of the compliance report given by the petitioner-Institution whether the petitioner-Institution has complied with the norms laid down.
18. In the light of the submission of Sri Shylendra Kumar that a direction should be issued to the petitioner not to admit any student till an order is passed by the Committee granting recognition, the question that would arise for consideration is whether such direction is required to be given by this Court while remitting the matter for fresh consideration to the Committee? In my view, there would not be any justification for me to pass an order restraining the petitioner from making any admission, pending passing of fresh orders either granting or refusing recognition to the petitioner-Institution. The quashing of the impugned orders, in my view, would have the effect of reviving the application filed by the petitioner seeking recognition. I am unable to accept the submission of Sri Shylendra Kumar that since different orders have been passed on various dates during the periods between 1996-97 and 1997-98, the proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act cannot be made applicable to the case of the petitioner. It is necessary to point out that the order Annexure-H made by the Committee refers to the application made by the petitioner for recognition on 9th of February, 1996. Therefore, it is clear that the application filed by the petitioner came to he disposed of by virtue of the order Annexure-H passed by the Committee. In the earlier orders passed by the Committee, the Committee had granted recognition for limited periods, pending final consideration of the application filed by the petitioner. Therefore, final adjudication of the rights of the parties came to be made only by virtue of the order impugned in this petition. In my view, once the orders impugned are quashed and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration, the applications filed by the petitioner must be held to be pending consideration. In that event, in view of the proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, the petitioner being the Institution existing on the date of coming into force of the Act, is entitled to continue Teachers Training Course till fresh decision is taken by the Committee. I am unable to accede to the submission of Sri Shylendra Kumar that if an order is not made directing the petitioner not to make any admission till a fresh decision is taken by the Committee, it would amount to this Court granting recognition to the petitioner-Institution. While remitting the matter for fresh consideration to the Committee, I have rejected the prayer of the petitioner for grant of recognition. However, in my considered view, insofar as the existing Institutions are concerned, in view of the proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, they are entitled to continue such Course or training period until the disposal of their applications by the Committee. In view of the proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 14, if I am to restrain the petitioner from making any admission as prayed for by Sri Shylendra Kumar, it would amount to impairing the rights guaranteed to the petitioner under the proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. I find that it is inappropriate for me to adopt such a course having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Admittedly, the petitioner-Institution was established in the year 1972 and since then, it has been imparting training programme. The Committee has granted recognition from time to time till the year 1999-2000. It is the case of the petitioner that all the deficiencies pointed out have been complied with by the petitioner immediately after the passing of the order by the Committee refusing recognition. As observed by me earlier, there is no serious dispute on this aspect of the matter. In my view, the power conferred on any authority or by this Court must be used to achieve the object of the law and sub-serve the cause of justice. It should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of oppression or to impair the rights of the citizens of this country. While there cannot be any doubt that the Act has been passed to maintain the academic standard in Teacher Training Institutions throughout the country and the Council as well as the Committee are endowed with heavy responsibilities to carry out the objects of the law, by that only it is not fair and reasonable to jump to the conclusion that all the existing Institutions on the date of the coming into force of the Act should be closed down even if such Institution; assert that they have updated the deficiencies pointed out at the stage of the consideration of the appeals filed by them or there has been substantial compliance of the deficiencies pointed out at the stage of considering their applications for recognition by the Committee. An attitude which is fair and reasonable, is required to be taken by the statutory authorities while considering the claims of the parties in a matter like this. Since the petitioner are entitled by virtue of the proviso given to Section 14(1) of the Act to continue the Teachers Training Course till the disposal of the applications, it cannot be equated to a situation where students are admitted by an Institution which has not obtained recognition at any time. In my view, by virtue of the proviso given to Section 14(1) of the Act, the petitioner is deemed to hold the statutory recognition till a fresh decision is taken by the Committee disposing of the application filed by it. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents that in the event of the petitioner being allowed to admit the students till a fresh decision is taken by the Committee, the students would run the risk of being admitted to an Institution which is not recognised. Further, in my view, as observed by me earlier, no serious prejudice or hardship will be caused if the status quo ante as on the date of the passing of the order by the Committee rejecting the claim of the petitioner for recognition is maintained. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kihota Hollohon v Zachilhu and Others while considering the approach to be made by the Court for the purpose of making interlocutory orders. At paragraph 51 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:
"51.. . . The purpose of interlocutory orders is to preserve in status quo the rights of the parties, so that, the proceedings do not become infructuous by any unilateral overt acts by one side or the other during its pendency. One of the contention urged was as to the invalidity of the amendment for non-compliance with the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution. It has now been unanimously held that paragraph 7 attracted the proviso to Article 368(2). The interlocutory orders in this case were necessarily justified so that, no landslide changes were allowed to occur rendering the proceedings ineffective and infructuous".
19. In the light of the discussion made above, while there cannot be any quarrel with regard to the proposition that the academic standard is required to be maintained in Teachers Training Institutions and it is not permissible for this Court to grant interim orders permitting the Institutions which are not recognised to admit the students for study of Teachers Training Course or permit such students to appear for the examination, I am of the view that none of the decisions relied upon by Sri Shylendra Kumar is of any assistance to him to decide the question that has arisen for consideration in this petition.
20. In the case of Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia, supra, the question that had arisen for consideration was whether the detenu or any one on his behalf was entitled to challenge the detention order without detenu submitting or surrendering to it and when the said order is under challenge, whether the Court can make an interim order. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 12 of the judgment, refers to the circumstances under which the High Court can interfere with the orders under challenge in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my view, the principle laid down in the said decision cannot be of any assistance to the respondents to contend that the orders impugned do not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
21. In the case of Dr. B.V. Panduranga, supra, the question that had arisen for consideration was whether an ineligible candidate, who had not completed the prescribed three years training period, could be permitted to appear for the examination on the dismissal of the writ petition since, during the pendency of the writ petition, by virtue of the interim order, he was permitted to appear for some examination and, therefore, he can claim equity in his favour. This Court, in the said case, said that in respect of an ineligible candidate though he was permitted to appear for the examination by virtue of the interim order granted by the Court, no equity will be created in his favour and, therefore, he cannot be permitted to appear for the final examination.
22. In the case of Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa, supra, the question that came up for consideration was as to whether extra 15 students, who were given admission in excess of the quota permitted for admission, were entitled to seek for a direction before the Court to the authorities to permit them to take up the examination. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while referring to its earlier decisions in the cases of State of Punjab and Others v Renuka Singla and Others, and State of Maharashtra v Vikas Sahebrao Roundale and Others , has affirmed the view taken by the High Court that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot direct the authorities to regularise the admission of the students who were admitted in excess of the intake permitted.
23. In the case of St. John's Teacher Training Institute, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the contention of the Institution that since the Institution was the minority Institution, the Rules and Regulations framed by the authorities to maintain academic standards should not be made applicable to the minority Institutions, made certain observations at paragraphs 18 and 21 of the judgment strongly relied upon by Sri Shylendra Kumar. The main question that has arisen for consideration in this petition is with regard to the correctness of the orders passed by respondents 1 and 2. Since the matter is being finally disposed of, the question of considering the prayer of the petitioner for grant of interim order has not arisen for consideration in this petition. Therefore, the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision is of no assistance to the learned Counsel for the respondents.
24. The reliance placed by Sri Shylendra Kumar on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Limited, supra, in my view, is of no assistance to him. It is not the case of the petitioner that a direction is required to be issued to the respondents to disobey the law. The discussion made by me above would clearly indicate that no order is being made to the authorities to disobey the order. I have only considered the correctness of the orders impugned in this petition. Therefore, I am unable to appreciate as to how the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 10 of the judgment is of any assistance to the learned Counsel for the respondents.
25. In the light of the discussion made above, I make the following:
ORDER
(i) Order Annexure-H, dated 11th of April, 2000 passed by the second respondent-Regional Committee and order Annexure-K, dated 5th of September, 2000 passed by the first respondent-Council are hereby quashed.
(ii) The matter is remitted for fresh consideration to the second respondent-Regional Committee and the Regional Committee shall reconsider the matter afresh in the light of the observations made in the course of this order and in accordance with law and take appropriate decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
26. In terms stated above, this petition is allowed and disposed of. Rule is issued and made absolute.
27. Sri K. Vishwanath, learned Additional Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks from today.